The Grand Alliance (106 page)

I felt that if only a machinery of military consultation could be established the problem of joint operations could be discussed in a reasonable manner which would not lead to misunderstanding. The unsatisfactory nature of the existing position is clear from my following minute:
Prime

Minister

to

5 Nov. 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

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We do not know when the Germans will arrive in the
Caucasus, nor how long it will be before they come up
against the mountain barrier. We do not know what the
Russians will do, how many troops they will use, or how
long they will resist. It is quite certain that if the Germans press hard neither the 50th nor the 18th British
Division could be on the spot in time. We are held in a
grip by the delay in “Crusader,” and it is not possible to
see beyond that at the present moment. I cannot feel
any confidence that the Germans will be prevented
from occupying the Baku oilfields, or that the Russians
will effectively destroy these fields. The Russians tell us
nothing, and view with great suspicion any inquiries we
make on this subject.

2. The only thing we have it in our power to do is to
base four or five heavy bombing squadrons in Northern
Persia to aid the Russians in the defence of the Caucasus, if that be possible, and if the worst happens to
bomb the Baku oilfields effectively and try to set the
ground alight. These squadrons will of course require
fighter protection. Neither the bombers nor the fighters
can be provided till after “Crusader” and its consequences can be judged. A plan should however be
made based on a large transference of air from Libya to
Persia, so as to deny the oilfields to the enemy as long
as possible. Pray let this be done during the next week,
so that we can see what is involved. One cannot tell
how long the Russians will retain the command of the
Black Sea, although with their forces it is inexcusable
that they should lose it.

The question of our breaking off relations with Finland had first been raised, as we have seen, by M. Maisky in his interview with me on September 4. I knew this was a subject on which the Russians felt strongly. The Finns had taken the opportunity of the German attack on Russia to renew hostilities on the Karelian front in July, 1941. They The Grand Alliance

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hoped to regain those territories lost by the Treaty of Moscow the previous year. Their military operations in the autumn of 1941 represented a grave threat not only to Leningrad, but also to the supply lines from Murmansk and Archangel to the Russo-German front. Both the American Government and ourselves had since August been warning the Finns in severe terms of the possible consequences of the situation. Their attitude was that they needed the disputed province of Eastern Karelia for their own security against Russia, and the history of the previous two years lent strength to their view. But now that Russia was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany it was clearly impossible for the Allies to allow the Finns, acting as a German satellite Power, to cut Russia’s main northern lines of communication with the West.

The position of Rumania was similar to that of Finland. The Russians had occupied the Rumanian province of Bessarabia, and thereby gained control of the mouth of the Danube, in June, 1940. Now, under the leadership of Marshal Antonescu, and in alliance with Germany, the Rumanian armies had not only reoccupied Bessarabia, but had bitten deep into the Black Sea provinces of Russia, as the Finns were doing in Eastern Karelia. The Hungarians also, in a key position astride the communications of Central and Southeastern Europe, were of direct assistance to the German war effort.

But I was by no means certain that a declaration of war was the correct method of dealing with the situation. There was still a possibility that, under pressure from the United States and ourselves, Finland would agree to fair and reasonable peace terms. In the case of Rumania at least there was every reason to believe that the dictatorial régime of Antonescu would not last indefinitely. I decided therefore to address myself again to Marshal Stalin on both the question The Grand Alliance

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of military planning and co-operation, and that of avoiding a declaration of war against these Axis satellite Powers.

Prime

Minister

to

4 Nov. 41

Premier Stalin

In order to clear things up and to plan for the future I
am ready to send General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief
in India, Persia, and Iraq, to meet you in Moscow,
Kuibyshev, Tiflis, or wherever you will. Besides this,
General Paget, our new Commander-in-Chief, secretly
designated for the Far East, will come with General
Wavell. General Paget has been in the centre of things
here, and will have with him the latest and best
opinions of our High Command. These two officers will
be able to tell you exactly how we stand, what is
possible and what we think is wise. They can reach you
in about a fortnight. Do you want them?

