A World at Arms (206 page)

103
Oshima to Tokyo No. 820 of 26 June 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 24192;
ADAP
,
E 3, No. 39; KTB Skl A 34, 27 June 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/37, f. 497, A 38, 5 July 1942, RM 7/38, f. 94–95; Seekriegsleitung, “Niederschrift Besprechung mit jap.Verb.Stab am 22.6.1942 beim Chef der Seekriegsleitung,” 27 June 1942, RM 6/76, f. 164–70; “ ... am 7.9.1942,” RM 7/253, f. 399–410.

104
KTB Skl A 37, 4 Sep. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/37, f. 552; Sk I, “Vermerk,” 25 Oct. 1942, RM 7/253, f. 433–35;
ADAP
,
E, 3, No. 76.

105
Holmes,
Undersea Victory,
p. 162; KTB Skl A 37, 4 Sep. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/40, f. 79, A 39,6 Nov. 1942, RM 7/42, f. 102; A 40,4 Dec 1942, RM 7/43, f. 94–95; OKW, 9 Nov. 1942, ibid., f. 438–42; Seekriegsleitung, “Vermerk,” 24 Nov. 1942, ibid., f. 470; Nomura’s letter of 3 Dec. 1942, ibid., f. 471–72; OKW, Gruppe Ausland, “Niederschrift über die Besprechung am 4.12.1942 Führerhauptquartier mit Japanern,” 7 Dec. 1942, ibid., f. 499–503; documents on a meeting with Nomura on 18 Dec. 1942, ibid., f. 528–33; Oshima to Tokyo No. 1433(?) of 12 Dec. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 28960–61; Jürgen Forster, “Strategische Überlegungen des Wehrmachtführungsstabes für das Jahr 1943,”
MGM
(1973), 100 n 21, 107 n 6o. See also OKM, Ski 10p, “2625/42 gKdos.Chefs. Einsatz der japanischen Ubootswaffe,” 6 Dec. 1942, RM 7/253, f. 475–79.

106
Motter,
Persian Corridor,
pp. 482–83.

107
Oshima to Tokyo No. 1121 of 22 Sep. 1942 and No. 1128 of 23 Sep. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 26634–35, 26661–62, 26818–19.

The German naval attaché in Tokyo, Admiral Wenneker, who saw this clearly and so reported in December 1942, was reprimanded for his pessimism but also defended by some in the navy for accurately reporting the facts and reflecting the new situation as seen by the Japanese themselves: the war in the Pacific had changed with Midway and the Solomons campaign and there was no prospect of a Japanese move into the Indian Ocean. See KTB Ski, A 40, 18 Dec. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/43, f. 354–56, and 28 Dec. 1942, ibid., f. 521; Ob.d.M., “Verschl.Tel. aus Tokio: Lagebeurteilumg zu Jahresende,” 17 Dec. 1942, RM 7/253, f. 512–13; Chef OWK WFSt Op Nr. 552243/42 g Kdos.Chefs., 24 Dec. 1942, ibid., f. 514; see also Amt Aus Il ABW, Ag Ausland Nr. 00478/42 g Kdos of 22 Dec. 1942, ibid., f. 528;
ADAP
,
E, IV, No. 20.

108
German military attaché Rome, “Zur seestrategischen Lage der italienischen Flotte,” 31 Dec. 1942, BA/MA, PG 45172, Case 17/3; KTB Sk1 A 32,8 Apr. 1942, RM 7/35, f. 123–25; Gerhard Schreiber,
Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben: Marinef Uhrnng und
Dec. 1942, BA/MA, PG 45172, Case 17/3; KTB Sk1 A 32,8 Apr. 1942, RM 7/35, f. 123–25; Gerhard Schreiber,
Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben: Marinef Uhrnng und deutsch-italienische Beziehungen 1919-1944 (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1978), pp. 331ff.

