Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (14 page)

Is it quite clear that the two men foresaw different objectives in the secondary stage of the campaign. For Halder the drive on Moscow was to be the decisive event of the war, whereas Hitler showed only marginal
interest and concerned himself more with the destruction of Soviet forces. It is typical of their relationship, and a reflection of the disjointed method of communication within the High Command itself, that Halder chose not to pursue his argument even though we know from subsequent events that he fiercely opposed any compromise on Moscow as the primary objective. Paulus confirmed that from the very beginning there existed ‘a sharp divergence of opinion between Supreme Headquarters (Hitler) and the Army General Staff regarding both the manner in which the operations should be conducted and the intermediate objectives that should be set’.
¹¹⁷
Yet the blame in this case must lie more with Halder as Hitler undoubtedly assumed his preference predominated, while Halder either surreptitiously opted to try and force Hitler's hand at the opportune moment (i.e. during the campaign), or he simply felt that the initial blow would remove any serious threat from the Red Army, and the secondary phase of operations would be a straightforward drive
eastward.
¹¹⁸
In any case the result postponed the conflict and ensured that this fundamental difference of opinion was to become a crisis in July/August
1941.

The degree of complacency demonstrated by a man of Halder's prominence and responsibility in such a fundamental aspect of the coming invasion highlights another facet of the conceited over-confidence shown by the Chief of the General Staff towards the most important military undertaking of the Third Reich. It also attests to his inflated perception of his own ability, confident that his plan held greater merit in spite of his poor, unimaginative and ultimately rejected proposal for the attack in the west (Plan Yellow).
¹¹⁹
Yet Halder was not alone in his supercilious estimations;
Brauchitsch himself later described the coming campaign in the following terms: ‘Massive frontier battles to be expected; duration up to four weeks. But in further development only minor resistance is then still to be reckoned with.’
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Halder's
diary for 5 December 1940 took a confident tone towards the forthcoming campaign and stated simply that ‘The Russian is inferior’, but beyond such bias, indistinguishable from the standard National Socialist racial prejudice, he also commented on the state of Soviet equipment. He portrayed the Soviet air force as antiquated even in comparison with the older German models; their artillery batteries were noted to
include a few ‘modern’ designs but he dismissed the majority as ‘rebuilt old material’. Most importantly Halder extolled the ‘clear superiority’ of the Mark III German panzer with its 5cm gun and estimated production of 1,500 units by the spring of 1941. Soviet tanks, Halder concluded, were largely distinctive for their poor armour.
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On 28 November 1940, OKH ordered the Chiefs of Staff of Army Groups A, B and C to carry out independent operational studies on the proposed invasion of the Soviet Union. Two of these by Generals Brennecke (Army Group C) and von Salmuth (Army Group B) were not dissimilar from the operational approach developed and tested by Paulus.
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Yet the third study by the Chief of Staff for Army Group A, General
Georg von Sodenstern, completed 7 December 1940, presented a novel approach which called for an envelopment by two army groups deployed to the north and south of the
Pripet marshes. This would be aided by a smaller central army group advancing into the marshes and driving the assumed significant enemy forces into the developing German pincers. Upon completion of this first phase the united northern and southern army groups would then drive directly on Moscow with their flanks covered by subsidiary thrusts towards
Pskov,
Toropez,
Kursk and
Kharkov. Sodenstern's narrow front of advance (which neglected contact with either the Baltic or Black Seas) proceeded from a recognition of the vastness of the territory and the resulting dissipation of strength along the line. Having seized the vital industrial heart of the country it was then hoped that such a bargaining chip would help secure grounds for a favourable peace settlement.
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Sodenstern's study seems radical in comparison with the other proposals presented and there is some unqualified evidence to suggest that he had doubts about the success of the campaign. This may account for the unorthodox operational approach he adopted, yet the degree of influence, if any at all, Sodenstern's study had on future planning within the OKH remains unclear.
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On 13 and 14 December
Halder hosted a conference with the Chiefs of Staff of the Army Groups and Armies. Its purpose, as Halder put it, was to outline the military–political situation ‘based on our version of a discussion with the Führer’.
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The analysis encompassed the broader
European situation and was not restricted to the coming invasion of the Soviet Union, but Halder pointed out that the struggle for hegemony in Europe would be resolved only through ‘war against Russia’.
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The result for the army, he continued, was a single-front war
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requiring between 130 and 140 divisions. The air force, however, would have to undertake a two-front war, while the navy cleared the Baltic. With no irony intended, Halder finished his summary: ‘
We do not seek conflict with Russia, but must
be prepared for this eventuality by spring 1941.’
¹²⁸
Not surprisingly, Halder's selective account of his discussion with Hitler included no mention of the rift over Moscow nor, as will be seen, his determination to circumvent Hitler's authority on the matter.

Following the conference on 5 December 1940 and Hitler's broad satisfaction with the proposals presented by the army, preparations began in earnest on a new draft war directive to be compiled by the Operations Section of OKW.
Walter Warlimont, Jodl's deputy in charge of OKW planning, later testified that the first drafts were completed with the firm approval of the Operations Section of the OKH, meaning that the concentration of effort was directed towards the unambiguous goal of Moscow.
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As one may expect, Halder maintained a watchful eye on developments hoping to secure a written endorsement of his own plan in the form of one of Hitler's all-important war directives.

