The Fall of Carthage (37 page)
Together the Spanish and Gallic infantry formed the army's centre, deployed in alternate companies. Polybius uses the word
sperae
,
one of the terms he uses to mean 'maniple', and it is likely that he uses it to mean units of a few hundred men, although there was probably no standard size. This interspersion of companies from two distinct ethnic groups suggests that Gauls were now fully absorbed into Hannibal's army, so that there was no need to place them in larger, tribal contingents. The Libyans were split into two halves, each roughly the strength of a Roman legion, and placed on the wings, formed into deep columns. Although this is not clear from our source, it is probable that they were actually behind the edges of the line of Spanish and Celts, out of sight of the Romans. They may well have composed the second of Hannibal's columns, crossing the river upstream of the main force, concealed from enemy gaze. Once the army had reached its positions, Hannibal led forward the centre companies of his infantry, causing the whole line to bulge towards the enemy, the units echeloned back on either side of the new, narrow front. The general himself, with his brother Mago, was with the Gauls and Spanish, while Hasdrubal led the heavy cavalry, and Livy says that Maharbal controlled the Numidians. Hannibal had rightly guessed that the main Roman effort was to be made in the centre and had adjusted his deployment and issued orders accordingly. His plan was to use the enemy's own strength against him, but it is easier to describe how this was achieved than it was to anticipate the action.
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sperae
,
one of the terms he uses to mean 'maniple', and it is likely that he uses it to mean units of a few hundred men, although there was probably no standard size. This interspersion of companies from two distinct ethnic groups suggests that Gauls were now fully absorbed into Hannibal's army, so that there was no need to place them in larger, tribal contingents. The Libyans were split into two halves, each roughly the strength of a Roman legion, and placed on the wings, formed into deep columns. Although this is not clear from our source, it is probable that they were actually behind the edges of the line of Spanish and Celts, out of sight of the Romans. They may well have composed the second of Hannibal's columns, crossing the river upstream of the main force, concealed from enemy gaze. Once the army had reached its positions, Hannibal led forward the centre companies of his infantry, causing the whole line to bulge towards the enemy, the units echeloned back on either side of the new, narrow front. The general himself, with his brother Mago, was with the Gauls and Spanish, while Hasdrubal led the heavy cavalry, and Livy says that Maharbal controlled the Numidians. Hannibal had rightly guessed that the main Roman effort was to be made in the centre and had adjusted his deployment and issued orders accordingly. His plan was to use the enemy's own strength against him, but it is easier to describe how this was achieved than it was to anticipate the action.
14
It must have taken hours for both the armies to reach their positions and deploy into battle, the tribunes scurrying about to join the two Roman armies together and jostle the men into place. When they were ready, over 125,000 men and 16,000 horses were gathered in an area no larger than 5 or 6 square miles, whilst more soldiers and tens of thousands of slaves, servants and camp followers looked on from the three camps. The noise of their movements drowned out the constant chirruping of the cicadas which fills the air on summer days in this plain. So many feet and hoofs threw up clouds of dust which swirled in the strong gusts of the hot Volturnus wind which blows from the south-east. The dust was another irritant to men beginning to swelter in their heavy armour under the hot glare of the sun. On the Roman side the army presented a fairly uniform appearance, although we must remember that these were citizen soldiers and there is no good reason to believe that they wore tunics of the same colour or that shields were painted with unit insignia. Our sources were most struck by the diverse dress of the enemy army. On the one hand were the Libyans, dressed in Roman helmets and armour, and with oval
scuta,
then the Gauls stripped to the waist (since this is probably what Polybius means by 'naked'), and the Spanish in their white tunics with purple borders, to which we might add the unarmoured Numidians with their distinctive hairstyles and riding their small, shaggy horses. It is uncertain how accurate this picture is. The Spanish had left home two years before and one may wonder how many still wore their native garb and had not replaced it with whatever was available locally or could be made in camp. However, they probably had retained their native weapons, the Spanish carrying their short-stabbing swords, and perhaps a few of the curved blades similar to the Greek
kopis,
whilst the Gauls had their long slashing blades.
scuta,
then the Gauls stripped to the waist (since this is probably what Polybius means by 'naked'), and the Spanish in their white tunics with purple borders, to which we might add the unarmoured Numidians with their distinctive hairstyles and riding their small, shaggy horses. It is uncertain how accurate this picture is. The Spanish had left home two years before and one may wonder how many still wore their native garb and had not replaced it with whatever was available locally or could be made in camp. However, they probably had retained their native weapons, the Spanish carrying their short-stabbing swords, and perhaps a few of the curved blades similar to the Greek
kopis,
whilst the Gauls had their long slashing blades.
