The Grand Alliance (102 page)

The Indian Air Force would come into action in the
same areas.

I never ceased to do my utmost to increase and stimulate the production of bombers, which lagged far behind even the most moderate claims of their partisans.

Prime

Minister

to

7 Sept. 41

Lord President of the

Council

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I have been deeply concerned at the slow expansion
of the production of heavy and medium bombers. In
order to achieve a first-line strength of four thousand
medium and heavy bombers, the Royal Air Force
require twenty-two thousand to be made between July,
1941, and July, 1943, of which 5500 may be expected
to reach us from American production. The latest
forecasts show that of the remaining 16,500 only
11,000 will be got from our own factories. If we are to
win the war, we cannot accept this position, and, after
discussion with the Minister of Aircraft Production and
Sir Charles Craven, I have given directions for a plan to
be prepared for the expansion of our effort to produce a
total of 14,500 in the period instead of 11,000. This can
only be done by a great concentration of effort and by
making inroads on our other requirements. Materials
and machine tools should not present an insuperable
difficulty, and there will be enough pilots to fly the
aircraft. The crux of the matter will be the provision of
sufficient skilled labour to set up the machines and to
train great numbers of fresh men and women. This
skilled labour can only be found at the expense of other
projects.

I have asked the Minister of Aircraft Production to
draw up a plan for this new programme and to state the
demands he must make for its fulfilment. I have also
asked him to make suggestions as to how these
demands could be met. I have asked the Secretary of
State for Air to adjust his programme for the expansion
of the Royal Air Force to fit the new production programme. This will give some easement in the preparation of airfields, the manufacture and filling of bombs,
etc., since the full first-line strength will be achieved
rather later than is at present planned.

I wish you to take the plan which the Minister of
Aircraft Production will produce, to convene such
Ministers as may be concerned, and to prepare for my
consideration proposals for implementing the plan. It
will be necessary to show what the effect on our other
activities will be. It may be necessary to slow up the
Admiralty programme or to reduce the flow of
equipment for the Army. Above all, it will certainly be

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necessary drastically to curtail the building of the great
number of new factories, which are now in the early
stages of construction, or which are about to be started,
and which absorb so much labour, not only in their
erection but in the fabrication of the materials they
require. You should call for a return of all such factories
showing the object for which they arc intended, the
date when they were started and the state of their
progress, and the year and month in which they are
likely to come into operation. Other long-term projects
must give way to the overriding need for more bomber
aircraft.

I regard this subject as a major factor in the war at
the present time, and I should like to receive your
preliminary proposals in a fortnight. Thereafter you
must watch over the progress of the scheme, and I will
hold periodic conferences to stimulate action.

At the same time I was forced to cool down the claims which some of our most trusted officers, especially Air Marshal Harris, the head of Bomber Command, put forward in their natural ardour. Coastal Command was particularly hard hit by the cuts which we were forced to make in its expected scale of expansion. My task at this time was to fight on all the administrative fronts at once, and amid conflicting needs to advise the Cabinet upon the right solution.

Prime Minister to C.A.

7 Oct. 41

S.

We all hope that the air offensive against Germany
will realise the expectations of the Air Staff. Everything
is being done to create the bombing force desired on
the largest possible scale, and there is no intention of
changing this policy. I deprecate however placing
unbounded confidence in this means of attack, and still
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more expressing that confidence in terms of arithmetic.

It is the most potent method of impairing the enemy’s
morale we can use at the present time. If the United
States enters the war, it would have to be supplemented in 1943 by simultaneous attacks by armoured forces
in many of the conquered countries which were ripe for
revolt. Only in this way could a decision certainly be
achieved. Even if all the towns of Germany were
rendered largely uninhabitable, it does not follow that
the military control would be weakened or even that war
industry could not be carried on.

