The French Way (69 page)

161
. Max Gallo, “Sauver l'homme-citoyen,”
Le Monde des débats
, November 1993, 8.

162
. This exchange is Mario Vargas-Llosa, “Cher Régis,”
Libération
, 2 December 1993, 6; and Régis Debray, “Quelles Tribus? Cher Mario,”
Libération
, 3 December 1993, 3.

163
. Jacques Toubon, quoted in John Rockwell, “Making a Mark on French Culture,”
New York Times
, 8 November 1993, C11.

164
. Jack Lang, quoted in Alan Riding, “The French Strategy, Months of Risk,”
New York Times
, 15 December 1993, D19.

165
. Jack Lang, quoted in C. Anthony Gifford, “Culture versus Commerce: Europe Strives to keep Hollywood at Bay,” in
Kazaam! Splat! Ploof! The American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945
, ed. Sabrina Ramet and Gordana Crnkovic (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 46.

166
. Harvey Feigenbaum, “Is Technology the Enemy of Culture?”
International Journal of Cultural Policy
10, no. 3 (2004): 251-63.

167
. Jack Valenti, “What U.S. Film Makers Really Wanted,”
New York Times
, 3 January 1994, A22.

168
. Henri de Bresson, “Les occidentaux guerroient sur le statut de l'investissement étranger,”
Le Monde
, 18 February 1998, 2. David Henderson, a principal American negotiator, blamed France for ending the talks; see David Henderson,
The MAI Affair: A Story and Its Lessons
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 4.

169
. Gordon and Meunier,
French Challenge
, 75.

170
. At Nice the cultural exception was explicitly included in EU law. France held out against granting the EU exclusive competence over trade in cultural and audiovisual services.

171
. At the end of the decade French films held 32 percent of the domestic market, as opposed to 54 percent for the Americans; see
http://www.cnc.fr/CNC_GALLERY_CONTENT/DOCUMENTS/statistiques/par_secteur_EN_pdf/Attendance.pdf
. See also John Tagliabue, “Now Playing Europe: Invasion of the Multiplex,”
New York Times
, 27 January 2000, Ci.

172
. Data from Gordon and Meunier,
French Challenge
, 50.

173
. Anne Jäckel, “The Inter/Nationalism of French Film Policy,”
Modern and Contemporary France
15 (2007): 21-36.

174
. Burin des Roziers,
Du cinéma
, 21. The comparable data are for Germany (43 percent to 85 percent), Spain (62 percent to 77 percent), United Kingdom (60 percent to 82 percent), and Italy (52 percent to 71 percent). The French stations in this sample were France 3 and TFI.

175
. Gordon and Meunier,
French Challenge
, 49.

176
. Laurent Creton,
Economie du cinéma: perspectives stratégiques
(Paris: Éditions Nathan, 1994), argues government support has been and is imperative for the industry to meet American competition. Eric Dubet, even though he believes subsidies risk hampering competitiveness, sees them as assisting the industry; see Eric Dubet,
Economie du cinéma européen: de l'interventionnisme à l'action entrepreneuriale
(Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 2000). See also Jonathan Buchsbaum, “After GATT: Has the Revival of French Cinema Ended?”
French Politics, Culture and Society
23 (2005): 42; Jean-Pierre Jeancolas, “From the Blum-Byrnes Agreement to the GATT Affair,” in
Hollywood and Europe
, ed. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and Steven Ricci (London: British Film Institute, 1998), 56. For the importance of television acting as the banker for cinema see Buchsbaum, “The
Exception Culturelle
.” Some European directors like Wim Wenders and David Puttnam wanted to extend the French subsidy system throughout Europe.

177
. Harvey Feigenbaum, “America's Cultural Challenge Abroad,”
Political Science Quarterly
, forthcoming.

