Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (139 page)

Prime Minister to General

14 Jan. 45

Ismay and to Sir Edward

Bridges

Triumph and Tragedy

869

I have been worrying about the following. Before we
went to the Quebec Conference in September very
sanguine views were expressed about the termination
of the German war, and Staff opinion is on record that it
would end before Christmas 1944. In consequence of
this a great many alterations in departmental plans
were made. The same process took place in the United
States on a far wider scale.

2. Now however quite a different picture opens, and
I am of opinion that we should be prudent to fix October
1, 1945, as the probable target date. Are you sure that
the change in the military situation has been properly
reflected throughout all the military and other
departments concerned, and that no special action is
called for from me? At present the expectation is, very
hard fighting all through the summer on land, a
recrudescence of U-boat activity on a serious scale
from February or March, and the revived challenge of
the German Air Force implied in their leadership in jet-propelled aircraft and their multiplication of fighter
aircraft.

3. Pray propose to me, after consulting with the
Chiefs of Staff, any measures which should be taken
about the target date for the end of the German war.

We can have a Staff meeting and a meeting of the War
Cabinet if necessary. Anyhow, we must not be caught
short. I expect a great many of the departments have
already adjusted their views to the new position. The
fact that they are always loth to cut down will be helpful
in this matter. The last date officially fixed for the end of
the German war was December 31, 1944. Have we
fixed a new date? If not, must we not now do so, and
how should it be announced to departments?

Prime Minister to General

14 Jan. 45

Ismay, for C.O.S.

Committee

In view of the great operations which impend before
the Rhine is reached, the question arises whether we
could not destroy the permanent Rhine bridges. If the
air cannot do it, what about fluvial mines? We went far
Triumph and Tragedy

870

in this in the early days, but aimed then mainly at
destroying the traffic on the Rhine.
1
The destruction of
the permanent Rhine bridges seems a great objective
as long as the main German armies are engaged west
of the Rhine. Destroying them will not hamper us after
we have passed that river because they will most
certainly be destroyed by the Germans themselves
once they are driven across it. It may well be that the
present type of fluvial mine is much too small to do any
good; but the principle, upon which much labour was
expended, is perhaps worth considering. Perhaps
however the Air Force could oblige. At any rate, the
fluvial mine would be very effective against floating
bridges, of which surely the Germans must have a
number.

2. Do not hesitate to remit the detailed study of this
matter to subordinate bodies.

PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

NOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

15 Jan. 45

At the present stage of the war research and
development projects likely to be effectively used in
operations before the end of 1946 must have the
highest priority.

Research workers and draughtsmen are scanty, and
are needed also by industry in preparation for the
change-over to peace-time production and for the
development of civil air transport.

All Service research and development projects now
in hand must therefore be reviewed forthwith in the light
of current hypotheses about the end of the German war
and the duration of the Japanese war. Those which are
not likely to be used in operations on a considerable
scale in the second half of 1946 should be slowed
down or temporarily abandoned so as to permit the
maximum concentration upon the remainder and some
release of man-power to civilian production.

Triumph and Tragedy

871

Departments must also review their present practice
in making modifications, particularly to obsolescent
weapons and equipment (including aircraft), so as to
cut out all but those which are essential for operational
purposes or to save life.

Prime Minister to General

19 Jan. 45

Ismay

Arrangements should be made to leave a large
number of static anti-aircraft guns which are not needed
in their positions for care and maintenance. I do not like
breaking up batteries planted with so much care. The
personnel can be removed and a few caretakers kept.

Otherwise I am sure we shall find that in a few months
we have simply stripped the western and northern parts
of the country of every form of defence, and should the
situation change we should have to begin almost from
the very beginning. It is the personnel that we want.

2. I must take exception to the expression “low-grade infantry brigades.” This should never be used
again. If it is necessary to differentiate between them in
any way by name they could be called “Reserve
Brigades.”

Prime Minister to Ministry of

22 Jan. 45

Agriculture

I am much concerned at the potato shortage,
because we had been taught to rely so much upon this
form of food.

As the Minister is absent in America the department
should let me have a short report showing why this
shortage has come about, what measures are being
taken to remedy it, and when the position will be
restored. The report should not exceed one page.

Prime Minister to General

25 Jan. 45

Ismay

Pray give me summaries of what our Intelligence
predicted [about German strategy and will to resist] on
the two previous dates, and what they predict now.

Each summary should be limited to fifteen lines.

Triumph and Tragedy

872

Nothing must be circulated until I have had an
opportunity of reading these summaries. Do not let the
officers concerned know that what they said a few
months ago is being compared with what they say now.

