Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (73 page)

62
See for details Garvin,
Chamberlain
, pp. 259-83, 332-41, 507-8; Amery,
Chamberlain
, pp. 144-55.

63
Kennedy, ‘Alliance Negotiations’, pp. 613. See Garvin,
Chamberlain
, pp. 268ff., 287-91, 503, 512; Amery,
Chamberlain
, pp. 148-51, 163.

64
Steinberg, ‘Copenhagen Complex’, pp. 27ff.; Kennedy, ‘Alliance Negotiations’, p. 610f., 619f.; Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War,
pp. 40f., 53.

65
See Garvin,
Chamberlain
, vol. III, pp.498, 511-15; Amery,
Chamberlain
, vol. IV, pp. 153, 157, 167-80.

66
Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 12.

67
Amery,
Chamberlain
, p. 197.

68
Kennedy, ‘Alliance Negotiations’, p. 618. See also
ibid
., pp.621, 625; Garvin,
Chamberlain
, p. 516.

69
A. J. Marder,
British Naval Policy 1880-1905: The Anatomy of British Sea Power
(London, 1964), p. 503.

70
Steinberg, ‘Copenhagen Complex’, pp. 31-8.

71
Wilson,
Entente
, p. 5.

72
Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 10, 17, 23-9.

73
B. Williams, ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907’,
Historical Journal
, 9 (1966), pp. 360-6; Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 2, 5, 7, 33f., 108, 115ff., 123f., 132, 140ff., 185, 216-20; Gooch,
Plans of War
, p. 175.

74
Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 200-2, 214-21.

75
Ibid
., pp.39, 113, 129, 134, 144; C. Andrew, ‘The Entente Cordiale from its Origins to 1914’, in N. Waites (ed.),
Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century
(London, 1971), pp. 11, 19ff.

76
Garvin,
Chamberlain
, p. 275; Amery,
Chamberlain
, pp.180, 202-6.

77
Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 71, 74; Andrew, ‘Entente’, p. 22; Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 129-33, 192.

78
Ibid
., pp. 187ff., 195f., 223.

79
A. Offer,
The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation
(Oxford, 1989), pp. 223f., 230, 291; Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 188f., 206ff.; d’Ombrain,
War Machinery
, pp. 76-80; French,
British Planning,
pp. 22f.

80
PRO, CAB 16/5 XC/A/035374, Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence Appointed by the Prime Minister to consider the Military Needs of the Empire, December 1908-March 1909.

81
Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 209f., 229. My emphasis.

82
Wilson, ‘Grey’, p. 173; Lloyd George,
War Memoirs
, vol. I, p. 1. See also the prescient warnings of Brodrick, Lansdowne and Salisbury quoted in Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 135, 212, 226, and the doubts of the radical Speaker, quoted in H. Weinroth, ‘The British Radicals and the Balance of Power 1902-1914’,
Historical Journal
, 13 (1970), pp. 659f.

83
The idea of war as an escape from domestic problems is applied to the British case in G. Dangerfield,
The Strange Death of Liberal England
(London, 1935); A. J. Mayer, ‘Domestic Causes of the First World War’, in L. Krieger and F. Stern (eds),
The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honour of Hajo Holborn
(New York, 1967), pp. 288f., 291f. For critical views see D. Lammers, ‘Arno Mayer and the British Decision for War in 1914’,
Journal of British Studies
, 11 (1973), esp. pp. 144, 153; P. Loewenberg, ‘Arno Mayer’s “Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956”: An Inadequate Model of Human Behaviour, National Conflict, and Historical Change’,
Journal of Modern History
, 42 (1970); Gordon, ‘Domestic Conflicts’, pp. 197f., 200, 203-13, 224f. But see also the comments by Nicolson, ‘Edwardian England’, p. 161, and K. M. Wilson, ‘The British Cabinet’s Decision for War, 2 August 1914’,
British Journal of International Studies
, I (1975), p. 148.

84
M. Bentley,
The Liberal Mind 1914-29
(Cambridge, 1977), pp. 11-15.

85
Norman Angell,
The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage
(London, 1913).

86
M. Howard, ‘The Edwardian Arms Race’, in
Lessons of History,
pp. 82f.

87
Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 18-22; Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 259.

