Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (9 page)

This is the way we will do it. The 3rd Platoon, with a section of light machineguns and one mortar squad attached, will move from their present positions as soon as possible and proceed up the main road leading northeast from Eilendorf. When you come to the crossroad at the crest of the hill, stop, send out security, and dig in. You will then try to maintain contact with the enemy.

The 1st Platoon will attack along the railroad going east out of town and upon reaching the tunnel will turn left and attack north along the ridge, cleaning out the woods and pillboxes. The objective is to clean the ridge, maintain contact with Company E on the right and with the 3rd Platoon on the left. The 2nd Platoon will move by the most direct route to the vicinity of Knapp and establish contact with the 3rd Platoon on the left and the 1st Platoon on the right, and prepare to defend to the northeast. The remaining mortars will stay in their present positions by the company command post, and will move up when called for. The command post will remain here, and as soon as you are dug in we will run a telephone line to you.

Are there any questions? If not, go back to your platoons and give them the dope I just gave to you.
⁴²

While Dawson did not know who the defenders in his zone of attack were, it was quite likely either elements of the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion of the 116th Panzer Division or the 9th Panzer Division. It was Armored Reconnaissance Battalion units whose defensive line was pushed back beyond the railroad line during the day when Company G first attacked. The railroad tunnel area was on the border shared with the 9th Panzer Division, their front line defined by the 116th Panzer Division historian as “east and south in an arc to the Ronheide railroad station, then south of Steinebruck—south of Burtscheid to the Aachen-Easchweilwer railroad line. After that, it was almost in line with this up to the tunnel entrance northeast of Eilendorf, and after that it ran to the 9th Panzer Division's sector of the Westwall, except for the deep breach at Mausbach and the second one at the right wing.”
Oberst
Voigtsberger also arrayed Machine Gun Battalion 34 near Eilendorf on 15 September, behind Combat Group Berger and elements of Militia Training Battalion II/6.
⁴³

It was dark by the time Dawson's platoon leaders got back to their positions. Reconnaissance was not necessary; they knew from their earlier observations that day what type of terrain confronted them. The ground was rugged, with large boulders along with a few quarries and some pits. Shrubbery afforded limited protection toward the ridge, situated out of sight in the darkness to the northeast on the top of a long, steep hill.

The line of departure for Dawson's 3rd Platoon was the railroad track near the tunnel. As soon as these men were oriented, they jumped off with two squads forward and one in the rear. The scouts on point were the first to draw fire and the platoon leader, knowing it was too dark to fire back effectively, ordered his men to keep moving. This action cost the platoon three men wounded, but two of their opposite number were killed and four were captured.

As soon as Dawson got word that this platoon was on its first objective, he alerted his 1st Platoon. These men jumped off at 2300 hours, worked their way through a heavily wooded area, and reached their objective after taking some incoming fire from their right flank. The trails in the thick stand of trees proved to be too treacherous to traverse in order to contact Company E per the plan, however. Dawson temporarily suspended the drive, and the men dug in.

At first light on what would be a clear and warm 16 September, Captain Dawson ordered his 2nd Platoon to move out; by 0700 these men were digging into defensive positions between the other two platoons.
Two columns of Germans about a thousand yards away were soon seen coming in their direction, in close formation. The platoon leader quickly sensed that these enemy soldiers were simply shuffling into their defensive positions after a warm breakfast, unaware that Company G now held the important ridge. He ordered his men to hold their fire until the Germans got closer. “On the command of ‘Fire,’” a later report revealed, “the whole platoon opened up, caught the Germans with their guard down, and inflicted many casualties.”
⁴⁴
In daylight now, Dawson could see the tactical importance of the ridge he and his men had just taken. The ridgeline terrain literally controlled the approaches to Aachen.

