Hitler's Bandit Hunters (17 page)

Assassination, or decapitation, as modern covert parlance calls it, has changed the course of history. Shooting, bombs, and kidnapping became norms in the occupation theaters. The question of assassination, irrespective of target, however, raises certain moral and ethical questions. Rab Bennett explored these dilemmas in Heydrich’s case. In Bennett’s opinion, the decision to kill Heydrich factored in the expectation of grievous German reprisals. He termed this an “artificial stimulation” of resistance by forcing the Germans to commit atrocities, which would lead to an upsurge in resistance and establish a cycle of violence. He understood this contributed to undermining Nazi rule and authority, but the views of many former SOE agents inclined toward doubts over the value of the mission. On the accumulated evidence, Bennett concluded that there was no satisfactory reason for the assassination.
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The cycle of violence was already in play long before Heydrich’s death. The manner of his death gave the Nazis another excuse to adopt more severe measures because their opponents deliberately breached the laws of war. The interpretation of the war was left for the victor.

In May 1942, Bach-Zelewski (Erich von dem Bach) returned to duty as HSSPF Russia-Centre. His illness has been the subject of some controversy among scholars, and given his prominence to Bandenbekämpfung, it is important to gauge his state of health in 1942. An indication of his poor state of mind prior to hospitalization can be found in his diary, “Dr. Sachs … to my great relief, I received a small box of strong poison. [I was] concerned with being captured, like my 1915 wounding and unable to kill myself.”
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Seventeen days later, he sent a signal to his SS surgeon, Dr. Grawitz, that under the orders of Himmler he would be arriving in Berlin the next day for an operation on his intestines.
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A series of stories developed after the war that he suffered from a nervous breakdown or required a varix operation for a dilated vein.
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According to the diary, he was absent from duty between January 29 and April 30, 1942.
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During this period, his medical attention was neither straightforward nor trouble-free. On March 4, Dr. Grawitz provided Himmler with a detailed report of his condition. Grawitz explained that the patient was given more opium during his surgery for hemorrhoids. The post-operative conditions had helped the healing process but Bach-Zelewski’s inactivity had led to a thickening of his stools. This forced the medical staff to clear them manually, and his extreme sensitivity to pain caused them to administer ether as a further anesthetic.
³¹

The delicate issue of drug abuse placed Grawitz and Himmler in an awkward position. Grawitz assured Himmler that the patient was on the way to recovery but it would take time before he was fit for work. The crucial part of
Grawitz’s letter referred to Bach-Zelewski’s state of mind. Grawitz explained that Bach-Zelewski was in a state of severe nervous exhaustion caused by arriving straight from the Eastern Front. This psychological trauma was awkward: “He is suffering particularly from hallucinations connected with the shootings of Jews, which he himself carried out, and with other grievous experiences in the East.”
³²
Grawitz assured Himmler that the patient would soon undertake convalescent leave. To assist the process, Grawitz allowed Bach-Zelewski’s wife (Mutti) to assist in his nursing. At no point was there any indication that Bach-Zelewski was repentent or suffering from pangs of guilt for the crimes committed in Russia. Within a few days, Bach-Zelewski registered a complaint through Himmler’s personal adjutant, Wolff, against the medical staff and the hospital. The problem again turned on the use of narcotics in his treatment. On March 6, Grawitz again wrote to Himmler describing Bach-Zelewski’s condition of blocked bowels and the removal of stools through surgery. Three days later, Himmler received another letter outlining the patient’s difficulty with an acute sensitivity to pain.
³³
The doctor (probably Professor Umber, the SS psychiatrist) indicated that the patient was suffering from a nervous condition but concluded with the ill-considered phrase, “… he wants to serve his dear Reichsführer very soon.” This combination of drugs, sensitivity to pain, and nervous condition did not portray the
Übermensch
of Himmler’s praetorian. Himmler’s response was predictable.

