Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (137 page)

Thereafter there would be the need to put the port in
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order, and therefore the Cette operation, even if the
naval objection to the landing-places were overcome,
would not influence the war in 1944 except in so far as
German troops now on the Riviera or dispatched from
O.K.W. were kept out of the “Overlord” theatre. On this
plan there could not be any large oversea intake from
the United States. This heavy-footed method of
approach to Bordeaux is not to be compared with the
results to be obtained by a descent upon Bordeaux
either from Bayonne or from neighbouring small landing-points. This might by a coup-de-main give a port and
bridgehead into which French troops from Africa and
the Mediterranean could enter France, and another
great port be opened directly on the Atlantic. Anyhow,
in view of the naval objections Cette has been ruled out.

15.We are therefore left with the Toulon-Marseilles
operation. The more I have thought about this the more
bleak and sterile it appears. It adds another 130 miles
to the march upon Bordeaux, making a total of 355

miles in all. This march would present a flaak to any
German forces to the northward. The landing itself
cannot be begun till August 30, and then only if the L.S.

T.s, etc., can be spared from “Overlord” by July 10. All
that can be said against Cette as a means of access to
Bordeaux is reinforced in the case of Marseilles by
these facts. Indeed, the march to Bordeaux from
Marseilles could not begin in ten-division strength till a
month after August 30, and could not be accomplished
for probably three months after that. For these reasons
I cannot feel convinced that the attack on Bordeaux
from the Gulf of Lions is a practical possibility.

16.But the successful capture of Toulon and
Marseilles by August 30 and the landing of ten divisions
by September 30 would also have as a possible
objective a march up the Rhone valley, with Lyons, 160

miles to the north, as its first objective. Here we should
have, if successful, the advantage of putting in all the
French available and such American divisions as were
withdrawn from Italy, from Africa, or diverted from the
United States at the cost of “Overlord.” We should also
be in close contact with the Maquis, who have
developed a moderate guerrilla in the mountains. We
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should have a first-class port through which to pour
American troops into this part of France if and as
desired. It is as easy to talk of an advance up the
Rhone valley as it is of a march from Italy to Vienna.

But very great hazards, difficulties, and delays may
menace all such projects. Once we are committed to
the landing at Marseilles, all .the enemy troops along
the Riviera, at present seven or eight divisions, can be
brought to oppose us. It will always be possible for O.K.

W. to move any forces they have in Italy through the
tunnels under the Alps, or till winter comes along the
great motoring roads which have been made over
them, and intercept our northward advance at any point
they choose. The country is most formidable. Without
the enemy withdrawing a single division from the

“Overlord” battle, we could be confronted with superior
forces at every step we advance up the Rhone valley.

The evacuation by the enemy of Piedmont would not
entail more than his guarding the Corniche roads along
the Riviera and the mountain passes, which, with the
winter coming on, would not be difficult. He can always
blow up the tunnels at his discretion. If we blow them
up by air action he can always, except in the depth of
winter, escape over the top or along the Riviera coast.

17.It seems to me very difficult to prove that either
Cette or the Marseilles operation would have any
tactical relation to the battle we have to fight now and
throughout this summer and autumn for “Overlord.” The
distance, as the crow flies, from Marseilles to
Cherbourg is 600 miles, and from Marseilles to Paris
400 miles. It would seem clear chat, even with great
success, neither of these operations would directly
influence the present battle in 1944.

18.Moreover, before we embark upon either of these
two forms of “Anvil” in the hopes of helping “Overlord” it
would be well to count the cost that must be paid for
either of them.

19.The telegrams from Wilson, Alexander, and Field-Marshal Smuts put before us the project of an attack
eastward across the Adriatic or/and around its shores,
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and General Wilson conceives it possible that, on this
plan, he and General Alexander could have possession
of Trieste by the end of September. This movement is
of course as equally unrelated tactically to “Overlord” as
are the variants of “Anvil.”

20.Whether we should ruin all hopes of a major
victory in Italy and all its fronts and condemn ourselves
to a passive rôle in that theatre, after having broken up
the fine Allied army which is advancing so rapidly
through that peninsula, for the sake of “Anvil,” with all
its limitations, is indeed a grave question for His
Majesty’s Government and the President, with the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, to decide. For my own part,
while eager to do everything in human power which will
give effective and timely help to “Overlord,” I should
greatly regret to see General Alexander’s army
deprived of much of its offensive power in Northern Italy
for the sake of a march up the Rhone valley, which the
Combined Chiefs of Staff have themselves described
as unprofitable, in addition to our prime operation of

“Overlord.”

