Hitler's Bandit Hunters (20 page)

Between August and October 1942, Hitler received a continuous flow of reports about the activities of the allied Special Forces. On August 4, he
ordered OKH to issue instructions on the treatment of captured individual allied parachutists.
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Himmler presented a report to Hitler on September 22, which included details of the sabotage and “bandit war” (
Sabotage und Bandenkrieg
) waged by the British. On October 7, Hitler instructed Jodl to issue an order for the ill-treatment of enemy soldiers captured while “fighting like bandits.” In a radio speech the same day, Hitler made this statement: “All terror and sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, who do not act like soldiers but like ‘bandits,’ have in future to be treated as such by the German troops, and they must be slaughtered ruthlessly in combat wherever they turn up.”
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The soldier most responsible for preparing the regulations that led to the “Commando Order” was Warlimont. His commanding officer, Alfred Jodl, later explained the reasoning behind the introduction of the Commando Order after the war. “The order arose from Hitler’s excitement about two kinds of intensified warfare which made their appearance about the same time in the autumn of 1942. One was the fatal efficacy of excellently equipped sabotage detachments, which landed by sea or were dropped from the air. The other was a special running wild in the fighting methods of enemies who acted singly or in small groups [sic].”
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On October 8, Warlimont received instructions from Jodl to polish Hitler’s political announcement into a military format. That same day, Himmler advised Hitler on the continuing incursions by the British. This process led to the introduction of the commando order that superseded the Commissar Order of 1941. The outcome was a less restrictive regulation, applicable to any theater.

On October 18, Hitler explained this new policy to army officers. He opened by stating that “for some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Convention. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behaviour of the so-called commandos, who, it is established, are partially recruited from freed criminals of enemy countries,” adding, “orders have been found in which the killing of [German] prisoners has been demanded in principle.”
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Hitler felt that once the soldiers understood the scale of the problem, they would treat the commandos like Soviet partisans. He employed a theoretical example of the destruction of a power plant with the consequential loss of energy that could deprive the Luftwaffe of thousands of tons of aluminium. “The homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front,” he concluded, “has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.”
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Hitler, the OKW, and the SS had orchestrated a consistency across the whole of German security policy. The Bandenbekämpfung directive, suitably amended, was applicable anywhere. “Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and executed with ruthless brutality,” Hitler confirmed, “were results achieved which eased the position of the fighting front.” The allied commandos, he explained, had been issued with uniforms, but they
usually wore civilian clothes to commit acts of sabotage and ran no risk from slaughtering German soldiers except becoming prisoners of war. Many were former prison inmates and had been absolved from their past crimes for volunteering with the commandos. “From now on,” Hitler ordered, “all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man.” Hitler expected all executions to be recorded. “The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communiqué will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.”
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To sustain the secrecy of his instructions, he issued on October 19 the following statement: “This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.” The orders became addendums “a” and “b” of Directive 46.
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OKH distributed the addendums within seven days of enactment to all German armies, including those in the east. The Kriegsmarine received its copies on October 27, 1942. The chief of staff of the rear area, Army Group South, received a copy of the order, and the war diary of the 3rd Panzer Army recorded the receipt of its copy. The 3rd Panzer Army confirmed the general application of the order to the Eastern Front and sanctioned the killing of soldiers in uniform.

Not surprisingly, with so many Nazi secrets falling into allied hands, it was only a matter of time before the Allies received evidence of the addendums. The British assumed that Hitler was about to revoke the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. On October 20, Sir Stafford Cripps prepared documentation to charge Germany with breaches in the laws of war. He also began to draw up an operational response if the Germans renounced the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.
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Ironically, the concentration of Anglo-American attention on the Commando Order served to artificially divide the Bandenbekämpfung directive in two.
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While OKW planned and prepared the Commando Order, in September Himmler prepared the Bandenbekämpfung pamphlet that served as the doctrinal guidelines for all security operations. This insignificant-looking document presents two impressions. Its contemporary style was laced with raw emotion and personified the moral outrage for the ways of the “bandit.” As a working document, it motivated the troops into aggressive and wanton acts of revenge and reprisal, but it was ostensibly defensive. The pamphlet was a hodgepodge of ideas strung together without a comprehensible structure yet represented the cutting-edge of security warfare. Bandenbekämpfung served as a rudimentary collection of instructions, brief practical guidelines, for troops assigned to security duties.
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Several sections exposed its true purpose, which was to enforce Nazi rule beyond the metropolitan centers of occupied Russia. It reflected Zenner’s report and the experience of combating Soviet incursion up to that time. Himmler’s conclusion was that banditry was set on the dual
task of disrupting Nazi control in rural Russia and the destruction of interior lines of communication. The mission was to defy their plans by waging terror across the land, causing “banditry” to wither through attrition.

