Hitler's Bandit Hunters (24 page)

Once the emergency subsided, Bach-Zelewski began the process of sidelining Schenckendorff. He spent the next five months meeting leaders of the regime. A formal meeting between the SS and the Kriegsmarine was held on April 10 when Bach-Zelewski and Himmler met Grand Admiral Dönitz and senior members of the German navy. The purpose was to bring the navy into coastal and river-based security operations.
³⁶
Throughout April, Bach-Zelewski conversed with Gottlob Berger, whom Robert Koehl referred to as the “Almighty Gottlob.”
³⁷
Bach-Zelewski also met with SS-Gruppenführer Winkelmann, the second-most senior police officer in the Hauptamt
Ordnungspolizei, because of Daluege’s recurring bouts of illness; they discussed police matters. Daluege, Himmler, and Bach-Zelewski met on May 11, at the KSRFSS; this was probably the last time the three men worked together. On June 1, Bach-Zelewski traveled to the General Government to meet Krüger and Globocnik and to discuss the security situation.

The meeting between Hitler and Himmler, held on June 19, 1943, and discussed earlier, occurred during the final preparations for Operation “Citadel” (Battle of Kursk). On June 21, Himmler issued new orders for fresh initiatives in Bandenbekämpfung.
³⁸
The order opened with a strategic assessment of the general situation. Himmler declared the Eastern Front rear areas and southeastern Europe rife with robbery and banditry undermining German rule and security. He explained that banditry was an historical problem in these areas, which had been intensified through Bolshevism. He blamed the Red Army for having nurtured robbers and “bandits,” employing them as partisans. It was his responsibility to restore law and order, military authority, and the security of German interests in these territories. To these ends, he explained that the office of Bevollmächtigter des Reichsführers SS für Bandenbekämpfung, instigated by his order of October 23, 1942, had proved instructive. Experience had shown that permanent successes against the “bandits” were the product of central planning and leadership with the HSSPF directly under his orders. In consequence of this success, Himmler ordered the Bevollmächtigter des Reichsführers SS für Bandenbekämpfung office to be transformed into a high command under Der Reichsführer-SS, und Chef der Deutschen Polizei–Der Chef der Bandenkampfverbände. Himmler remained Chef der Bandenbekämpfung until the end of the war.

Himmler announced Bach-Zelewski’s promotion to Chef der Bandenkampfverbände (Ch.BKV) in the presence of Krüger, Kaltenbrunner, and Prützmann.
³⁹
Yet this theme has received little academic scrutiny. Erich Kordt was one of the first and only scholars to mention the Ch.BKV as a stand-alone function.
⁴⁰
In 1945, the U.S. Army identified SS police, army, Luftwaffe, and naval forces assigned to “antipartisan warfare” as temporarily serving under the Ch.BKV command.
⁴¹
F. H. Hinsley, with access to all the decoded signals traffic, referred to the Order Police as “military in character,” as an “army of occupation” working closely with the SS, and as reinforcements for the Wehrmacht. He elected to ignore the Ch.BKV even with the amount of signals intercepts.
⁴²
In 1956, Wolf Keilig incorrectly placed the Ch.BKV within the Waffen-SS command structure.
⁴³
Rudolf Absolon, the esteemed German military archivist, referred to Bandenbekämpfung regulations but not its organization.
⁴⁴
The doyen of military lists, Georg Tessin, completely ignored the subject.
⁴⁵

The authority of the Ch.BKV came from Hitler but was defined and engineered by Himmler. The first part of his order was concerned with command tasks. The most important was the absolute control over planning and
the decision to commit to operations. These decision-making powers also extended to stopping an operation in mid-flow and redeploying the troops to other pressing assignments. Another task involved exploiting the authority to “calm down” regional commanders from sectors under threat of incursion and incapable of appreciating the “bigger picture.” In this context, his authority extended to convincing SS leaders to contain a difficult situation, even suffering a temporary reverse, in order to achieve greater success later. The Ch.BKV was also authorized to command forces in the field during large-scale operations or to intervene in operations if the situation demanded it. The second part of the order addressed command bureaucracy. The Ch.BKV was empowered to raise the headquarters of a high command in parallel with the offices of the Reichsführer-SS. In 7(e) of the order, the Ch.BKV was required to produce the instructions for Bandenbekämpfung and was responsible for training.
⁴⁶

