Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (52 page)

Triumph and Tragedy

319

Triumph and Tragedy

320

South of the Ardennes Patton’s Third Army had meanwhile crossed the Moselle on each side of Thionville and thrust eastward to the German frontier. Metz was entered on November 20, though the Germans still clung to the surrounding forts, of which the last held out until December 13. From Metz and Nancy the Army swung up towards the river Saar, which they reached on a broad front, and threw bridgeheads across it near Saarlautern on December 4.

Here they confronted the strongest part of the Siegfried defences, consisting of a forward line along the north bank of the river, and behind it a zone over two miles deep of mutually supporting concrete works. Against such formidable and obstinately held fortifications the Third Army came to a halt.

On the right of the line General Devers’s Sixth Army Group from Lunéville and Epinal, forced their way through the Vosges and the Belfort Gap. The American Seventh Army had a stiff fight for the mountain crests, but the French First Army, after a week’s battle, the opening of which I had hoped to see, captured Belfort on November 22 and reached the Rhine north of Basle. Thence they swung down the river towards Colmar. This turned the German flank in the Vosges and the enemy withdrew. Strasbourg was entered on November 23, and during the next few weeks the Seventh Army cleared all Northern Alsace, wheeled up on the right of the Third Army, and, crossing the German frontier on a wide front, penetrated the Siegfried Line near Wissembourg. There was still a large pocket of Germans on French soil at Colmar, thirty miles deep and broad, which the French had been unable to clear. This was to prove an embarrassment a few weeks later.

Triumph and Tragedy

321

I sent my comments on the whole situation to Smuts.

Prime

Minister

to

3 Dec. 44

Field-Marshal Smuts

… 2. In spite of Metz and Strasbourg and other
successes, we have of course sustained a strategic
reverse on the Western Front. Before this offensive was
launched we placed on record our view that it was a
mistake to attack against the whole front and that a far
greater mass should have been gathered at the point of
desired penetration. Montgomery’s comments and
predictions beforehand have in every way been borne
out. I imagine some readjustments will be made giving
back to Montgomery some of the scope taken from him
after the victory he gained in Normandy. You must
remember however that our Armies are only about one-half the size of the American and will soon be little more
than one-third. All is friendly and loyal in the military
sphere in spite of the disappointment sustained. We
must now re-group and reinforce the Armies for a
spring offensive. There is at least one full-scale battle to
fight before we get to the Rhine in the north, which is
the decisive axis of advance. I am trying meanwhile to
have Holland cleaned up behind us. But it is not so
easy as it used to be for me to get things done.

3. Our armies in Italy were delayed by “Anvil” and
greatly weakened for its sake. Consequently we
cleared the Apennines only to find the valley of the Po
a bog. Thus both in the mountains and on the plains
our immense armour superiority has been unable to
make itself felt, and now the bad weather in Italy, as on
the Western Front, greatly diminishes the tactical air-power in which we have so great a predominance.

Hitherto in Italy we have held twenty-eight German
divisions, and therefore no reproach can be made
against our activities. On the contrary, General Marshall
is astonished we have done so well. This is only
however because the Germans have delayed a
withdrawal through the Brenner and Ljubljana,
Triumph and Tragedy

322

presumably in order to bring their forces home from the
Balkans. We cannot look for any very satisfactory
events in Northern Italy at present, though we are still
attacking….

5. In Burma too we have been compelled to work
downward from the north through the jungles I had
hoped to avoid, and Mountbatten was doing pretty well.

Now however the disasters in China have overtaken
Kunming, and may soon affect Chungking. The
Generalissimo is withdrawing his best Chinese troops
from the southward advance in Burma to defend his
capital, his air terminus, and, I expect, his life and
régime. I cannot blame him, but this gravely affects the
success of Mountbatten’s well-conducted but already
unappetising operations. We seem condemned to
wallow at half-speed through these jungles, and I
cannot so far procure agreement for a far-flung
amphibious strategical movement across the Bay of
Bengal. Everything has to be chewed up by the
Combined Staffs and “Safety first” overloads every
plan. The Americans are having hard fighting at Leyte,
but their advance in the Pacific has been admirable
during the year, and I hope our Fleet will join them in
growing strength in 1945. As old Fisher said, “The
Royal Navy always travels first class,” and you can
imagine the enormous demands in man-power,
ancillary vessels, and preparations of all kinds which
the Admiralty blithely put forward.

6. Meanwhile there approaches the shadow of the
General Election, which, before many months have
passed, will certainly break up the most capable
Government England has had or is likely to have.

Generally we have a jolly year before us. Our financial
future fills in any space in the horizon not already
overcast with clouds. However, I am sure we shall
master all these troubles as they come upon us, singly
or in company, even though the tonic element of mortal
danger is lacking.

