The French Way (70 page)

28
. The question was, “How much confidence would you say you have in the ability of the United States to deal responsibly with world problems?” The “confident” choice represents the sum of those who said they had a “great deal” and those who said a “fair amount.” Usually the former was small, around 10 percent. From 1981 to 1988 (Ronald Reagan), the average expressing confidence was 45 percent, with a dip in February 1987 to 34 percent. From 1989 to 1991 (George H. W. Bush), the average was 63 percent, with an unusual peak of over 70 percent in January 1991. From 1991 to 2000 (Bill Clinton), the average was over 50 percent until 1997 with high volatility in late summer 1995 (low 39 percent to high 62 percent) because of events in Bosnia; it then dropped to an average of 46 percent from 1998 to 2000. The most detailed sources are the A-2 tables in U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, and in graph form in U.S. Department of State,
Key West Europeans Mostly Negative
, 2, fig. 5.

29
. Some 47 percent named trade and economics, followed distantly by American hegemony at 11 percent. See U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, Opinion Analysis,
Six in Ten French Elites Value U.S. Leadership
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 19 March 2001).

30
. CSA-Libération, “L'Amérique.”

31
. Ibid.

32
. SOFRES and French American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 15. The choice of ascribing motives to the United States were: to protect and extend its interests (63 percent); to impose its will on the world (51 percent); to preserve peace (28 percent); to promote democracy (11 percent).

33
. As military intervention approached in the spring of 2003, half of those who had said they favored the United States the previous summer changed their mind, and the favorable vote dropped from 63 percent to 31 percent; U.S. Department of State,
Key West Europeans
, appendix, table 2. Similarly, the good reputation of Americans faded. Once the war began, “very” or “somewhat” favorable opinions of Americans plunged precipitously and unfavorable attitudes soared; Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, T-133. But the president was the primary target. Among those holding unfavorable views of the United States in April-May 2003, when asked pointedly if this was “mostly because of President George Bush or is it a more general problem with “America,” three-quarters charged the president while less than a quarter blamed America; Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, T-134. French cynicism about U.S. motives is recorded in Pew Center,
What the World Thinks
, 3.

34
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 9, 48. On issues like trade and economic disputes and the environment over 60 percent of the public said (in 2001) that the two countries were working in different directions. The only issues where as many as 40 percent perceived similarity in policy were on questions like reducing international drug trafficking or preventing Iraq from developing a nuclear capacity.

35
. CCFR and GMF,
Worldviews 2002
, 26.

36
. SOFRES and French American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 7.

37
. CCFR and GMF,
Worldviews 2002
, 15. Superpower status for the EU was the choice for 91 percent of the French; 76 percent of the Italians, 63 percent of the Poles, 59 percent of the Dutch; 56 percent of the British, and 48 percent of the Germans.

38
. CSA-Libération, “L'Amérique.” A common European defense without the United States was the choice of 43 percent, while 45 percent preferred a defense constructed with NATO. And 6 percent wanted an independent French defense.

39
. CCFR and GMF,
Worldviews 2002
, 17.

40
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 17-18. Objections to American influence from 1984 to 2000 increased by the following percentages: television (45 percent to 65 percent); cinema (36 percent to 57 percent); food (9 percent to 26 percent); language (28 percent to 34 percent); clothes (18 percent to 22 percent); advertising (34 percent to 35 percent). But for music, those who found influence excessive declined from 42 percent to 37 percent.

41
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 39. In 1995 those expressing unfavorable opinions of “American popular culture such as music, television and films” were: the French, 57 percent; the Germans, 50 percent; and the British, 39 percent. In 2000 the percentages were: the French, 48 percent; the Germans, 38 percent; the Italians, 33 percent; and the British, 30 percent.

42
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, A-29. The comparable perceptions of a cultural threat were: British, 27 percent; Germans, 24 percent; Italians, 19 percent.

43
. SOFRES poll of May 1994, reported in Hervé Jannic, “Les Français craignent l'envahissement américain,”
L'Expansion
, 2-15 June 1994, 52-53.

44
. In 2003, one survey found two-thirds of the French, similar to other West Europeans, declaring they “liked,” rather than “disliked,” these American imports. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, T-139.

45
. Pew Center,
What the World Thinks
, 63. If 71 percent regarded the spread of American ideas as bad, 66 percent said they liked American popular culture.

46
. Ibid., 63, 66.

47
. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, T-18. In fact, 47 percent of Americans also believed fast food was a change for the worse.

48
. In 1988 the choices were:
power
(56 percent),
dynamism
(32 percent),
wealth
(31 percent), and
liberty
(30 percent). In 1996 they had become:
violence
(59 percent),
power
(57 percent),
inequality
(45 percent), and
racism
(39 percent).
Liberty
fell to 18 percent and
imperialism
rose from 12 percent to 21 percent. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 15.

49
. Frachon, “L'image des Etats-Unis,” 2.

50
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 15. The numbers were:
violence
(67 percent),
power
(66 percent),
inequality
(49 percent),
racism
(42 percent), and
imperialism
(23 percent).
Liberty
fell to 16 percent. But more positive words like
wealth
(39 percent) and
dynamism
(34 percent) also increased over 1996.

