Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (34 page)

3
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 212 (5 December 1940).

4
John Keegan,
The Second World War
(New York, 1989), p. 146.

5
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 150 (4 November 1940).

6
Domarus,
Hitler
, Volume III, p. 2139; Detlef Vogel, ‘Die deutsche Balkanpolitik im Herbst 1940 und Frühjahr 1941’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band III, p. 422.

7
Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia 1939–1941
, p. 165.

8
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 332 (28 March 1941).

9
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, pp. 271–272.

10
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 145;. Günther Blumentritt,
Von Rundstedt. The Soldier and the Man
(London, 1952), p. 101; Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 506–507; Detlef Vogel ‘Der deutsche Überfall auf Jugoslawien und Griechenland’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band III, p. 483.

11
Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia 1939–1941
, p. 166.

12
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 387 (30 April 1941); Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’, p. 36.

13
Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 134.

14
Vogel, ‘Der deutsche Überfall’, p. 483; Seaton,
The German Army 1933–45
, p. 171. For a detailed study see Mark Mazower,
Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation, 1941–1944
(London, 1993).

15
Keegan,
The Second World War
, pp. 171–172.

16
Kershaw,
Hitler 1936–1945
, pp. 368–369.

17
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 387 (30 April 1941); Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 134; Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 507–508; Kershaw,
Hitler 1936–1945
, p. 368.

18
Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
, p. 100.

19
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 8,
War Diary
, p. 201 (27 February 1941).

20
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 325 and 330 (21 and 27 March 1941).

21
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 16 (14–16 May 1941). See also Fol. 21 (4 June 1941),
War Diary
, p. 213 (14–16 May 1941), and p. 218 (4 June 1941).

22
Ibid., Fol. 16, p. 213 (14–16 May 1941).

23
Macksey,
Guderian
, p. 131.

24
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 23,
War Diary
, p. 220 (12 June 1941).

25
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 382 (26 April 1941).

26
Ibid., pp. 396–397 (5 May 1941).

27
Burleigh,
The Third Reich
, p. 491; Hillgruber, ‘The German Military Leaders’ View of Russia’, p. 181.

28
Von Hassell,
Vom andern Deutschland
, p. 209 (15 June 1941); von Hassell,
Diaries
, p. 180 (15 June 1941).

29
Guderian,
Achtung-Panzer!
, pp. 153–154.

30
Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 226–227; Engel,
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943
, p. 86 (10 August 1940).

31
Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky was a Marshal of the Soviet Union who staunchly advocated the mechanisation of the Red Army and sought to employ these technological advancements in a new method of warfare which he described as ‘Deep Battle’. Tukhachevsky authored the Red Army's 1936 field manual which included many of the principal formulas of modern military operations and cemented his places as one of the great military minds of the twentieth century. In spite of his brilliance Tukhachevsky never enjoyed good relations with Stalin and was one of the most prominent victims of the military purge, being arrested and shot in 1937.

32
Manfred Zeidler, ‘Das Bild der Wehrmacht von Russland und der Roten Armee zwischen 1933 und 1939’ in Hans-Erich Volkmann (ed.),
Das Russlandbild im Dritten Reich
(Cologne, 1994), pp. 116–123.

33
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, pp. 64–65.

34
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, pp. 131–134.

35
As cited in Georg Meyer,
Adolf Heusinger. Dienst eines deutschen Soldaten 1915 bis 1964
(Berlin, 2001), p. 150.

36
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, p. 277.

37
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 455 (14 June 1941); Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fols. 23–24,
War Diary
, pp. 220–222 (14 June 1941).

38
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, p. 277.

39
Ibid., p. 278.

40
Ibid., pp. 279–280.

41
Streit, ‘Partisans’, pp. 262–263.

42
H. F. Hinsley, ‘British Intelligence and Barbarossa’ in John Erickson and David Dilks (eds.),
Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies
(Edinburgh, 1998), p. 72; Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 121. See also Churchill,
The Second World War
, p. 461.

43
Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 444 (footnote 93) and 558; Hillgruber,
Der Zenit des Zweiten Weltkrieges
, pp. 26–27; Gerd R. Ueberschär, ‘Das Scheitern des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”. Der deutsch-sowjetische Krieg vom Überfall bis zur Wende vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42’ in Gerd Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (eds.),
‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’. Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941
(Paderborn, 1984), pp. 150–151.

44
Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.),
Ciano's Diary 1939–1943
(Kingswood, 1947), p. 365 (1 July 1941). See also comments on p. 354 (6 June 1941).

45
Although Kiyomoto's view represented the prevailing view within the army, the Japanese Navy, favouring a southward strike into the Pacific, were by no means as convinced. John Chapman, ‘The Imperial Japanese Navy and the North-South Dilemma’ in John Erickson and David Dilks (eds.),
Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies
(Edinburgh, 1998), p. 176.

46
Elke Fröhlich (ed.),
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels
, Teil I: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, Band 9, Dezember 1940–Juli 1941 (Munich, 1998), p. 377 (16 June 1941).

47
Thomas,
Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft
, p. 18.

48
Eleanor Hancock,
The National Socialist Leadership and Total War 1941–45
(New York, 1991), p. 27.

49
Fest,
Hitler
, p. 647.

50
Domarus,
Hitler
, Volume IV, p. 2455.

51
Hugh Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944. His Private Conversations
(London, 2000), p. 71 (17–18 October 1941).

