Their Finest Hour (86 page)

Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.

3.XII.40.

The King asked me today whether there was any shortage of instruments for aircraft.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

4.XII.40.

Two searchlights [at Suda Bay] seem very insufficient. What is going to be done to increase them?

2. In view of the torpedoing of the
Glasgow
by a seaplane while at anchor, ought not ships at anchor to be protected by nets at short range? I gather this was the Italian method at Taranto, but at the moment of the attack they had taken them off. Pray let me have a note on this.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

9.XII.40.

I understand that you are asking for another big call-up shortly. The papers talk about a million men. This forces me to examine the distribution of the men you have. According to your paper, twenty-seven British divisions are credited to Expeditionary Force and Middle East. These divisions are accounted for at 35,000 men each, to cover corps, army and line of communication troops, etc., plus 70,000 security troops in M.E.

2. The approved establishment of a British division at the present time is 15,500 men. It comprises only nine battalions with an establishment of 850, i.e., about 7500. The establishment of all battalions comprises a considerable proportion of servicing elements, and I doubt whether the rifle and machine-gun strength – i.e., fighting strength – amounts to more than 750. Thus the total number of men who actually fight in the infantry of a British division is 6750. This makes the fighting infantry of twenty-seven divisions, in what used to be called bayonet or rifle strength, 182,250. It used to be said that the infantry was “the staple of the Army,” to which all other branches were ancillary. This has certainly undergone some modification under new conditions, but none the less it remains broadly true. The structure of a division is built round its infantry of nine battalions, with a battery to each battalion, the necessary proportion of signallers and sappers, the battalion, brigade, and divisional transport, and some additional elements, the whole being constituted as an integral and self-contained unit of 15,500 men.

3. When we look at the division as a unit, we find that twenty-seven divisions at 15,500 official establishment require no less than 1,015,000 men. This gives an actual burden of 35,000 men for every divisional unit of 15,500 men, the units themselves being already fully self-contained. Nearly 20,000 men have therefore to be accounted for for each division of the E.F. or M.E. over and above the full approved establishment of 15,500.

This great mass, amounting to 540,000, has now to be explained. We are assured that the corps, army, L. of C. troops, etc., plus the 70,000 security troops in the M.E., justify this enormous demand upon the manhood of the nation.

4. One would have thought, if this were conceded, that the process was at an end. On the contrary, it is only just beginning. There still remain nearly two million men to be accounted for, as are set out on the attached table and graph. No one can complain of seven divisions for the Home Field Force, though it is surprising that they should require 24,000 men for divisional establishments of 15,500. This accounts for 170,000 men.

5. A.D.G.B. 500,000 must be submitted to for the present, pending improved methods of dealing with the night-bomber and increased British ascendancy in the air.

6. Two hundred thousand men for the permanent staffs and “unavailable” at training and holding units is a distressing figure, having regard to the great margins already provided. Staffs, static and miscellaneous units, “Y” list, etc., require 150,000 after all the twenty-seven divisions and the seven home divisions have been fully supplied with corps and army troops. Apart from everything necessary to handle an army of twenty-seven divisions and seven home divisions, there is this mass of 350,000 staffs and statics, living well of the nation as heroes in khaki.

7. Compared with the above, overseas garrisons, other than M.E., of 75,000 seems moderate. India and Burma at 35,000 is slender.

8. One hundred and fifty thousand men for the corps, army, and L. of C. troops for divisions other than British requires to be explained in detail. I understand the Australian and New Zealand fortes had supplied a great many of their rearward services. At any rate, I should like to see the exact distribution of this 150,000 in every category behind the divisions which they are expected to serve.

9. The net wastage – 330,000 – is of course a purely speculative figure. But it might well be
supplied from the 350,000 permanent staffs, static and other non-availables already referred to.

10. Deducting for the moment the 330,000 men for wastage, which deals with the future up till March, 1942, and 110,000 required for overseas garrisons other than M.E., India, and Burma, we face a total of 2,505,000 required for the aforesaid twenty-seven divisions plus seven home divisions, equal to about 74,000 per division. If the 500,000 for A.D.G.B. is omitted we still have over 2,000,000 men, i.e., nearly 60,000 men mobilised for each of thirty-four divisions.

Before I can ask the Cabinet to assent to any further call-up from the public, it is necessary that this whole subject shall be thrashed out, and that at least a million are combed out of the fluff and flummery behind the fighting troops, and made to serve effective military purposes. We are not doing our duty in letting these great numbers be taken from our civil life and kept at the public expense to make such inconceivably small results in the fighting line.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

9.XII.40.

Let me have a report on the development of the Salvage Section of the Admiralty, showing the work that has been done and what expansions, if any, are contemplated to meet the evergrowing need of repairs rapidly.

(Action this day. Prime Minister to Minister of Works and Buildings (Lord Reith).

9.XII.40.

I am in general agreement with your proposals to set up machinery for the large-scale rebuilding which will be necessary after the war. Perhaps you will discuss with Sir Edward Bridges the best methods of obtaining a decision upon this, i.e., whether by the Home Policy Committee or by the Cabinet.

2. Your most urgent task, however, is to repair existing buildings which are not seriously but only slightly damaged. Sometimes I see a whole row of houses whose windows are blown out, but which are not otherwise damaged, standing for weeks deserted and neglected. Active measures should be taken to replace the tiles and to close up the windows with fabric, with one small pane for light, and to make such repairs as render the houses fit for habitation. In dealing with house casualties the least serious should claim priority. You ought to have a regular corps of workmen who would get this job done so that the people may get back into their homes, which are unlikely to be hit a second time. Branches of this corps should exist in all the great cities. Not a day should be lost. How the expense is met or divided can be settled with the Treasury. But this question must be no impediment on action.,

Pray let me have your plans for dealing with this forthwith.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

14.XII.40.

There is one thing about the warfare between the Air Ministry and M.A.P. which is helpful to the public interest, namely, that I get a fine view of what is going on and hear both sides of the case argued with spirit. Will you very kindly address yourself to the various statements made in this letter attached [from Lord Beaverbrook], and especially to the one that on September 1 you had over a thousand unserviceable trainer aircraft? I have long suspected that the inefficiency which formerly ruled in the A.S.U.s and left us with only forty-five airplanes when the new Government was formed, as against about one thousand two hundred now, was reproduced in all the trainer establishments and communication flights and that a great mass of airplanes were kept in an unserviceable state, and I remember particularly the statement of one of your high officers that the Training Command worked on a basis of fifty per cent unserviceable. Who is responsible for repair and training establishments? If I were you, I should throw the whole business of repair on to M.A.P., and then you would be able to criticise them for any shortcomings.

See also the figures of how repaired aircraft and engines have increased since the change was made.

I recur to the point I made to you yesterday when you sent me your letter to M.A.P. The Air Ministry’s view is that the Germans have nearly 6000 airplanes in front-line action, and we have about 2000. Air Ministry also believe that the German output is 1800 a month, out of which they provide only 400 for training establishments, while we, out of 1400 output, provide also 400. How do you, then, explain that the Germans are able to keep three times our establishment in front-line action with only an equal monthly subscription of trainer aircraft? Apparently, on your figures, which I may say I do not accept (except for controversial purposes), the Germans can keep three times as large a force in action as you can for the same number of trainer planes. I know that you will rightly say you are preparing for the expansion of the future, but they have to keep going on a threefold scale, and expand as well.

I await with keen interest further developments of your controversy.

Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook. (Private.)

15.XII.40.

It is a magnificent achievement
²³
in the teeth of the bombing. Quite apart from new production, the repaired aircraft has been your own creation. We now have 1200 in the A.S.U.’s, which is a great comfort. Dispersion has greatly hampered you, but was absolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk.

In addition, you have not confined yourself to mere numbers, but, on the contrary, have pushed hard into quality.

The reason why there is this crabbing, as at A,
²⁴
is of course the warfare which proceeds between A.M. and M.A.P. They regard you as a merciless critic, and even enemy. They resent having had the M.A.P. functions carved out of their show, and I have no doubt they pour out their detraction by every channel open. I am definitely of opinion that it is more in the public interest that there should be sharp criticism and counter-criticism between the two departments than that they should be handing each other out ceremonious bouquets. One must therefore accept the stimulating but disagreeable conditions of war.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Dominions.

15.XII.40.

You will see from my telegram to Mr. Menzies that I do not view the situation in the Far East as immediately dangerous. The victory in Libya has reinforced, nay redoubled, the argument there set forth. I do not wish to commit myself to any serious dispersion of our forces in the Malay peninsula and at Singapore. On the contrary, I wish to build up as large as possible Fleet, Army and Air Force in the Middle East, and keep this in a fluid condition either to prosecute war in Greece and presently in Thrace, or reinforce Singapore should the Japanese attitude change. I could not commit myself to the dispatch of many of the air craft mentioned, certainly not the P.B.Y.s [Flying-boats] at this juncture, when we have a major peril to face on the northwestern approaches. I could not therefore agree to your telegram, and I should have thought my own (as amended in red) was quite sufficient at the present time.

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

15.XII.40.

How are you getting on with the development on a large scale of aerodromes in Greece to take modern bombers and fighters, and with the movement of skeleton personnel, spare parts, etc., there?

It is quite clear to me this is going to be most important in the near future, and we must try not to be taken by surprise by events.

I should be glad to have a fortnightly report.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

20.XII.40.

Please let me know the earliest date when the 2d Armoured Division
(a)
will land at Suez, and
(b)
can be available for action in the Western Desert.

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

20.XII.40.

I hope you will try to take a few days’ rest, and seize every opportunity of going to bed early. The fight is going to be a long one, and so much depends upon you. Do not hesitate to send your deputy to any meetings I may call.

Pray forgive my giving you these hints, but several people have mentioned to me that you are working too hard.

* * * * *

The possible use and counter-use of poison gas, should invasion come in the New Year, rested heavily upon me. Our progress in this sphere was, however, considerable.

 

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

21.XII.40.

You will remember that the War Cabinet ordered an inquiry into the fact that bulk storage for two thousand tons of mustard gas which had been ordered by the Cabinet in October, 1938, was still not ready in October, 1940.

The latest information which I have received from your Ministry shows that the bulk stock of mustard gas on December 9 was 1485 tons. I was also informed through your Ministry that 650 tons of additional new storage was to have become available last week, and that production was being increased accordingly. Was this promise fulfilled?

Meanwhile, I note that the filling of the new twenty-five pounder base-ejection shell has at last begun in earnest, and that 7812 of this type of shell had been filled by December 9. I should be glad to know how this figure compares with the total reserve of this type of shell required by the Army, and when this reserve is likely to be attained.

None of the new six-inch base-ejection shells has yet been filled. What reserve does the Army require of this type of shell, and when is this reserve expected to be ready?

I am sending a copy of this Minute to the Secretary of State for War.