88
See his warning to the Austrian ambassador during the July Crisis that war ‘must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry’ comparable with that which occurred in 1848: Wilson,
Entente
, p. 13. For a similar comparison with 1848 by Morley, see French,
British Planning
, p. 87.

89
Lloyd George,
War Memoirs
, vol. I, pp. 28f., 60; Churchill,
World Crisis
, p. 203.

90
Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 257, 287; Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 34ff.

91
Cf. Bentley Brinkerhoff Gilbert,
David Lloyd George: A Political Life: The Organiser of Victory, 1912-16
(London, 1992), pp. 81ff.

92
Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 17, 30ff.

93
Searle, ‘Critics’, pp. 79-96.

94
Gooch,
Plans of War
, pp. 97ff., 265, 289; d‘Ombrain,
War Machinery
, pp. 15-22, 88, 93-105, 135, 264, 271ff.; Hankey,
Supreme Command
, pp.84, 118ff., 122; French,
British Planning
, pp. 74-84; Trebilcock, ‘War’, pp. 152f., 161.

95
As note 1. Cf. Trevelyan,
Grey
, esp. pp. 7-20; K. Robbins,
Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Grey of Falloden
(London, 1971).

96
Grey,
Twenty-Five
Years, vol. I, pp. 153-9. Cf. Asquith,
Genesis
, p. 53.

97
Williams, ‘Strategic Background’, pp. 367-73; Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 6f., 76ff.; Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 285.

98
H. Butterfield, ‘Sir Edward Grey in July 1914’,
Historical Studies,
5 (1965), pp.4f., 20f.; D. W. Sweet and R. T. B. Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Russia, 1907-1914’, in F. Hinsley (ed.),
British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey
(Cambridge, 1977), pp.236, 245-54. Cf. Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 284, 297ff.

99
Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 35, 72; Weinroth, ‘Radicals’, pp. 657-61.

100
Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 278.

101
Details in d’Ombrain,
War Machinery
, pp. 75-96, 103-9; Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 238-52; Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 63-7; M. Howard,
The Continental Commitment
(London, 1972), pp. 32-46. The talks had their origins in the CID conference at Whitehall Gardens in December 1905-January 1906. It was at this time - that is, during the first Moroccan Crisis - that the Director of Military Intelligence, Grierson, met the French military attaché in London to discuss the possibility of British intervention in a Franco-German war. The original impetus came from Esher and Clarke on the CID. However, the debate did not develop in quite the way they had intended, partly because Fisher was reluctant to make a naval commitment, but mainly because the French were far more interested in the idea of an expeditionary force. The talks therefore played into the hands of the advocates in the General Staff of a continental expeditionary force. The subsequent debates revolved around (a) where exactly such an expeditionary force should be sent, (b) what size it should be, (c) whether or not regular troops should be left to defend Britain itself, and (d) how long it would take to get troops to the continent.

102
K. A. Hamilton, ‘Great Britain and France, 1911-1914’, in Hinsley (ed.),
British Foreign Policy
, p. 331. Cf. Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 88f.; Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 271.

103
PRO, CAB 2/2, Committee of Imperial Defence - Minutes of the 114th meeting, 23 August 1911. Cf. Hankey,
Supreme Command,
pp. 81f.; Nicolson, ‘Edwardian England’, p. 149; d’Ombrain,
War Machinery
, p. 102;
French
,
British Planning
, pp.32f.; Wilson,
Entente
, p. 64.

104
B. Collier,
Brasshat: A Biography of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson
(London, 1961), pp. 117-21; Andrew, ‘Entente’, p. 27.

105
Churchill,
World Crisis
, p. 94.

106
Langhorne, ‘Colonies’, pp. 363-87.

107
Wilson,
Entente
, p. 10; Langhorne, ‘Colonies’, p. 369. See J. D. Vincent-Smith, ‘Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese Colonies in Africa 1911-1914’,
Historical Journal
, 17 (1974), pp. 621f.

108
Max M. Warburg,
Aus meinen Aufzeichnungen
(privately printed), pp. 27f.

109
Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 117f. Cf. Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 266, 275ff.