Himmler fired a full salvo at the medical staff, questioning the ability of the doctors while reiterating his concern over the patient.
³⁴
He referred to prior correspondence concerning Wolff’s visit. He pointed out that the patient was anesthetized at 10:00 a.m., but when Wolff arrived (6:00 p.m.), Bach-Zelewski was still under the influence of drugs. Himmler refuted the medical staff’s allegation that Bach-Zelewski’s complaint was the product of his self-induced drugs. He accused Grawitz of failing to explain the full extent of the patient’s medical condition from the beginning. In consequence, he intended to “counter objectivity with objectivity.” Himmler pointed out that if Bach-Zelewski were dependent on certain drugs, they would have to bring him down, causing further difficulties. “I form a picture from out of the Bach-Zelewski case of the sins you commit on our poor little man in this hospital,” he concluded. “If the SS-Obergruppenführer is so badly treated psychologically what can ordinary people expect?”
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Hallucinations aside, Bach-Zelewski’s pride was hurt; he was disgusted with his ailment and the disgrace at being unable to continue his duties. His susceptibility to imputations about his family reputation only disturbed him further. On March 31, he wrote to Himmler about both his treatment and state of mind, complaining about the severe stomach cramps caused by his poor medical attention. He accused Professor Umber of casting aspersions against his character. He decried his treatment as leading him to quiet death (
Strohtod
), which denied him the honor of a soldier’s death.
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Bach-Zelewski accepted his medical condition
regarding difficult bowel movements but begged Himmler, as one old fighter (
alter Kämpfer
) to another, to be allowed to return to duty. Himmler agreed but only after four extra weeks of recuperation.
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Bach-Zelewski returned to duty on May 1, 1942, fully fit and psychologically prepared for the rigors of the campaign. He wrote to his wife on May 7, describing his impressions. Traveling east by car, his first stop was to meet SS-Brigadeführer Fromm (SSPF Bialystok). He then drove on to Baranowicze but was disappointed at what he found there and blamed the situation on SS-Brigadeführer Carl Zenner, the SSPF Weissruthenien (White Russia), for allowing the Nazi civilian administration “to walk all over” him. Ordered to Russia in the summer of 1941, Zenner had carved a spectacularly dubious career. Before the war, while serving with the Aachen police, he had led illegal “Jew hunts” across the Dutch border. He rather laconically noted that “laziness in the east led to primitiveness.” He moved on to Bobruisk and visited the SS training complexes under construction. From there he flew by “stork” airplane to Mogilev, flying over burning partisan villages, the sight of which gave him the “itchy finger” for action.
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The welcoming party in Mogilev included Carl Graf von Pückler-Burghaus (Bach-Zelewski’s stand-in) and Oberst Walter Schimana, commander of the gendarmerie. There was a Russian guard of honor and a Ukrainian band adding a touch of pomp to his arrival ceremony. His first impression on arrival was described with a pathos—destroyed wooden housing contrasted with the fully functional library—that completed the sentimentality of his return to duty. That evening Bach-Zelewski and his officers stayed up until the early hours drinking alcohol. Pückler surprised him by drinking wine, schnapps, and a bottle of vodka, which he had been saving, and then made matters worse by staggering into Bach-Zelewski’s bedroom. Bach-Zelewski depicted Pückler as the embodiment of the proud paper warrior. In the three months as substitute HSSPF, he had apparently not bothered to visit the troops. The next day, Bach-Zelewski began a schedule of visits to all his commanders and troops. On May 6, he flew to meet Schenckendorff at his headquarters in Smolensk and discovered yet more truths about Pückler. The army considered him egotistical, criticized his refusal to cooperate in operations, and thought his concentration on police matters was only to gain promotion kudos. The latest partisan drive threatened supply lines, and so Bach-Zelewski quashed all Pückler’s orders and immediately sent the police units forward to Smolensk. He issued a command decree that “the life of milk and honey” (
Schlaraffenleben
) was over and that all seriousness had returned to their lives.
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Some weeks prior to Bach-Zelewski’s return to duty, the army’s influential senior officer of security warfare Gen. Max von Schenckendorff protested
that he no longer had the resources to continue operations against Soviet partisans. On March 1, 1942, Schenckendorff vented his fears in a situation report titled, “Proposals for the Liquidation of the Partisans.”
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He wished to strike a balance of effort concentrating on the occupied population as the source of exploitation and plunder, while using collaborators in operations against the partisans. The report combined military efficiency and economic expediency and conformed to the German military tradition of simply employing Russians to defeat the partisans. Hitler obviously thought the time had come for change. In May, Schenckendorff again attempted to garner a response for resources and reassert military authority for security, but the report was far too pessimistic. “No longer in control of the situation,” he complained, “everything built up over the last few months had been destroyed.”
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Schenckendorff represented tradition; his methods could be traced back to Boguslawski’s teachings, while Hitler’s appreciation of the situation differed completely. He interpreted demands for troops as a sign of weakness and a lack of will. Since the failure of the army at Moscow, he was not prepared to accept advice on strategy or occupation policy. From his perspective, the rising tide of lawlessness and insurgencies had culminated with Heydrich’s death. Hitler demanded action, not words.