Lieutenant-Colonel von
Lossberg composed the document and the first draft was presented to Jodl for his revision on 12 December 1940. Jodl expanded on the detail to include some matters of secondary importance, but in substance accepted the basic conclusions of the draft. The text was returned to Lossberg on 14 December for modification and resubmitted to Jodl on 16 December for final approval. On 17 December Jodl took the text to Hitler who, not surprisingly, ordered ‘a considerable alteration’.
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The new text, in line with Hitler's pronouncements of December 5, now read:

In the theatre of operations, which is divided by the Pripet Marshes into a Southern and a Northern sector, the main weight of the attack will be delivered in the
Northern
sector. Two Army Groups will be employed here.

The more southerly of these two Army Groups (in the centre of the whole front) will have the task of advancing with powerful armoured and motorised formations from the area around and north of Warsaw, and routing the enemy forces in White Russia. This will make it possible for strong mobile forces to advance northwards and, in conjunction with the Northern Army Group operating out of East Prussia in the general direction of
Leningrad, to destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic area. Only after the achievement of these essential first tasks has been made safe, which must include the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, will the attack be continued with the intention of occupying Moscow, an important centre of communications and of the armaments industry.
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Importantly for Halder the main weight of the attack was still placed in the centre of the front and
Army Group Centre was to start out along the road to Moscow, which remained consistent with his own plan. Yet in deference to the undisputed precedence enjoyed by
Hitler's preference, Halder devised a cunning solution. In what probably seemed to Hitler a pedantic fuss over semantics of no real consequence, Halder arranged for some subtle word changes which he felt left the future course of operations open to some interpretation as well as denying Hitler the absolute endorsement such a document would otherwise have provided him. The fact that Halder resorted to such a deceitful technique shows he was fairly certain Hitler would oppose his recommendation. By the same token, this clash of equally unyielding wills leads one to question the wisdom of delaying such a dispute until the campaign was underway.

In the final text of
Directive No. 21, issued 18 December 1940, Halder ensured Army Group Centre's redirection towards Moscow would take place once Hitler's northern objectives had been ‘made safe’ (
Sicherstellung
)
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– a substantial amendment over what had formally been described as ‘settled’ (
Erledigung
).
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The difference was the more subjective interpretation that one could apply towards the achievement of Hitler's goals. In an even more blatant example, Halder successfully arranged for the inclusion of a clause at the beginning of the section on ‘Conduct of Operations’ which declared Hitler in agreement
with the army's plans. The passage opened: ‘A.
Army
(Approving the intentions reported to me)’
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(
In Genehmigung der mir vorgetragenen Absichten
).
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Halder was evidently seeking to tie Hitler down to the Army's point of view, providing himself with pivotal counter-arguments against the resistance he expected in the future. Halder's scheming, unknown to Warlimont at the time, prompted the latter to conclude, ‘the Army…suddenly faced with this major alteration in its plans, accepted the situation in silence.’ As the situation developed, however, he noted: ‘It later became known that their reasoning was that in time the course of the campaign would compel even Hitler to go back to the original Army concept.’ Such a dangerous and naive assumption on the part of the army,
Warlimont regarded as ‘to a certain extent taking the easy way out’; furthermore ‘it proved no more than self-deception’.
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Thus, Directive 21 formalised the titanic clash between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and, unspoken and unknown to most, the same document drew the lines for a similar clash, clearly foreseen by Halder, which would plunge the German High Command into its own
crisis.

The idea of shifting the main attack of Army Group Centre to the north did not originate with Hitler, but rather formed an integral part of
Lossberg's Operational Study East. This has raised some questions about whether Hitler ever saw Lossberg's study or if in fact he came to this conclusion of his own accord.
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Likewise, Jodl's role in advising Hitler remains a point of conjecture, as he was no doubt aware of Lossberg's study and could have presented the idea to Hitler
and supported it again during their December 17 meeting.
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A report by Lossberg of Hitler's discussion with Jodl on 17 December 1940 retraced many of the main points set out by his own Operational Study East, including the shift of armoured forces to the north to assist in the clearance of the Baltic states before the advance on Moscow was undertaken.
¹³⁹

Beyond the direct importance of Moscow in the coming campaign, Directive No. 21 also outlined the underpinnings for both the German
plans for victory in the east and its associated assumptions about the Red Army and the Soviet Union. Under the sub-heading ‘General Intention’, the German aim was for ‘daring’ armoured thrusts to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the western regions of the country. The success of these early operations would prevent the escape of battle-worthy elements and allow the remaining enemy forces to be ‘energetically pursued’ to the final line of advance along the
Volga to
Archangel.
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Not surprisingly, the absence of a rigorous critical review of the earlier operational studies allowed many of their fundamental errors and misconceptions to flow directly into Directive No. 21. Notably, the assumption that German operations would continue after the initial encirclements, in the form of a pursuit, suggests major operations would no longer be necessary. Even in the question over Army Group Centre's
deployment to the Baltic or Moscow, the victory fever pervading the planning deemed it necessary to add: ‘a surprisingly rapid collapse of Russian resistance could justify the simultaneous pursuit of both objectives.’
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Finland
and
Romania were identified as Germany's two main allies offering direct involvement in the campaign at the extreme north and south of the front. Finland would cover the flank of German detachments from Group XXI advancing out of
Norway and pressure the Red Army to the west with an advance to the shores of Lake Ladoga, while Romania was enlisted to support the German southern flank tying down Soviet forces and providing troops for rear area administration.
Army Group South, operating south of the
Pripet marshes, was to eliminate all resistance west of the Dnepr in a concentric two-pronged attack led by its main force striking out of the Lublin area towards
Kiev and supported by a broad wheeling manoeuvre from German forces in Romania attacking across the lower Pruth.
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