110
W. A. Renzl, ‘Great Britain, Russia and the Straits, 1914-1915’,
Journal of Modern History
, 42 (1970), pp.3f. Cf. Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 162ff., 176-89, 272.

111
Fischer,
Germany’s Aims
, pp. 45f.; Grey,
Twenty-Five Years,
vol. I, pp. 272-5; Butterfield, ‘Grey’, p. 4.

112
Frankfurter Zeitung,
20 October 1913.

113
Brock, ‘Britain Enters the War’, p. 164. See also J. Gooch, ‘Soldiers’ Strategy and War Aims in Britain 1914-1918’, in B. Hunt and A. Preston (eds),
War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War
(London, 1977), p. 23.

114
Ferguson, ‘Public Finance and National Security’,
passim.

115
Grey,
Twenty-Five
Years, vol. I, p. 149; Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War
, pp. 67f., 119ff.; G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds),
British Documents on the Origins of the War
,
1898-1914,
vol. VI (London, 1930), No. 446; Churchill,
World Crisis
, pp. 96ff.; R. T. B. Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Germany, 1911-1914’, in Hinsley (ed),
British Foreign Policy
, pp. 290ff. For the German side of the story, J. S. Steinberg, ‘Diplomatie als Wille und Vorstellung: Die Berliner Mission Lord Haldanes im Februar 1912’, in H. Schottelius and W. Deist (eds),
Marine und Marinepolitik im kaiserlichen Deutschland
(Düsseldorf, 1972).

116
Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War
, pp. 59f., 121f.

117
Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Germany’, pp. 293f. My emphasis. Cf. Asquith’s version in
Genesis
, pp. 55, 100.

118
Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Germany’, pp. 299, 303f.

119
Asquith,
Genesis
, pp. 77f.; Churchill,
World Crisis
, pp. 103, 114f., 157; Grey,
Twenty
-
Five
Years, vol. I, pp. 249f.; Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Germany,’ pp. 296f.

120
Howard, ‘Edwardian Arms Race’, pp. 91f. Pessimists believed the Germans were aiming to accelerate their building ‘tempo’ so much that within a few years they would have more dreadnoughts than the Royal Navy. In fact, the German total in 1912 was nine to Britain’s fifteen.

121
French,
British Planning
, p. 28; Offer,
Agrarian Interpretation,
pp. 232-41, 252, 260, 277-80, 296ff.; Hankey,
Supreme Command
, pp. 77, 88, 91, 97-100; Wilson,
Entente
, p. 106; Churchill,
World Crisis
, pp. 114f., 157.

122
Gooch and Temperley (eds),
British Documents
, vol. VI, No. 456, p. 611. Cf. Cain and Hopkins,
British Imperialism,
p. 458. Cf. D. W. Sweet, ‘Great Britain and Germany, 1905-1911’, in Hinsley (ed.),
British Foreign Policy
, p. 230.

123
Churchill,
World Crisis
, pp. 168-77; R. S. Churchill,
Winston S
.
Churchill
, vol. II.
Companion
, Part III:
1911-1914
(London, 1969), pp.1820, 1825-37, 1856f.; K.O. Morgan (ed.),
Lloyd George Family Letters
,
1885-1936
(Oxford, 1973), pp. 165f.; Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. I, p. 5; Wilson,
Entente
, p. 8.

124
Churchill,
World Crisis
, pp. 178f.; Asquith,
Genesis
, pp. 143f.

125
Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 260, 267ff.

126
Gooch and Temperley (eds),
British Documents
, vol. VI, No. 344, p. 461. Cf. Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 254f.

127
Sweet, ‘Great Britain and Germany’, pp. 229f.

128
Wilson,
Entente
, p. 93. Cf. Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Germany’, pp. 290f.; Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, p. 251.

129
Sweet and Langhorne, ’Great Britain and Russia‘, pp. 243f.; Trevelyan, Grey, p. 114f.

130
Wilson,
Entente
, p. 101.

131
Nicolson’s phrase, quoted in Wilson,
Entente
, p. 38. Grey may initially have been influenced by the fear that Russia and Germany might conclude an alliance, which the Kaiser and Tsar sought unsuccessfully to do in 1905. Cf. Butterfield, ‘Grey’, p. 2; Wilson, ‘Grey’, p. 193; Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 293.