The Grand Alliance (17 page)

And to General Smuts:

21 Feb. 41

I share your misgivings that Russian attitude has
undermined Turks, and it may be that they will do no
more than maintain an honest neutrality. Whole Greek
position must be considered now by our envoys at
Cairo. Will keep you informed.

On the same day Mr. Eden sent another telegram from Cairo:

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As regards the general prospects of a Greek campaign, it is, of course, a gamble to send forces to the
mainland of Europe to fight Germans at this time. No
one can give a guarantee of success, but when we
discussed this matter in London we were prepared to
run the risk of failure, thinking it better to suffer with the
Greeks than to make no attempt to help them. That is
the conviction we all hold here. Moreover, though
campaign is a daring venture, we are not without hope
that it might succeed to the extent of halting the Germans before they overrun all Greece.

It has to be remembered that the stakes are big. If
we fail to help the Greeks there is no hope of action by
Yugoslavia, and the future of Turkey may easily be
compromised. Though, therefore, none of us can
guarantee that we may not have to play trump cards,
we believe that this attempt to help Greece should be
made. It is, of course, quite possible that when we see
the Greeks tomorrow they may not wish us to come.

We have discussed the question of command. Dill,
Wavell, and I are all agreed that we must select a figure
who will command respect with the Greeks and
exercise authority over the Greek officers with whom he
will have to work. It is also necessary to choose a first-class tactical soldier. We have, therefore, decided that
the command should be given to Wilson, who will be
replaced in the military governorship of Cyrenaica by
Neame, at present commanding in Palestine…. Wilson
has a very high reputation here among the general
public, as well as among the soldiers, and his appointment to lead the forces in Greece will be a guarantee to
the Greeks that we are giving of our best.

On February 22, Mr. Eden, with General Wavell, Sir John Dill, and other officers, flew to Athens, to confer with the Greek King and Government. When Mr. Eden arrived in the evening for the first contacts with the Greeks he was taken The Grand Alliance

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to the Royal Palace at Tatoi. The King at once asked him if he would receive his Prime Minister alone. He explained to the King his reluctance to do this, because he wished the discussions to be on an entirely military basis. If we were to send assistance to Greece it should be because of military reasons, and he did not want political considerations to play an undue part. However, the King persevered in his request, and he consented. At the meeting the Prime Minister, M. Korysis, read him a statement setting forth the outcome of the Greek Cabinet discussions in the past day or two.

As this statement forms the basis of our action, I set it forth in full.

Mr. Eden to Prime

22 Feb. 41

Minister

Following is summary of written declaration given to
me by President of the Council at outset of our meeting
today:

“I desire to repeat most categorically that Greece, as
a faithful ally, is determined to go on fighting with all her
forces until final victory. This determination is not limited
to the case of Italy, but will apply to any German
aggression.

“2. Greece has only three divisions in Macedonia on
the Bulgarian frontier. Consequently, a purely military
problem arises of what reinforcements should be sent
to enable the Greek army to resist the German. While
more or less accurate information is available about
German forces in Rumania and about forces mobilised
in Bulgaria, the Greek Government, for their part, so far
only know what British help might be given to them
within a period of a month’s time. Moreover, they do not
know what are the intentions of Turkey and Yugoslavia.

In these circumstances, Your Excellency’s arrival in the
Middle East is of the greatest help, not only for the
purpose of clarifying the situation, but also of turning it
to the common advantage of Great Britain and Greece.

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“3. I desire to repeat once again that, whatever the
outcome and whether Greece has or has not any hope
of repulsing the enemy in Macedonia, she will defend
her national territory, even if she can only count on her
own forces.”

The Greek Government wished us to understand that their decision had been taken before they knew whether we could give them any help or not. The King had wished Mr.

Eden to know this
before
the military conversations opened, and this was the basis upon which they took place.

After military conferences and staff meetings held all night and the next day, Mr. Eden sent us the following most important telegram, dated the twenty-fourth:
Foreign Secretary to

24 Feb. 41

Prime Minister

Agreement was reached today [23d] with the Greek
Government on all points.