For a while the armies stared at each other, whilst their light infantry skirmished between the lines. Neither side seems to have gained much advantage in this combat and eventually the skirmishers pulled back behind the main lines of their infantry. Hannibal's light troops may then have moved to support his cavalry on the wings as they did at Trebia, for early in the fighting Paullus was hit in the face by a slingstone cast by one of the Balearic slingers. The Roman
velites
seem to have pulled back through the small intervals left in the line of
hastati.
However, the first close combat occurred when Hasdrubal led his Spanish and Gallic cavalry against the Roman horse. A vicious melee developed, the sources once again stressing that it was unlike most cavalry combats, consisting not of charges and pursuits, but of a standing fight. Again we hear of men dismounting to fight on foot. Eventually the ferocity of Spanish and Gallic horsemen proved too much and the Romans were killed or put to flight. It is unclear how much advantage Hasdrubal had from his numbers, for the confined space between the infantry centres and the river may have prevented him from bringing them to bear. It may simply be that the Roman cavalry had got as used to being beaten by the Punic horsemen as the latter had to winning. In hand-to-hand combat confidence was often of greater importance than numbers or equipment. The Romans fled, but many found that their escape was cut off by the river and were slaughtered by their exultant opponents. The combat had been fierce, but according to Livy had not lasted very long, although it is always difficult to know what to make of such vague allusions to time. Before it was finished the heavy infantry had met in the centre.
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velites
seem to have pulled back through the small intervals left in the line of
hastati.
However, the first close combat occurred when Hasdrubal led his Spanish and Gallic cavalry against the Roman horse. A vicious melee developed, the sources once again stressing that it was unlike most cavalry combats, consisting not of charges and pursuits, but of a standing fight. Again we hear of men dismounting to fight on foot. Eventually the ferocity of Spanish and Gallic horsemen proved too much and the Romans were killed or put to flight. It is unclear how much advantage Hasdrubal had from his numbers, for the confined space between the infantry centres and the river may have prevented him from bringing them to bear. It may simply be that the Roman cavalry had got as used to being beaten by the Punic horsemen as the latter had to winning. In hand-to-hand combat confidence was often of greater importance than numbers or equipment. The Romans fled, but many found that their escape was cut off by the river and were slaughtered by their exultant opponents. The combat had been fierce, but according to Livy had not lasted very long, although it is always difficult to know what to make of such vague allusions to time. Before it was finished the heavy infantry had met in the centre.
15
Hannibal's men do not seem to have advanced further once he had formed his convex line pointing towards the enemy, so it was probably the Romans who marched forward, eager as they were to decide the combat before their cavalry were beaten. The cacophony of noise can only have been appalling as the Romans cheered, blew their trumpets and clashed their weapons against their shields, the Celtic and Spanish warriors answering them with their own war cries as each side tried to terrify the other into submission. As they came closer, the Roman line checked and began to hurl their
pila,
the enemy replying with showers of their own javelins. Despite their numbers the Romans did not throw many more missiles than their opponents, for the men in the rear ranks even of the maniples of
has
tati
could not do so without severe risk of hitting their own front ranks. Soon the Romans, encouraged by their officers and the men behind, surged forward into contact. The combat fell into the usual pattern, with brief flurries of savage hand-to-hand fighting, after which the exhausted participants pulled back a few yards to draw breath, taunting and lobbing missiles at their enemies, until they regained the confidence and energy to renew the fight. Livy speaks of the Romans 'for a long time repeatedly pushing forward', before they began to win ground against strong opposition.
