The Grand Alliance (47 page)

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This sudden collapse destroyed the main hope of the Greeks. It was another example of “One at a time.” We had done our utmost to procure concerted action, but through no fault of ours we had failed. A grim prospect now gaped upon us all.

At the moment of the German advance into Greece the 1st British Armoured Brigade was forward on the river Vardar.

The New Zealand Division lay on the river Aliakhmon. On their left were the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions. The leading troops of the 6th Australian Division were also arriving. By April 8 it was clear that Yugoslav resistance in the south was breaking down and that the left flank of the Aliakhmon position would shortly be threatened. To meet this an Australian brigade group, later joined by the 1st Armoured Brigade, was posted to block the approach from Monastir. The enemy advance was delayed by demolitions and some effective bombing by the Royal Air Force, but on April 10 the attack on our flank guard began. It was arrested during two days of stiff fighting in severe weather.

Farther west there was only one Greek cavalry division keeping touch with the forces in Albania, and General Wilson decided that his hard-pressed left flank must be pulled back on Kozani and Gravena. This move was completed on April 13, but in the process the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions began to disintegrate, and could no longer play an effective part. Hence-forward our Expeditionary Force was alone. By April 14 the New Zealand Division had also withdrawn to guard the important mountain pass north of Mount Olympus. One of its brigades was covering the main road to Larissa. The enemy made strong attacks, which were held. But Wilson, still menaced upon his left flank, decided to withdraw to Thermopylae. He put this to The Grand Alliance

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Papagos, who approved, and who himself at this stage suggested British evacuation from Greece.

Prime

Minister

to

3 April 41

General

Wilson,

Athens

I am glad to see the movement of 20th Greek and
Cavalry Division to close the gap between the Greek
western army and your army. It is glaringly obvious that
a German advance southward through this gap will not
only turn your Aliakhmon position, but far more decisively round up the whole of the Greek Army in Albania. It is
impossible for me to understand why the Greek
western army does not make sure of its retreat into
Greece. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff states
that these points have been put vainly time after time.

All good wishes to you in this memorable hour.

I am also glad to hear that King is not leaving
Greece at present. He has a great opportunity of
leaving a name in history. If, however, he or any part of
the Greek Army is forced to leave Greece every facility
will be afforded them in Cyprus, and we will do our best
to carry them there. The garrisoning of Crete by a
strong Greek force would also be highly beneficial,
observing that Crete can be fed by sea.

The next few days were decisive. Wavell telegraphed on the sixteenth that General Wilson had had a conversation with Papagos, who described the Greek Army as being severely pressed and getting into administrative difficulties owing to air action. He agreed to a withdrawal to the Thermopylae position. The first moves were already made.

Papagos also repeated his suggestion that we should re-embark the British troops and spare Greece from devastation. Wilson considered that this course should commence with the occupation of the new position and that evacuation should be arranged forthwith. Wavell’s instructions to Wilson were to continue the fighting in co-The Grand Alliance

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operation with the Greeks so long as they were able to resist, but authorised any further withdrawal judged necessary. Orders had been given for all ships on the way to Greece to be turned back, for no more ships to be loaded, and for those already loading or loaded to be emptied. He presumed that a formal request to this effect from the Greek Government should be obtained before our actual re-embarkation. He assumed Crete would be held.

To this grave but not unexpected news I replied at once.

Prime

Minister

to

17 April 41

General Wavell

We have no news from you of what has happened
on Imperial front in Greece.

2. We cannot remain in Greece against wish of
Greek Commander-in-Chief, and thus expose country
to devastation. Wilson or Palairet should obtain endorsement by Greek Government of Papagos’s
request. Consequent upon this assent, evacuation
should proceed, without, however, prejudicing any
withdrawal to Thermopylae position in co-operation with
the Greek Army. You will naturally try to save as much
material as possible.

3. Crete must be held in force, and you should
provide for this in the redistribution of your forces. It is
important that strong elements of Greek Army should
establish themselves in Crete, together with King and
Government. We shall aid and maintain defence of
Crete to the utmost.

On the seventeenth General Wilson motored from Thebes to the palace at Tatoi, and there met the King, General Papagos, and our Ambassador. It was accepted that withdrawal to the Thermopylae line had been the only possible plan. General Wilson was confident that he could hold that line for a while. The main discussion was the

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method and order of evacuation. The Greek Government would not leave for at least another week.

