Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (55 page)

From the north two American corps, with the XXXth British on their western flank, pressed down upon the enemy. On January 8 they crossed the Laroche-Vielsalm road, an important escape route for the Germans. Struggling through snowstorms, the two wings of the Allied attack slowly drew closer, until they met at Houffalize on January 16. The Germans were forced steadily eastward and harassed Triumph and Tragedy

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continually from the air, until by the end of the month they were back behind their frontier, with nothing to show for their supreme effort except ruinous losses of material and casualties amounting to a hundred and twenty thousand men.

One awkward situation during the battle must be recorded, although happily it did not affect the issue. In order to release divisions from the Third Army Eisenhower had ordered Devers’s Sixth Army Group to take over part of Patton’s front, and authorised, if necessary, a withdrawal from the Rhine to the Vosges. This meant leaving Strasbourg open to the enemy. There was understandable consternation in French political and military circles. What vengeance would fall upon the citizens of Strasbourg who had rallied so passionately to their deliverers! I chanced to be at Eisenhower’s headquarters at this juncture, and he and Bedell Smith listened attentively to my appeal. The enemy did indeed spring into action on the Army Group’s front, especially in the Colmar pocket, but were repulsed.

Eisenhower cancelled his instructions, and the military necessity which might have made the evacuation of Strasbourg imperative never arose. De Gaulle expressed his gratitude.

This was the enemy’s final offensive of the war. At the time it caused us no little anxiety. Our own advance had to be postponed, but we benefited in the end. The Germans could not replace their losses, and our subsequent battles on the Rhine, though severe, were undoubtedly eased. The German High Command, and even Hitler, must have been disillusioned. Taken by surprise, Eisenhower and his commanders acted swiftly, but they will agree that the major credit lies elsewhere. In Montgomery’s words, “The Triumph and Tragedy

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Battle of the Ardennes was won primarily by the staunch fighting qualities of the American soldier.”
2

For my own part, I will quote from a speech I made to the House of Commons on January 18:

I have seen it suggested that the terrific battle which
has been proceeding since December 16 on the
American front is an Anglo-American battle. In fact
however the United States troops have done almost all
the fighting, and have suffered almost all the losses…. I
never hesitate … to stand up for our own soldiers when
their achievements have been cold-shouldered or
neglected or overshadowed, as they sometimes are,
but we must not forget that it is to American homes that
the telegrams of personal losses and anxiety have
been going during the past month…. According to the
professional advice which I have at my disposal, what
was done to meet von Rundstedt’s counter-stroke was
resolute, wise, and militarily correct. A gap was torn
open as a gap can always be in a line hundreds of
miles long. General Eisenhower at once gave the
command to the north of the gap to Field-Marshal
Montgomery, and to the south of it to General Omar
Bradley…. In the result both these highly skilled
commanders handled the very large forces at their
disposal in a manner which I think I may say without
exaggeration may become the model for military
students in the future….

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18

British Intervention in Greece

Operation “Manna”— German Delay in Quitting
Athens — The Caserta Agreement, September
26

— The Liberation of Athens, October
15
—

Greece in Ruins — Mr. Eden’s Visit to Athens
Disorder Grows and Spreads
—
General Scobie is
Directed to Make Counter-Preparations Against E.

A.M
. —
Demobilising the Guerrillas — Resignation
of E.A.M. Ministers — Civil War Begins, December
3
— I order General Scobie to Put Down the
Rebellion
—
Hard Fighting in Athens, and Hard
Attacks at Home and in the United States — My
Speech in the House of Commons, December
8

— American Feeling
—
Proposals to Set Up a
Regency in Greece
—
Mr. Harold Macmillan and
Field-Marshal Alexander Arrive in Athens
—

Alexander is Given a Free Hand — An Astonishing Leakage
—
Loyalty of the British Trades Union
Congress
—
A Telegram from the President,
December
13
— And from Field-Marshal Smuts,
December
14
— My Reply to Mr. Roosevelt,
December
17
— Telegram to the Prime Minister of
Canada, December
15
— Our Policy Vindicated
by the English
-
Speaking World.

B
EFORE LEAVING ITALY at the end of August I had asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to work out the Triumph and Tragedy

341

details of a British expedition to Greece in case the Germans there collapsed.
1

We gave it the code-name “Manna.” Its planning was complicated by our strained resources and the uncertainty of Germany’s strategic position in the Balkans, but I directed that our forces should be ready to act by September 11, and that the Greek Prime Minister and representatives of the Greek Government in Italy should be prepared to enter Athens without delay. By the end of the first week of September they were installed in a villa near Caserta. Here Papandreou set to work with his new E.A.M.

colleagues.
2
It was essential that there should be no political vacuum in Greece. As I minuted on August 29, “It is most desirable to strike out of the blue without any preliminary crisis. It is the best way to forestall the E.A.M.”