178
. Martine Danan, “From a ‘Prenational' to a ‘Postnational' French Cinema,” in
The European Cinema Reader
, ed. Catherine Fowler (London: Routledge, 2002), 237-43; Kristin Hohenadell, “European Films Learn to Speak English,”
New York Times
, 30 January 2000, 15. Other French directors who tried their hand at English films were Louis Malle, Bertrand Tavernier, Jean-Pierre Jeunet, and Jean-Jacques Annaud. On Hollywood remakes, see Lucy Mazdon,
Encore Hollywood: Remaking French Cinema
(London: British Film Institute, 2000).

179
. Messerlin, “La politique,” 597. Much of the critique in this paragraph comes from Messerlin's study.

180
. Harvey Feigenbaum, “The Production of Culture in the Postimperial Era: The World Versus Hollywood?” in
Postimperialism in World Politics
, ed. David G. Becker and Richard L. Sklar (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 105-24.

181
. Alan Riding, “Where Is the Glory That Was France?”
New York Times
, 14 January 1996, 22.

182
. Antoine de Baecque, “Il n'y a pas de cinéma français,”
La Règle du jeu
12 (1994): 234-40.

183
. Data provided in Messerlin, “La politique,” 587. Nevertheless, Messerlin stresses a decline in the French appetite for their own films since the late 1970s. As a percentage of ticket sales for American films, the French in 1991-93 selected local productions at a rate of 59 percent, compared to 22 percent for the Germans and Italians.

184
. Alan Riding, “French Comic Book Heroes Battle Hollywood's Hordes,”
New York Times
, 10 February 1999, E2.

185
. Bruno Palier, “The Long Good Bye to Bismarck? Changes in the French Welfare State,” in Culpepper et al., eds.,
Changing France
, 127.

Chapter 7. The Paradox of the Fin de Siècle: Anti-Americanism and Americanization

1
. Patrick Gofman,
Le cauchemar américain
(Lausanne, Switzerland: Éditions l'Age d'homme, 2000); Noël Mamère and Olivier Warin,
Non merci, Oncle Sam!
(Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 1999).

2
. Thierry de Montbrial, cited in Joseph Biden, “Unholy Symbiosis: Isolationism and Anti-Americanism,”
Washington Quarterly
23 (2000): 11.

3
. Jane Perlez, “At Democracy's Picnic Paris Supplies Ants,”
New York Times
, 27 June 2000, 6.

4
. For investment data see Ambassade de France aux Etats-Unis,
Les Investissements directs français auxEtats-Unis
, December 1999.

5
. Data from the Centre National de la Cinématographie website,
http://www.cnc.fr/CNC_GALLERY_CONTENT/DOCUMENTS/statistiques/par_secteur_FR_pdf/Frequentation.pdf
. In a nation of almost sixty million people, twenty million tickets were sold for the movie
Titanic.

6
. “English Is Still on the March,”
Economist
, 24 February 2001, 50.

7
. One survey showed that 61 percent of those consulted in France relied on TV for information on national and international issues, with the press and radio accounting for 18 percent and 17 percent, respectively. See Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2003), T-96. The U.S. State Department, asking about how the French learned about “American culture,” found almost half (46 percent) said it was from TV; and the rest were scattered among cinema (14 percent), the press (11 percent), schools (8 percent), visits to the United States (5 percent), books (3 percent), etc. See Anna Dean and Mary Demeri, U.S. Department of State, Office of Research,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism: Fact vs. Fiction
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 2002), A-23. In general, polling agents like the Pew Center and the State Department hold that in 19 out of 20 cases the sampling error is no more than about 4 percentage points.

8
. For example, in the summer of 2002 one poll found 71 percent held either a “very” or “somewhat” favorable opinion of Americans. In 2002 the Germans (70 percent) and Italians (74 percent) held similar favorable views of Americans while the British recorded the high, at 83 percent. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, T-132-33.

9
. CSA-Libération, “C'est de plus en plus loin, l'Amérique,”
Libération
, 10-11 April 1999, 6.

10
. When asked which people they felt more sympathy for, 39 percent chose the Germans; 20 percent the Americans, and only 15 percent the British. And few, given a choice between various Europeans and Americans, would select Americans. Jérôme Sainte Marie, “Nos derniers sondages publiés: l'image des Etats-Unis,”
Paris-Match
, 20 February 2003, n.p.