It would only dishearten them.

FEBRUARY

Prime Minister to

General Jacob6

Major

Feb. 45

All this seems metaphysical hairsplitting. Whatever
happens there must be no diminution of the 26 million
tons rate of import into the United Kingdom during the
German war. Further, no inroad on British stocks below
those at present sanctioned. Finally, the loss, if any, to
be borne operationally. Any inroad upon the basic
requirements of the United Kingdom on imports must
be fought out as a first-class issue between Governments. Report to me in what way this affects your
metaphysics.

Prime Minister to Foreign

6 Feb. 45

Secretary, First Sea Lord,

and General Ismay

The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean told me he
had heard of an impending cut of 97 per cent, in the
pay of the Greek Navy — i.e., from about £5 a week to
3s. If this, or anything like it, were to be enforced as a
part, no doubt, of most necessary and desirable
economies in Greece, it would at this moment have
disastrous consequences, and it can in no circumstances be allowed to occur. One way would be for us
to pay the difference for three or six months. I am
assured that the Greek vessels are most useful to the
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

Prime Minister to General

20 Feb. 45

Hollis

The work of British troops is rarely mentioned in the
newspapers; but no one ever sees any reference to the
work of English troops. Get me the best figure available
Triumph and Tragedy

873

of the losses sustained by the English in this war from
the beginning. I imagine they amount to at least double
those of all the other portions of the United Kingdom
and British Empire put together; it might be three times.

The civilian casualties should also be included. Let rue
see what can be done about this. Do not confine
yourself to the particular questions I have asked, but
give me some illustrations.

2. Another calculation which might be made would
refer to the losses of the Cockneys. Would it perhaps
be true to say that the citizens of London, military and
civil, have lost more than the whole of the British
Empire, or the rest of the United Kingdom, or the whole
of the British Empire and the rest of the United
Kingdom put together? Whether and how I shall use
these facts I will myself judge. But let me know what
they are.
2

Prime Minister to

23 Feb. 45

Chancellor of the

Exchequer and Sir Edward

Bridges

I am not prepared to agree to this costly and to a
large extent needless investigation [into the effects of
the combined bomber offensive]. The pressure in all the
Service departments is of course high at the present
time to find new jobs for their vastly expanded
personnel. I hope I can rely upon the Treasury to tackle
a demand like this in the first instance. I regard the
whole process proposed as devoid of justification. I
think it safe to say that no lessons of use in bombing
Japan will be gathered by this special organisation. If
the United States choose to embark upon such
inquiries, that is only a part of their wasteful methods,
which we in our impoverished condition cannot afford to
imitate. As Allies however it is probable that they would
let us see the results of their inquiries.

2. I am prepared myself to fight this matter through. I
think the first collision should however be taken by the
Triumph and Tragedy

874

Treasury and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer
should oppose the scheme.

MAN-POWER

DIRECTIVE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF

DEFENCE

26 Feb. 45

I. It is evident that we are attempting more than our
resources will permit, and some restatement of the
priorities which underlie our planning is called for in
order to effect the necessary easement. Our war effort
cannot be maintained unless our civil economy receives
a considerable reinforcement. In particular we should
aim at a total increase of about 275,000 in the first half
of 1945 in the labour force allocated to the Board of
Trade.

11 The following principles should guide the
allocation of man-power:

(a) First priority must of course continue to be given
to what is required to achieve the defeat of Germany at
the earliest possible date. Above all, the first-line
strength of the Army in Europe must be maintained,
and such essential needs as artillery ammunition must
be met. Some earlier diminution in our air strength in
Europe in the latter half of 1945 can however be
accepted. Man-power should not in any case be
employed on the manufacture of aircraft or other
munitions of war designed for use only in the European
theatre which cannot be completed until after the end of
1945.

(b)Subject to a), every effort must be made to meet
the essential requirements for a reasonable expansion
of civil production.

(c) I do not propose that there should be any change
in the ultimate overall strength of the forces to be
deployed against Japan, but there can be some delay
in their build-up and equipment, including reserves.

Munitions programmes should be reviewed in the light
of this general principle.

Triumph and Tragedy

875

(d) We should ensure that man-power is not
employed in the manufacture in quantity of equipment
of new and improved types, where equipment of older
but serviceable types is available for the purposes of
the Japanese war. Scales of initial equipment, assumed
wastage rates, and scales of reserves should also be
scrutinised. Items of equipment which are not
absolutely essential should be eliminated. Over-insurance in provision is a luxury we cannot afford.