109
Note Hitler’s serious interest in shifting the supplying of North Africa to submarines
ADAP,
E, I, No. 181).

110
See the summary in
KTB OKW,
1942, 1: 1001 - 103; Salewski,
Deutsche Seekriegsleitung,
2: 60–72. For Hitler’s suggestion that Malta be taken
after
the British had been defeated in North Africa in the face of Cavallero’s objections, see Schmundt’s memorandum in
MGM
, 1972, No. I, p. 120.

111
A recent account in John W. Gordon,
The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North
Africa,
1940–1943
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 100–3, which also explains how the British got onto this source and turned it.

112
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 356–63, Appendices 14, 16;
DRuZW,
6: 570–647; Sadkovich, “Rommel and the Italians,” pp. 302–5.

113
A view from British intelligence in Hinsley, 2: 368t T. Auchinleck was planning to hold Tobruk and at the Egyptian border as late as June 16 (CS 1270 to Churchill, PRO, WO 106/2238A). An inquiry into the disaster was conducted by General Wilson, see WO 106/2234–36, 2238A. Of the captured soldiers, 49 percent were from the United Kingdom, 42 percent from South Africa, 9 percent from India. For Churchill’s concern about
the disaster, see PRO, PREM 3/54/10. There had already been discussion of the reintroduction of the death penalty for desertion or cowardice (abolished in 1930), but this was not done; see, e.g., Grigg to Churchill, 5 June 1942, PRO, WO 259/75.

114
KTB OKW,
1942, 1: 104–7; Mariano Gabriele,
Operazione
C3:
Malta
(Rome: Ufficio

115
ADAP
,
E, 3, Nos. 42, 43, 49, 56, 59, 60, 66, 129, 299, 4, No. 101; German embassy Rome documents of July-Aug. 1942 in AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.) “Geheim, 59/5,” fro E 261726ff. For British capture of the relevant German-Italian document of 28 Aug. 1942, see British Minister of State No. 63 of 24 Nov. 1942, J 4867/1145/16, PRO, FO 37 1/31586. The Italians were very suspicious of German intentions, but Hitler certainly intended to leave them in charge. it is astonishing that the Axis assurances are still taken at face value in
DRuZW,
6: 652.

116
KTB Skl A 35, I July 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/38, f. 3–4.

117
Rommel Papers,
pp. 243–56, 520; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 392–407; Donald G. Brownlow,
Checkmate at Ruweisat: Auchinleck’s Finest Hour
(North Quincy, Mass.: Christopher Pub. House, 1977); Mc Narney to Roosevelt, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Marshall, Cont. 5; Farnie,
East and West of Suez,
p. 628; Brooke to Auchinleck, 17 July 1942, Liddell Hart Centre, Auchinleck Papers, 6/D/4(f) item D.

118
An account in Nigel Hamilton,
Monty: The Making of a General 1887–1942
(Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982), Part 4, chap. 17, Part 5, chaps 1–3. Omitted from the published version of the Brooke Diary for Aug. 17, 1942 is the sentence: “The more I look back on our decision to get rid of Auchinleck the more convinced I am that we were correct” (Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers). Numerous other high-ranking officers from GHQ Cairo and HQ 8th Army and its corps were also relieved.

119
Zweig, “British Plans for the Evacuation of Palestine,” pp. 296–99; Daniel Silverfarb, “Britain, the United States, and the Security of the Saudi Arabian Oilfields in 1942,”
Historical Journal
26 (1983), 721–25; Santoni,
Ultra
, p. 264 n 89; WM(42) War Cabinet 85(42) of 3 July 1942, PRO, CAB 65/27. The remaining British warships at Alexandria were withdrawn. There was concern about the French warships immobilized there. The latter were of special interest to the Japanese; note Mitani (Vichy) to Tokyo No. 309 of 16 July 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 24839.