The essence of the plan was to occupy Athens and its airfield with a parachute brigade, bring in four squadrons of fighter aircraft, clear Piraeus harbour for further reinforcements from Egypt, and ensure the early arrival of the Greek Ministers. We would then hasten in relief supplies, and bring over the Greek Brigade from Italy.

German delay in quitting Athens forced us to modify our project. The garrison of ten thousand men showed no sign of moving, and on September 13 I telegraphed to General Wilson instructing him to prepare a preliminary descent in the Peloponnese, where the Germans were withdrawing northward to the Corinth area. As from midnight September 13–14 the troops for “Manna” were placed at forty-eight hours’ notice. They were commanded by General Scobie, and consisted initially of the 2nd Parachute Brigade from Italy, the 23d Armoured Brigade acting as infantry, administrative troops from Egypt, and whatever Greek forces were at the disposal of their recognised Government.

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The 15th Cruiser Squadron, with mine-sweeping flotillas, and four British and three Greek air squadrons, together with United States transport aircraft, were to sustain this expedition.

The tardy German withdrawal from Athens enabled us however to consolidate the direction of Greek affairs on the eve of the decisive stroke. I was glad that the Greek Government was now at hand in Italy. At the end of September General Wilson summoned Saraphis, the E.L.A.

S.. general,
3
and his Nationalist rival Zervas to meet Papandreou at Caserta. Mr. Macmillan, as Minister Resident in the Mediterranean, together with Mr. Leeper, our Ambassador to the Greek Government, were present to advise and direct the political side of this important conference, which had to create a unified command of all Greek forces available in Italy and inside Greece, together with the British forces now poised for the landing.

A comprehensive agreement was signed on September 26.

It laid down that all guerrilla forces in the country should place themselves under the orders of the Greek Government, who in their turn put them under the command of General Scobie. The Greek guerrilla leaders declared that none of their men would take the law into their own hands. Any action in Athens would be taken only on the direct orders of the British commander. This document, known as the Caserta Agreement, governed our future action.

The liberation did not begin until October. Commando units were then sent into Southern Greece, and in the early hours of October 4 our troops occupied Patras. This was our first foothold since the tragic exit of 1941. The troops then worked their way along the southern shores of the Gulf of Corinth. On October 12 General Wilson learnt that the

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Germans were evacuating Athens, and next day British parachutists landed on the Megara airfield, about eight miles west of the capital. On the 15th the rest of the paratroopers arrived, and occupied the city on the heels of the German withdrawal. Our naval forces entered the Piræus, bringing with them General Scobie and the main part of his force, and two days later the Greek Government arrived, together with our Ambassador.

The testing time for our arrangements had now come. At the Moscow Conference I had obtained Russian abstention at a heavy price. We were pledged to support Papandreou’s Provisional Administration, in which E.A.M.

were fully represented. All parties were bound by the Caserta Agreement, and we wished to hand over authority to a stable Greek Government without loss of time. But Greece was in ruins. The Germans destroyed roads and railroads as they withdrew northward. Our Air Force harassed them as they went, but on land we could do little to interfere. E.L.A.S. armed bands filled the gap left by the departing invaders, and their central command made little effort to enforce the solemn promises which had been given. Everywhere was want and dissension. Finances were disordered and food exhausted. Our own military resources were stretched to the limit.

At the end of the month Mr. Eden visited Athens on his way home from Moscow, and received a tumultuous welcome in memory of his efforts for Greece in 1941. With him were Lord Moyne, the Minister Resident in Cairo, and Mr.

Macmillan. The whole question of relief was discussed and everything humanly possible was done. Our troops willingly went on half-rations to increase the food supplies, and Triumph and Tragedy

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British sappers started to build emergency communications.

By November 1 the Germans had evacuated Salonika and Florina, and ten days later the last of their forces had crossed the northern frontier. Apart from a few isolated island garrisons, Greece was free.

But the Government in Athens had not enough troops to control the country and compel E.L.A.S. to observe the Caserta Agreement. Disorder grew and spread. On November 7 I minuted to Foreign Secretary Eden:
Prime

Minister

to

7 Nov. 44

Foreign Secretary

In my opinion, having paid the price we have to
Russia for freedom of action in Greece, we should not
hesitate to use British troops to support the Royal
Hellenic Government under M. Papandreou.

2. This implies that British troops should certainly
intervene to check acts of lawlessness. Surely M.

Papandreou can close down E.A.M. newspapers if they
call a newspaper strike.

3. I hope the Greek Brigade will soon arrive, and will
not hesitate to shoot when necessary. Why is only one
Indian brigade of the Indian Division to be sent in? We
need another eight or ten thousand foot-soldiers to hold
the capital and Salonika for the present Government.