The pamphlet set out to dehumanize Soviet partisans as criminal “political bandits” and flag bearers of Jewish-Bolshevism. Extracts from SD reports and captured Soviet documents were added to deliberately present a distorted picture. For example, an extract from Stalin’s speech of July 3, 1941, calling for a general uprising highlighted these lines: “They shall inflame partisan warfare all over the place…. It is necessary to create unbearable conditions for the enemy in the occupied areas. His collaborators must be pursued and eliminated.” There was even a comparison of Nazi and Soviet blood oaths. The SS recruits swore an oath to Hitler but the “bandit” oath (
Bandenschwur
) declared “Blood for blood! Death for death!” A supplementary selection of documents was attached to the pamphlet called, “The companion of the ‘partisan.’”
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These documents included excerpts on how the “soviet bandits” measured their success. This served to further dehumanize the “bandits” by implying they were crafty and underhanded with impudence rather than courage being their typical trait. The “bandit” was stereotyped as a practitioner of espionage who ambushed in small groups, used silent weapons to “stab with the bayonet, beat with the shovel and stab with the dagger.” The pamphlet concluded by focusing on the Soviet instructions: “Don’t leave the initiative to the enemies” and maintain control over the local populations. The Germans were reminded to, “keep one thing in mind: The ground rule of the ‘bandit’ is: attacking, attacking and again attacking.”
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The heart of the pamphlet was titled “Reflection on the Fundamental Methods for Combating Bandits” (
Grundsätzliche Betrachtungen zu den Methoden der Bekämpfung der Banden
), and it was about tactics.
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It had eight subsections. A psychological warfare section began with a warning to the troops to distinguish between the military or conventional formations, stressing the difference between the “bandit” band and the single or opportunist “bandit.” The importance of gathering intelligence about the “bandits” was regarded as essential for carrying out a tactical encirclement. The pamphlet warned against “bandit” mobility undermining attempts at the collection of intelligence.
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To enhance the intelligence capability, the pamphlet recommended placing trusties (
Vertrauensmänner
) within the bands. The preferences included former Soviet POWs, captured “bandits,” local dignitaries, young girls, women, grandparents, and children. “Captured bandits” were regarded as a primary source of intelligence, but after intensive interrogation, they were to be executed. Only a month before, Himmler warned, “All women and girls had the potential to be bandits and assassins.”
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An interrogator was permitted to employ mild treatment (
milde Behandlung
) to trick a captured “bandit,” in fear for his life, into giving away useful information. This treatment might include the offer of cigarettes and schnapps. The skilled
interrogator was expected to exploit the “bandit’s” fear of Soviet reprisals against his or her family, which was made worse because the Germans deliberately mislead the community by saying that the “bandits” were paid informers.

Self-protection proposals were collected in a section on preventative measures (
Präventivmassnahmen
). The first stage involved the registration of strangers in a community. The onus of registration was placed with local community leaders; “headman, the village seniors, the inhabitants … report every stranger to the police immediately [and threaten them to be] whipped or shot, if they do not.” A list of residents, confirmed by the headman, was pinned to the inside front door of houses. The reasoning: “Everything needs to be done to stop migration without purpose and timetable.” The pamphlet recommended the introduction of an alarm system, a network of villages connected by messengers, hand signals, and radio-wirelesses. A network of strongpoints placed at critical transport junctions, supported by the communication network, was supposed to protect the interior lines of communication. The ultimate level of prevention was the declaration of security zones. This involved the complete evacuation of all civilians and led to channels of depopulated land running across occupied Russia. The pamphlet recommended further reinforcement of these zones, including the placement of strongpoints, the flattening of terrain features that might provide cover for an ambush and regular patrols.
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The prescribed method of “combating the bandits” (die
Bekämpfung
) concentrated on the role of the Waffen-SS, Order Police, and Wehrmacht in the conduct of field operations. The SD and SIPO were assigned supporting roles of field intelligence, conducting interrogations, and punishments. Their job was to keep a constant flow of intelligence to the troops during operations to ensure the complete extermination of the “bandits.” To prevent endangering an operation and the “cost of spilling German blood” unnecessarily, it was impressed on the SD to remain diligent in their work. The only tactical goal of an operation was “the extermination of the bandits not its expulsion.” The operation had to be quick, with surprise, and projecting dynamism. The main objective was the decapitation of the band leaders: “After losing its leadership, the band is broken.” Depending on the circumstances, troops were to establish seclusion zones to conduct plunder and the deportation of the community. The community elders were pressed into enrolling in the Schuma and assisting the patrols. While these actions were under way, an area was supposed to be flooded with propaganda. A Kampfgruppe was to form a security cordon ready to counter any attempt by the bands to break out or break in.
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The pamphlet recommended ongoing aggressive counteraction against the “bandits.” This included raising hunting teams, formed from local troops, led by SD or SIPO officers, with radio equipment operating in “bandit-infected” (
bandenverseucht
) areas. During the registration (Erfassung) of
community populations, “bandit-suspects” (
Bandenverdächtigte
) were executed individually and discretely, to prevent the outbreak of violence. Local collaborators working as
agents provocateurs
were supposed to sow doubt and suspicion throughout the bands. The pacification process, with or without armed action, was always enforced against local dignitaries and village elders, who were to be held hostage. The sanction of revenge actions (
Vergel-tungsmassnahmen
) was automatic if an elder failed to adequately explain incursions into his community or if residents had aided the “bandits.” Himmler’s concern remained the misdirected revenge action but not for humanitarian reasons. He worried that survivors might escape and join the bands. To reduce the possibility of this happening, the commanding officers had to take responsibility for the punishment and ensure the whereabouts of everyone in the community. Few orders were quite so specific in assigning responsibility for the execution of entire communities. Even so, the Germans also tried to develop an “air of willingness to being ruled” in communities as a counter to intimidation of the “bandits.” This included a proactive propaganda program and a counter-campaign against “bandit” propaganda. The officer responsible for writing Bandenbekämpfung, Gottlob Berger, sent a copy of the final draft to Bach-Zelewski in November 1942.
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