11
. U.S. Department of State,
Key West Europeans Mostly Negative
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 2003), fig. 4. In the summer of 2002 the favorable view was endorsed by 63 percent of the French, 61 percent of the Germans, 70 percent of the Italians, and 75 percent of the British. Pew Research Center,
What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View Their Lives, Their Countries, the World, America
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2002), 53
^.

12
. A negative trend emerged in French opinion of the United States. Data are contradictory on this subject, but one set of polls conducted by a French agency demonstrated a modest deterioration after 1988. The question posed was, “Are you, with respect to the United States, rather sympathetic, rather antipathetic, or neither sympathetic nor antipathetic?” Given this limited choice, polls taken in 1988, 1994, 1996, showed “sympathy” steadily in decline (54 percent, 40 percent, 35 percent). In contrast, “antipathy” advanced from 6 percent, to 11 percent, to 17 percent. And the “neither/nor” option rose from 38 percent to 47 percent; SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis: regards croisés
, June 2000, 6. In May 2000 the same question evoked slightly better results: 41 percent said they were “sympathetic”; 10 percent said “antipathetic”; and among the rest who answered, 48 percent said neither one nor the other; SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 1. In other words, sympathy for the United States slipped between 1988 and 2000 from 54 percent to 41 percent; and both antipathy and indifference toward the United States increased.

13
. Sondages CSA,
Les Français et les Etats-Unis à l'approche de l'électionprésiden-tielle américaine
, October 2000.

14
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 1.

15
. See U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 11-12. The question was, “Does the United States have too much influence over domestic affairs?”

16
. In 1996
Le Monde
found that 64 percent of those polled regarded U.S. influence in the world “excessive”; Alain Frachon, “L'image des Etats-Unis ne cesse de se dégrader en France,”
Le Monde
, 31 October 1996, 1-3.

17
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, A-24.

18
. The percentages that assessed U.S. influence as excessive were: culture (61 percent), economics (60 percent), the military (56 percent), and politics (53 percent); CSA-Libération, “LAmérique,” 6.

19
. Sondages CSA,
L'Approche de l'éléction.
Once George W. Bush took office the spread of “American ideas and customs” was considered undesirable by almost three-quarters of the French, the Germans, and the Spanish. Only half of the Italians and the British felt the same way (Pew Global Attitudes Project,
Views of a Changing World
, T-136).

20
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 10. The percentages of those who said the United States does not consult others were: French, 79 percent; British, 68 percent; Italians, 67 percent; and Germans, 63 percent. The Pew Center,
What the World Thinks
, 58, also found that the French led these four nations in the belief that the United States did not take the interests of others into account.

21
. SOFRES and French-American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 12.

22
. U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 11-12.

23
. Ibid., A-24. Some 92 percent of the French, 91 percent of the Italians, and 83 percent of the British, but only 68 percent of the Germans, found the United States “domineering.”

24
. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States,
Worldviews 2002: European Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
29,
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202002/2002_Europe_Report.pdf
. Henceforth these organizations will be abbreviated as CCFR and GMF.

25
. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research,
Highlights from the Office of Research: Elite Surveys in France, Germany, Spain, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2001), 3. There was yet another surge (to 79 percent) with the coming of the Bush government in the winter of 2000-2001.

26
. If a majority of the French approved of globalization, they also accounted for the largest negative minority opinion of any wealthy nation. A State Department poll for 2000-2001 also found that a majority in France thought globalization was good, but 33 percent of the public and 25 percent of the elite said it was bad. In Germany, 17 percent of the public and 31 percent of the elite found globalization bad. See U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 23. And while 1 in 10 in Germany, and 2 in 10 in Britain and Italy, viewed globalization as a threat to their national culture, 4 in 10 did so in France; ibid., 23-24.

27
. On the link with U.S. domination, see U.S. Department of State,
Europeans and Anti-Americanism
, 23. The data on who benefits from globalization are in SOFRES and French American Foundation,
France-Etats-Unis
, 3.