The 116th Panzer Division was all too aware of Company G's success, noting in the early morning hours of 16 September, “Strike troop platoons infiltrated through the remaining near bunkers south of Verlautenheide. Militia and scattered troops deployed in the Westwall are no longer combat effective. Division Reconnaissance Platoon deployed for reconnaissance and security toward Verlautenheide.”
⁴⁵

Dawson also sent a platoon up to Verlautenheide for his own reconnaissance later in the day, but as a friendly tank pulled up to the crest of the hill overlooking the town and fired six rounds into its western edges, return fire delivered by
Oberleutnant
Phidias Triantaphylides's 2nd Company of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 156 came in. Since this fire came dangerously close, the American platoon backed off the hill. Casualties were starting to mount; this time the platoon suffered two killed and nine wounded and two others were unaccounted for. To the remaining men the situation became clearer and very dangerous. They could now see hundreds of enemy soldiers marching southeast in columns of twos as far back as their widened eyes allowed.

Anticipating that his 12th Infantry Division's commitment at the Aachen front could not be achieved with the immediate close employment of its full fighting strength,
Oberst
Engel had decided to have the first transports arrive and unload in Julich and Duren on the morning of 16 September. This was the 27th Infantry Regiment. Engel ordered “combat transports” for the two battalions he chose to first commit, meaning each was equipped with heavy weapons (infantry howitzers and antitank guns) with artillery following as the next transport. As he remembered,
“Thus, at least the commitment of regiments and battalions was sure of not taking place without heavy arms.”
⁴⁶

Under orders that morning to push back enemy forces wherever they were met, to close the gap between Stolberg and Zweifall, to recapture the
Westwall
, and to reoccupy the pillboxes in these areas, Engel used all of the available transportation vehicles he could muster in order to reach the front. In addition to LXXXI Corps transports, mail cars, workman's buses, and civilian trucks were pressed into service. After a short reconnaissance Engel committed the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment on the road from Julich to Broichweiden to attack toward Verlauntenheide. As he noted, “The plateau of Verlauntenheide was considered to be the key position for the Aachen-Stolberg front arc. This dominating hill had to be in our hands.”
⁴⁷

This is the very plateau from which Captain Dawson's Company G had looked into Verlautenheide that morning. The vast marching columns of twos represented but one of the enemy forces he would face with other 16th Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion companies during the encirclement of Aachen. The plateau would become famously known as “Dawson's Ridge” before the fighting ended five weeks later.

With the attack of Boudinot's CCB through Mausbach toward Gressenich and the thrust of Hickey's CCA toward Munsterbusch meeting increased enemy resistance, General Rose decided to commit another task force on the morning of 16 September. Task Force Hogan, commanded by Texan Lt. Col. Samuel M. Hogan, was ordered at 0900 to attack northward and to clear the town of Busbach, located on a knoll of limestone that had been originally mined by ancient Romans. The town was about 2,000 meters from Dorff, and was located on the edge of the Schill Line fortifications. Major Adams's 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment had linked up with Task Force Hogan late on 15 September, and would now lead this mission.

Company G of the 83rd Reconnaissance Battalion had also made contact with the Germans at a crossroads just south of Busbach early the same morning. This reconnaissance force was holding the slopes on the southwest side of town. Captain Simons's Company B was given the assignment to go into Busbach itself and clear out any enemy forces
holding up in the shadows of the spire marking the St. Hubertus church. Captain Anderson's Company A, supported by two platoons of tanks, was also ordered to clear nearby Brockenberg and to take the high ground in the vicinity of Bauschenberg, a small town with brass producing factories; this move would protect Simon's right flank. These towns were defended by elements of the 9th Panzer Division, reported at the time by its commander to be down to just its reconnaissance platoon, some engineers, and three tanks, altogether perhaps 150 men in the area.
⁴⁸

When Captain Simons's men reached the outskirts of Busbach around noon they immediately received plunging machine-gun fire from the St. Hubertus church steeple. In response, they brought forward one of the 155mm SP guns that had proven so effective in reducing the pillboxes back in Nutheim; this time they fired it directly upward, promptly killing the German crew in the spire and neutralizing their gun. Company B then made good progress through the limited resistance left until they reached a roadblock just north of town; small-arms fire from a pillbox slowed their advance. Antitank and machine-gun fire also increased, so the men were simply unable to move any farther. A 155mm SP was again pressed into service to fire at close range; it not only blew up the box, but also broke every window in Busbach with its concussions. Enemy resistance in town ceased later in the day when Captain Ferry's Company C men came forward to mop up.

