The Fall of Carthage (33 page)

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Authors: Adrian Goldsworthy

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BOOK: The Fall of Carthage
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Such a move would also draw the Roman army further away from the support of whatever forces they had stationed east of the Apennines -Hannibal is unlikely to have known the precise location of Geminus' army - who would doubtless attempt to join Flaminius as soon as they had confirmed which way Hannibal was going. Other factors made such a plan both feasible and desirable. Hannibal had established no permanent base from which he intended to keep his army supplied and so had no lines of communication which the Roman army could cut if he left it in his rear. Instead he relied on gathering food and forage from the land through which he was passing, carrying just enough in his baggage train to keep men and horses fed until the next opportunity came to stop and scour the neighbourhood for supplies. Although this granted his army considerable freedom of movement, it also meant that the army could never afford to stop moving for any length of time, since they would swiftly consume all the available resources of that locality. The problem was made more acute now that he had left behind the allied tribes of Cisalpine Gaul. Therefore, to move on Arretium, and hope to draw Flaminius into battle on favourable terms before his army ran out of food and had to disengage, was highly risky. Hannibal simply could not afford to fight too many indecisive battles, or win minor victories at the cost of high casualties amongst his irreplaceable experienced soldiers. Bypassing the Roman army gave Hannibal the initiative and ensured that he would dictate the course of the campaign.
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Flaminius immediately responded as the Carthaginian had predicted, and indeed as any other Roman commander of this period, and certainly the consuls of 218, would have acted. As soon as he realized that the Punic army had passed him and was devastating the land of Rome's allies, he marched out of Arretium in pursuit. He is supposed to have ignored the advice of his senior officers, as well as a series of bad omens, such as when his horse threw him, and the standard bearers had difficulty pulling the standards free from the ground where their iron butts had been planted to hold them upright. It is possible that some officers advised the consul to wait until he had been reinforced by his colleague, since Flaminius' soldiers on their own were significantly outnumbered by the enemy, but this is more probably part of the tradition which placed the sole blame for the disaster on the commander. As the Roman army marched south, it passed through the area laid waste by the enemy, through villages pillaged and burned. It was immensely humiliating when an enemy could violate the fields of a state or its allies without any interference from the army of that state, and reflected badly on its military prowess. It is important to

remember that the Roman army was still largely recruited from a rural population of farmers and their sons, commanded by officers who were themselves landowners. They retained much of the old hoplite ethos which held the preservation of the community's land to be the highest duty of the citizen under arms. When the enemy openly ignored a Roman army and felt free to plunder the land at will, this implied that it held Roman might in contempt and issued a direct challenge to prove otherwise. Few, if any, states in the ancient world were able to resist such provocation without admitting their own weakness. The Romans were no exception, especially since they were still convinced of the superiority of their infantry despite the defeat at Trebia.

