The Fall of Carthage (36 page)
Polybius claims that Paullus still did not like the ground, but felt that the armies were now too close together for the Romans to disengage safely. It may be that Polybius was simply trying to shift the blame for the defeat onto Varro, but the difficulty of withdrawing in the face of the enemy was genuine. The Romans would be vulnerable as they withdrew across the open plain and anyway such a retreat would have had a demoralizing effect on the soldiers. It should never be forgotten that the legions at this time were not composed of the highly disciplined, professional soldiers of later years, but were still a volunteer militia of citizens who looked forward to returning to civilian life as soon as the campaign was over and the threat to their State ended. At the moment the army was enthusiastic, confident in its own numbers and encouraged by the promises of its leaders and the victories in the skirmishes over the winter. If their commanders appeared to lack a belief in victory and decided to flee from the enemy who was freely devastating Roman and allied fields, then the army's spirit would begin to drop. Apart from the risk of lowering morale, there was another pressing reason for the army to seek an early battle. Feeding so many men was an immensely difficult and never-ending problem, made far worse by the loss of the supplies at Cannae. If the campaign were prolonged, then the two consuls would be forced to divide their forces in order to keep men and horses fed. Paullus divided his army and sent the smaller portion across the Aufidius into a separate camp with the express intention of protecting the foraging parties which were to be sent out on this side of the river.
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Hannibal faced similar problems, made far worse by his lack of any immediate source of supplies beyond what his soldiers could forage or capture. Livy claims that immediately prior to the battle the situation had got so bad that many of his mercenaries, and particularly the Spanish contingents, were contemplating desertion. Hannibal is even supposed to have considered making a run for Gaul with his senior officers and cavalry, although his desperation may simply be another attempt to emphasize the wisdom of Fabius' strategy if only it had been followed. The capture of Cannae was only a temporary solution to his army's requirements and with the Romans so close he could no longer risk spreading his army out into detachments to forage. Both sides thus needed to seek battle in the immediate future if supply problems were not to put pressure on them to retreat or disperse, both of which would put them in danger. Yet the size of the Roman army was daunting and one of Hannibal's officers, a certain Gisgo, is supposed to have commented on their superiority. The general is said to have looked solemn and then quipped that whilst there may be a lot of Romans over there, there is not one called Gisgo, prompting a burst of laughter, perhaps forced, nervous, sycophantic, or a mixture of all three, from his assembled staff.
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Several days followed during which the armies stared at each other and skirmished in the usual way. Though both sides were eager to fight a battle, neither wanted to provoke one until they felt ready. By this time Hannibal had moved on from the hilltop citadel of Cannae itself and crossed the river, camping on the same side as the larger Roman camp. The most likely location for his camp is the high ground on which the modern village of San Ferdinando di Puglia now lies. On the next day, 31 July, the Carthaginian army was ordered to prepare for battle, cleaning their armour and sharpening the blades of their weapons. On 1 August Hannibal's army marched out to deploy on the open plain in front of the ridge. This was Paullus' day of command, but his only move was to deploy strong covering forces in front of both of the Roman camps. Hannibal seems to have been content with giving his soldiers this demonstration of Roman timidity. Numidian light horsemen crossed the river and rode up to harass the slaves gathering water for the smaller camp. Paullus remained on the defensive and Hannibal made no further moves to force a battle.
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The Roman commander's reluctance to fight in the open plain is understandable given Hannibal's marked superiority in cavalry, but Polybius tells us that his soldiers resented his passive behaviour, a natural mixture of enthusiasm and nervousness making them long to get the anticipated battle over with. Varro is supposed to have been similarly roused by the sight of
Numidian cavalry riding up to the Roman camp, and when he took over command of the army on the next day, decided to give battle. However, he did not plan to do so under the same circumstances which his colleague had just refused, but across the river on the narrower plain north of Cannae itself. Livy claims that he issued the orders without even bothering to consult Paullus, but this is extremely unlikely and not claimed by Polybius. It may be that Paullus did not believe it wise to fight, but this would then make his willingness to close with the enemy in the first place rather strange, and it is distinctly probable that he agreed with Varro's decision. One scholar has even suggested the ingenious and attractive theory that the battle was actually fought on Paullus' day of command, but this is impossible to prove and it is safer to stick with our sources.