When at the end of discussions I asked whether the
Greek Government would welcome the arrival in
Greece of British troops in numbers and on conditions
we proposed, President of Council stated formally that
the Greek Government accepted our offer with
gratitude and approved all detailed arrangements
reached between the two General Staffs.

2. On arrival here this afternoon we met with the
King of Greece, the President of Council and General
Papagos. I gave an account of the international
situation as we see it and dealt in detail with German
designs upon the Balkans. I then explained that the
conclusion had been reached by Ministers and Chiefs
of Staff in London, with which Commanders-in-Chief
here are in full agreement, that we should give maximum help to Greece at the earliest possible moment.

We then gave details of the forces which we should be
able to make available for Greece, explaining that this
was all we could do at the moment. What we should be
able to do in future depended on the development of
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the general war situation and the state of our
resources. All I could say was that the troops we
offered were well equipped and well trained and we
were confident that they would acquit themselves well.

3. The President of Council, after reaffirming the
determination of Greece to defend herself against
Germany, reiterated the misgivings of the Greek
Government lest insufficient British help should merely
precipitate German attack, and stated that it was
essential to determine whether available Greek forces
and forces which we could provide would suffice to
constitute efficacious resistance to the Germans, taking
into account the doubtful attitude of Turkey and Yugoslavia. Before the Greek Government committed
themselves, the President of the Council, therefore,
wished the military experts to consider the situation in
the light of the British offer. I made plain the logical
conclusion of the attitude taken up by the President of
Council. If we were to delay action for fear of provoking
the Germans, such action must inevitably be too late.

4. From the ensuing discussion between General
Dill, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, and the Air
Officer Commanding on the one hand, and General
Papagos on the other hand, it emerged that in view of
the doubtful attitude of Yugoslavia the only line that
could be held and would give time for withdrawal of
troops from Albania would be a line west of the Vadar,
Olympus-Veria-Edessa-Kajmakcalan. If we could be
sure of Yugoslav moves it should be possible to hold a
line farther north from the mouth of the Nestos to Beles,
covering Salonika. It would be impracticable, unless
Yugoslavia came in, to hold a line covering Salonika in
view of exposure of Greek left flank to German attack.

He then described the detailed arrangements which had been agreed:

The discussions lasted some ten hours, and covered the main points of political and military cooperation…. We were all impressed by frankness and fair dealing of Greek representatives on all subjects discussed. I am quite sure that it is their determination

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to resist to the utmost of their strength, and that His Majesty’s Government have no alternative but to back them whatever the ultimate consequences. While recognizing the risks, we must accept them.

In a further message he said:

We are all convinced that we have chosen the right course and as the eleventh hour has already struck felt sure that you would not wish us to delay for detailed reference home.

The risks are great, but there is a chance of success. We are accepting difficulties which will make a heavy demand upon our resources, more particularly of fighter aircraft….

On these messages, which carried with them the assent of both Dill and Wavell, it was decided in the Cabinet to give full approval to the proposals.

Prime Minister to Mr.

24 Feb. 41

Eden, Cairo

The Chiefs of Staff having endorsed action on lines
proposed in your telegrams from Cairo and from
Athens, I brought whole question before War Cabinet
this evening, Mr. Menzies being present. Decision was
unanimous in the sense you desire, but of course Mr.

Menzies must telegraph home. Presume, also, you
have settled with New Zealand Government about their
troops. No need anticipate difficulties in either quarter.

Therefore, while being under no illusions, we all send
you the order, “Full steam ahead.”

So far we had not taken any steps which went beyond gathering the largest possible strategic reserve in the Delta and making plans and shipping preparations to transport an army to Greece. If the situation changed through a reversal The Grand Alliance

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of Greek policy or any other event, we should be in the best position to deal with it. It was agreeable, after being so hard pressed, to be able to wind up satisfactorily the campaigns in Abyssinia, Somaliland, and Eritrea and bring substantial forces into our “mass of manoeuvre” in Egypt. While neither the intentions of the enemy nor the reactions of friends and neutrals could be divined or forecast, we seemed to have various important options open. The future remained inscrutable, but not a division had yet been launched, and meanwhile not a day was being lost in preparation.