120
In spite of its generally very laudatory tone, the authorized biography by Nigel Hamilton is especially good on this. See also Grigg to Churchill, 11 Sep. 1942, PRO, PREM 3/54111. is especially good on this. See also Grigg to Churchill, 11 Sep. 1942, PRO, PREM 3/54111.

121
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 418ff; Dill correspondence file 52 in PRO, CAB 106/323.

122
Hamilton,
Monty,
pp. 637–711. See also
ADAP
,
E, 3, No. 153; Hinsley, 2: 408–16.

123
Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front,
chap. 2; Fraser,
Alanbrooke,
chap. II; Richard W. Steele,
The First Offensive, 1942
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), chaps. 1–3; Butler,
Grand Strategy,
3, Part 2, chaps. 24, 27.

124
See Chapter 7, below.

125
JP(41) 1028 of War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff, “Operation ‘Roundup’,” 24 Dec. 1941, PRO, WO 106/4126, and the following documents in this file and in WO 106/4127, 4191.

126
See Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 305–6, for Roosevelt’s 25 Mar. 1942 approval of this approach.

127
Note Roosevelt to Marshall, 17 Mar. 1942,
Bullitt Papers,
pp. 548–50; Kirk to Welles No. 608 of 17 Apr. 1942, FDRL, PSF Box 96, State, Welles 1942, and other documents in this file, esp. No. 1366 of 2 Aug. 1942.

128
See Stimson to Roosevelt, 20 July 1942, FDRL, Map Room 167, Naval Aide, A 16–3 Middle East.

129
Note the comments of Sir Michael Howard on “Scholarship on World War II: Present and Future,”
Journal of Military History
55 (1991), 378–80.

130
Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 336; Marshall memorandum for Roosevelt, “American Forces in the
Middle East,” 23 June 1942, FDRL, Map Room 167, Naval Aide, A 16–3 Middle East; Maxwell to War Dept. 10 July 1942, ibid.

131
Note Brooke Diary, 6, 10, 28 Mar. 1942, Liddell Hart Centre; Eden to Churchill, PM 42/52 of 23 Mar. 1942, PRO, CAB 120/410 and PREM 3/135/1; Combined Commanders 3rd Meeting, 23 May 1942, P 129/314, CAB 106/1027. The emerging British argument was not over a landing but about its
location,
with Brooke arguing for the Calais or Boulogne area because it could be covered by land-based planes while Admiral Mountbatten, the Chief of Combined Operations, argued for the Cherbourg area. See esp. Brooke Diary, 28 Mar. 1942. The editor of Brooke’s diary, Sir Arthur Bryant, was determined to prove Brooke a consistent opponent of what both men by the post-war years considered the foolish American advocacy of a 1942 landing and left out of the printed version all sections of the original diary which point to Brooke’s rather different views in March 1942.

132
On the visit of Marshall and Hopkins to England in April, 1942, see
FDR Letters,
2:
1303–5; Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 308–20; McJimsey,
Harry Hopkins,
pp. 242–49; Steele,
The First Offensive,
chaps. 4, 6; Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front,
chap 3; Dill to Brooke, 23(?) Apr. 1942, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/38. Note also Sikorski’s memorandum of 13 Apr. 1942, forwarded to Roosevelt, in FDRL, PSF Safe File, Cont. 5, Marshall.

133
FRUS,
1942,3: 587.

134
On Molotov’s visit, see Stoler, chap. 3, though I do not entirely agree with the interpretation.

135
Ibid., chap. 4; Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 332–33.

136
Marshall memorandum for Roosevelt, “Prospective Movement of Planes to the Middle East,” 26 June 1942 (corrected to 25 June), FDRL, Map Room 167, Naval Aide A 16–3 Middle East; Lewis L. Brereton,
Diaries: The War in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe
(New York: Morrow, 1946, henceforth
Brereton Diary),
pp. 130–3 1, 145–49.

137
Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 365.

