The Grand Alliance (97 page)

The Grand Alliance

591

Thus ended this brief and fruitful exercise of overwhelming force against a weak and ancient state. Britain and Russia were fighting for their lives.
Inter arma silent leges.
We may be glad that in our victory the independence of Persia has been preserved.

Persian resistance had collapsed so swiftly that our contacts with the Kremlin became again almost entirely political. Our main object in proposing the joint Anglo-Russian campaign in Persia had been to open up the communications from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea.

We hoped also, by this direct co-operation of British and Soviet forces, to establish more intimate and friendly The Grand Alliance

592

relations with our new ally. We were of course both agreed on the expulsion from Persia or capture of all Germans and the wiping-out of German influence and intrigues in Teheran and elsewhere. The deep and delicate questions about oil, Communism, and the post-war future of Persia lay in the background, but need not, it seemed to me, impede comradeship and good-will.

Prime

Minister

to

27 Aug. 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

Now that it seems that the Persian opposition is not
very serious, I wish to know what are the plans for
pushing on and joining hands with the Russians and
making sure we have the railway in working order in our
hands. We do not simply want to squat on the oilfields,
but to get through communication with Russia. We
have made certain proposals to the Shah, but these
may be rejected, or the Russians may not agree to
them. What therefore are the plans to join hands with
the Russians, and what are the troop movements
foreseen in the next week by our different forces?

Prime

Minister

to

30 Aug. 41

General Wavell

I am so glad the Persian adventure has prospered.

There is now no reason why you should not return
home as you proposed. I am deeply interested in your
railway projects, which are being sedulously examined
here.

Everyone here is delighted you have had another
success.

General Wavell’s visit to London was however shelved by the need for his presence in Teheran. I also hoped that, speaking Russian fluently as he did, he might become an important link with the Soviet High Command.

The Grand Alliance

593

Prime

Minister

to

1 Sept. 41

General Wavell

I agree with Chiefs of Staff that your presence in
Teheran at present would be helpful to Bullard [the
British Minister] in dealing with military requirements
and for ensuring that Russian influence is kept within
reasonable bounds.

Prime Minister to Sir

3 Sept. 41

R. Bullard (Teheran)

We cannot tell how the war in these regions will
develop, but the best possible through route from the
Persian Gulf to the Caspian will be developed at the
utmost speed and at all costs in order to supply Russia.

It is very likely that large British forces will be operating
in and from Persia in 1942, and certainly a powerful air
force will be installed.

We hope it will not be necessary, in the present
phase at any rate, to have an Anglo-Russian
occupation of Teheran, but the Persian Government will
have to give us loyal and faithful help and show all
proper alacrity if they wish to avoid it. At the present
time we have not turned against the Shah, but unless
good results are forthcoming his misgovernment of his
people will be brought into the account. Although we
should like to get what we want by agreement with the
Persian Government and do not wish to drive them into
active hostility, our requirements must somehow be
met, and it ought to be possible for you to obtain all the
facilities we require, bit by bit, by using the leverage of
a possible Russian occupation of Teheran. There is no
need to fear undue Russian encroachments, as their
one supreme wish will be to get the through route for
American supplies.

Prime

Minister

to

16 Sept. 41

Premier Stalin

I am most anxious to settle our alliance with Persia
and to make an intimate efficient working arrangement

The Grand Alliance

594

with your forces in Persia. There are in Persia signs of
serious disorder among tribesmen and of breakdown of
Persian authority. Disorder, if it spreads, will mean
wasting our divisions holding down these people, which
again means burdening the road and railway communications with movements and supplies of aforesaid
divisions, whereas we want to keep the lines clear and
improved to the utmost in order to get supplies through
to you. Our object should be to make the Persians keep
each other quiet while we get on with the war. Your
Excellency’s decisive indications in this direction will
speed forward the already favourable trend of our
affairs in this minor theatre.

Prime

Minister

to

21 Sept. 41

Lord

Beaverbrook

(on

Mission

to

Russia)

General Wavell proposes to go to Tiflis via Baghdad
on his return to India. He speaks Russian, and I contemplate his directing, or possibly, if the forces grow
large enough, commanding, the right hand we shall
give to the Russians in and about the Caspian Basin in
the forthcoming campaign. It is therefore important that
he should confer with high Russian military authorities
on the whole position of their southern flank and in
Persia.

You may bring this into your discussions, and see
that the most is made of it.

Prime

Minister

to

12 Oct. 41

Premier Stalin

Our only interests in Persia are, first, as a barrier
against German penetration eastward, and, secondly,
as a through route for supplies to the Caspian Basin. If
you wish to withdraw the five or six Russian divisions
for use on the battle-front we will take over the whole

The Grand Alliance

595

responsibility of keeping order and maintaining and
improving the supply route. I pledge the faith of Britain
that we will not seek any advantage for ourselves at the
expense of any rightful Russian interest during the war
or at the end. In any case, the signing of the Tripartite
Treaty is urgent to avoid internal disorders growing,
with consequent danger of choking the supply route.

General Wavell will be at Tiflis on October 18, and will
discuss with your generals any questions which you
may instruct them to settle with him.

Words are useless to express what we feel about
your vast heroic struggle. We hope presently to testify
by action.

All arrangements with the Russians were smoothly and swiftly agreed. The conditions imposed on the Persian Government were, principally, the cessation of all resistance, the ejection of Germans, neutrality in the war, and the Allied use of Persian communications for the transit of war supplies to Russia. The further occupation of Persia was peacefully accomplished. British and Russian forces met in amity, and Teheran was jointly occupied on September 17, the Shah having abdicated on the previous day in favour of his gifted twenty-two-year-old son. On September 20 the new Shah, under Allied advice, restored the Constitutional Monarchy, and his father shortly afterwards went into comfortable exile and died at Johannesburg in July, 1944. Most of our forces withdrew from the country, leaving only detachments to guard the communications, and Teheran was evacuated by both British and Russian troops on October 18. Thereafter our forces, under General Quinan, were engaged in preparing defences against the possible incursion of German armies from Turkey or the Caucasus, and in making administrative

The Grand Alliance

596

preparations for the large reinforcements which would arrive if that incursion seemed imminent.

The creation of a major supply route to Russia through the Persian Gulf became our prime objective. With a friendly Government in Teheran, ports were enlarged, river communications developed, roads built, and railways reconstructed. Starting in September, 1941, this enterprise, begun and developed by the British Army, and presently to be adopted and completed by the United States, enabled us to send to Russia, over a period of four and a half years, five million tons of supplies.

We can now return to the dominant theatre of the Mediterranean.

Both sides used the summer to reinforce the armies in the Libyan Desert. For us the replenishment of Malta was vital.

The loss of Crete deprived Admiral Cunningham’s fleet of a fuelling base near enough to bring our protecting sea power into action. The possibilities of a seaborne assault on Malta from Italy or Sicily grew, though, as we now know, it was not until 1942 that Hitler and Mussolini approved such a plan. Enemy air bases both in Crete and Cyrenaica menaced the convoy route from Alexandria to Malta so seriously that we had to depend entirely on the West for the passage of supplies. In this task Admiral Somerville, with Force H from Gibraltar, rendered distinguished service. The route the Admiralty had judged the more dangerous became the only one open. Fortunately at this time the demands of his Russian invasion compelled Hitler to withdraw his air force from Sicily, which gave a respite to Malta and restored to us the mastery in the air over the Malta Channel. This not only helped the approach of