Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (136 page)

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Production, Secretary of

State for War, and to

General Ismay for C.O.S.

Committee

In accordance with my verbal instructions the
Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces has prepared
a memorandum showing the present man-power
position in the Middle East.

From this report it appears that there are about
662,000 on the ration strength, plus some 242,000

directly employed in civil labour, a total of 904,000 in
all. The analysis of the ration strength is as follows:
Of the 154,000 U.K. military personnel, 88,000 are
in formations, garrison units, base depots, etc., 50,000

at the base in Egypt and Palestine, and 16,000 in
headquarters and administrative units.

Although the Middle East is an important theatre it
cannot be allowed to absorb such large numbers. The
need to reduce them is twofold. At the present time of
man-power stringency it is essential to bring as many
British soldiers as possible into action against the
enemy. Therefore I consider that the Middle East
should give up to other theatres some 50,000 Service
personnel from their total. In addition, there must be a
reduction in local labour.

Also, on account of our financial position, our
expenditure in the Middle East will have to be curtailed.

At June 30 Egypt and Palestine, the main areas of the
Middle East base, had amassed sterling balances of
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some £320,000,000 and £95,000,000 respectively. At
present our net military expenditure in these two
countries is still running at £6,000,000 per month,
against an average of about £8,250,000 per month in
both 1942 and 1943. This drain on our sterling
resources cannot be allowed to go on. I am of opinion
that the time has now come to reduce the man-power in
the Middle East base in the first instance by at least
one-quarter; i.e., the 662,000 on the ration strength and
the 242,000 directly employed civil labour, totalling
904,000, should be reduced to 680,000.

The Secretary of State for War should put forward
proposals to bring these reductions into effect.

Prime Minister to Foreign

19 Dec. 44

Secretary

Why do we want to withdraw our garrison from
Persia? I should have thought it was the greatest
mistake. It is small, competent, and mainly Indian.

There are so many questions unsettled that we had
much better stay. It is easy to go and hard to return. I
am not pressing on military grounds for any such
withdrawal at the present time.

Prime Minister to Foreign

28 Dec. 44

Secretary

Surely it would be possible to reassure these men
who have fought in the Polish divisions that whatever
happens to them the British Empire will find them a
home. This is a sad letter from the son of Aubrey
Herbert. He was found medically unfit for the British
Army, so has been fighting for the last two years with
the Poles.

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Appendix D, Book One

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRES THE ATTACK ON

THE SOUTH OF FRANCE1

NOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF

DEFENCE

28 June 44

I have thought it right to put down a few points which
seem to me dominant.

2.At the present stage of the war in Europe our
overall strategic concept should be the engagement of
the enemy on the largest scale with the greatest
violence and continuity. In this way only shall we bring
about an early collapse. Here is the prime test.

3.For this purpose sufficient ports must be acquired
to allow the direct and speedy deployment in Europe of
the thirty or more American divisions which are in the
United States.

4.In choosing points of landing or attack regard must
be paid, first, to their tactical relation with the main
enterprise and battle proceeding under General
Eisenhower in Western France, and, secondly, to the
strain produced upon the central power of Germany,
the O.K.W. The optimum is to combine both.

5.Political considerations, such as the revolt of
populations against the enemy or the submission and
coming over of his satellites, are a valid and important
factor.

6.It is better to have two ventures than three, and
there are certainly not enough L.S.T.s, etc., available
for more than two major ventures.

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7.The various choices now open should be
examined in the light of the above requirements.

8.The supreme priority must naturally be accorded
to the support of “Overlord,” for it is certain that the
number of divisions now assigned to that enterprise up
to the end of August, namely, forty plus, are not
sufficient to establish mastery over the enemy
resources available in Western France (apart from a
psychological collapse, which should not be reckoned
upon). It was understood that United States divisions
would directly reinforce “Overlord” after August at the
rate of five per month. The number of divisions which
can be provided to reinforce “Overlord” in this period
should be limited only by shipping possibilities and port
accommodation on the western shores of France. The
fundamental problem for S.H.A.E.F. is the reception of
the maximum of divisions from any quarter, together
with the necessary tail.