2. We told you in my message of September 6 that
we were willing to declare war on Finland. Will you
however consider whether it is really good business
that Great Britain should declare war on Finland,
Hungary, and Rumania at this moment? It is only a
formality, because our extreme blockade is already in
force against them. My judgment is against it, because,
first, Finland has many friends in the United States and
it is prudent to take account of this fact. Secondly,
Rumania and Hungary: these countries are full of our
friends; they have been overpowered by Hitler and
used as a cat’s-paw, but if fortune turns against that
ruffian they might easily come back to our side. A
British declaration of war would only freeze them all and
make it look as if Hitler were the head of a grand
European alliance solid against us. Do not, pray,
suppose it is any want of zeal or comradeship that
makes us doubt the advantage of this step. Our Dominions, except Australia, are reluctant. Nevertheless, if
you think it will be a real help to you and worth while, I
will put it to the Cabinet again.

3. I hope our supplies are being cleared from
Archangel as fast as they come in. A trickle is now
beginning through Persia. We shall pump both ways to
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our utmost. Please make sure that our technicians who
are going with the tanks and aircraft have full opportunity to hand these weapons over to your men under the
best conditions. At present our Mission at Kuibyshev is
out of touch with all these affairs. They only want to
help. These weapons are sent at our peril, and we are
anxious they shall have the best chance. An order from
you is necessary.

4. I cannot tell you about our immediate military
plans, any more than you can tell me about yours, but
rest assured we are not going to be idle.

5. With the object of keeping Japan quiet we are
sending our latest battleship, Prince of Wales, which
can catch and kill any Japanese ship, into the Indian
Ocean, and are building up a powerful battle squadron
there. I am urging President Roosevelt to increase his
pressure on the Japanese and keep them frightened so
that the Vladivostok route will not be blocked.

6. I will not waste words in compliments, because
you know already from Beaverbrook and Harriman
what we feel about your splendid fight. Have confidence in our untiring support.

7. I should be glad to hear from you direct that you
have received this telegram.

On November 11 M. Maisky brought to me Stalin’s chilling and evasive reply to this message.

M. Stalin to the Prime

8 Nov. 41

Minister

Your message received on November 7.

I fully agree with you that clarity should be established in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great
Britain. Such a clarity does not exist at present. The
lack of clarity is the consequence of two circumstances:
(a) There is no definite understanding between our two
countries on war aims and on plans for the post-war
organisation of peace. (b)There is no agreement
between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain on mutual
military assistance against Hitler in Europe. As long as
there is no accord on both these questions there can
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be no clarity in the Anglo-Soviet relations. More than
that: to be frank, as long as the present situation exists
there will be difficulty in securing mutual confidence. Of
course the agreement on military supplies to the U.S.S.

R. has a great positive value, but it does not settle,
neither does it exhaust, the whole problem of relations
between our two countries. If the General Wavell and
the General Paget whom you mention in your message
will come to Moscow with a view to concluding agreement on the two fundamental questions referred to
above, I naturally would be happy to meet them and to
discuss with them these questions. If however the
mission of the Generals is confined to the questions of
information, and to the consideration of secondary
matters, it would not be, I think, worth while to intrude
upon the Generals. In such a case it would also be very
difficult for me to find the time for the conversations.

2. It seems to me that an intolerable situation has
been created in the question of the declaration of war
by Great Britain on Finland, Hungary, and Rumania.

The Soviet Government raised this question with the
British Government through the secret diplomatic
channels. Quite unexpectedly for the U.S.S.R., the
whole problem, beginning with the request of the Soviet
Government to the British Government and ending with
the consideration of this question by the U.S.A. Government, received wide publicity. The whole problem is
now being discussed at random in the press – friendly
as well as enemy. And after all that the British Government informs us of its negative attitude to our proposal.

Why is all this being done? To demonstrate the lack of
unity between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain?

3. You can rest assured that we are taking all the
necessary measures for speedy transportation to the
right place of all the arms coming from Great Britain to
Archangel. The same will be done with regard to the
route through Persia. In this connection may I call your
attention to the fact (although this is a minor matter)
that tanks, planes, and artillery are arriving inefficiently
packed, that sometimes parts of the same vehicle are