Hitler's Bandit Hunters (19 page)

Until August 1942, issuing regulations for the combating of partisans was largely a hit-and-miss affair between OKW and the Army High Command (
Oberkommando des Heeres
, OKH), with the occasional interference from Hitler in July and September 1941. Since the introduction of the “Barbarossa” directives, the armed forces had fumbled with security regulations. This reflected the difficulty of gauging the scale of the resistance that Stalin had initiated in July 1941 and its growing sophistication. In response to the intensified partisan activity, OKH distributed Field Marshal Brauchitsch’s guidelines of October 25. They codified existing German practices and began a process of building a common doctrine for all forces committed to security. These guidelines were oriented toward prescribing operations by scale and planning and by encouraging initiative and aggression. Brauchitsch’s initiative was proactive and biased toward the German tradition of responding aggressively toward incursions.
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When Schenckendorff tried to raise awareness of the security problem, he was attempting to contain it within this existing doctrine. Himmler’s Bandenbekämpfung took a fundamentally different direction in the first instance by accepting that Lebensraum had happened. The criminalization of the partisan was the first step in interpreting the laws of conquest rather than war. When OKW issued Führer Directive No. 46, “Instructions for Intensified Action against Banditry in the East” (
Richtlinien für die verstärkte Bekämpfung des Bandenunwesens im Osten
), in August 1942, it confirmed that Germany would treat the conquered lands as Germanized.
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To the untutored, the plethora of Führer orders (
Führerbefehl
) and Führer directives (
Führerweisungen
) can befuddle the mind. Wrapped together in the concept of the Führer principle (
Führerprinzip
), they formed a peculiar triangulated equation of decision making. The Führer, or leader principle, was in theory a strict centralizing and hierarchical methodology but in practice the excuse that allowed those approved worthy to manipulate Nazi and military power. What Kershaw described as “working towards the Führer” involved a complex cycle of encouraging initiative and constructing regulatory devices to promote a climate for further motivating initiative.
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Hugh Trevor-Roper and Walter Hubatsch agreed that the “order” and the “directive” were both binding but that in the directive, the manner of execution was left to the initiative of the responsible subordinate. Thus, a Führer order in this context was inflexible, whereas the Führer directive was flexible in its application. The directives usually followed a pattern not unlike a prescription, first explaining the condition, then offering remedial instructions, and finally providing some form of
answer. Directive No. 46 followed the prescriptive formula and was broad enough to allow dynamic initiative. This was not what made it exceptional.