This June 1943 order introduced the concept of the “combating-bandits formations” (
Bandenkampfverbände
), discussed in
chapter 5
, and the “combating-bandits area” (
Bandenkampfgebiet
) discussed in
chapter 6
. The territorial scope of the Ch.BKV followed the SS regional command structure of HSSPF Russia-North, Russia-South, Russia-Centre, Northeast, Weichsel (Vistula), Croatia, Southeast, Warthegau, Serbia, East (General Government), Northwest (Nederland), and the Alpenland. Later, the HSSPFs in France, Czechoslovakia (Böhmen-Mähren), Norway, and Northern Italy joined the list along with the SD office in Belgium. The territorial scope of the Ch.BKV was defined by Bach-Zelewski. “I was responsible for all partisan reports from the whole of Europe,” he later stated.
⁴⁷
The SS-Hauptämter received instructions to the effect that “all Hauptamt chiefs are instructed to assist and support the Chef der Bandenkampfverbände, who carries out, under my authority, one of the most important tasks of the SS and Police for Germany, in its fight for survival.”
⁴⁸

On the day the June order was released, Bach-Zelewski was designated with the codename “Arminus.” It is uncertain whether this name was bestowed with due reverence or irony or by someone poking fun at Himmler’s Romanesque cult.
⁴⁹
The formal announcement was also unusual by Nazi standards. Aside from Hitler, the entire Nazi Party leadership received a copy of the announcement including Göring, Bormann, Speer, Rosenberg, Frank, Sauckel, and party treasurer Schwarz. The senior officers of the OKW, including Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont, and the army chief of staff Kurt Zeitzler, Gen. Fritz Fromm, the commander of the reserve army, Adm. Wilhelm Canaris of the Abwehr, and Hitler’s army liaison officer, each received a personalized copy. The senior SS officers included Berger, Prützmann, Jeckeln, Korsemann, and Rode, but there appears to have been correspondence to Daluege and Jüttner (chief of staff of the Waffen-SS). The government officials included Hans Lammers (Reich chancellery), Albert Ganzenmüller, and Julius Dorpmüller
(Railways) and Wilhelm Ohnesorge (Post and Telegraph). Bach-Zelewski received the unlimited use of a Junkers fifty-two-passenger transport airplane, with the formal letters of transfer from Hermann Göring.
⁵⁰
This “gift” of a highly prized aircraft was more than a status symbol and placed the Ch.BKV in the realm of a strategic command.

On September 7, 1943, Himmler, already ensconced as the minister of the interior, issued fresh guidelines for the new Bandenbekämpfung command structure.
⁵¹
The system adopted was partly an extension of the KSRFSS and partly a compromise with pseudo-military-security practices. The command structure was multifaceted containing a command (political-military strategic leadership) function, a quartermaster (police-military management) capability, a planning (political) section, and intelligence and communication (political) tasks. The emphasis was information-led security warfare with centralized intelligence and higher mobility and flexibility in the response of the field commander. This set of guidelines followed on from the June order in outlining the operational doctrine of Bandenbekämpfung, listing eight points of strategic and tactical rules. There is an explanation of these tactical rules in
chapter 6
. Himmler stated that the basis of this doctrine was strict and mobile leadership, which was necessary in large territories with an increasing “bandit” problem. “The ways of the bandit,” his second point stated, “can only be mastered by a leadership that is active all of the time.” It was deemed crucial that the bands were denied the initiative.

Himmler went on to rouse the SS officer corps into intensifying their efforts through strong leadership. This became a rant over the installation of a staff system. He expected each HSSPF to form a leadership staff for Bandenbekämpfung analysis and planning, irrespective of the level of security risk. In regions declared a Bandenkampfgebiet, they were to form an “antibandit staff” (
Bandenstab
) and combat group (Kampfgruppe).
⁵²
Diagram II (p. 308) provides an indication of how this was organized. Bandenstab manpower was supposed to be located among the existing staff of the HSSPF. He expected the HSSPF to use initiative in staff selection; in certain unspecified circumstances, they might request his assistance.
⁵³
Himmler explained that the Bandenstab was to arrange all Bandenbekämpfung functions including reconnaissance missions, collection of reports, and analysis of the insurgents. During large-scale operations, experts were expected to be attached on an ad hoc basis to supplement local headquarters staffs. Within the command of each Bandenstab, the intelligence (Ic) function was given to SD officers. They were responsible for compiling intelligence reports at the local level and subsequent dispatch to the Ch.BKV for central analysis. The only record of a Bandenstab in operation is examined in
chapter 9
. The role of the Kampfgruppe is dicussed in
chapter 7
.