138
See Clark Kerr (Moscow) No. 51 of 30June 1942, C 6553/19/55, PRO, FO 371/31084’ Terry
(Poland’s Place in Europe,
pp. 225–44) argues convincingly that the British had always wanted the Polish forces for the Middle East and that General Wladyslaw Anders, the Polish Commander-in-Chief in Russia, worked toward the same end against Sikorski’s preference and orders.

139
Matloff and Snell,
Strategic Planning,
1941–1942, pp. 217–19; Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 327ff; FDR Letters, 2: 1329-30; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 602ff; Roosevelt-Marshall exchanges of 1-6 May 1942, and 19 June-15 July 1942, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Box 5, Marshall; Winant to Roosevelt, 3 June 1942, PSF Box 9, Winant.

140
Note Mountbatten to Roosevelt, IS June 1942, FDRL, Map Room 164, Naval Aide’s File, which evidently reinforced American opinion that gaining a foothold in Normandy was feasible.

141
An excellent case for the fear of another mass surrender as a key factor in British policy is made in Joseph L. Strange, “The British Rejection of Sledgehammer, An Alternative Motive,”
Military Af Jairs
46, No. 1 (Feb. 1982), 6–14.

142
There is a good outline history of “Sledgehammer” in PRO, WO 106/4289; another summary is in WO 106/4175. See also Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 464; Strange; Churchill memorandum WP
⁴²
31 I of 21 July 1942, CAB 66/26.

143
See Brooke’s comments in his diary of 27 May 1942 in Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 3/A/IV, p. 403; Brooke Diary of 5 June 1942, 25 Sep. 1942; PRO, AIR 8/938; British Joint Planning Staff memorandum of 17 July 1942, CAB 119/56; Butler,
Grand Strategy,
Vol. 3, Part 2, pp. 646–50.

144
Puttkamer, “Niederschrift über Äusserungen des Fuhrers vom 4.1.42,” BA/MA, RM
6/75, f. 225–27; Salewski,
Deutsche Seekriegsleitung,
2: 3–3 I, 39–40; Wolfgang Wilhelmus, “Vorbereitungen der faschistischen \Vehrmacht zur Besetzung Schwedens,”
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschafi
23 (1975), 1034–35; Raeder to Boehm, 19 Feb. 1942, and Boehm to Raeder, 5 Oct. 1942, Boehm Nachlass, BA/MA, N 172/4; Ziemke,
Northern Theater
, pp. 216–19; Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence
, pp. 122–28;
ADAP
, E, I, No. 181. The report of the British board of inquiry into this episode is in PRO, AIR 20/3356.

145
Carlgren,
Swedish Foreign Policy,
p. 127; Ziemke,
Northern Theater,
p. 215; Wilhelmus, pp. 1036–37; Forster, “Strategische Uberlegungen,” p. 104 and n 42; Woermann to Helsinki No. 297 of 26 Feb. 1942, AA, Gesandtschaft Helsinki, “Drahtberichte,” fro H 069326; Berg to Lammers, 14 Mar. 1942, BA, R 4311/1494, f. 74–75.

146
Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 342–48; Steele,
The First Offensive,
chaps. 7–8; WM(42) 94th Conclusions, Confidential Annex, 22 July 1942, PRO, CAB 120/82; Alex Danchev, “A Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and General George C. Marshall,”
Journal, Royal United Seroice for Defence Studies
130, No.2 (1985), 59.

147
Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins,
pp. 610–1 I; Roosevelt to Hopkins, Marshall and King, London [23 July 1942?], FDRL, PSF Box 4, Hopkins; Roosevelt memorandum of 29 July 1942, ibid., Box 5, Marshall; Roosevelt memorandum of 6 May 1942, ibid., Box 106, War Department, Marshall. Note that this appears to have been the first time in the war that Roosevelt checked with the Map Room to see whether any message from London had come in, 24 July 1942, Map Room Box 195, Chart Room Logs and Standing Orders, I, p. 92.