52
Barber and Harrison,
The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945
, pp. 40–41. See also John Erickson, ‘Soviet War Losses. Calculations and Controversies’ in John Erickson and David Dilks (eds.),
Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies
(Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 255–277.

53
Weinberg,
A World At Arms
, p. 894.

54
The total war dead of both the Allied and Central Powers was in excess of 8 million men. Brian Bond,
The Pursuit of Victory. From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein
(Oxford, 1998), p. 124. Barber and Harrison looked at Soviet losses another way: ‘for every dead Briton or American (including both soldiers and citizens), some seven Japanese, twenty Germans and eighty-five Soviet citizens had died’ (Barber and Harrison,
The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945
, p. ix).

55
Braithwaite,
Moscow 1941
, p. 310.

56
This figure is a linear measurement of the front; the actual length was about half as much again. See Glantz,
The Soviet-German War 1941–1945
, p. 5. For a partial reproduction of this essay see Glantz, ‘Introduction’, p. 5.

57
In January 1943 with the German disaster at Stalingrad entering its final stages, Hitler was clear about the cost of losing the war. It was not to be seen as one of victory and defeat, but rather one of ‘survivors and annihilated’. Overy,
Why the Allies Won
, p. 321.

58
Taken from the World War II memoir of eastern front veteran Rick Holz. Rick Holz,
Too Young to be a Hero
(Sydney, 2000), p. 132.

Part II The military campaign and the July/August crisis of 1941

5 Awakening the bear

Indecisive border battles and the surfacing of strategic dissent

The war on Germany's eastern frontier began at 3.15 a.m. on 22 June 1941 with powerful artillery bombardments at the points of main concentration along the front. The barrage was soon followed by the advance of panzer and motorised divisions with the Luftwaffe poised to strike Soviet airfields at first light. The largest military operation in history was underway.

Map 1 
Dispositions of Army Group Centre 22 June 1941: David M. Glantz,
Atlas and Operational Summary The Border Battles 22 June–1 July 1941

Aiding
the German advance, Soviet deployments in their first strategic echelon opposite Army Group Centre were set well forward, with only the most rudimentary of prepared defences
¹
and, owing to
Stalin's intransigence, received no warning of the impending invasion until it was literally underway. Compounding the problem, the strategic deployment of the Soviet
3rd,
10th and
4th Armies, which according to pre-war Soviet plans were to absorb an initial German blow, were heavily concentrated in the west of the
Belostok salient largely between the joint armoured thrusts of 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups, thus greatly facilitating their encirclement.
²
Not surprisingly therefore, in the early hours of
3rd Panzer Group's surge eastward, forward units reported ‘only very weak or no enemy contact’.
³
Luftwaffe reconnaissance counted just one enemy artillery battery in its
path.
⁴
Before the end of the day Hoth's panzer group was on the
Neman River with captured bridges at
Olita and
Merkine. The penetration of the Soviet front, Halder suggested, had already won the panzer group freedom of operational manoeuvre.
⁵
Yet
, in spite of its success, the panzer group's war diary includes the observation:

Where the enemy appears he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. The struggle, as a result, will be harder than those in Poland and the Western
campaign.
⁶

In similar fashion the commander of the
XXXXIII Army Corps
⁷
in Kluge's
4th Army, General of Infantry Gotthard
Heinrici, wrote home to his family on 24 June that the Soviet solder fought ‘very hard’. Heinrici then concluded: ‘He is a much better soldier than the Frenchman. Extremely tough, devious and deceitful.’
⁸

The
2nd Panzer Group, operating 190 kilometres to the south of Hoth, had a more difficult advance (see
Map 1
). While some bridges across the
Bug River (which then formed the German/Soviet border) were seized in the initial German assault, Field Marshal
Bock observed that at
Brest, which sat on the road to Moscow, the first bridge over the river was only secured at noon. Complicating matters, General of Panzer Troops Joachim
Lemelsen, the commander of the
XXXXVII Panzer Corps (
17th and
18th Panzer Divisions,
29th Motorised Division and
167th Infantry Division
⁹
) reported that he was having difficulties crossing the captured bridges because the approach roads were literally sinking into the swamplands under the heavy weight of traffic.
¹⁰
Even once across the Bug, German forces still had to contend with the Brest fortified district which
was to prove a thorn in the army's side long after the armoured spearhead had passed it by. Difficulties continued to mount when a central route of the panzer group's right wing, made up of the
XXIV Panzer Corps (
3rd and
4th Panzer Divisions,
10th Motorised Division,
1st Cavalry Division and
255th Infantry Division
¹¹
) under General of Panzer Troops Freiherr Geyr von
Schweppenberg, was found to consist of ‘catastrophic road conditions’ that were deemed ‘impossible’ to traverse.
¹²
As a result 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions had to share the same road, which was deemed ‘hardly traversable’ for wheeled vehicles.
¹³
The delays and subsequent loss of the bridge over the
Muchaviec River meant that in the course of the day the distance advanced was only 18 kilometres when it should have been 80
kilometres.
¹⁴