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Early on the morning of 2 August, Varro had the red
vexillum,
the square Roman flag carried by the consul's bodyguard, displayed outside his tent in the traditional signal for battle. It is probable that orders had been issued to the tribunes during the night, giving them time to prepare their men, for just after dawn the army began to march out of the larger camp and cross the river. Joining the troops from the smaller camp, the Romans formed a single line of battle with its right flank resting on the river. This vital position was held by the Roman cavalry who should have been 2,400 strong if all eight legions had their full complement of horsemen. The left flank, resting against the hill of Cannae itself, was held by the Latin and allied cavalry who composed the remainder of the army's 6,000 horse, and were thus probably around 3,600 strong. The
alae
were normally supposed to supply three times as many horsemen as the legions, but the lower proportion at Cannae may have been a result of the heavy losses suffered by Centenius' force the year before. However, it is equally possible that some of the legions were below strength in horsemen, in which case the allied contingent would have been larger.
vexillum,
the square Roman flag carried by the consul's bodyguard, displayed outside his tent in the traditional signal for battle. It is probable that orders had been issued to the tribunes during the night, giving them time to prepare their men, for just after dawn the army began to march out of the larger camp and cross the river. Joining the troops from the smaller camp, the Romans formed a single line of battle with its right flank resting on the river. This vital position was held by the Roman cavalry who should have been 2,400 strong if all eight legions had their full complement of horsemen. The left flank, resting against the hill of Cannae itself, was held by the Latin and allied cavalry who composed the remainder of the army's 6,000 horse, and were thus probably around 3,600 strong. The
alae
were normally supposed to supply three times as many horsemen as the legions, but the lower proportion at Cannae may have been a result of the heavy losses suffered by Centenius' force the year before. However, it is equally possible that some of the legions were below strength in horsemen, in which case the allied contingent would have been larger.
The centre of the army was composed of its strongest component, the heavy infantry of the legions and
ala
e.
There were perhaps 55,000 heavy infantry supported by 15,000
velites,
allowing for the contingents left out of the battle for various reasons. They were in the usual
triplex acies
,
but with one major difference, for Polybius tells us that the maniples were placed closer together than usual, each one's depth 'many times' wider than its frontage. We do not know the precise dimensions of this formation and estimates have varied from a total depth for the three lines of between fifty and seventy ranks, giving a frontage for the centre of perhaps half a mile to a mile, with perhaps each maniple deploying five men abreast. There were several reasons for adopting this formation. The first was simply one of space, for the flat land between the hills and the river was narrow and would not have permitted all of the legions and
alae
to deploy in their normal, shallower formation, but given that the Romans had chosen to fight in this position they clearly did not believe this to be a major problem. The deeper, narrower formation allowed both the individual maniples and the army as a whole to move more quickly whilst the ranks kept their dressing, for the wider a formation is, the quicker it will fall into disorder as it marches across even the flattest ground. Although some of the Roman soldiers had been in service since 218, and a good number had experience from the previous year, more than half the army consisted of recent recruits whose standard of drill cannot have been high. Moreover, the entire army had had little or no time to train together, and none of the officers had experience of leading or serving in such an unprecedentedly large force. The formation adopted was simple enough to work with such material and was able to create tremendous forward pressure. Visually it was intimidating to any enemy in its path, whilst the Roman soldiers enjoyed the security of being surrounded by so many of their comrades. The deep formation would also make it harder for any of the soldiers to flee. The men in the front ranks would be unable to escape until the men behind them had given way and these were removed from the immediate risks and stress of combat. Once the Roman mass had begun its lumbering advance it would be difficult to stop. At the very least it ought to have far greater staying power than Hannibal's less numerous infantry. The price was a loss of flexibility, for the reduction in the gaps between the maniples made it virtually impossible for these to change formation or wheel to face another direction.
ala
e.
