The Grand Alliance (49 page)

… My thoughts [he said] in regard to the Eastern Mediterranean are: You have done not only heroic but very useful work in Greece, and the territorial loss is more than compensated for by the necessity for an enormous German concentration and resulting enormous German losses in men and material.

Having sent all men and equipment to Greece you could possibly spare, you have fought a wholly justified delaying action, and will continue to do so in other parts of the Eastern Mediterranean, including North Africa and the Near East. Furthermore, if additional withdrawals become necessary, they will all be a part of the plan which at this stage of the war shortens British lines, greatly extends the Axis lines, and compels the enemy to expend great quantities of men and equipment. I am satisfied that both here and in Britain public opinion is growing to realise that even if you have to withdraw farther in the Eastern Mediterranean, you will not allow any great
débâcle
or surrender, and that in the last analysis the naval control of the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean will in time win the war.

My reply may be thought less responsive than this generous message deserved. I felt myself held in such harsh duress by events, and was also so conscious of the The Grand Alliance

299

sentiment alive in the United States, that I sought to make claims on the future.

Former Naval Person

4 May 41

to President Roosevelt

Your friendly message assures me that no
temporary reverses, however heavy, can shake your
resolution to support us until we gain the final victory….

We must not be too sure that the consequences of
the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would not be
grave. It would seriously increase the hazards of the
Atlantic and the Pacific, and could hardly fail to prolong
the war, with all the suffering and military dangers that
this would entail. We shall fight on whatever happens,
but please remember that the attitude of Spain, Vichy,
Turkey, and Japan may be finally determined by the
outcome of the struggle in this theatre of war. I cannot
take the view that the loss of Egypt and the Middle East
would be a mere preliminary to the successful maintenance of a prolonged oceanic war. If all Europe, the
greater part of Asia and Africa, became, either by
conquest or agreement under duress, a part of the Axis
system, a war maintained by the British Isles, United
States, Canada, and Australasia against this mighty
agglomeration would be a hard, long, and bleak proposition. Therefore, if you cannot take more advanced
positions now, or very soon, the vast balances may be
tilted heavily to our disadvantage. Mr. President, I am
sure that you will not misunderstand me if I speak to
you exactly what is in my mind. The one decisive
counterweight I can see to balance the growing pessimism in Turkey, the Near East, and in Spain would be
if United States were immediately to range herself with
us as a belligerent Power. If this were possible I have
little doubt that we could hold the situation in the
Mediterranean until the weight of your munitions gained
the day.

We are determined to fight to the last inch and
ounce for Egypt, including its outposts of Tobruk and
Crete. Very considerable risks are being run by us for
that, and personally I think we shall win, in spite of the

The Grand Alliance

300

physical difficulties of reinforcing by tanks and air. But I
adjure you, Mr. President, not to underrate the gravity
of the consequences which may follow from a Middle-Eastern collapse. In this war every post is a winning-post, and how many more are we going to lose?

With regard to Vichy, we are more than willing that
you should take the lead, and work out how to get the
best from them by threats or favours. You alone can
forestall the Germans in Morocco.
3
If they are once
installed, it will not be necessary for them to go overland; they will soon get airborne troops to Dakar.

I shall await with deep anxiety the new broadcast
which you contemplate. It may be the supreme turning-point.

Let me thank you for the splendid help in shipping
and tankers which we owe to your action, and for all
your generous and bold assistance to us and to the
common cause.

In my broadcast the night before I had tried not only to express the feelings of the English-speaking world, but to state the dominant facts which ruled our fate.

While we naturally view with sorrow and anxiety much that is happening in Europe and in Africa, and may happen in Asia, we must not lose our sense of proportion and thus become discouraged or alarmed. When we face with a steady eye the difficulties which lie before us, we may derive new confidence from remembering those we have already overcome. Nothing that is happening now is comparable in gravity with the dangers through which we passed last year. Nothing that can happen in the East is comparable with what is happening in the West.

The Grand Alliance

301

Last time I spoke to you I quoted the lines of Longfellow which President Roosevelt had written out for me in his hand. I have some other lines which are less well known but which seem apt and appropriate to our fortunes tonight, and I believe they will be so judged wherever the English language is spoken or the flag of freedom flies:
For while the tired waves, vainly breaking,
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent, flooding in, the main.