In addition to the main proposals, Himmler included point 7, covering several operational provisions. Each operational commander was warned to
establish an efficient signals network. The chief of signals had the authority through Himmler to supervise the signals network. He made the provision for medical services and the safe transportation of German wounded. The senior SS medical officer in the field was to ensure the presence of fully mobile medical teams. The Luftwaffe liaison officer attached to the local HSSPF command had sole control over close-air support and liaison with the air force. This Luftwaffe liaison officer had to be integrated into the planning process to ensure full communications between the SS and Luftwaffe. To assist in signals functions, the Luftwaffe would provide an air location device and detection troops.

To further explain the authority vested in Bach-Zelewski’s command, one needs to examine the changes imposed on the SS organization in 1943. Heinrich Himmler’s climb to the most powerful position in Hitler’s Germany was beset by petty squabbles and court intrigue. In 1943, he loosened his grip on the workings of the SS organization to become the minister of the interior: this was not a simple task after a routine of control of everyday affairs. In metaphorical terms, Himmler allowed his lieutenants enough rope to succeed or fail, but he also kept a tight hold on the rope. Until 1943, Himmler maintained a strict schedule that relaxed as the confidence in his power grew. He was also forced to loosen his grip if he was to become Hitler’s “regent,” leading what Robert Koehl called the “inner-German theatre of operations” (
Kriegsschauplatz Inneres-Deutschland).
⁵⁴
This was not a Faustian bargain, the “faithful Heinrich” was being groomed for national leadership.

According to Leonnie Wheeler, 1943 opened for the SS command with internal squabbling. Lines were drawn between the SS main offices (
SS-Hauptämter
) in Berlin and the HSSPFs in the occupied territories. In 1941–42, there had been troubles with Bach-Zelewski, and in 1943, the police became the cause of further difficulties between Daluege and his former protégé. This time Daluege somehow acquired a copy of correspondence (since lost) from Bach-Zelewski to Kurt Knoblauch, chief of staff KSRFSS, regarding criticism of the police troops. Daluege took umbrage and wrote, “I am most grateful for your candid letter to Gruppenführer Knoblauch about the work of my police, General Winkelmann and myself. I am now right in the picture as to the true meaning for the police, of your ceremonial calls. That the police tell lies without stopping is a fact only now revealed to me, their chief. The question of a third battalion will be dealt with by my office.”
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The situation between the two men remained difficult. The continuing Frank–Krüger clash in the General Government of Poland was typical of the troubled relations between some SS and Nazi Party officials. Faced with considerable unrest in the General Government, Krüger made a serious proposal of removing Frank and his inner circle and reorganizing the economy and raising manpower for the war.

On January 2, Himmler informed Bach-Zelewski that he was placing Gottlob Berger in the Ostministerium as state secretary with two tasks: to bring Rosenberg’s policies into line over ideology and to tighten the control over the eastern HSSPFs. Interestingly, Bach-Zelewski was asked by Himmler to appraise Bassewitz-Behr as a potential HSSPF.
⁵⁶
In March 1943, Rosenberg attempted to persuade Hitler to support the idea of focusing on the “bandits” rather than continuing with indiscriminate punishment.
⁵⁷
On May 25, Himmler explained to Frank that troubles with Jews like the Warsaw ghetto uprising would continue until the last 250,000 Jews were executed. In Russia, the military and the police had largely side-stepped Wilhelm Kube, the civilian commissar for White Russia (
Generalkommissar Weissruthenien
). The relationship between Kube and Bach-Zelewski, former colleagues in the prewar Prussian farming association, began to breakdown. This situation deteriorated further with the onset of a Bandenbekämpfung operation codenamed “Cottbus” and is discussed in detail in
chapter 7
.