As Flaminius and his army hastened to catch up with the enemy in the first weeks of June, it may well have seemed that the Carthaginians were fleeing because they were terrified of Roman arms. According to Polybius the Roman column was swollen by volunteers anticipating an easy victory and bringing along fetters and chains they expected to use on the prisoners they would capture and sell as slaves.
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Hannibal continued south, deliberately provoking the Romans with the savagery of his depredations. They were now no more than a day's march behind him. Passing the city of Cortona, he came to Lake Trasimene and saw an opportunity as the main route continued through a defile with the shore on one side and a line of hills on the other. On 20 June the Carthaginian army marched past the lake and very visibly pitched a camp at the far end of the line of hills. During the night Hannibal divided his troops into several columns and led them round behind the hills, taking up positions parallel with the path. Such night marches are never easy and it was no small feat for an army composed of so many different nationalities to' make their way quietly to the correct positions without confusion or discovery by the enemy, who had pitched camp near the lake shore late in the day. Most, if not all, of the troops were positioned on the reverse slopes of the high ground, concealed from the enemy's view when the sun came up. The cavalry were on the flank nearest to the Romans, ready to swing round behind the enemy column once it had completely entered the defile and cut off their retreat. The Celts formed the centre and the African and Spanish foot the left flank near the Punic camp. The javelin skirmishers and Balearic slingers were probably to the left of these troops ready to close the exit to the defile. Precisely where on the northern or eastern shores of Lake Trasimene the ambush was set is now impossible to know, since our sources are unclear and sometimes contradictory. It is also uncertain where the third-century shore-line lay in relation to the modern lake and possible that it has changed considerably.
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Flaminius' army was ready to move at dawn on the 21st, clearly expecting to close with his quarry today. The morning was misty, the line of hills mostly obscured, but it is possible that he could see the Punic camp at the far end of the defile. He may well have formed his army into the three columns ready to wheel into the
triplex a
cies
which was the normal way to approach the enemy, but our sources are vague, and much would depend on the width of the level ground between hills and lake in the third century
BC
. Had the army been in a single column this would have stretched for at least 5 miles and probably considerably more, making it unlikely that the whole force could have fitted into any of the likely ambush positions. Flaminius did not send out scouts, but it was rare for Roman armies at this time to take much care over reconnoitring their line of advance. It was normally assumed that in daylight any enemy numerous enough to present a threat would be clearly visible for some distance.
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As the Roman army marched steadily along the lakeside Hannibal's waiting soldiers maintained admirable discipline. It was only when the Roman vanguard - usually composed of Roman and allied cavalry and the
extra
ordinarii
followed by one of the Latin
alae -
bumped into the left of
the Punic line, either the skirmishers or the Libyans and Spanish, that Hannibal sent orders for the remainder of his army to attack. Soon attacks began to come in downhill from all directions. The Roman army was thrown into confusion. The soldiers could see little, since the mist still lay heavy in the defile and visibility was limited, and instead they heard enemy war cries and the sounds of fighting from many different directions simultaneously.
From the moment that the ambush was sprung Hannibal's victory was certain, for the Roman army was in a hopelessly bad position. Nevertheless there were to be three hours of heavy fighting before that victory was complete. The Romans may well have been marching in three columns, but it took time and considerable supervision to turn this formation into anything resembling a proper fighting line. At Trasimene there was little or no time, and anyway none of the officers knew where and facing in which direction to form a line. In some places there was panic as the soldiers fled from real or imagined foes looming out of the mist. Elsewhere the legionaries clustered together, often led by their centurions, sometimes by tribunes, and held their ground with that grim determination which so often characterized the Roman soldier. The fighting was especially heavy in the centre where the Gallic warriors suffered heavy losses as they gradually beat down the Roman resistance.
Polybius claims that Flaminius panicked and fell into despair, until he was killed by unnamed Gauls, but Livy, who has little else to say in favour of the consul, describes behaviour more appropriate for a Roman senator in the face of crisis. In this version, Flaminius galloped around the army, shouting out encouragement to the soldiers and trying to organize their resistance. Rallying a group of the bravest soldiers, he charged to the aid of his men wherever he saw them sorely pressed. Easily recognizable by his splendid equipment, the consul became the focus for enemy attacks, particularly from Hannibal's Gallic allies, who are supposed to have recognized him as the man who had defeated their warriors and laid waste their lands in 223. According to Silius Italicus' epic poem, Flaminius had adopted the further provocation of wearing a Gallic scalp on the crest of his helmet. This work is often fanciful and this may simply be a lurid invention, although if it is true it presents a far more savage image than we normally associate with the civilized Roman aristocracy. Finally, an Insubrian cavalryman, whom Livy names Ducarius, charged the Roman lines, killed Flaminius' personal bodyguard and then impaled the consul himself with his spear. However, a group of legionaries,
triarii
according to Livy although he may have been using the term generally, drove the Gauls back and saved the consul's corpse from being despoiled and beheaded.
The confusion may not all have been on the Roman side. Hannibal's army had started the battle spread over a wide area of hilly ground and had to cope with the same problems of visibility as the Romans, so their attacks may not have been as perfectly co-ordinated as our sources suggest. The Roman vanguard broke through the enemy opposing them, perhaps the light infantry, and pushed on up the road. At some point they had lost contact with the troops behind them, perhaps as some officer drew them off to form a line facing one of the other threats. About 6,000 men pushed on in this way and found no more enemies in front of them, but it was only as they climbed out of the defile and the mist began to thin that they were able to look back and see the scale of the disaster which had befallen the rest of the army. Organized resistance had largely collapsed with the consul's death. Men were killed as they ran, abandoning their weapons, or drowned as they tried to swim to safety across the lake. Others waded out into the water, submerging up to their necks, and later the Punic cavalrymen amused themselves by swimming their horses into the water and hacking at the bobbing heads. The vanguard could do nothing useful by turning back, so marched on to take sanctuary in a nearby village. Later in the day, Hannibal sent Maharbal with some Spanish troops supported by the javelin-men to surround the place. The vanguard surrendered on the promise that their lives be spared and, according to Livy, that they be allowed to go free with the clothes they wore, but nothing else. Hannibal did not approve the agreement made by his subordinate. The Romans were enslaved, but as usual the allies, who probably formed the bulk of this group, were well treated and allowed to return home with the assurance that he was fighting on their behalf against their Roman masters.
Fabius Pictor claimed that 15,000 Romans were killed, whilst 10,000 men were dispersed and gradually made their way back to Rome. It is unclear whether this figure included prisoners, such as the 6,000 men of the vanguard, but Polybius says that Hannibal captured around 15,000 men. He also gathered a great quantity of booty and in particular military equipment. Soon the Libyan infantry were re-equipped as Roman legionaries, each man being given mail, a bronze helmet and an oval
scutum,
although it is unclear whether they also adopted Roman
pila
or swords. Hannibal's own losses were much less, either 1,500 or 2,500 depending on the source, the vast majority Gauls, but including thirty senior officers. A loss of 3-5 per cent was not too high a price to pay for the annihilation of the enemy as an effective force, but, given the tactical advantages enjoyed by the Punic army, it testifies to the ferocious resistance put up by many of the Roman and allied soldiers. Hannibal buried his own dead, and particularly his officers, with some care and attempted to locate the body of Flaminius in order to pay the consul the same courtesy, but was unable to find it. Perhaps the Insubres had disposed of it after their own fashion, but it may simply have been lost amongst the many dead, or quickly stripped of its armour and clothing by looters thus becoming unrecognizable.
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Within a few days the Romans suffered another disaster. Geminus had been hurrying to join his colleague and had sent on ahead 4,000 cavalry under one Gaius Centenius. Hannibal learned of their approach before the Romans knew of Flaminius' defeat. Maharbal took another column out and launched a surprise attack on the Roman horsemen. Those who were not killed in the first onslaught retired to some high ground, but were surrounded and surrendered the next day. The loss of its cavalry effectively removed whatever threat had been posed by the other Roman army in the field.
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