The Grand Alliance (19 page)

The Grand Alliance

118

26 Nov. 40

I understand we are to receive from you a full
account of the reasons now alleged to prevent the
operation against Kismayu before May, and that you
will make a strenuous effort not to succumb to these
reasons. If it should be decided that nothing can be
done till May, the West African brigade must go with the
first set of empty transports to the West Coast, relieving
the battalion now at Freetown.

The proposal to keep the brigade and not to fight is
most depressing.

As a result of Wavell’s conference on December 2, it was decided to attack the Italians in Kassala and to stimulate the rebellion in Abyssinia by all possible means. But the attempt to capture Kismayu was still to be postponed till after the spring rains, which meant May or June.

I continued to gird at the numbers and the inaction of troops in Kenya.

Prime

Minister

to

26 Jan. 41

General Wavell

I was perplexed by your telegram of the twenty-first.

I thought you wanted to have a large strategic reserve
in the Delta, and this is in accordance with the
directions we have given from here. Certainly there is
no need to send another South African division to swell
the 70,000 troops of various kinds who are now virtually
out of action in Kenya. I asked General Smuts, and he
has agreed, to keep the destination of the new division
fluid, as I thought that by the time transport, etc., could
be arranged he might be willing for them to come north
to join the Army of the Nile. How can you expect me to
face the tremendous strain upon our shipping, affecting
as it does all our food and import of munitions, in order
to carry more divisions from this country to the Middle
The Grand Alliance

119

East, when you seem opposed to taking a South
African division, which would only have less than half
the distance to come? I hope indeed that both the
South African divisions now in Kenya will in a few
months be moved to the Delta, and that the West
African brigade will be sent, as promised, back to
Freetown. On no account must General Smuts be
discouraged from his bold and sound policy of gradually
working South African forces into the main theatre.

Under the strong pressure from home Wavell eventually decided to make the effort before the rains. He animated the Kenya Command, and we were presently informed that the Nairobi forces hoped to carry out Operation

“Canvas” (as the attack on Kismayu was called) between February 10 and 16. This signified a real movement in the East African theatre. I was much relieved to get Wavell’s telegram of February 2, 1941, in which he said: In Kenya I have approved the proposal to attempt capture of Kismayu about the middle of February.

Enemy has strong positions and supply situation limits our force, but think attempt has reasonable chance of success…. Generally I have given instructions to both Platt and Cunningham for the maximum effort they can make against Italian East Africa in the next two months.

Thus we achieved the forward movement. The results showed how unduly the commanders on the spot had magnified the difficulties and how right we were at home to press them to speedy action.

February marked the beginning of General Cunningham’s attack in strength. An Italian force of six brigades and six groups of local levies held the river Juba, near the mouth of which lies the port of Kismayu. Against them General Cunningham deployed, on February 10, four brigade groups. Kismayu was taken without opposition on the fourteenth. North of the port, beyond the river, stood the The Grand Alliance

120

main enemy position at Jelib. That was attacked on the twenty-second, from both flanks and from the rear. A considerable success was gained. The enemy was completely routed, over thirty thousand being killed, captured, or dispersed into the bush The enemy air had been roughly handled by the South African airplanes and took no part in the battle. Nothing now remained to hinder the advance to Mogadishu, the major seaport of Italian Somaliland, two hundred miles farther north. Our motorised troops entered it on the twenty-fifth, to find great quantities of material and stores and over four hundred thousand gallons of precious petrol. On its airfield lay twenty-one destroyed aircraft. General Cunningham rightly judged that there was no enemy to oppose his next move. He had sufficient troops, even though the 1st South African Division, except for one brigade, was held back for operations elsewhere. Distance was the only problem.

Transport and supply were the decisive factors.

Cunningham got permission from General Wavell to make his next objective Jijiga, no less than 740 miles from Mogadishu. After pausing only three days the advance was renewed on March 1, and, brushing aside only light opposition, and meeting little interference from the enemy air force, whose airfields were subjected to frequent attacks, reached Jijiga on March 17. These were fine operations.

Prime

Minister

to

1 March 41

General Wavell

Hearty congratulations on the brilliant result of the
campaign in Italian Somaliland. Will you convey to
General Cunningham the thanks and appreciation of
His Majesty’s Government for the vigorous, daring, and
highly successful operations which he has conducted in
command of his ardent, well-trained, well-organised

The Grand Alliance

121

army. Will you ask him to convey this message to his
troops. Publish as you find convenient.