At about 1500 hours Major Adams ordered Captain Anderson to take up positions on the road just to the south of the dragon's teeth. The movement actually began at dusk with Anderson personally leading, but the uneven terrain combined with growing darkness introduced confusion. Instead of reaching the dragon's teeth, the men discovered that they had stumbled right into the edge of Stolberg; they halted at a railroad overpass when an enemy artillery barrage was laid down. Anderson, meanwhile, joined a patrol to continue reconnoitering even closer to town. Antitank and artillery fire intensified toward midnight; it became even more evident that the Germans were determined to keep the Americans out of Stolberg, so Major Adams radioed Anderson and told him to cancel his unexpected visit and come back.
⁴⁹

Anderson's reserve platoon had broken the deadlock by crossing a stream much earlier that night and then moving through 250 yards of
open terrain, finally reaching the pillbox cluster near Brockenberg despite being exposed to both horrific grazing and enfiladed fire. Fourteen prisoners were taken from two pillboxes; others were abandoned. Two thousand civilians seeking refuge from the fighting in the area were discovered in a nearby gravel pit.
⁵⁰

Task Force Doan spent the rest of 16 September holding in the positions they had taken at Am Geisberg. Every time an advance was attempted, German antitank and gun fire held up movement. Lieutenant Colonel Orr's infantry also found the day's going to be difficult. After waiting for the 16th Infantry Regiment to move up and protect his right flank, Orr moved out at 1600 to take another hill overlooking Stolberg near Schneidmuhle.
⁵¹
His Company A, supported by two tanks, advanced just 100 yards before they ran into fire so intense that the men were immediately pinned down. At 1830, Orr's companies returned to their original line of departure and set up an all-around defense for the night. A captured prisoner confessed that more German forces were now engaged in the woods north of his position. These forces had also knocked out two of the three tanks that had accompanied Orr's attack; the third received a round that damaged its track.
⁵²

The objective on 16 September had been Schneidmuhle, a settlement outside of Stolberg dotted with factories and chemical plants. Three battalions of infantry were to widen the bridgehead within the Schill Line and secure the immediate area. This action was also intended to uncover enemy antitank guns and make it possible for more American tanks to move through the gap opened by Task Force Doan. In the middle of the afternoon, a great deal of vehicular movement was seen in the factory area. Lt. Leonard F. Banowetz, a forward observer for the attached field artillery, answered by calling for a “serenade” with five rounds by everything in the Corps—a time on target arrangement. As Banowetz remembered, “When this barrage was fired, the vehicular movement stopped.”

A journalist explained its effect for his paper's readers in Miami:

The smoke was rising everywhere in the heavy wet air of this chill and rainy autumn afternoon. Overhead shells from our 155millimeter guns are whistling every minute or so with a high
piercing wail and the hard flat blasts of mortars endlessly fills the air. Shells are falling in an orderly pattern, first on the fringe of woods at the western edge of town, and then across it to the east.

Before us there is a line of little concrete cottages and these homey, pretty little places are catching it from our guns. You might expect vines around the doors. Then you see that their “windows” are machinegun apertures. These are pillboxes with little gabled roofs.

The Germans are struggling like demented men. Three times this morning they counterattacked in a shoulder-to-shoulder line, screaming hoarsely as they came forward and falling in unbroken rows before our tank guns. This is what they used to call a “psychological attack” in Russia. Here it is sheer, utter suicide.
⁵³

Despite the efforts of the artillery units, 16 September was a difficult day for the infantry overall. On the other side of Stolberg, Major Mills had gone up to Lieutenant Colonel Lovelady's command post in the captured pillbox south of Burghulz that morning. Here, a meeting took place to plan an attack toward Weissenberg with Col. Edgar A. Gans, commander of both of their task forces’ infantry. A record of this meeting revealed: