A World at Arms (205 page)

48
Ibid., p. 143.

49
Alfred D. Chandler,
et al.
(eds.),
The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years,s
vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), I: No. 1.

50
Matloff and Snell,
Strategic Planning,
1941–1942 pp. 148–50; Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 208”10

51
ADAP
,
E, 2, No. 72. Vichy enthusiasm for the Japanese remains to be investigated.

52
Morton,
Strategy,
p. 203.

53
A useful survey in Mark Clayton, “The North Australian Air War, 1942–44,”
Journal of
the Australian War Memorial
8 (1986), 33–45.

54
Roosevelt to Admiral Land and enclosure, 21 Feb. 1942, FDRL, PSF Box 5, Marshall.

55
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 336–37.

56
Willmott,
Barrier,
pp. 56–63.

57
See also Hopkins to Roosevelt, 14 Mar. 1942, FDRL, PSF Box 152, Hopkins.

58
On the internment in the Soviet Union and Japanese concern about this issue, see Tokyo to Kuibyshev No. 267 of 1 May 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 26975; Tokyo circular No. 775 to Harbin and Hsinking, 2 May 1942, SRDJ 22644–46.

59
On the Doolittle raid and its impact, see Willmott,
Empires,
pp. 447–50; Butow,
Tojo
,
pp. 516–17; Stephan,
Hawaii under the Rising Sun,
pp. 113–17; Morton,
Strategy,
p. 217; Toshikazu Ohmae, “Strategische Konzeptionen,” p. 195; Alvin D. Coox, “The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Forces,”
Aerospace Historian,
Oune 1980), p. 83; Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (eds.),
Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome
Ugaki,
1941–1945, trans. by Masataka Chihaya (Pittsburgh: Univ of Pittsburgh Press, 1991) (henceforth cited as
Ugaki Diary),
18–21 Apr. 1942, pp. I I I-IS. See also the assessment of a shrewd German observer, Dr. Hans Kolb of the German Foreign Ministry, “Aufzeichnung über Japanische Kriegsausweitung,” 28 Apr. 1942, AA, St.S.,
“Diplomatische Aufzeichnungen Betr. Japan, Apr. 42-Apr. 43,” fro J 000146–48.

60
For a very useful account, see NA, RG 457, SRH-230. The Japanese were also afflicted by over–confidencein their code security: the April attack on Ceylon was called Operation C, that on Port Moresby, Operation MO, that on the Aleutians, Operation AL, that on Midway, Operation MI. The U.S. Office of Chief of Naval Operations, “Secret Supplement Summary of Japanese Naval Activities” of 27 May 1942 noted that the Japanese 14th Air Group not only planned to be based on Midway but wanted its mail forwarded there! (NA, RG 457, SRNS-44).

61
See esp. Costello,
Pacific War,
chap. 14. There is an ironic aspect to the suggestion of the German navy that the way to help the Japanese assure long-term code security was to send them German enigma machines, OKM, Skl B, Chef MND, “1557/42g Kdos., Deutsch-japanische Schlüsselmittel,” 2 Apr. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/253, f. 265–67.

62
The subject is reviewed in Kahn,
Codebreakers,
chap. 17; Lewin,
American Magic,
chap. 4.

63
Merrill Bartlett and Robert W. Love, “Anglo-American Naval Diplomacy and the British Pacific Fleet, 1942–1945,”
American Neptune
42 (1982), 205–7; Willmott,
Barrier,
pp. 331–35; Costello,
Pacific War,
pp. 373–74. Marshall still hoped for one or two British carriers in June, see Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 379.

64
On the Coral Sea battle, see Willmott,
Barrier,
chaps. 6–8, with clear text and maps. Cf.
Ugaki Diary,
7–9 May 1942, pp. 121–25.

65
KTB Skl A 33,9, 12,27 May 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/36, f. 181–82,242–43,521;
ADAP
,
E, 2, Nos. 195, 212. The Germans naturally thought that the victory they believed Japan had won would enable the latter to drive the British out of Madagascar where they had just landed, but by June l Ithe Germans had figured out what had actually happened had won would enable the latter to drive the British out of Madagascar where they had just landed, but by June l Ithe Germans had figured out what had actually happened (KTB SkI A 34, RM 7/37, f. 218).

66
The carrier was sunk by an American submarine in June 1944.

67
The fullest account of these matters is in Willmott,
Barrier,
chap. 3.

68
On the Alaska-Aleutian fighting, see Brian Garfield,
The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969). No theater of war had worse weather or more fierce inter-serviceclashes. Note Roosevelt’s concern about defense preparations there in his memorandum for Captain Mc Rae of 20 Jan. 1942, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Cont. I, Alaska.