You will no doubt discuss future operations with
General Smuts on the seventh. As you know, I have
always wanted the South African divisions to come
forward to the Mediterranean shore.

General Wavell to

2 March 41

Prime Minister

Your congratulations are very much appreciated. I
have conveyed your message to General Cunningham.

2. Cunningham is pushing light forces on to Ferfer

[about two hundred miles north of Mogadishu and
Dolo], which will complete occupation of Italian Somaliland. Owing to situation as regards supplies and
transport, he does not think he can advance on Harrar
before March 21. He is coming to Cairo March 7, and
we will discuss future plans and moves of South African
divisions.

3. Have already instructed Aden to reconnoitre
Berbera with view to reoccupation if possible.

At this point our troops from Aden could help. Our four air squadrons there had, apart from their duties over the Red Sea, been supporting from their central position both Cunningham’s and Platt’s campaigns by attacking the enemy air bases. On March 16 two of our battalions were landed at Berbera. The enemy garrison of a brigade melted away, leaving two hundred prisoners in our hands. All British Somaliland was now quickly regained, and through the port of Berbera General Cunningham’s further advance could now be more readily sustained. He resumed his advance to Harrar, which surrendered on March 26, and on March 29 he entered Diredawa. This brought us to the railway from French Somaliland. Had the port of Jibuti been The Grand Alliance

122

opened to us by the Vichy French, it would have greatly eased supply. That, however, was not to be. At Diredawa General Cunningham collected his resources for the final bound to Addis Ababa. During the month of March he had traversed eight hundred and fifty miles from Mogadishu with the 11th African Division and the 1st South African Brigade.

Since the crossing of the river Juba his troops had accounted for more than fifty thousand of the enemy, killed, prisoners, or dispersed, at a cost of under five hundred casualties.

As a result of these successes various complications arose.

General Wavell feared that the policy of strict blockade of Jibuti favoured by Generals de Gaulle and Le Gentilhomme would merely stiffen its resistance. He proposed instead making an offer to admit sufficient supplies, such as milk for children, to prevent distress, to allow any troops wishing to join the Free French to do so and to evacuate the rest to some other French colony, and to negotiate for the use of the railway for supplying his own forces. But at home we took a different view.

Prime

Minister

to

1 April 41

General Wavell

We consider that you should follow policy laid down
in Chiefs of Staff telegram of March 25 as closely as
possible, subject to any modification which may seem
desirable after your discussions with General de
Gaulle. In particular, the initial approach to French
Somaliland should be made by Free French authorities,
and there should be no hesitation in using the blockade
weapon to the full. Do not worry about the susceptibilities of Weygand and Vichy. We will look after them at
this end.

2. I hope that on this and similar matters you will feel
able to give full weight to the views of General de
Gaulle, to whom His Majesty’s Government have given

The Grand Alliance

123

solemn engagements, and who has their full backing as
leader of the Free French Movement.

President Roosevelt was concerned about the Italian civil population in Abyssinia.

Former Naval Person

4 April 41

to President Roosevelt

Count Sforza’s suggestion [about Italian noncombat-ants] has been most attentively considered here. I beg
you to realise our difficulties. Duke of Aosta might
indeed be ready to yield Addis Ababa and march off
into the mountains to carry on the war for some weeks,
or even months, while leaving us with the whole responsibility for the health and safety of the civilian
population, numbering scores of thousands. We have
no means of discharging such a task until the organised
fighting ends. We do not even hold port Jibuti, the
railway line is broken, every ounce of transport we
possess is sustaining our troops in their long advance.

Result might well be a lamentable breakdown, whole
burden of which would be cast on us, like the concentration camps in the old South African War. The moment
the Duke brings the fighting to an end we will strain
every nerve, and there might be prospects of success.

Any prolongation of Italian resistance in Ethiopia delays
our reinforcement of Libya, and you can see how
urgent that has become. It is not merely a case of
giving the enemy an immense military advantage, but
undertaking a task in which we should fail.

Prime

Minister

to

30 May 41

General Wavell

It will be convenient to have [Jibuti] in the near
future, and I shall be glad if you will consider what
forces would be necessary to break the French resistance, and whether they could be found without preju-