The thrust of the directive was official confirmation that Nazi Germany outlawed the Soviet partisans as political “bandits.” This equated combating partisans with combating gangsters or gangsterism. The rules of engagement covered six points of general principles in forming countermeasures to the “bandit.” The first reinforced the strategic status of Bandenbekämpfung. All existing operational headquarters staffs, irrespective of organization or arm, were required to deploy resources to conduct Bandenbekämpfung. The second point ordered the troops to take the initiative against banditry and its supporters, sanctioning all extreme measures. The remaining instructions were concerned with the handling of civilians. The third point recommended that those conducting security operations should regain the confidence of civilians through just treatment. To undermine local support for the “bandits,” the fourth point of the directive stipulated that the local populace should receive the minimum level of sustenance. In the fifth point, the troops received a warning to gain the cooperation of the populace. This reflected the stick-and-carrot intent of the directive—rewards for cooperation and collaboration and severe punitive measures for aiding the “bandits.” This placed the civilian in an arbitrarily decided position of innocence or labeled him as a “bandit-suspect” (
Bandenverdächtige
). A final contradictory point warned against misplaced confidence in relying on indigenous population, especially among those employed by the Germans.
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The strategic orientation of the directive was extermination and mobilization, with an operational emphasis on cooperation between the SS and Wehrmacht. The division of labor was simplified: the army was to clear “bandits” and mobilize civilians in the front area (
Operationsgebiet
), while the SS-Police administered racial cleansing and securing Lebensraum. The directive integrated Zenner’s proposal for the transfer of reserves and rear-area depots, thereby turning annexed territory into German lands. A time frame was included in the directive to bring about a repositioning of military assets into the security zone. Four key decisions were placed on the army. The first turned the General Government of Poland into a “Home Forces” area with two reserve army divisions. Second, scheduled for completion by October 15, 1942, Hitler ordered the transfer of five reserve army divisions into the Baltic area and Ukraine. Third, all formations, staff, depots, and military academies stationed in the General Government of Poland redeployed east into rear areas and security zones of occupied Russia by October 1. Finally, a target was set to transfer fifty thousand soldiers from the reserve army into the forward operational areas by the end of October. The directive stipulated that the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe should also transfer combat units to areas threatened by “bandits” to reinforce the garrisons already in Russia.
Completing the deployment program and making the directive a national security regulation, the “auxiliary forces,” a plethora of Nazi and state organizations, were given license to carry out Bandenbekämpfung. This included the Reich Labor Service (
Reichsarbeitsdienst
), railwaymen security troops (
Eisenbahntruppen
), state foresters (
Reichsforstamt
), and agricultural overseers (
Landwirtschaftsführer
). Hitler ruled that these organizations should be armed to defend themselves.
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Early in August 1942, Hitler revealed his impression of combating partisans. He compared it to the struggle waged in North America against “Red Indians.” This was a telling remark, possibly originating from his fascination with Karl May novels and offering an insight into his perception of Lebensraum as life on the frontier.
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The form of Directive 46 was a set of strategic instructions and rules of engagement. Hitler in this directive revealed his Catholic loathing for “banditry,” reflecting the received wisdom of the time, and he was at ease with the prospect of burning alive thousands of innocent men, women, and children to exterminate “bandits.” He wished to lodge these sentiments in the German mindset by granting the freedom to wage active or passive Bandenbekämpfung. To meet Hitler’s sentiments, Himmler had little problem choosing Bach-Zelewski to become his expert.

Following a long meeting between Bach-Zelewski and Himmler, on September 9, the reorganization process took on a new vigor. Bach-Zelewski joined a number of senior SS guests attending a typical Himmler business luncheon and, at 7:00 p.m., discovered the reason for his attendance. Himmler decided to make Bach-Zelewski inspector of Bandenbekämpfung (
Inspekteur für die Bandenbekämpfung im gesamten Ostgebiet
) for the complete eastern area for a trial period.
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Bach-Zelewski had still to report to both Schenckendorff and Himmler. The OKW officer responsible for monitoring the progress of Bandenbekämpfung was Maj. Gen. Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of the OKW operations department (
Wehrmachtführungsstab–WFSt
) responsible for planning. He was also a logical choice because, since March 1941, he had been involved in drafting the “Barbarossa” regulations, and once the campaign was under way, he had advised Hitler every two weeks on the partisan situation.
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The new Bandenbekämpfung regulations did not stop bickering between the Nazis. The SS was directly responsible for policing and guarding the territories designated as Reichskommissariate. The German civilian occupation of Soviet Russia was administered from Berlin by the Reich Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Territories (known as the Ostministerium), which in theory controlled two zones—Ostland (an area comparable with the former Ober Ost) and the Ukraine. Since these lands were to be integrated into the empire, the Reichskommissars were also Gauleiters from Germany and took up permanent residence in their respective territories. The Reichskommissar for
the Ukraine, Erich Koch, was Gauleiter of East Prussia, and he extended his power base into the Ukraine through a political land bridge through Bialystok. In other words, Koch’s territorial power bisected Bach-Zelewski’s security environment. After the Schacht incident of 1935 when Bach-Zelewski protested against Schacht’s compliments of Koch, whom he considered inferior and corrupt, relations were permanently marred between Bach-Zelewski and Koch. Since 1941, Koch had depended on two senior SS officers. His HSSPF for both East Prussia and the Ukraine was Hans-Adolf Prützmann. Koch was assigned Jakob Sporrenberg as his security police advisor in 1936. Sporrenberg had calmed the situation after Koch’s contretemps with Bach-Zelewski, and in 1941, he became Koch’s SSPF-without portfolio until March 1943. Koch had built a reputation as a repulsive and brutal character who exploited his membership of Göring’s social clique. The introduction of Bandenbekämpfung and its control by Bach-Zelewski set in train another bout of trouble between the SS and Koch.