The Greek Prime Minister, M. Korysis, has already been mentioned. He had been chosen to fill the gap when Metaxas died. He had no claim to public office except a blameless private life and clear, resolute convictions. He could not survive the ruin, as it seemed, of his country or bear longer his own responsibilities: Like M. Teleki in Hungary, he resolved to pay the forfeit of his life. On the eighteenth he committed suicide. His memory should be respected.

It was necessary in this convulsive scene to try to assign proportions and priorities as far as possible. Air Marshal Long-more appealed for guidance in the use of his overstrained air power. I therefore sent a directive to the Chiefs of Staff, which they endorsed and telegraphed textually to the Middle East commanders.

Chiefs of Staff to

18 April 41

Commanders-in-

Chief

Following directive has been issued by the P.M. and
Minister of Defence:

It is not possible to lay down precise sequence and
priority between interests none of which can be wholly
ignored, but the following may be a guide. The extrication of New Zealand, Australian, and British troops from
Greece affects the whole Empire.

2. It ought to be possible to arrange shipping in and
out of Tobruk cither before or after the evacuation
crisis, observing that Tobruk has two months’ supplies.

3. You must divide between protecting evacuation
and sustaining battle in Libya. But if these clash, which

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may not be avoidable, emphasis must be given to
victory in Libya.

4. Don’t worry about Iraq for the present. It looks to
be going smoothly.

5. Crete will at first only be a receptacle of whatever
can get there from Greece. Its fuller defence must be
organised later. In the meanwhile all forces there must
protect themselves from air bombing by dispersion and
use their bayonets against parachutists or airborne
intruders if any.

6. Subject to the above general remarks, victory in
Libya counts first, evacuation of troops from Greece
second. Tobruk shipping, unless indispensable to
victory, must be fitted in as convenient. Iraq can be
ignored and Crete be worked up later.

The retreat to Thermopylae was a difficult manoeuvre, since, while the enemy was kept at bay in the Tempe Gorge, the Olympus Pass, and at other points, our whole force had to pass through the bottleneck of Larissa. Wilson expected the most dangerous threat on his western flank, and placed a brigade group at Kalabaka to deal with it. But the crisis came on the east, at the Tempe Gorge and the Olympus Pass. The pass was sternly defended for the necessary three days by the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The Tempe Gorge was even more critical, as it was for the Germans the shortest approach to Larissa. It was defended at first only by the 21st New Zealand battalion, later reinforced by an Australian brigade. This was held for the three days needed for all our troops to pass through the Larissa bottleneck.

Until April 13 bad weather had prevented the full use of the enemy’s tenfold superiority in the air, but on the fifteenth a heavy dawn attack on the airfield near Larissa destroyed The Grand Alliance

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many of our remaining aircraft. The rest were ordered back to Athens, there being no intermediate landing grounds.

The weather was again bad on the sixteenth and seventeenth, but then it cleared, and the German Air Force came out in strength and harassed continually the stream of troops making for Thermopylae. They were not unresisted, for in a raid near Athens twenty-two of the enemy machines were brought down for a loss of five Hurricanes.

These stubborn and skilful rear-guard actions checked the impetuous German advance at all points, inflicting severe losses. By April 20 the occupation of the Thermopylae position was complete. Frontally it was strong, but with the need to guard the coast road, to watch for possible intrusion from Euboea, and above all to prevent a move on Delphi, our forces were strained. But the Germans made slow progress and the position was never severely tested. On this same day the Greek armies on the Albania front surrendered.

I did not, however, give up hope of a final stand at Thermopylae. The intervening ages fell away. Why not one more undying feat of arms?

Prime

Minister

to

20 April 41

Foreign Secretary

I am increasingly of the opinion that if the generals
on the spot think they can hold on in the Thermopylae
position for a fort-night or three weeks, and can keep
the Greek Army fighting, or enough of it, we should
certainly support them, if the Dominions will agree. I do
not believe the difficulty of evacuation will increase if
the enemy suffers heavy losses. On the other hand,
every day the German Air Force is detained in Greece
enables the Libyan situation to be stabilised, and may
enable us to bring in the extra tanks [to Tobruk]. If this
is accomplished safely and the Tobruk position holds,