Their Finest Hour (82 page)

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

23.IX.40.

I regard the production of G.L. sets
¹⁰
as of prime importance, and every step should be taken to accelerate output. I understand that the chief difficulty at the moment is that of obtaining the skilled labour required, and I wish everything possible to be done to meet this requirement. Speed is vital.

{Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

23.IX.40.

There is not much in the report referred to, and what there is applies equally to the Soudan. We are piling up troops and artillery in Kenya which are urgently needed in the Soudan.

With regard to what you say about the vast strategical front of the Kenya operation: if we lie back on the broad-gauge railway from Mombasa to the lake, we have a lateral line of communication incomparably superior to any line by which we can be approached, and it should be possible to move our forces so as to have sudden superior strength at the point where the enemy advance develops. Although no one can say for certain where the enemy’s blow will fall, I am convinced that the true disposition would economise [troops] to the utmost in Kenya in order to reinforce the Soudan. The one concession which is needed for Kenya is about ten cruiser tanks. If these were put on suitable vehicles on the railway, they could strike with deadly effect, and with
surprise,
at any Italian movement. But the mere piling-up of guns and brigades is a most painful process to watch.

In order to raise these points, I must ask that the move of the mountain battery from Aden to Kenya shall be held up, and that instead the question of moving it or another battery to the Soudan shall be considered. Please let me have a statement showing ration, rifle, machine-gun, and artillery strength of all troops in Kenya.

Prime Minister to Captain, H.M. Destroyer “Churchill.”

25.IX.40.

Am delighted that your ship should be named after the great Duke of Marlborough, and I am sending you one of his handwritten letters for your Ward Room for luck. Thank you so much for your kind message.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

25.IX.40.

Lord Lothian’s proposal to return for a flying visit appeals to me. Pray authorise it, and arrange it as you think most serviceable and convenient.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

26.IX.40.

If these facts [about the use of the blind beam for bombing] are accurate they constitute a deadly danger, and one of the first magnitude. I expect the Chiefs of the Staff to use all the resources at their disposal and to give me a report by tomorrow night
(a)
upon the reality of the danger,
(b)
upon the measures to counter it. In making any recommendation for action the Chiefs of the Staff may be sure that the highest priorities and all other resources will be at their disposal.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

26.IX.40.

The composition hat for air raids which Mr. Bevin is promoting seems to me of the utmost importance, and if it gives a measure of protection against falling splinters, etc., it should certainly be mass-produced on a great scale, and eventually made a full issue.

Pray let me have a report today on the experimental aspect, and in conjunction with the Minister of Supply let me have estimates for production.

Prime Minister to Minister of Labour.

26.IX.40.

I was delighted with your hat, and something on these lines should certainly be mass-produced as soon as possible for issue pending steel hats. I think it is a mistake to call it a “rag hat,” as I see is done in some of the papers today. I hope you will think of some better name.

I am calling for a full report today from the Home Secretary.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

26.IX.40.

Considering that everything depends upon Lord Beaverbrook’s success in obtaining the supply of aircraft, and the heavy blows he is receiving at Bristol, Southampton, and elsewhere, I earnestly trust you will see that his wishes are met fully and immediately in the matter of these spares.

Prime Minister to Minister of Agriculture.

26.IX.40.

I am far from satisfied at the proposal to reduce pigs to one-third of their present number by the middle of the autumn. This is certainly not what was understood by the Cabinet. Why do you not ask for a greater proportion of feeding-stuffs in the imports? We could then see what, if anything, had to give way to it. Meanwhile, what arrangements are you making for curing the surplus bacon that will come upon the market through the massacre of pigs? What increases have you been able to establish in the pig population by encouraging people to feed individual pigs from household refuse?

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

28.IX.40.

Recent air raids have shown that the production of certain vital munitions, and particularly De Wilde ammunition, has been concentrated in one factory, with the result that output has been seriously curtailed by one successful raid. Pray let me have a report on the distribution of the production of every important key munition. It will then be possible to assess the danger of serious reductions in output and to consider what can be done to distribute the risk more widely.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

28.IX.40.

1. These two papers [about the supply of material for chemical warfare] cause me great anxiety. I had understood that Randle [factory] had been working at full capacity as a result of the orders given by the War Cabinet on October 13, 1939 – i.e., almost exactly a year -ago. What is the explanation of the neglect to fulfil these orders, and who is responsible for it?