16
The Gauls were renowned for their ferocity in the early stages of battle, but supposed to weary quickly and lose heart if they did not seem to be winning. At Cannae, as at Telamon, they confounded the literary cliche of the fickle and easily tired barbarian, and put up a long and sturdy resistance. There were several reasons why they were able to do so. In numbers they were roughly equal to the Roman
hastati
and, since they occupied roughly the same frontage, their companies were formed in similar depth. The stiffening of experienced Spanish infantry may also have helped to steady the Gauls, and they were inspired by the presence of Hannibal and Mago, who rode around, close behind the righting line, yelling encouragement to their warriors. Pride probably had a lot to do with it, for both the Gauls and Spanish were products of warrior societies which prized military glory above all else. At Cannae these men had been specially chosen as the first to meet the enemy, even being advanced ahead of the main army where all could witness their valour, in a gesture not unlike that of the Gaesatae at Telamon, running naked ahead of the whole army, challenging the enemy and daring them to come on.
pila,
the enemy replying with showers of their own javelins. Despite their numbers the Romans did not throw many more missiles than their opponents, for the men in the rear ranks even of the maniples of
has
tati
could not do so without severe risk of hitting their own front ranks. Soon the Romans, encouraged by their officers and the men behind, surged forward into contact. The combat fell into the usual pattern, with brief flurries of savage hand-to-hand fighting, after which the exhausted participants pulled back a few yards to draw breath, taunting and lobbing missiles at their enemies, until they regained the confidence and energy to renew the fight. Livy speaks of the Romans 'for a long time repeatedly pushing forward', before they began to win ground against strong opposition.
16
The Gauls were renowned for their ferocity in the early stages of battle, but supposed to weary quickly and lose heart if they did not seem to be winning. At Cannae, as at Telamon, they confounded the literary cliche of the fickle and easily tired barbarian, and put up a long and sturdy resistance. There were several reasons why they were able to do so. In numbers they were roughly equal to the Roman
hastati
and, since they occupied roughly the same frontage, their companies were formed in similar depth. The stiffening of experienced Spanish infantry may also have helped to steady the Gauls, and they were inspired by the presence of Hannibal and Mago, who rode around, close behind the righting line, yelling encouragement to their warriors. Pride probably had a lot to do with it, for both the Gauls and Spanish were products of warrior societies which prized military glory above all else. At Cannae these men had been specially chosen as the first to meet the enemy, even being advanced ahead of the main army where all could witness their valour, in a gesture not unlike that of the Gaesatae at Telamon, running naked ahead of the whole army, challenging the enemy and daring them to come on.
Only slowly did the Romans force the Celts and Spaniards back, and at first they did so step by step, still facing forward. The bulge in Hannibal's line was flattened, and still the Romans pushed on, till in the centre they drove the enemy back further, so that now the line was concave instead of convex. More of the front lines were in contact and the fighting general, but the main effort was still in the centre where the two sides had first met and where the Romans were winning. Roman officers, including the many tribunes, the proconsul, and Paullus himself who had ridden to the centre after the defeat of his cavalry, urged the legionaries on, led them in charges, and fed in maniples from the reserve lines to support the
hastati,
desperate to keep the forward momentum going and exploit this success. Gradually the Roman infantry lost their neat formation, as the narrow gaps between the maniples vanished and the units merged into one great crowd. The intervals between the three lines had probably also been reduced by the deep formation of the individual maniples. There was always a tendency for very large mass formations to lose order and degenerate into a mob of men pushing forward, (as Napoleon's army was to discover when the declining quality of its infantry led to the use of gigantic formations at Wagram, Albuera and Waterloo). Yet the forward pressure created by the densely packed mass of Roman infantry was inexorable and, eventually, the Gauls and Spanish began to break. In the centre they at last gave way, and the Romans surged forward, victory in sight. It was probably now that the Gauls suffered a good proportion of the many casualties, as those who did not run quickly enough or were slowed by their wounds were hacked down by the elated legionaries. The Roman mass burst through the centre of the enemy army and, in the rear, the Roman commanders urged more men on to support them.
hastati,
desperate to keep the forward momentum going and exploit this success. Gradually the Roman infantry lost their neat formation, as the narrow gaps between the maniples vanished and the units merged into one great crowd. The intervals between the three lines had probably also been reduced by the deep formation of the individual maniples. There was always a tendency for very large mass formations to lose order and degenerate into a mob of men pushing forward, (as Napoleon's army was to discover when the declining quality of its infantry led to the use of gigantic formations at Wagram, Albuera and Waterloo). Yet the forward pressure created by the densely packed mass of Roman infantry was inexorable and, eventually, the Gauls and Spanish began to break. In the centre they at last gave way, and the Romans surged forward, victory in sight. It was probably now that the Gauls suffered a good proportion of the many casualties, as those who did not run quickly enough or were slowed by their wounds were hacked down by the elated legionaries. The Roman mass burst through the centre of the enemy army and, in the rear, the Roman commanders urged more men on to support them.