51
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 12, 14.

52
. Sondages CSA,
LApproche de l'élection.

53
. The percentages for the 1995/2001 polls were:
domineering
(90/92),
materialistic
(88/83),
democratic
(77/68),
violent
(74/82),
trustworthy
(68/53),
racist
(65/71),
cultured
(65/59),
religious
(62/69),
cooperative
(62/49),
isolationist
(54/51), and
hypocritical
(48/53). U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, A-24.

54
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, A-27.

55
. But this survey revealed considerable ignorance because almost 40 percent believed mistakenly that the unemployment rate in the United States was higher than in France when in fact it was 12 percent in France and 5 percent in the United States. Frachon, “L'image des Etats-Unis,” 2.

56
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 9-10.

57
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 37.

58
. Ibid., A-27.

59
. Ibid., 26-27.

60
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 9.

61
. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, T-138. Aversion for American corporate wrongdoing and reservations about the market may have been the cause of this criticism; Pew Center,
What the World Thinks
, 68.

62
. Statement made by former ambassador Felix Rohatyn to the National Press Club, 25 October 1999.

63
. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, 109; for specifics see T-7.

64
. Ibid., T-53. In assessing failure, the French blamed the individual rather than society, at a percentage ratio of 68:28. For Americans the ratio was 82:12; for Germans it was 74:22; and for Italians it was 57:31.

65
. Ibid., T-55. Some 87 percent of the French and 90 percent of the Germans professed this, but only 73 percent of Americans did.

66
. Ibid., 105. While 62 percent of the French believed that government aid for the needy was more important than freedom of opportunity, only 34 percent of Americans held this view.

67
. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, Opinion Analysis,
West Europeans Positive Toward U.S.
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2 November 2000), 5. But the Italians believed all of their values were even more different than the French did.

68
. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, 115. In agreement with the proposition that belief in God is necessary for morality were: the British, 25 percent; the Italians, 27 percent; the Germans, 33 percent; and the Americans, 58 percent.

69
. Ibid., T-142. Some 65 percent of the French, compared to 36 percent of the Germans, 33 percent of the British, 18 percent of the Spanish, and 14 percent of the Italians said America was too religious.

70
. University of Michigan,
World Values Survey
, summarized in “Living with a Superpower,”
Economist
, 24 January 2003, 18-20.

71
. Details of the methodology for polling elites can be found in U.S. Department of State,
Six in Ten French Elites
, 5.

72
. Ibid., 2. From 1999 on, the public was split almost 50/50 on the desirability of U.S. leadership in world affairs, but elites were far more positive; U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 45.

73
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, A-6.

74
. U.S. Department of State,
Six in Ten French Elites
, 3.

75
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, A-27.

76
. A majority of the public, as opposed to less than a majority of the elite, for example, thought the two nations had conflicting views on both “family” and “democracy” (“democracy” apparently referred to social equality rather than political institutions). Three of four members of both elites and nonelites perceived differences over “work.” But many more of the nonelite than the elite thought the countries differed with respect to both “morality and ethics” and “law and order.” Above all, it was “lifestyle” that exposed the most glaring notion of Franco-American social dissimilarity. See U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, A-25.

77
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 39. See also U.S. Department of State,
Six in Ten French Elites
, 4.

78
. Some 63 percent of the Communists and 35 percent of the Greens made the very negative choice. Data for elites and political affiliation come from U.S. Department of State,
Highlights from the Office of Research: Elite Surveys
, 11.

79
. Data for elite subcategories come from U.S. Department of State,
Six in Ten French Elites
, 5. See also U.S. Department of State,
Highlights from the Office of Research: Elite Surveys
, 11.

80
. The percentages were: educators, 17 percent; media elites, 21 percent; cultural leaders, 24 percent; religious leaders, 28 percent; and elite politicians, 30 percent. There were inconsistencies among religious and cultural elites who simultaneously registered strong positive and strong negative views.

81
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 1.

82
. Sondages CSA,
L'Approche de l'élection.
Women also chose, more highly then men, the category “tout est permis.”

83
. CSA-Libération, “L'Amérique.”

84
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 6.

85
. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, 78. Among those age 50 and over, 89 percent said they liked American popular culture, while 96 percent of the 18-29 cohort expressed the same preference.

86
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 1, found that 44 percent of the oldest cohort, compared to 37 percent of the youngest cohort (18 to 24), expressed sympathy toward the United States. A survey conducted by the Institut BVA found that age correlated directly with a good opinion of Americans; Sainte Marie, “Nos derniers sondages.”

87
. Sondages CSA,
LApproche de l'élection.

88
. CSA-Libération, “L'Amérique.” For example, 45 percent of those over 65 said they felt close to the American people, but only 29 percent of those between 30 and 49 did and even fewer did among those younger than age 30.

89
. One survey, taken in the midst of the Franco-American debate over Iraq in 2003, found that those between 18 and 24 were the only age group of whom a relative majority expressed a bad opinion of the American people. Among the young, the division between bad and good opinion of Americans was 46 percent to 44 percent; Sainte Marie, “Nos derniers sondages.”