On September 27, 1942, Koch summoned Prützmann, and a serious argument ensued. Prützmann reported to Himmler that Koch had contrived the argument. Koch’s petulance was defensive, a reaction to keep Himmler from treating him as he treated Hans Frank or Epp. The influence of Bandenbekämpfung, lightly dismissed by Koch as irrelevant, was the crux of the problem. Although the argument centered on who controlled the HSSPF in the field, the Reichsführer-SS or the Gauleiter, Koch demanded “yesmen” as subordinates and expected an elaborate system of reporting to monitor any Bandenbekämpfung operation in his areas so he could retain control over decisions and personnel.
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Since 1935, Koch had manipulated and milked the loss of face over Bach-Zelewski, but this time, Himmler commented that it was not his style to surround himself with obedient subordinates; still, if that was Koch’s way, so be it. Placing the issue of subordinates on hold until after the new year, Himmler mildly rebuked Koch by stating they were too busy for such altercations. Then he made it clear that if Koch wanted to make an issue of this present situation he was quite prepared to accept a fight.
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On October 2, Prützmann wrote to Koch in his official capacity confirming the implementation of Bandenbekämpfung. He quoted regulation and code to the effect that Führer Directive 46 was in force. Prützmann explained that engaging in bureaucratic procedures prior to a cleansing action was impractical. He added that to be effective, measures must be performed immediately, although local officials would be advised when possible. Prützmann agreed with Koch that holding villages to ransom for money or plunder was a political act with political consequences. He confirmed that the safeguard against errors in collective punishments (
Kollektivstrafen
) was that they could only be made by the commanding officer of the operation. He added, however, that the army commander of the Ukraine had confirmed his orders.
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The SS, with silent assistance from the army, had neutralized Koch.

A significant difference between Directive 46 and other policies was the breadth of its authority, the scale of its tasks, and the manner in which a doctrine was built on it. A mistaken impression has grown since the war that Bandenbekämpfung was specific to the east, was solely under Himmler’s authority, and formed a “parallel jurisdiction” with the army.
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This ignores the cross-fertilization of Nazi policies and the transferability of methods from one front to another. Since 1940, British covert warfare had irritated Hitler. The evening of the directive’s release, the British, by a remarkable coincidence, carried out the Dieppe raid. During September and October, the British conducted “pin-prick” raids along the French coast and in the Channel Islands.
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While the SS-SD countered the SOE, quite effectively in some cases, OKW believed that there was a need to regulate against the commando problem. This was not the same as countering the clandestine SOE and saboteurs dressed in civilian clothes. British and U.S. special forces, commandos, and rangers wore full uniform and carried out military operations. The existing laws of war were quite specific regarding the treatment of soldiers, captured while fighting in uniform or in conventional warfare; they were entitled to the full protection of the Geneva Convention of 1925.

The situation regarding the conventionality of the British commandos was not clear-cut. A former commando confirmed that they were highly trained professional soldiers versed in the ways of the “hardiest and most austere guerrilla.”
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Roger Beaumont was quite scathing about these troops, calling them “mob for jobs.”
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Months before the German army had drawn a category for the “commandos” in their secret handbook of the British army (
Das Britische Kriegsheer
), they identified the commandos as volunteers; its officers were known to be an exclusive group subject to special selection. They trained in handling weapons, using explosives, and surviving inside enemy country. The Germans assumed the British had adopted Russian partisan skills in their training programs. Their weaponry included machine guns and pistols, knives and hand grenades, mortars and flamethrowers. Commando operations included the fleet and the air force in combined operations, with the troops trained to alight from special motor landing crafts or by parachutes. The Germans identified commando tasks as normally seaborne operations in hostile territory, setting up obstacles, destroying war industries, and preparing the way for larger operations. They correctly identified the Special Service Brigades of the Royal Marines and the Special Air Services (SAS) Brigade deployed in North Africa. Thus, in April 1942, the Germans were still not discriminating against the commandos as “bandits.”
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However, by August 1942, OKW and Hitler wanted to discriminate against the commandos in the same manner as they had with the Commissar Order of 1941.