69
An excellent account in Willmott,
Barrier,
chaps. 6–16. See also Costello,
Pacific War,
chaps. 15–16; Dull,
Imperia Japanese Navy,
chaps. 9–11;
Ugaki Diary,
18 May–15 June 1942, pp. 127–64; Toshikazu Ohmae, “Strategische Konzeptionen,” pp. 195–96; Carl Boyd, “American Naval Intelligence of Japanese Submarine Operations Early in the Pacific War,”
Journal of Military History
53 (1989), 169–89. Ugaki wrote in his diary (5 June, p. 152): “Dorit let another day like this come to us during the course of the wad” pp. 127–64; Toshikazu Ohmae, “Strategische Konzeptionen,” pp. 195–96; Carl Boyd, “American Naval Intelligence of Japanese Submarine Operations Early in the Pacific War,”
Journal of Military History
53 (1989), 169–89. Ugaki wrote in his diary (5 June, p. 152): “Dorit let another day like this come to us during the course of the wad!”

70
The table in Willmott,
Barrier,
p. 522, does not include the U.S. commissionings of 1945. Of course, the U.S. navy was also engaged in the Atlantic, but then it turned over an additional 37 carriers to the British (see Ernest J. King,
U.S. Navy at War
1941–1945:
Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy
[Washington: GPO, 1946], pp. 253–57).

71
Note
Kido Diary,
8 June 1942, pp. 335–36. This would be June 7 at Midway.

72
See Skl KTB A 34, 29 June 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/37, f. 548–49; Wenneker No. 110 of 10June 1942, NA, RG 457, SRGL 101; Skl to Tokyo No. 32 of 15 June 1942, SRGL 19; Kretschmer and Ott No. 1768 of 11 June 1942, AA, S1.S. “Japan,” Bd. 7, fro E 362179; Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 104. The Germans refused the sale. Unfortunately we have no indication of what the American cryptographers thought of the idea of hauling an uncompleted German aircraft carrier from European waters to the Pacific.

73
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 284–85.

74
Stephan,
Hawaii under the Rising Sun,
p. 120.

75
On May 10, 1942, a German raider seized an Australian ship with a document among
the mail it was carrying that showed some Allied decyphering of Japanese naval messages, and this information was passed on to the Japanese at the end of August 1942; John W.M. Chapman, “German Signals Intelligence and the Pacific War,”
Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies (History and International Relations)
4 (1979), 140–41. See also ibid., p. 144; KTB Skl A 36, 17, 31 Aug. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/39, f. 326–27, 622; A 37, 3 Sep. 1942, RM 7/40, f. 40.

76
The chapter on this in Lewin,
American Magic,
is entitled: “The Stab in the Back.”

77
The only warships hit by the land-based bombers were the two heavy cruisers which had collided.

78
Willmott,
Barrier,
p. 521.

79
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 289–94.

80
Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 325–26.

81
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 284–85.

82
Ibid., pp. 316–17.

83
Excellent accounts in the American army’s official history, Samuel Milner,
Victory in Papua
(Vashington: GPO, 1957), and the Australian official history, Dudley McCarthy,
Southwest Pacific Area - First Year: Kokoda to Wau
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957). See also D. Clayton James,
The Years of MacArthur
, Vol. 2:
1941–1945
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975) chaps. 4–6; Long,
Six Years’ War
, pp. 197ff. Important for details on the campaign and especially the role of the American general sacked by MacArthur as well as the division involved, Leslie Anders,
Gentle Knight: The Life and Times of Major General Edwin Forrest Harding
(Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 1985). On the public relations aspect of this and other campaigns in the Southwest Pacific, see Michael Schaller,
Douglas Macllrthur: The Far Eastern General
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 71–73.

84
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 336–37, 340.

85
Mc Carthy,
Southwest Pacific Area,
pp. 121–22, 155–88; Long,
Six Years’ War,
pp. 210–14; Edward J. Drea,
Macllrthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945
(Lawrence, Kans.: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 44–48.

86
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 306–7.

87
John Miller, Jr.,
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
(\Vashington: GPO, 1949), and Morison,
US Naval Operations
, vol. 5:
The Struggle for Guadalcanal
, remain most helpful. See also Dull,
Imperial Japanese Navy
, pp. 180–260; Kreis,
Ait Base Defense
, pp. 220–34; Toshikazu Ohmae, “Strategische Konzeptionen,” pp. 196–98; Ugaki Diary, 7 Aug.–31 Dec.1942, pp. 177–319 passim. Eric Larrabee,
Commander in Chief Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 256ff, stresses the personal involvement of Roosevelt in the launching of the operation and its support.

88
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 352–56.

89
Ibid., p. 340.

90
Ibid., pp. 364–67.

91
See
FDR Letters,
2: 1355, 1356, 1371–72; Dill to Brooke, 19 Oct. 1942, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/38; Dill No. 442 of 27 Oct. 1942, PRO, AIR 20/7472.

92
For some time the Japanese fooled themselves as well as their German ally about the battle; eventually the Germans discovered at least a part of the truth. See KTB Sk1 A 36, 15 Aug. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/39, f. 299–300; A 37,2 and 6 Sep. 1942, RM 7/40, f. 47, 128; A 38, 11 and 17 Oct. 1942, RM 7/4 1, f. 212,356; A 39, 13, 22, 25 Nov. 1942, RM 7/42, f. 353, 601, 675; cf. OKM, Sk I, 3.Abt. 7 Dec. 1942, RM 7/253, f.481–95.