9.For this purpose one ought not to consider only
the ports envisaged. There are many small ports
besides,

as

Port-en-Bessin,

Courseulles,

and

Ouistreham, with an aggregate capacity of 4000 tons
per diem, which have already been found, even on the
very closely studied beaches of the actual “Overlord”

assault. The use of landing-craft enormously increase;
the discharge from these small ports. For this reason it
would seem a mistake to move large quantities of
landing-craft from the supreme operation across the
Channel to any diversion elsewhere which was not in
tactical relation to the battle. The question is how to
give General Eisenhower the maximum support directly
in the shortest time and without causing needless
havoc elsewhere.

10.The whole facilities for reception of troops and
vehicles along the French Atlantic coast should be re-examined in the light of newly won experience.

Moreover, the gaining of new ports to the north and
south of our present “Overlord” objectives is greatly
facilitated by the use of shore-based airfields or fuelling
grounds now soon to be available in France. The taking
of Havre and St. Nazaire is a necessity in far closer
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relation to the battle than any ports in the Mediterranean. In short, it is the main interest of “Overlord” to
receive the great volume of troops who are waiting in
the United States and can, if they can take them and if
they can come into action sooner, be drawn from the
Mediterranean. It would be a great pity to sweep aside
all possibilities of broadening the intake direct from the
United States or by stages through the United Kingdom
into the western coasts of France.

11.Not only should the quantity of the intake be
expanded to the utmost limit, but also the quality should
be related to the fighting prospects of the next few
months. Attached to this paper will be found, in a note
prepared for me, the arrivals in the United Kingdom
during May and the estimate of arrivals for June, July,
and August. From this it will be seen that 553,356

American soldiers have arrived or are to arrive in these
four months, but they only constitute seven divisions.

The field troops of seven divisions amount to about
20,000 men a division, and with other fighting
accessories, such as tank brigades and independent
brigades, etc., to, say, 25,000. Total, 175,000.

Deducting this from 553,356 leaves 378,356. The
question arises whether it might not be possible by
severe adjustments, within the limits of existing
shipping arrangements, to give a higher priority to at
least four or five more fighting divisions at the expense
of some 378.356 servicing troops of many details
comprised in this immense figure. The battle in France
in this period may turn upon the more speedy arrival of
these additional fighting units. This would still leave
nearly a quarter of a million for the tail. Here also it
must be observed that the casualties in France have
happily been much less than those provided for in the
scale of build-up, and we should be justified on the
results of May and June alone in sending in two
additional formed divisions instead of 50,000

replacements.

12.There are three French divisions which could be
withdrawn from North Africa and a further four French
divisions which might be withdrawn from Italy if ports
and shipping and tail could be found for them. General
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Eisenhower plainly foresees this possibility as his
second choice.

13.Thus there are possibilities of a considerable
increase on the schedule of arrivals in the “Overlord”

area in the next three months. Let us be sure that we
are right in discarding these possibilities before we turn
to more sombre alternatives, for it is certain that in no
other way can so great or so timely a reinforcement be
given to “Overlord.”

14.We must now consider the application of the
axioms set forth in Part I to the Mediterranean in
relation to the remarks in Part II about reinforcement of

“Overlord” from the west. If there were any way of
capturing Bordeaux within the present fighting season
by a thrust from the Gulf of Lions, and thus opening
Bordeaux and other smaller ports near it to the advance
across the ocean of the main United States Army, this
would clearly take priority over any purely Mediterranean enterprise which could be launched. Let us
therefore examine in this setting the variants of “Anvil”

which have for so many months held our thoughts. Two
projects have been put forward, to wit, a landing of,
say, ten divisions with a three-division lift and a seven-division follow-up at Cette or at Marseilles. Cette has
the great advantage of being only 225 miles from
Bordeaux and is without any serious mountain
obstructions. It is, I understand, admitted by all sides
that there is no possibility of any landing on August 1

and the earliest possibility is August 15, and that even
this is doubtful. If we attack Cette between August 15

and 30 we are told it would be conceivable to land up to
ten divisions by the end of September or the middle of
October. There would then be the 225-mile march to
accomplish in the face of such opposition as might be
offered. If there were any opposition worthy of the
name it would be very surprising if a rate of more than
five miles a day could be maintained by a substantial
force. Thus we could not expect to take Bordeaux from
the back before the beginning or middle of December.