Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (30 page)

In his 1937 book
Achtung-Panzer
the German tank commander, Heinz
Guderian, wrote:

The extensive mechanization of the army has raised two important issues: how will the army as a whole be supplied with fuel, spares and replacement vehicles? And how will we be able to move our large mechanized formations, and especially the ones that are road-bound? A positive answer to these two requirements is a precondition for the deployment of large tank formations, not least for their use in the operational dimension.
¹⁴⁰

In answer to his own pertinent questions, Guderian cited three areas of concentration – fuel, sustained replenishment of military vehicles with spare parts and access to a network of highways and roads. While each of these three conditions presented their share of problems during the
French campaign, the ultimate success of the operation has suggested to some that none of these posed insurmountable difficulties.
¹⁴¹
In casting an eye forward to the eastern campaign, maintaining faith in the army's logistical apparatus should have taken into account both the expansion
of the German army and the fundamental geographic differences to be encountered. Whereas shortages of fuel proved substantial in France, their effect was mitigated firstly by the much shorter distances (the longest stretches of the advance were undertaken only after effective Allied resistance had been broken), secondly by the seizure of Allied fuel dumps, and thirdly by the fact that German tanks were fitted with petrol engines, which allowed them to refuel at roadside petrol stations.
¹⁴²
By contrast, not only was the Soviet Union a much larger theatre of operations, but Soviet fuel contained a lower octane content rendering captured stocks useless until they could be treated in specially-constructed installations.
¹⁴³

Guderian's second condition, the need to ensure the replenishment of military vehicles and spare parts, has already been identified as failing to meet even the most basic requirements of the army. This was evident even from the Polish campaign and the problem became so acute in the invasion of France that ten days into the campaign Wagner, then Chief of Staff at the Quartermaster-General's office, requested and received permission to ‘gather all available motorised transport in Germany’ to provide for the needs of the
army.
¹⁴⁴
By comparison with the conditions in the west, the eastern campaign presented logistical challenges so profound that the prospect of a greater crisis of over-extension was not only likely, it was preordained.

The third point raised by Guderian was the need for access to roads or highways to facilitate supply. Given the extremely limited degree of German motorisation in 1937, such an assertion neglects the vital role railways would have to play in any foreseeable war, but it also makes the implicit assumption that supplying mobile divisions is only possible in developed areas.
¹⁴⁵
The barren and open plains to the east, crossed only by minor farming tracks and occasional dirt roads, often ruined by the heavy traffic of horse and cart, were not what Guderian had in mind
. Indeed, of the 850,000 miles of road in the Soviet Union, only 40,000 miles were hard surfaced, all-weather roads.
¹⁴⁶

There can be no doubt that the German operations in the east were underpinned by irresponsible staff work and shameless over-confidence. In 1940–1941 Germany stood at the height of its overwhelming military success and, flushed with the accolades of past victories, Hitler's generals eagerly accepted each new task. The challenges presented by Operation Barbarossa seemed less threatening than those faced by the ultimately victorious campaign in the west. The collective shame of those generals, who had dared doubt the invasion of France and the Low Countries, soon extinguished future scepticism and confused the line between reasoned objection and pessimistic cynicism. Accordingly, the flaws so plainly apparent in the conception of the coming campaign were allowed to pass, at times with both a measure of official acknowledgement and indifference.
¹⁴⁷
Reminiscent of Hitler's constant extolment of the primacy of ‘will’, irrespective of difficulties, the generals remained steadfastly undeterred by problematic or negative reports and concentrated simply on implementing the orders at hand. Beginning such a major campaign with such a deplorable base in logistics and supply was an obvious symptom of the larger
problem.

1
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 183.

2
Overy,
Why the Allies Won
, p. 201.

3
Ibid., p. 203.

4
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, p. 130.

5
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 177.

6
Thomas,
Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918–1943/45)
, p. 437.

7
As cited by Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 179.

8
Ibid., pp. 180–181.

9
Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East’, p. 124.

10
This is an abbreviation for ‘Panzer-Kampfwagen I’ (Armoured Fighting Vehicle I), commonly referred to as just ‘Mark I’.

11
See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

12
George Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
(London, 1999), pp. 30–31.

13
Ferdinand Maria von Senger und Etterlin,
German Tanks of World War II. The Complete Illustrated History of German Armoured Fighting Vehicles 1926–1945
(Harrisberg, 1969), pp. 24–25, 91–92.

14
Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
, pp. 37–38.

16
See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

15
Von Senger und Etterlin,
German Tanks of World War II
, p. 25.

17
Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
, pp. 48–51; Helmut Ritgen, ‘6th Panzer Division Operations’ in David M. Glantz (ed.),
The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front 22 June–August 1941
(London, 1997), p. 108; Peter Tsouras (ed.),
Panzers on the Eastern Front. General Erhard Raus and his Panzer Divisions in Russia 1941–1945
(London, 2002), p. 223.

18
See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

19
Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
, pp. 51–60.

20
See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

21
See the table: ‘Die materielle Ausstattung des deutschen Ostheeres am 22. Juni 1941’, ibid., pp. 186–187.

22
Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
, p. 58.

23
Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
, pp. 18–19, 61; Kenneth Macksey,
Guderian. Panzer General
(London, 1975), pp. 65–66.

24
Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
, pp. 61–62.

25
See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

26
Von Senger und Etterlin,
German Tanks of World War II
, p. 39.

27
See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

28
This changed when the main armament was upgraded in 1942, overtaking the role of the Mark III and becoming the main anti-tank tank.

29
Forty,
German Tanks of World War II
, pp. 79–80.

30
See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

31
‘KV’ stands for Kliment Voroshilov, the Soviet Commissar of War (renamed Commissar of Defence in 1934) from 1925 to 1940.

32
Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, p. 117; Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, p. 36. John Erickson cites a lower figure 1,475 (508 Kv-1s and 967 T-34s); Erickson,
The Soviet High Command 1918–1941
, p. 567.

33
Earlier designs in the KV-1 series supported slightly weaker guns, but even the weakest variant of these (the 76.2mm F-32) was capable of penetrating 52mm armour at a range of 1,000 metres.

34
The earlier model T-34 possessed a smaller gun (the 76.2mm L-11) which could still penetrate 56mm armour at a range of 1,000 metres.

35
David M. Glantz, ‘Introduction: Prelude to Barbarossa. The Red Army in 1941’ in Glantz (ed.),
The Initial Period of War
, p. 33; Glantz,
Colossus Reborn
, p. 247.

36
Franz Halder, KTB II, pp. 411–412 (14 May 1941).

37
‘Oberkommando des Heeres/Generalstab des Heeres’, BA-MA RH 2/v. 247, Fol. 151.

38
Each corps was destined to field 36,080 men, 1,031 tanks (half of these being either KV-1s or T-34s), 358 guns, 268 armoured cars, 5,165 vehicles and 352 tractors.

39
Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, pp. 116–118.

40
Erickson,
The Soviet High Command 1918–1941
, p. 567.

41
Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, pp. 117–118.

42
Braithwaite,
Moscow 1941
, p. 50.

43
Figures cited in Rolf-Dieter Müller's table on armoured fighting vehicles includes armoured staff cars, which I have subtracted from my total (Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185). Karl-Heinz Frieser's figure does not include the six StuG IIIs which I have added (Frieser,
Blitzkrieg-Legende
, p. 44).

44
Matthew Cooper,
The German Army 1933–1945. Its Political and Military Failure
(New York, 1984), p. 276.

45
Figures cited in Rolf-Dieter Müller's table on armoured fighting vehicles include armoured staff cars, which I have subtracted from my total (Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185).

46
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 270.

47
Statistical calculations have been made from figures given in Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand,
Das Heer 1933–1945
, Band III:
Der Zweifrontenkrieg. Das Heer vom Beginn des Feldzuges gegen die Sowjetunion bis zum Kriegsende
(Frankfurt am Main, 1969), p. 205.

48
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, pp. 186–187.

49
Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, p. 44.

50
‘Beurteilung des Kampfwertes der Divisionen nach dem Stand vom 20. Juni 1941’, BA-MA RH 2/v. 247, Fol. 154.

51
Ibid., Fols. 151–153.

52
Kroener, ‘Die Winter 1941/42’, p. 879.

53
Department of the U.S. Army (ed.),
Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia
(Washington, 1953), pp. 1–2. One former German soldier of the eastern front wrote of November 1941: ‘Missions were carried out with a few men that would have seemed nearly incredible in earlier months and that would have occasioned an unbelieving smile from every teacher of tactics at the war college.’ Helmut Günther,
Hot Motors, Cold Feet. A Memoir of Service with the Motorcycle Battalion of SS-Division ‘Reich’ 1940–1941
(Winnipeg, 2004), p. 207.

54
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 270.

55
Overy,
Why the Allies Won
, p. 215; Richard L. DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism: Horses and the German Army in World War II
(London, 1991), pp. 39–40; Mary Habeck,
Storm of Steel. The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939
(London, 2003), p. 292.

56
The best source available for maps of the period are the many dozens which accompany David Glantz's edited work
The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front 22 June–August 1941
. His privately published
Atlas and Operational Summary The Border Battles 22 June–1 July 1941
and
Atlas of the Battle of Smolensk 7 July–10 September 1941
are indispensable.

57
Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, p. 306. Evan Mawdsley suggests that the Red Army only had a total of 33,200 artillery pieces in June 1941, but even this lower figure still gives the Soviets an almost fivefold advantage over the Germans. Evan Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East. The Nazi–Soviet War 1941–1945
(London, 2005), p. 26.

58
4,760 light artillery pieces, 104 army AA guns (88mm), 2,252 heavy artillery pieces and 30 super-heavy high/low angle guns (Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 270).

59
Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, pp. 163–164.

60
See table: ‘Das Rüstungsprogramm B. Die Fertigung von Waffen Gerät und Munition für das Heer vom 1.9.1940 bis 31.3.1941’ in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 184.