Himmler was well positioned to exploit events. He was determined to take control of all operational security. A few days after the conference of July 16, 1941, referred to in
chapter 2
, Himmler ordered the KSRFSS to evaluate the Soviet partisan. Hannes Heer has mentioned the circulation of an SS-Einsatzgruppen report on recommendations for handling the partisans. The report, primarily based on the partisans’ manual, included an analysis of its general principles and of partisan tactics, in particular their focus on destruction of communications (
Verkehrswege und der Verbindungen
), plundering and destruction of supply depots, and surprise attacks on German soldiers. The SD-Einsatzgruppen field studies and reports allowed Himmler to issue SS-Directive 42 on November 18, 1941. Heer identified this as the first realistic appraisal of the partisan.
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On the strength of received wisdom, Himmler extended the Gestapo “trusty” system to increase surveillance and raise the quality of intelligence in Russia. He began to draw the conclusion that eliminating the partisans through extermination was preferable to the army’s approach of controlling ground and conducting formal operations. The Einsatzgruppen began to adopt a higher profile in security actions against partisans as their reports confirmed a renewed campaign. The onset of spring and milder weather saw renewed partisan attacks directed against the symbols of German rule and military authority. For a brief period, however, the SS-SD-Police organization proved effective in countering deep-ranging partisan incursions. The political implication was that the weakened SS-Polizeiverbände had countered the partisans without Schenckendorff’s bluff and bluster.
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Hannes Heer thought Keitel’s announcement in July requesting Himmler
to form a unified command to combat the partisans originated from a report issued by OKW on May 26 or a civilian administration report from June 17, 1942.
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The details appear to indicate other possibilities. On June 6, 1942, Himmler held the first in a series of conferences and planning meetings with senior officers from the east. There seems to be no record of this meeting other than an entry in Himmler’s appointments diary. Given usual SS practice, Himmler was almost certainly building a planning team to concentrate on internal security matters, especially since the removal of Heydrich. Seven days later, Himmler received a report from Carl Zenner titled
Partisanenbekämpfung
. The report was supposed to recommend and ingratiate Zenner to Himmler, but its implications ran deep, far beyond his personal remit.
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The report typically summarized straightforward issues and concluded with a clearly identifiable cure-all as preached by the SS planning cult. Zenner opened by advising that “partisan bands” were deployed in specific districts (
ortsgebundene Partisanen
) and received regular resupply by the Soviet air force. Soviets were in regular contact with Moscow and had welded the myriad of small bands of the region into a common military purpose. He concluded his report by reiterating the scale of the partisan problem that was terrorizing and bullying the populace. He inferred doubt and concern over the capability of the army and police to guarantee German protection. The partisans endangered food supplies with their attacks on large farmsteads, and their presence in the forests threatened the woodland industry. In one of his few positive comments, Zenner noted, “At the moment of combating the partisans, there is comradely co-operation between the security forces and the army.”