Luftwaffe Fighter Aces (9 page)

The so-called Battle of Britain was in fact a campaign, with major air battles on some days and small-scale skirmishes on others. The strategic aim of the
Luftwaffe
was to destroy RAF Fighter Command as an effective force. The strategic aim of Fighter Command was to stay in being to thwart the expected invasion, while inflicting unacceptably high levels of attrition on the
Luftwaffe.

The short combat radius of the Bf 109 effectively restricted it to southeastern England, reaching inland only as far as north London when based in the Pas-de-Calais, and the south and south-west coast from the Cherbourg Peninsula. And not only were the German fighters thus restricted: if the bombers were to have fighter protection, then they also had to confine themselves to these areas.

Whilst the number of single-engine fighters available to either side was very similar, the British were able to deploy barely half of theirs in the most threatened areas. Although other airfields were available, these did not have the communications facilities to enable them to slot into
the main fighter control system, and were discounted for that reason. On the other hand, the detection and control network was usually able to direct the RAF fighter squadrons to the right place at the right time, thus greatly increasing their effectiveness. At a lower operational level, the
Jagdflieger
generally operated in
Gruppe
strength of 30 to 40 fighters. Even when casualties reduced strength, this was easily enough heavily to outnumber the twelve-ship squadron formation used by the British.

The German fighter pilots enjoyed two further tactical advantages. The primary aim of the British fighters was to shoot down bombers. When concentrating on the latter, they were vulnerable to the escorting German fighters. In addition, the German top cover almost invariably had a considerable altitude advantage, which allowed them to swoop swiftly down from their high perches to intercept. Altitude was traditionally the greatest advantage that a fighter pilot could have, and the
Jagdflieger
made full use of it.

The advantages were not all one-sided. Flying over water in a single-engine fighter was a nerve-wracking experience. A motor which ran smoothly over land often sounded rougher over the sea. As
Oberleutnant
Julius Neumann commented, ‘Either the Channel or the Spitfires: either was bad enough. But both together …’ Flying with
JG 27
from Normandy, he and his comrades faced the longest sea crossing. But even those pilots based in the Pas-de-Calais flew with one eye on the fuel gauge, waiting for the warning light to flash. When this happened, they had but a few minutes to make good their return to base. Quite often they failed.

Finally, with much of the fighting taking place over England, any German pilot who force-landed or baled out was destined for a prisoner-of-war camp. This imposed an extra psychological strain. By contrast, a British pilot in the same situation would soon be back with his unit.

The first fighter actions of the battle took place on 4 July, when, in a series of isolated skirmishes, one Hurricane was shot down and four Spitfires damaged, two of them severely enough to have to make forced
landings. The Bf 109s involved emerged unscathed. The pattern was repeated three days later when Bf 109Es of
JG 51
bounced a section of three Spitfires of No 54 Squadron near Deal, shooting down two and damaging the third. Later in the day, a
Frei-jagd
by
II
and
III/JG 51
clashed with Spitfires of No 65 Squadron, shooting down three of them, again for no loss.

It was a promising beginning for the Germans, but it was not to last. On the following day four Bf 109s were lost and a fifth force-landed, its pilot wounded. British fighter losses were three shot down and one damaged. Then on 10 July came fighting heavy enough to allow this day to be formally identified (by the British) as the official opening of the Battle of Britain. A 26-strong
Gruppe
of Do 17s was launched against a convoy near Dover, escorted by about 20 Bf 109s of
III/JG 51,
led by Spanish veteran Hannes Trautloft, and 30 Bf 110s of
I/ZG 26.
The six Hurricanes patrolling above the convoy were heavily outnumbered but were soon joined by elements of three more squadrons, making a total of 30 British fighters.

The
Zerstörer
, well aware of their vulnerability to single-seat fighters, immediately entered a defensive circle in which each machine was protected by the front guns of the aircraft behind. This became a standard ploy of the 110 units and has often been denigrated on the grounds that the escort fighters were not even capable of defending themselves in open combat. The truth is rather more complex. By forming a circle, the
Zerstörerflieger
occupied a commanding position in the sky: thus not only were they difficult to attack, but they could at any moment launch an attack of their own if the opportunity arose. The circle was of necessity very large—rather over a mile in diameter—and threatened a considerable area around it. Just because the 110s were in a circle, they could not be ignored by British fighters unless the latter had a significant altitude advantage. In the fierce fighting that followed, while the Spitfires and Hurricanes outnumbered the German single-seaters, they were forced to keep a wary eye on the 110s, which thus exerted an indirect influence on the battle. It was difficult to counter, although as the circles increased in size they became rather easier to break up, as we shall see shortly. The final factor was that the circle was not confined to one place: by widening the turn, it could be moved in any direction!
To summarise, the defensive circle was valid given two preconditions. The first was that it was not too large; the second was that combats took place over the Channel or English coast. Only when the fighting moved inland did it become a liability, because once the
Zerstörerflieger
had to break off and head for home they became vulnerable.