And not by eastern windows only,
When daylight comes, comes in the light;
In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly!

But westward, look, the land is bright.

The Grand Alliance

302

13

Tripoli and “Tiger”

From Desert Sand to Salt Water — Admiral
Cunningham’s Anxieties — Our Need to Strike at
Tripoli — The Hard Alternative to Bombardment —

Drastic Proposal by the First Sea Lord — Admiral
Cunningham’s Reply — A Successful and Bloodless Operation, April
21 —
Admiral Cunningham’s
Strong View — Credit for All — My Explanations
to Admiral Cunningham — The American Aid —

Disquieting News from Wavell — My Minute of
April
21 —
The Defence Committee Agree to
Send Three Hundred Tanks Through the Mediterranean — A Severe Comment on Tobruk, April
22

—
Reinforcements for Rommel
—
Operation

“Tiger” Arrives — A Brilliant Success — Tanks for
Crete — My Wish to Repeat Operation “Tiger” —

Wavell Does Not Press.

D
ISASTER on our Desert flank had produced the consequences in Africa which have been described. It also meant the failure to take Rhodes which impaired our communications with Greece. It severely injured that already hazardous enterprise, though this would have foundered by itself. We must now add to the tale of what happened in the desert sand the simultaneous events upon salt water. Anyone can see how great was the strain which the Greek expedition had put upon our Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. But this was only one of the demands

The Grand Alliance

303

made upon them at this chaotic time. As early as April 10, Admiral Cunningham felt himself seriously affected by the sudden leap forward of Rommel’s triumphant armoured forces.

If [he warned us] the Germans can get sufficient forces across in the next month, they will probably gain control up to Mersa Matruh at least, and if they do this, it will be questionable if Alexandria will be usable for the Fleet against attack by fighter-escorted aircraft. The German prospects of achieving this are good unless Tripoli is destroyed. I do not think it feasible to do this by bombardment. It is not only a question of the risk to the battle fleet, but of lasting effects being sufficient to make it justifiable. I feel continuous air attack is solution…. I consider, therefore, that it is essential that long-range bombers should be flown out immediately to Egypt for this work and that nothing should stand in way of this. It may well be a matter of days, and the results will decide whether we are going to be able to hold the Eastern Mediterranean.

I would again emphasise the time factor, which is vital.

There could, alas, be no question of building up in Egypt within a few weeks a long-range bomber force capable of having any appreciable effect on Tripoli. Bombardment from the sea, besides being far more effective and economical in effort, was the only practical measure within our power, and I felt that the Fleet might perhaps make a vital contribution to the defence of Egypt in this way, notwithstanding the heavy strain it was then bearing in the Greek campaign.

The Grand Alliance

304

The need to strike at Tripoli led to vehement discussion between the Admiralty and Admiral Cunningham, in which the First Sea Lord, strong in the consciousness of the American aid accorded by the President, confronted the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean with a hard alternative to risking his fleet by a bombardment in a most dangerous area. The incident is unusual in our naval records.

Admiralty

to

15 April 41

Commander-in-

Chief, Mediterranean

It is evident that drastic measures are necessary to
stabilise the position in the Middle East. After thorough
investigation it is considered that air action alone
against Tripoli will not sufficiently interrupt the flow of
reinforcements which are entering Libya chiefly through
that port.

It is essential, therefore, to do something at Tripoli
which may interrupt their communications drastically
and for a considerable time. We are of opinion that
heavy and consistent mining of the harbour and approaches would have a considerable effect, but we
cannot wait until this is proved. It is essential, therefore,
to take other measures at the earliest moment.

There are two alternatives: (a) bombardment of the
harbour, (b) attempting to block it.

Their Lordships are in agreement with you that the
result of bombardment is uncertain and could not be
expected drastically to reduce the rate of reinforcement
even temporarily. It has been decided, therefore, that
an attempt must be made to carry out a combined
blocking and bombardment, the latter being carried out
by the blocking ships at point-blank range as they
approach the harbour.