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wallis should not, how ever, entangle himself by explanations.

When accordingly Rashid Ali was informed by our Ambassador that more transports would reach Basra on the thirtieth, he said that he could not give permission for any fresh landings until the troops already at Basra had passed through the port. General Auchinleck was told that the landings should go forward none the less, and Rashid Ali, who had been counting on the assistance of German aircraft, and even of German airborne troops, was forced into action.

His first hostile move was towards Habbaniya, our air force training base in the Iraqi Desert. On April 29, 230 British women and children had been flown to Habbaniya from Baghdad. The total number in the cantonment was just over 2200 fighting men, with no fewer than 9000 civilians.

The Flying School thus became a point of grave importance. Air Vice-Marshal Smart, who commanded there, took bold and timely precautions to meet the mounting crisis. The Flying School had previously held only obsolescent or training types, but a few Gladiator fighters had arrived from Egypt, and eighty-two aircraft of all sorts were improvised into four squadrons. A British battalion, flown from India, had arrived on the twenty-ninth. The ground defence of the seven miles perimeter, with its solitary wire fence, was indeed scanty. On the thirtieth Iraqi troops from Baghdad appeared barely a mile away on the plateau overlooking both the airfield and the camp. They were soon reinforced from Baghdad, until they numbered about nine thousand men, with fifty guns. The next two days were spent in fruitless parleys, and at dawn on May 2

fighting began.

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From the outset of this new danger General Wavell showed himself most reluctant to assume more burdens. He said he would make preparations and do what he could to create the impression of a large force being prepared for action from Palestine, which might have some effect on the Iraqi Government. The force he could make available would in his opinion be both inadequate and too late. It would be at least a week before it could start. Its departure would leave Palestine most dangerously weak, and incitement to rebellion there was already taking place. “I have consistently warned you,” he said, “that no assistance could be given to Iraq from Palestine in present circumstances, and have always advised that a commitment in Iraq should be avoided…. My forces are stretched to the limit everywhere, and I simply cannot afford to risk part of them on what cannot produce any effect.”

In Syria resources were equally strained. The Commanders-in-Chief Middle East had said that the maximum force that could be spared for Syria until the Australians were re-equipped was one mechanised cavalry brigade, one regiment of artillery, and one infantry battalion,
subject to no
Iraq commitment.
This force could not be expected to deal with the number of troops which the Germans would be able to send to Syria, and should not be sent unless the Vichy French were actively resisting. If it was decided to send troops into Syria it would certainly be better to send British in the first instance and not Free French, whose intervention would be bitterly resented.

On May 4 we sent General Wavell our decisions about Iraq:
A commitment in Iraq was inevitable. We had to
establish a base at Basra, and control that port to
safeguard Persian oil in case of need.

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The line of communication to Turkey through Iraq
has also assumed greater importance owing to German
air superiority in the Aegean Sea…. Had we sent no
forces to Basra the present situation at Habbaniya
might still have arisen under Axis direction, and we
should also have had to face an opposed landing at
Basra later on instead of being able to secure a bridgehead there without opposition…. There can be no
question of accepting the Turkish offer of mediation.

We can make no concessions. The security of Egypt
remains paramount. But it is essential to do all in our
power to save Habbaniya and to control the pipeline to
the Mediterranean.

General Auchinleck continued to offer reinforcements up to five infantry brigades and ancillary troops by June 10 if shipping could be provided. We were gratified by his forward mood. General Wavell only obeyed under protest.

“Your message,” he said on the fifth, “takes little account of realities. You must face facts.” He doubted whether the forces he himself was gathering were strong enough to relieve Habbaniya, or whether Habbaniya could hold out till they might arrive on the twelfth. “I feel it my duty to warn you in the gravest possible terms,” he said, “that I consider the prolongation of fighting in Iraq will seriously endanger the defence of Palestine and Egypt. The political repercussions, will be incalculable, and may result in what I have spent nearly two years trying to avoid, namely, serious internal trouble in our bases. I, therefore, urge again most strongly that a settlement should be negotiated as early as possible.”

I was not content with this.

Prime

Minister

to

6 May 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

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The telegrams from Generals Wavell and Auchinleck
should be considered forthwith, and a report made to
me at the House of Commons before luncheon today.

The following points require attention: (1) Why
should the force mentioned, which seems considerable,
be deemed insufficient to deal with the Iraq Army?

What do you say about this? Fancy having kept the
cavalry division in Palestine all this time without having
the rudiments of a mobile column organised! (2) Why
should the troops at Habbaniya give in before May 12?

Their losses have been nominal as so far reported.

Their infantry made a successful sortie last night, and
we are told that the bombardment stops whenever our
aircraft appear. Great efforts should be made by the air
force to aid and encourage Habbaniya. Surely some
additional infantry can be flown there as reinforcements
from Egypt? The most strenuous orders should be
given to the officer commanding to hold out.

How can a settlement be negotiated, as General
Wavell suggests? Suppose the Iraqis, under German
instigation, insist upon our evacuating Basra, or moving
in small detachments at their mercy across the country
to Palestine. The opinion of the senior naval officer at
Basra is that a collapse or surrender there would be
disastrous. This is also the opinion of the Government
of India. I am deeply disturbed at General Wavell’s
attitude. He seems to have been taken as much by
surprise on his eastern as he was on his western flank,
and in spite of the enormous number of men at his
disposal, and the great convoys reaching him, he
seems to be hard up for battalions and companies. He
gives me the impression of being tired out.

The proposals of C.-in-C. India for reinforcing Basra
seem to deserve most favourable consideration.

Supported by the Chiefs of Staff, I brought all this to an issue before the Defence Committee when it met at noon.

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There was a resolute temper. The following orders were sent at their direction:

Chiefs

of

Staff

to

6 May 41

General Wavell and

others concerned

Your telegram of yesterday has been considered by
Defence Committee. Settlement by negotiation cannot
be entertained except on the basis of a climb down by
Iraqis, with safeguard against future Axis designs on
Iraq. Realities of the situation are that Rashid AH has
all along been hand-in-glove with Axis Powers, and was
merely waiting until they could support him before
exposing his hand. Our arrival at Basra forced him to
go off at half-cock before the Axis was ready. Thus
there is an excellent chance of restoring the situation by
bold action, if it is not delayed.

Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, advised Defence
Committee that they are prepared to accept responsibility for dispatch of the force specified in your telegram at
the earliest possible moment. Defence Committee
direct that Air Vice-Marshal Smart should be informed
that he will be given assistance, and that in the meanwhile it is his duty to defend Habbaniya to the last.

Subject to the security of Egypt being maintained,
maximum air support possible should be given operations in Iraq.

Meanwhile at Habbaniya the squadrons of the Flying School, together with Wellington bombers from Shaiba, at the head of the Persian Gulf, attacked the Iraqi troops on the plateau. They replied by shelling the cantonment, their aircraft joining in with bombs and machine guns. Over forty of our men were killed or wounded that day, and twenty-two aircraft destroyed or disabled. Despite the difficulty of taking off under close artillery fire, our airmen continued their

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attacks. No enemy infantry assault developed, and gradually their batteries were mastered. It was found that the enemy gunners would not stand to their pieces under air attack or even if our aircraft were to be seen overhead.