The convoy attack was a failure: only one small ship was sunk, for the loss of two Dorniers and a third badly damaged.
III/JG 51
lost one aircraft, that of
Oberfeldwebel
Dau, Trautloft’s
Kacmarek
, who got the worst of a head-on encounter with a Hurricane of No 56 Squadron. He later recalled:

The coolant temperature rose quickly to 120 degrees. The whole cockpit stank of burnt insulation. But I managed to stretch my glide to the coast, then made a belly-landing close to Boulogne. As I jumped out the machine was on fire, and within seconds the ammunition and fuel went up with a bang.

Another NCO pilot of
III/JG 51
belly-landed outside Calais; and a Bf 110 of
III/ZG 26
was shot down into the sea and another damaged. German claims during this action totalled six, including two by future high scorer Walter Oesau. British losses were actually minimal—one Hurricane destroyed in a collision with a Dornier, two Spitfires heavily damaged, and one Hurricane receiving minor damage. Further combats that day saw seven more German aircraft lost, mostly reconnaissance types, but no further British losses.

This action set the pattern for the next few days—convoy attacks interspersed with raids on coastal targets and fighter sweeps thrown in for good measure. These last the British soon learned to leave well alone to suffer the attrition inevitable when flying from temporary airfields. By 16 July, Hannes Trautloft’s
III/JG 51
was down to fifteen serviceable aircraft, 40 per cent below establishment. The other
Gruppen
were in a similar plight, and only later in the month were they reinforced by other
Jagdgeschwader.

Note:
While main bases are given, many units stationed far from the battle moved to forward areas to refuel before starting out.

Two Fighter Command squadrons were equipped with the Boulton-Paul Defiant. This strange aircraft was a single-engine bomber interceptor, armed with a powered gun turret but no forward-firing weapons. Defiants achieved a certain amount of success over Dunkirk, where they were mistaken for Hurricanes and attacked from astern. The
Jagdflieger
soon recognised the type for what it was—a slow and unmanoeuvrable turkey—and did not make the same mistake twice. Their chance came on 19 July, when Trautloft’s men encountered twelve Defiants off Dover. A bounce from head-on out of the sun was followed by attacks from below and astern, to which the British two-seaters had no answer. Six were shot down and a seventh badly damaged. Only the intervention of a Hurricane squadron prevented the slaughter from becoming total. All the Bf 109s returned safely, although many had sustained damage: on the following day, only eleven were serviceable. Total British losses on the day were ten, to four German. At this rate it would not be long before air superiority was attained.

JG 26 ‘Schlageter’
, with the redoubtable Adolf Galland at the head of the third
Gruppe
, joined the fray on 24 July. His first mission was to escort Dorniers attacking a convoy in the Thames Estuary. Weaving and criss-crossing high above the bombers, Galland saw a flight of Spitfires from No 54 Squadron approaching the bombers. Hurtling down from his high perch, Galland engaged as they reached the Dorniers, hitting one which broke away. The five remaining British fighters were engulfed in 109s, and their survival was due in part to the German fighters’ getting in each other’s way. The fray was then joined by a flight of Spitfires of No 65 Squadron.

As was so often the case, this intense dogfight produced a lot of manoeuvring and shooting but few positive results. With the aircraft held in close combat for an extended period, fuel ran low and one by one the Messerschmitts disengaged with a half-roll and dive, engines smoking at full power. This led many British pilots to think they were going down with engine damage. In fact, only two were lost, in return for two Spitfires downed, one of which force-landed with its pilot wounded.
The man who many consider to be the greatest ace of the war was back in action.

Four days later Werner Mölders’ return to combat was less happy. Appointed
Kommodore
of
JG 51
only that morning to replace Osterkamp, in the early afternoon he led elements of
I
and
II
/
JG 51
to escort a bomber raid. As they approached Dover they were engaged by Spitfires of No 74 Squadron, led by the man widely considered to be the ‘British Mölders’—Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan. A vicious dogfight developed, in the course of which Mölders’ aircraft was badly damaged and he was wounded in the leg, putting him out of action for several weeks. It is possible that the victor was Malan, but, as Richard Leppla
of I/JG 51
(eventual score 68) claimed to have immediately shot down the Spitfire responsible, some doubt exists. Certainly two Spitfires were lost in this engagement, although one pilot survived. German losses numbered four, including Mölders’ aircraft (which had to be written off after a belly landing), plus two more damaged, one of which force-landed.

One thing the Germans noted during this period was the ability of the British fighters to show up when and where they were least wanted. Naturally they monitored Fighter Command’s radio transmissions, and from these they deduced that an extremely advanced ground detection and control system was in operation. But exactly how it worked, they were not certain. This was to become crucial in the next phase.

The assault which was supposed to destroy Fighter Command was scheduled for 10 August, but bad weather forced a postponement. August 11 saw ferocious fighting. Fighter sweeps over southern England were followed by a huge raid on the Royal Navy base at Portland. About 75 bombers, strongly escorted by 61 Bf 110s of
I
and
II/ZG
2, and 30 Bf 109s
of III/JG
2, were intercepted by seven RAF fighter squadrons.