There were perhaps 55,000 heavy infantry supported by 15,000
velites,
allowing for the contingents left out of the battle for various reasons. They were in the usual
triplex acies
,
but with one major difference, for Polybius tells us that the maniples were placed closer together than usual, each one's depth 'many times' wider than its frontage. We do not know the precise dimensions of this formation and estimates have varied from a total depth for the three lines of between fifty and seventy ranks, giving a frontage for the centre of perhaps half a mile to a mile, with perhaps each maniple deploying five men abreast. There were several reasons for adopting this formation. The first was simply one of space, for the flat land between the hills and the river was narrow and would not have permitted all of the legions and
alae
to deploy in their normal, shallower formation, but given that the Romans had chosen to fight in this position they clearly did not believe this to be a major problem. The deeper, narrower formation allowed both the individual maniples and the army as a whole to move more quickly whilst the ranks kept their dressing, for the wider a formation is, the quicker it will fall into disorder as it marches across even the flattest ground. Although some of the Roman soldiers had been in service since 218, and a good number had experience from the previous year, more than half the army consisted of recent recruits whose standard of drill cannot have been high. Moreover, the entire army had had little or no time to train together, and none of the officers had experience of leading or serving in such an unprecedentedly large force. The formation adopted was simple enough to work with such material and was able to create tremendous forward pressure. Visually it was intimidating to any enemy in its path, whilst the Roman soldiers enjoyed the security of being surrounded by so many of their comrades. The deep formation would also make it harder for any of the soldiers to flee. The men in the front ranks would be unable to escape until the men behind them had given way and these were removed from the immediate risks and stress of combat. Once the Roman mass had begun its lumbering advance it would be difficult to stop. At the very least it ought to have far greater staying power than Hannibal's less numerous infantry. The price was a loss of flexibility, for the reduction in the gaps between the maniples made it virtually impossible for these to change formation or wheel to face another direction.
Varro placed himself at the head of the Latin cavalry, whilst Paullus commanded the Roman horse and the proconsul Servilius Geminus led the infantry centre. Paullus' position with the prestigious Roman cavalry has been used as evidence by those who believe that the battle was fought on his day of command, but it is actually uncertain whether there was a normal position for the supreme commander of an army. In the few battles where both consuls were present they do not appear to have placed themselves in any particular precedence, since traditionally they were not expected to fight together.
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The entire army must have occupied a frontage of between 1 and 2 miles and it is distinctly probable that it was angled back from the river, facing roughly south-west, to allow it to fit into a plain which was no more than 1
/
3
miles wide. The Roman plan was simple and based upon their experience in earlier battles. At Ticinus and Trebia the Roman cavalry had been outnumbered and outfought, allowing the enemy cavalry to outflank the entire army. Yet at Trebia the Roman infantry had broken through the enemy centre, whilst even in the disorganized fighting at Trasimene they had put up a strong resistance and the vanguard had actually smashed through the Punic line. The strengthened Roman centre should be able to repeat these successes and crush the Carthaginian centre. All that was required of the cavalry wings was for them to protect the flanks of the infantry long enough for them to win the battle in the centre. Terrain prevented the cavalry wings from being outflanked by their numerically superior enemy and the Roman tactics here were to be purely defensive, designed to hold their ground for as long as possible. It was probably for this reason that the two consuls held command of these critical positions, their presence intended to inspire the cavalry to stand against their more numerous foes. With his infantry beaten and scattered, Hannibal's army would be permanently defeated, even if his cavalry were eventually successful in their combat with their Roman counterparts. Varro's plan was not subtle, and nothing illustrates Polybius' earlier comment on the Romans' reliance on brute force better than their tactics at Cannae, but it might easily have worked and anything much more sophisticated would have been impossible with the army under his command. Hannibal had been brought to battle on ground of the Romans' choosing where they hoped to negate his cavalry superiority and could be sure that no ambush lay behind their lines. He no longer had the elephants which had panicked earlier Roman armies and now he would be crushed by the numbers and courage of Rome's greatest strength, her sturdy citizenry of farmer-soldiers.