2. The Air Staff would make a mistake to put their
claim too high. Before the war we were greatly misled
by the pictures they painted of the destruction that
would be wrought by air raids. This is illustrated by the
fact that two hundred and fifty thousand beds were
actually provided for air-raid casualties, never more
than six thousand being required. This picture of air
destruction was so exaggerated that it depressed the
statesmen responsible for the pre-war policy, and
played a definite part in the desertion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1938. Again, the Air Staff, after the war
had begun, taught us sedulously to believe that if the
enemy acquired the Low Countries, to say nothing of
France, our position would be impossible owing to the
air attacks. However, by not paying too much attention
to such ideas we have found quite a good means of
keeping going.

3. It may well be that German morale will crack, and
that our bombing will play a very important part in
bringing the result, about. But all things are always on
the move simultaneously, and it is quite possible that
the Nazi warmaking power in 1943 will be so widely
spread throughout Europe as to be to a large extent
independent of the actual buildings in the homeland.

4. A different picture would be presented if the
enemy’s Air Force were so far reduced as to enable
heavy accurate daylight bombing of factories to take
place. This however cannot be done outside the radius
of fighter protection, according to what I am at present
told. One has to do the best one can, but he is an
unwise man who thinks there is any certain method of

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winning this war, or indeed any other war between
equals in strength. The only plan is to persevere.

I shall be delighted to discuss these general topics
with you whenever you will.

I now arrived at general conclusions about the strength and character of the Army at which we should aim for 1942, as well as upon the man-power measures necessary to sustain it. I obtained the agreement of the authorities concerned to the following programme and consequential measures which were enforced.

ARMY STRENGTH

Directive by the Minister of Defence
9 Oct.41

We have now in the United Kingdom (including
Northern Ireland) twenty-six standard motorised infantry
divisions and the Polish Division, total twenty-seven,
well equipped with guns and transport, with an average
strength of about 15,500 men, with ten corps organisations and corps troops (61,000). There are eight county
divisions for work on the beaches, averaging about
10,000, without artillery other than coast artillery and
with little transport. We have five armoured divisions
and four Army tank brigades; the whole comprising
fourteen armoured brigades (with five divisional elements), four brigade groups with artillery and transport,
seven infantry brigades, and twelve un-brigaded
battalions; furthermore, eight aerodrome defence
battalions and the 100,000 men in the Home Defence
and Young Soldiers battalions.

2. It is proposed to transform this organisation into
twenty-seven standardised divisions (hereinafter to be
called Field Divisions), plus the Polish Division (which
will have an armoured element), total twenty-eight; and
to increase the armoured forces to seven armoured
divisions with eight Army tank brigades, the whole
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comprising twenty-two armoured brigades (with seven
divisional elements). The four brigade groups are to
remain. Instead of the eight county divisions and other
units mentioned above, there will be thirteen brigades,
plus the equivalent of two Ally brigades, and eight

“detached battalions”; the foregoing constituting the
Home Field Army, which can thus be reckoned the
equivalent of forty-five divisions. In addition, there will
still be the eight aerodrome battalions and the Home
Defence and Young Soldiers battalions.

3. The object of these changes is to increase the
war-power of the Army, particularly in armoured troops,
and to provide additional field, anti-tank, and flak
artillery, including that required for five additional Indian
divisions, to be formed during 1942. For this last
purpose also it will be necessary to provide up to
seventeen British battalions for the Indian Army.

4. No reduction in the force mentioned in paragraph
2 is compatible with our war needs. To maintain it
during the next nine months, i.e., to July 1, 1942, and
also to maintain the drafts for the Army of the Middle
East, for India, and for our garrisons in Iceland, Gibraltar, Malta, and Hong Kong, etc., with a normal wastage
of 50,000 a quarter, there must be provided an intake
to the Army of 278,000 men. Measures are being taken
to provide this. The Army also requires at least 142,000

more women above the 63,000 already recruited.

I then set forth in detail our forces at home and abroad. The conclusion shows the strength of our military resources and deployment before the supreme events which brought the United States into the war. The directive continues:
10. If we estimate our Army in divisions or their
equivalent, the general layout for 1942 is as follows: