Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (31 page)

61
Tsouras (ed.),
Panzers on the Eastern Front
, p. 223.

62
Chris Perello, ‘German Infantry on the Eastern Front in 1941’ in Command Magazine (ed.),
Hitler's Army. The Evolution and Structure of German Forces, 1933–1945
(Boston, 2003), p. 20.

63
Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘Squaring the Circle. Blitzkrieg Strategy and the Manpower Shortage, 1939–1942’ in Wilhelm Deist (ed.),
The German Military in the Age of Total War
(Warwickshire, 1985), pp. 294–295; Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘The “Frozen
Blitzkrieg
”. German Strategic Planning against the Soviet Union and the Causes of its Failure’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 142–143. Also see Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East’, pp. 124–125.

64
Tooze,
Wages of Destruction
, p. 437.

65
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 422 (20 May 1941).

66
Kroener, ‘Die Winter 1941/42’, p. 872.

67
Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, p. 301.

68
Roger R. Reese,
Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers. A Social History of the Red Army 1925–1941
(Lawrence, 1996),
Chapter 7
, ‘The Predictable Disaster and the End of the Red Army: 22 June to December 1941’; Mark von Hagen, ‘Soviet Soldiers and Officers on the Eve of the German Invasion: Towards a Description of Social Psychology and Political Attitudes’ in Robert Thurston and Bernd Bonwetsch (eds.),
The People's War. Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union
(Chicago, 2000), pp. 187–210; Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
,
Chapter 3
, ‘The Soviet Soldier’.

69
Richard R. Muller, ‘Close Air Support. The German, British and American Experiences, 1918–1941’ in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds.),
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period
(Cambridge, 1998), p. 160.

70
Williamson Murray, ‘Strategic Bombing. The British, American and German Experiences’ in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds.),
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period
(Cambridge, 1998), pp. 131–132; Muller, ‘Close Air Support’, p. 160.

71
There were also a sizeable number of long- and short-range reconnaissance aircraft in service which I have excluded owing to their non-tactical role.

72
Seaton,
The Russo-German War 1941–45
, p. 87.

73
Peter Young (ed.),
The World Almanac of World War II. The Complete and Comprehensive Documentary of World War II
(London, 1981), pp. 469–470.

74
An abbreviation of
Stukageschwader
– dive-bomber groups.

75
Young (ed.),
The World Almanac of World War II
, pp. 484–485.

76
Ibid., pp. 495–497; Horst Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
; see table: Taktisch-technische Daten der hauptsächlichsten im Sommer 1941 im Osten eingesetzten Flugzeugmuster der deutschen Luftwaffe, p. 314.

77
Williamson Murray,
The Luftwaffe 1933–45. Strategy for Defeat
(Washington, 1996). See Table X: Aircraft Losses – May–September 1940, p. 54.

78
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 129 (7 October 1940).

79
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, pp. 93–94.

80
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 278. See also Richard Muller,
The German Air War in Russia
(Baltimore, 1992), p. 38.

81
Murray,
The Luftwaffe 1933–45
. See figures presented in Table V: German Fighter Losses 1940, p. 42; Table IV: German Bomber Losses 1940, p. 43; Table XVI: German Fighter Losses 1941, p. 92; Table XV: German Bomber Losses 1941, p. 91.

82
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, pp. 279–280.

83
Murray,
The Luftwaffe 1933–45
. See figures presented in Table XVI: German Fighter Losses 1941, p. 92 and Table XV: German Bomber Losses 1941, p. 91.

84
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 281.

85
Murray,
The Luftwaffe 1933–45
, p. 77.

86
For a good overview of the problems within the German aircraft industry see Tooze,
Wages of Destruction
, pp. 446–452; Overy,
Why the Allies Won
, pp. 218–220.

87
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 287.

88
Ibid., p. 298; Schwabedissen,
Russian Air Force
, p. 49.

89
Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, p. 204.

90
David M. Glantz,
Barbarossa. Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941
(Stroud, 2001), p. 27.

91
Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, pp. 186–191; Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, pp. 297–298.

92
Schwabedissen,
Russian Air Force
, p. 51.

93
Muller,
The German Air War in Russia
, p. 41; Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, p. 184.

94
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 299.

95
Ibid., p. 305.

96
Hermann Plocher,
The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1941
(New York, 1965), p. 24.

97
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’. See table: Ist-Stärke und Einsatzbereitschaft der fliegenden Verbände (einschl. Ergänzungsgruppen) der Luftwaffe im Osten am Vortage ‘Barbarossa’ (21.6.1941), p. 313. The small Fifth Air Fleet deployed in the extreme north of the front did however command 40 dive-bombers and four destroyers.

98
Kesselring,
Memoirs
, p. 89.

99
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 309.

100
Ibid., p. 307.

101
Muller,
The German Air War in Russia
, p. 40. On this note, aviation historian Richard Muller added: ‘While not every Luftwaffe unit had undergone such extensive recent use, the fact remains that the German air force commenced its largest operation of the war with a force structure and serviceability at dangerously low levels.’

102
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’; see table, p. 313. See also Plocher,
German Air Force Versus Russia
, p. 35.

103
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 316.

104
Klaus Schüler, ‘The Eastern Campaign as a Transportation and Supply Problem’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), p. 206, footnote 2. See also Klaus Schüler,
Logistik im Russlandfeldzug. Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vorbereitung und Durchführung des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42
(Frankfurt am Main, 1987).

105
Martin van Creveld,
Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
(Cambridge, 1984), pp. 143–144.

106
Klaus Schüler, ‘The Eastern Campaign’, p. 207.

107
Van Creveld,
Supplying War
, p. 144.

108
Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, pp. 204–205.

109
Halder records this figure as being ‘less than 2%’, which is mathematically incorrect.

110
The fact that the overall figure for trucks undergoing maintenance and repair is so much lower than that for those in the
Grosstransportraum
(20 per cent) may reflect the added strain placed on this arm of the service.

111
Franz Halder, KTB I, pp. 180–181 (4 February 1940).

112
Ibid., p. 181.

113
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 4 (1 July 1940).

114
General Guderian later wrote that these French vehicles were ‘in no way capable of meeting the demands of warfare in eastern Europe’ (Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 143). See also comments by General Hoth (Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, pp. 44–45).

115
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 321 (18 March 1941).

116
Many of these, however, were destined to remain in Africa to support Rommel's Africa corps. Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 390 (2 May 1941).

117
Van Creveld,
Supplying War
, p. 151.

118
Overy,
Why the Allies Won
, p. 217.

119
Rudolf Steiger,
Armour Tactics in World War II. Panzer Army Campaigns of 1939–41 in German War Diaries
(Oxford, 1991), p. 127.

120
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, pp. 188–189.

121
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 454 (13 June 1940).

122
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 272.

123
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 454 (13 June 1940).

124
Ibid., p. 51 (1 August 1940).

125
Dr Ihno Krumpelt and a small staff were commissioned by Wagner at the beginning of October 1940 to commence planning for an eastern campaign. See Ihno Krumpelt,
Das Material und die Kriegführung
(Frankfurt am Main, 1968) p. 149.

126
‘Beurteilung des Kampfwertes der Divisionen nach dem Stand vom 20. Juni 1941’, BA-MA RH 2/v. 247, Fols 151–153.

127
Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia 1939–1941
, p. 138.

128
Von Senger und Etterlin,
German Tanks of World War II
, p. 45.

129
Franz Halder, KTB II, pp. 382 and 384 (26 and 28 April 1941); van Creveld,
Supplying War
, p. 151; Wilhelm Deist, ‘Die militärische Planung des “Unternehmens Barbarossa”’ in Roland G. Foerster (ed.),
‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’
(Munich, 1993), p. 115.

130
Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen “Blitzkriegstrategie”’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, p. 961.

131
Elisabeth Wagner (ed.),
Der Generalquartiermeister. Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner
(Munich, 1963), p. 285; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia 1939–1941
, pp. 138–139; van Creveld,
Supplying War
, p. 153; Müller, ‘Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen “Blitzkriegstrategie”’, pp. 961–962.

132
Krumpelt,
Das Material und die Kriegführung
, pp. 150–151 and 154–155.

133
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 257–258.

134
Bartov,
The Eastern Front, 1941–45
, pp. 130 and 135.

135
In some regions such as eastern Poland, the Ukraine and the Baltic states the Germans were initially seen as liberators from communist domination.

136
Alexander Dallin,
German Rule in Russia 1941–1945. A Study of Occupation Policies
(London, 1957), p. 215.

137
Schüler, ‘The Eastern Campaign’, pp. 209–210.

138
Van Creveld,
Supplying War
, p. 153.

139
Müller, ‘Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen “Blitzkriegstrategie”’, p. 962. It was only in the summer of 1942 that the army groups in the east were at last given command over their supply apparitus. Krumpelt,
Das Material und die Kriegführung
, p. 153.

140
Guderian,
Achtung-Panzer!
, p. 207.

141
Much less than a major inhibiting factor, R. H. S Stolfi's argument even suggests that the German supply system could have supported operations as far as Moscow in the summer of 1941 (Stolfi,
Hitler's Panzers East
, Chapter 11, ‘German Logistics: Could the Germans Support an Advance into the Moscow-Gorki Space in the Summer of 1941?’).

142
Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, p. 179.

143
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 422 (20 May 1941); van Creveld,
Supplying War
, p. 150.

144
Wagner (ed.),
Der Generalquartiermeister
, p. 256.

145
Guderian suggested that Italian achievements in building roads during their Abyssinian campaign presented a model for adapting his operations to desolate landscapes. Thus, he called for the establishment of special road-construction units, equipped with modern machines and tools. Yet he does not address how these special units could possibly keep pace with the rapid forward movement of operations, especially over long distances. Guderian,
Achtung-Panzer!
, p. 209.

146
Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer,
Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East
(New York, 1988), p. 14.

147
Richard Lakowski, ‘Between Professionalism and Nazism. The Wehrmacht on the Eve of its Invasion of the USSR’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 162–164.