12
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The entire army must have occupied a frontage of between 1 and 2 miles and it is distinctly probable that it was angled back from the river, facing roughly south-west, to allow it to fit into a plain which was no more than 1
/
3
miles wide. The Roman plan was simple and based upon their experience in earlier battles. At Ticinus and Trebia the Roman cavalry had been outnumbered and outfought, allowing the enemy cavalry to outflank the entire army. Yet at Trebia the Roman infantry had broken through the enemy centre, whilst even in the disorganized fighting at Trasimene they had put up a strong resistance and the vanguard had actually smashed through the Punic line. The strengthened Roman centre should be able to repeat these successes and crush the Carthaginian centre. All that was required of the cavalry wings was for them to protect the flanks of the infantry long enough for them to win the battle in the centre. Terrain prevented the cavalry wings from being outflanked by their numerically superior enemy and the Roman tactics here were to be purely defensive, designed to hold their ground for as long as possible. It was probably for this reason that the two consuls held command of these critical positions, their presence intended to inspire the cavalry to stand against their more numerous foes. With his infantry beaten and scattered, Hannibal's army would be permanently defeated, even if his cavalry were eventually successful in their combat with their Roman counterparts. Varro's plan was not subtle, and nothing illustrates Polybius' earlier comment on the Romans' reliance on brute force better than their tactics at Cannae, but it might easily have worked and anything much more sophisticated would have been impossible with the army under his command. Hannibal had been brought to battle on ground of the Romans' choosing where they hoped to negate his cavalry superiority and could be sure that no ambush lay behind their lines. He no longer had the elephants which had panicked earlier Roman armies and now he would be crushed by the numbers and courage of Rome's greatest strength, her sturdy citizenry of farmer-soldiers.
12
There was no guarantee that Hannibal would accept battle in the narrow plain. Paullus left 10,000 men to guard the larger camp which remained on the same side of the river as the enemy. It is not certain whether these were a whole unit, perhaps a legion with its
ala,
or detachments from several units. There is no good reason to believe that the entire
triarii
were given this task, since, contrary to some claims, this was not their normal role. Paullus is said to have ordered them to attack the Punic camp if Hannibal took the bait and crossed the river to fight. If this is true, then this was a bold plan, but characteristically Roman, and the capture of Hannibal's camp and baggage would make sure that the enemy had no chance of reforming his army to continue the struggle. At the very least it might compel the enemy to weaken their force by leaving a detachment to protect the camp while the rest of the army fought the main battle. In fact, the Punic commander quickly decided to accept the challenge to battle and does not seem to have made any special provision for the defence of his base.
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ala,
or detachments from several units. There is no good reason to believe that the entire
triarii
were given this task, since, contrary to some claims, this was not their normal role. Paullus is said to have ordered them to attack the Punic camp if Hannibal took the bait and crossed the river to fight. If this is true, then this was a bold plan, but characteristically Roman, and the capture of Hannibal's camp and baggage would make sure that the enemy had no chance of reforming his army to continue the struggle. At the very least it might compel the enemy to weaken their force by leaving a detachment to protect the camp while the rest of the army fought the main battle. In fact, the Punic commander quickly decided to accept the challenge to battle and does not seem to have made any special provision for the defence of his base.
13
Hannibal responded quickly to the sight of the Romans crossing the river, which may suggest that his army was at least partially prepared to move out in any case. His slingers and javelin-men were sent across the river as a covering force to allow the remainder of his army to move out and deploy. The main body forded the Aufidius in two places, which suggests that they were formed into two columns. The army then wheeled into line facing the Romans, its left flank resting on the river. The 10,000 cavalry were divided between the wings, but in this case Hannibal put all of his Numidians opposite the Latin Horse and concentrated his close order cavalry, who rode with saddles and bridles, on the left. It is unclear just how many of each nationality were present, but at least 4,000 of the cavalry were Gallic and several thousand Spanish, so it is probable that the Punic left wing significantly outnumbered the Romans facing them. The Numidians may have been roughly equal in numbers to the Latins, but certainty is impossible. Hannibal had 40,000 infantry, but this total included the light infantry. He had had 8,000 of these at Trebia and it is doubtful whether his recruitment of Celts had added substantially to this total, for skirmishing was not common in Gallic warfare. This left 32,000 close order foot, of whom the majority were Celts, perhaps as many as 20,000, for he had received no more drafts of Libyans or Spanish. Possibly there were 8-10,000 Libyan infantry and around 4,000 Spanish.
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