7. Of all the messages which reached me on my
birthday, none was more movingly phrased or gave me
Triumph and Tragedy

323

more encouragement than yours, my old and trusted
friend.

Three days later I addressed myself to the President.

Prime

Minister

to

6 Dec. 44

President Roosevelt

As we are unable to meet, I feel that the time has
come for me to place before you the serious and
disappointing war situation which faces us at the close
of this year. Although many fine tactical victories have
been gained on the Western Front and Metz and
Strasbourg are trophies, the fact remains that we have
definitely failed to achieve the strategic object which we
gave to our armies five weeks ago. We have not yet
reached the Rhine in the northern part and most
important sector of the front, and we shall have to
continue the great battle for many weeks before we can
hope to reach the Rhine and establish our bridgeheads.

After that, again, we have to advance through Germany.

2. In Italy the Germans are still keeping twenty-six
divisions — equivalent to perhaps sixteen full strength
or more — on our front. They could however at any
time retreat through the Brenner and Ljubljana and
greatly shorten their line by holding from Lake Garda to,
say, the mouth of the Adige. By this they might save
half their Italian forces for home defence. Even after
that there are the Alps to which they could fall back,
thus saving more men. It seems to me that their reason
for standing so long in Italy may have been to extricate
the twelve divisions in the Balkans, etc., which are now
fighting their way back to Hungary and Austria. Apart
from the Air and Partisans and small Commando
forces, there are no means of preventing this, and my
opinion is that the greater part will escape. About half of
these might be available for adding to what may be
saved from Italy. This would be a powerful reinforcement to the German homeland, available, according to
events, either in the East or in the West.

3. We have secured weighty advantages from

“Dragoon” [the landing in Southern France] for the
Triumph and Tragedy

324

battle on the main front, but I the reason why the
Fifteenth Group of Armies has not been able to inflict a
decisive defeat on Kesselring is that, owing to the delay
caused by the weakening of our forces for the sake of

“Dragoon,” we did not get through the Apennines till the
valley of the Po had become waterlogged. Thus neither
in the mountains nor on the plains have we been able
to use our superiority in armour.

4. On account of the obstinacy of the German
resistance on all fronts, we did not withdraw the five
British and British-Indian divisions from Europe in order
to enable Mountbatten to attack Rangoon in March,
and for other reasons also this operation became
impracticable. Mountbatten therefore began, as we
agreed at Quebec, the general advance through Burma
downstream from the north and the west, and this has
made satisfactory progress. Now, owing to the advance
of the Japanese in China, with its deadly threat to
Kunming and perhaps Chungking, to the Generalissimo
and his regime, two and possibly more Chinese
divisions have to be withdrawn for the defence of
China. I have little doubt that this was inevitable and
right. The consequences however are serious so far as
Mountbatten’s affairs are concerned, and no decision
has yet been taken on how to meet this new misfortune, which at one stroke endangers China and your air
terminal as well as the campaign in Northern Burma. All
my ideas about a really weighty blow across the
Adriatic or across the Bay of Bengal have equally been
set back.

5. The vast-scale operations which you have
conducted in the Pacific are at present the only part of
the war where we are not in a temporary state of
frustration.

6. We have however, happily, to consider what the
Russians will do. We have Stalin’s promise for a winter
campaign, starting, I presume, in January. On most of
his immense front he seems to have been resting and
preparing, though only about three or four German
divisions have come over to face Eisenhower. I am not
in a position to measure the latest attacks he has
launched to the southwest of Budapest. We may,
Triumph and Tragedy

325

however, I think, look forward to more assistance from
this and other Russian action than we have had lately,
and the German position is so strained that any heavy
penetration might bring about a partial if not a total
collapse.

7. I have tried to survey the whole scene in its scope
and proportion, and it is clear that we have to face, in
varying degrees of probability:

(a) A considerable delay in reaching, still more in
forcing, the Rhine on the shortest road to Berlin.

(b) A marked degree of frustration in Italy.

(c) The escape home of a large part of the German
forces from the Balkan peninsula.

(d) Frustration in Burma.

(e) Elimination of China as a combatant.

When we contrast these realities with the rosy
expectations of our peoples, in spite of our joint efforts
to damp them down, the question very definitely arises,

“What are we going to do about it?” My anxiety is
increased by the destruction of all hopes of an early
meeting between the three of us and the indefinite
postponement of another meeting of you and me with
our Staffs. Our British plans are dependent on yours,
our Anglo-American problems at least must be
surveyed as a whole, and the telegraph and the
telephone more often than not only darken counsel.