On either side of the victorious Roman infantry were the columns of the Libyan infantry. We do not know whether Hannibal had given their commanders instructions to begin to move when the enemy reached a certain point, or whether he now sent orders by courier for them to do so. Calmly, the columns turned to face inwards, and although there has been considerable debate over precisely how this manoeuvre was performed, this need not concern us, since so much depends on the details of the formation they started the battle in, concerning which we have no precise information. Then, ranks neady dressed, they advanced to take the mass of Roman infantry from both sides. The disorganization amongst the Romans was appalling and no one was able to assemble a coherent fighting line to face these new threats. The maniples were hopelessly confused and the men turned as individuals and small groups to confront the advancing Libyans. Most of the Romans were weary from the fighting, since even those not actually in the front ranks had endured the stress of close combat, and now they faced men who were well formed and fresh. It is even possible that they did not immediately realize that these new troops were enemies, for the African soldiers were dressed in Roman equipment and in battle men often become disorientated and lose their sense of direction. All forward movement in the Roman centre ceased, the two bodies of Africans compressing the mass of soldiers like a vice. In the lull, the Gauls and Spanish who had broken began to rally and return to the fight.
17
17
Varro must have watched the early stages of the battle with some satisfaction, as his infantry started to achieve the breakthrough which was to smash the enemy army. His own command was faced only by skirmishing Numidians, who never risked a charge and fled whenever the Latins advanced towards them. His men suffered a steady drain of casualties, but there was no reason for him to advance and drive the enemy back, since as long as he remained in place and protected the flank of the infantry the legions could perform their task and win the battle. It is doubtful that the consul could have seen the defeat of the Roman cavalry on the opposite wing, but even if Varro had knowledge of it, there was nothing that he could have done to prevent it. Various rumours circulated in the aftermath of the battle to explain the Roman defeat, and one of these was that a party of Numidians had pretended to surrender, only to produce swords which they had concealed on their persons and attack their captors in the rear, but Polybius does not mention this and it is most likely untrue.
18
18
On the opposite flank, Hasdrubal had allowed his cavalry to pursue the fleeing Roman horse for a short distance along the river, but soon rallied them. It was always difficult to reform cavalrymen once they had begun to scatter in pursuit of a helpless enemy and it is a tribute to Hasdrubal's ability and the discipline of his men that he so quickly re-established order. The narrowness of the plain probably helped to keep the pursuers together and they were prevented from charging off too far into the distance by the smaller Roman camp, only a mile or so along its bank. The Spanish and Gallic cavalry then moved round behind the Roman army and prepared to charge into the rear of the Latin horse. Without waiting to receive them, Varro and his men fled in panic as soon as they perceived the threat. Such routs were not uncommon when a force was unexpectedly confronted by a new threat, but the ground may have added to the Latin horsemen's nervousness, for if they stayed to fight they would have been trapped between the Numidians, Hasdrubal's men, their own infantry and the steep slopes of the high ground around Cannae. Once again the commander of the Punic left wing displayed admirable control over his Celtic and Spanish warriors, halting them and leaving the pursuit of Varro's troopers entirely in the hands of the Numidians. The fact that his men had not actually made contact with the enemy probably made it easier to keep them in order. Hasdrubal wheeled them round and began a series of charges against the rear of the Roman infantry. The
triarii
may no longer have been a clearly distinct line, having been absorbed into the general mass, and anyway there were probably few senior officers in the rear of the army to organize resistance as most will have made their way forward to control the critical fighting against the Punic infantry. There was no question of a line of spearmen being able to turn around and ward off the approaching cavalry. In some places a dense group of men presented a wall of spear points to deter the oncoming horsemen, in which case they were bombarded with thrown javelins, but elsewhere the Punic horsemen were able to charge home into the panicked and disordered men.
19
triarii
may no longer have been a clearly distinct line, having been absorbed into the general mass, and anyway there were probably few senior officers in the rear of the army to organize resistance as most will have made their way forward to control the critical fighting against the Punic infantry. There was no question of a line of spearmen being able to turn around and ward off the approaching cavalry. In some places a dense group of men presented a wall of spear points to deter the oncoming horsemen, in which case they were bombarded with thrown javelins, but elsewhere the Punic horsemen were able to charge home into the panicked and disordered men.
19
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