93
The Japanese decision to evacuate was formalized on Jan. 4, 1943, text in Morton,
Strategy,
PP. 624–26.

94
ADAP
,
E, I, No. 276; 2, No. 168; 4, Nos. 76, 121; Tokyo Nos. 622 and 624 of 3 Mar. 1942, BA, R 9/573; Kolb, “Aufzeichnung über die Behandlung des deutschen Vermögens
durch Japan,” 28 Apr. 1942, AA, St.S., “Diplomatische Aufzeichnungen Betr. Japan Apr. 42 -Apr. 43,” fro J 000149–54; Tokyo to Shanghai No. 520 of 15 Apr. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 2181 I; Bangkok to Tokyo No. 1096 of 4 June 1942, SRDJ 23452–54; Tokyo to Berlin No. 471 of 13 June 1942, SRDJ 23817; l Vladrid to Tokyo No. 1025 of 23 Sep. to Berlin No. 471 of 13 June 1942, SRDJ 23817; l Vladrid to Tokyo No. 1025 of 23 Sep. 1942, SRDJ 26649–51; Jochmann, Hitler Monologe, pp. 269–70.

95
ADAP
, E, 3, Nos. 25 1, 254,316; Togo to Oshima No. 351 of 1 May 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 22637; Berlin to “Tokyo No. 1130 of 23 Sep. and No.1133 of 24 Sep. 1942, SRDJ 26976–77, 26647–48; Tokyo to Berlin No. 769 of 15 Oct. 1942, SRDJ 27198; Meskill,
Hitler and Japan,
chap. 4; Bernd Martin,
Deutschland und Japan in Zweiten
Weltkrieg
(Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1969), chap. 6.

96
They also discussed at great length how they could use the Mufti for propaganda to the Muslims of the Near East and India (Berlin No. 1491 of 19 Dec. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 17994; Tokyo to Rome No. 344 of 27 Dec. 1941, SRDJ 18273;
ADAP
, E, 2, No. 87).

97
On these negotiations, only a small sampling of the documents can be listed here; the main contribution the project appears to have made to the Axis war effort was the time of Allied cryptographers taken up by the interminable exchanges. See
ADAP
,
E, 3, Nos. 68, 92, 113, 208, 4, No. 50; NA, RG 457, SRDJ 22020–23, 23901-2, 24232, 26915–16, 27037–38, 27377–78, 27778–79,29025; Ribbentrop to Göring, 1 Sep. 1942, AA, Handakten Ritter, “Japan,” Bd. 4–5, fro 310188–89; Meskill,
Hitler and Japan,
pp. 412–13.

98
On the Italian plane, see Tokyo to Rome No. 179 of 3 June 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 23552; Tokyo to Japanese military attaché Rome No. 308 of 2 Aug. 1942, SRA 02375–77. Information on the trip provided by an Italian air force officer who flew on it is in U.S. Navy, CNO, Intelligence Division, Intelligence Report 210–44 of 21 Mar. 1944, NA, RG 165, Box 2413, File 9900–Japan.

99
Compare Hitler’s attitude in Apr. 1942
ADAP,
E, 2, No.182) with that in July (ibid., 3, No. 76). On Japanese sensitivity about Soviet reaction to any overflight, see ibid., No. 35; Tokyo to Berlin No. 441 of 3 June 1942, No. 974 of 3 June 1942, No. 472 of 15 June 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 23414–15, 26463-64, 23931–32; Berlin to Tokyo No. 734 of 8 June 1942, SRDJ 23486–87. The formal Japanese ‘No’ to the suggestion that they attack is in Tokyo to Berlin No. 588 of 27 July 1942, SRDJ 25150-59; see also SRDJ 21937–40, 21956–58, 21975–79, 24223–25, 27052; SRGL 368–70; SRA 16218–19.

100
Note Donovan’s reports to Roosevelt No. 153 of 15 Jan. 1942 and 164 of 16 Jan. 1942, FDRL, PSF Box 164, OSS Donovan Reports, Folder 4.

101
See KTB Skl A 33, 10 May 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/36, f. 184–85.

102
Seekriegsleitung, “Besprechung mit Admiral Nomura am 4.2.1943,” 5 Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/254, f. 35–39, “ ... am 18.2.2943,” 22 Feb. 1943, ibid., f. 45–53; “ ... am 27.3.42,” RM 7/253, f. 230–31; “ ... am 8.4.1942,” ibid., f. 279–82; “ ... am 13.5.42,” ibid., f. 312–20; KTB Skl A 36, 16 Aug. 1942, RM 7/39, f. 304–5; Oshima to Tokyo No. 309 of 28 Feb. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 20178–79, Tokyo to Berlin No. 655 of 26 Aug. 1942, SRDJ 32229–30;
ADAP
,
E, 3, Nos. 142, 295; Meskill,
Hitler and
Japan,
pp. 64–67. German army Chief of Staff General Halder was more cautious and did not expect the German army to operate south of the Caucasus until 1943 (Salewski,
Deutsche Seekriegsleitung,
2: 94–95).