21.To sum up:

(a)Let us reinforce “Overlord” directly, to the utmost
limit of landings from the west.

(b)Let us next do justice to the great opportunities of
the Mediterranean commanders, and confine ourselves
at this phase to minor diversions and threats to hold the
enemy around the Gulf of Lions.

(c) Let us leave General Eisenhower all his landing-craft as long as he needs them to magnify his landing
capacity.

(d)Let us make sure of increasing to the maximum
extent the port capacity in the “Overlord” battle area.

(e)Let us resolve not to wreck one great campaign
for the sake of winning the other. Both can be won.

ANNEXE

U.S. ARMY, INCLUDING A.A.F. ARRIVALS IN U.K., MAY TO

AUGUST 1944

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President Roosevelt to

29 June 44

Prime Minister

I have given careful personal consideration to your
memorandum, and I have had our joint staffs give the
whole subject further consideration.

2. I agree with you that our over-all strategic concept
should be to, engage the enemy on the largest scale
with the greatest violence and: continuity, but I am
convinced that it must be based on a main effort,
together with closely co-ordinated supporting efforts
directed at the heart of Germany.

3. The exploitation of “Overlord,” our victorious
advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France,
combined with the Soviet drives to, the west — all as
envisaged at Teheran — will most surely serve to
realise our object — the unconditional surrender of
Germany. In this connection also I am mindful of our
agreement with Stalin as to an operation, against the
South of France and his frequently expressed views
favouring such an operation and classifying all others in
the Mediterranean as of lesser importance to the
principal objective of the European campaign.

4. I agree that the political considerations you
mention are important factors, but military operations
based thereon must be definitely secondary to the
primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany.

5. I agree that the “Overlord” build-up must receive
continuing attention, but consider this to be definitely
Elsenhower’s responsibility. The forces we are sending
him from the United States are what he has asked for.

If he wants divisions ahead of service troops he has but
to ask — the divisions will be ready.

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6. Until we have exhausted the forces in the United
States, or it is proved we cannot get them to Eisenhower when he wants them, I am opposed to the wasteful
procedure of transferring forces from the Mediterranean
to “Overlord.” If we use shipping and port capacity to
shift forces from one combat area (the Mediterranean)
to another (“Overlord”) it will certainly detract from the
build-up of “Overlord” direct from the United States, and
the net result is just what we don’t want — fewer forces
in combat areas.

7. My interest and hopes centre on defeating the
Germans in front of Eisenhower and driving on into
Germany, rather than on limiting this action for the
purpose of staging a full major effort in Italy. I am
convinced we will have sufficient forces in Italy, with

“Anvil” forces withdrawn, to chase Kesselring north of
Pisa-Rimini and maintain heavy pressure against his
army at the very least to the extent necessary to
contain his present force. I cannot conceive of the
Germans paying the price of ten additional divisions,
estimated by General Wilson, in order to keep us out of
Northern Italy.

8. We can — and Wilson confirms this — immediately withdraw five divisions (three United States and two
French) from Italy for “Anvil.” The remaining twenty-one
divisions, plus numerous separate brigades, will
certainly provide Alexander with adequate ground
superiority. With our air superiority there is obviously
sufficient air in the Mediterranean to furnish support
both for operations in Italy and for “Anvil,” and to
provide overwhelming air support during the critical
moments of either operation. We also have virtual
mastery of the sea in the Mediterranean.

9. I agree that operations against Bordeaux or Cette
with Mediterranean forces are out of the picture. As to
Istria, I feel that Alexander and Smuts, for several
natural and very human reasons, are inclined to
disregard two vital considerations: the grand strategy
firmly believed by us to be necessary to the early
conclusion of the war, and the time factor as involved in
the probable duration of a campaign to debouch from
the Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. The
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difficulties in this advance would seem far to exceed
those pictured by you in the Rhone valley, ignoring the
effect of organised Resistance groups in France and
the proximity to “Overlord” forces. I am informed that for
purely logistical reasons it is doubtful if, within a
decisive period, it would be possible to put into the
fighting beyond the Ljubljana Gap more than six
divisions. Meanwhile we will be struggling to deploy in
France thirty-five United States divisions that are now in
continental United States, plus an equivalent of corps
and army combat troops, not to mention the necessary
complement of service troops. I cannot agree to the
employment of United States troops against Istria and
into the Balkans,
2
nor can I see the French agreeing to
such use of French troops.