2. Secondly, it appears that practically no steps have been taken to make projectiles or containers, either for air or artillery to discharge these various forms of gas. The programme now set out would clearly take many months before any results are realised. Let me have an immediate report on this. The highest priority must be given. I regard the danger as very great.

3. Thirdly, the possibility of our having to retaliate on the German civil population must be studied, and on the largest scale possible. We should never begin, but we must be able to reply. Speed is vital here.

4. Fourthly, instant measures should be taken to raise Randle to full production, and above all to disperse the existing stock.

5. What are the actual amounts in stock?

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

29.IX.40.

These figures [about A.A. fire, first year of war] are encouraging. You should ask General Pile, however, to send in the account for September.

I should like to see a return of the ammunition fired every twenty-four hours during September as soon as possible.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Minister of Supply and President of the Board of Trade.

30.IX.40.

I am sure we ought to increase our steel purchases from the United States so as to save tonnage on ore. 1 should like to buy another couple of million tons, in various stages of manufacture. Then we should be able to resume the plan of the Anderson shelters, and various other steel requirements which press upon us. 1 would if necessary telegraph to the President.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

4.X.40.

This shows the very serious misconception which has grown up in this Ambassador’s mind about the consequences of the United States entering the war. He should surely be told forthwith that the entry of the United States into war, either with Germany and Italy or with Japan, is fully conformable with British interests.

2. That nothing in the munitions sphere can compare with the importance of the British Empire and the United States being co-belligerents. That if Japan attacked the United States without declaring war on us, we should at once range ourselves at the side of the United States and declare war upon Japan.

It is astonishing how this misleading Kennedy
¹¹
stud, that we should do better with a neutral United States than with her warring at our side, should have travelled so far. A clear directive is required to all our Ambassadors in countries concerned.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

9.X.40.

… Anyone can see that aircraft are needed in the Middle East. What is not so easy is whether they can be spared here. Remember that we are still vastly inferior in numbers, both of fighters and bombers, to the German air forces, and that heavy losses have been sustained by our air production. The Chief of the Air Staff and Secretary of State must be asked for a precise recommendation.

Prime Minister to General de Gaulle.

10.X.40.

I have received your telegram with great pleasure, and I send my best wishes to you and to all other Frenchmen who are resolved to fight on with us. We shall stand resolutely together until all obstacles have been overcome and we share in the triumph of our cause.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

12.X.40.

This development of Radar with German long-range coastal batteries is serious. We have for a long time been on the track of this device, and I drew attention to it some weeks ago. I was then told that it had to have a low priority because of other even more urgent needs. Perhaps it may now be possible to bring it forward. Evidently it will turn night into day so far as defence against sea bombardment is concerned.

Pray see if some proposals can be made without injury to other radio projects.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

13.X.40.

There are great disadvantages in stationing many British troops on the West African coast. In view of the altered situation, pray consider bringing one of the West African brigades back from Kenya by one of the convoys returning empty. This should not add in any way to shipping burdens.

Prime Minister to Sir James Grigg.

13.X.40.

A hot discussion is raging in the A.T.S. about whether members who marry should, if they wish, be allowed to quit. Nearly everyone is in favour of this. It seems futile to forbid them, and if they desert there is no means of punishing them. Only the most honourable are therefore impeded. Pray let me have, on one sheet of paper, a note on this showing the pros and cons.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

14.X.40.

Let a report be prepared on two sheets only showing what are the possibilities of Germany developing the munitions industries, especially aircraft, of the countries she has overrun, and when these evil effects are likely to become manifest.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

15.X.40.

If you wish to circulate the Naval Staff paper
¹²
of October 13, which I have now read, I do not demur. It is, of course, a most pessimistic and nervous paper which it is very depressing to receive from the Admiralty. Instances of the overdrawn character of the paper are found in paragraph 3, which claims that we must maintain “general control in every sea,” whereas effective power of passage is all we require in many cases. And in paragraph 5, “German strength, in which from
now onward
[October 15] must be counted the
Tirpitz
and the
Bismarck.”
This is not true, as even the
Bismarck
has, I suppose, to work up, like the
King George V,
which should be ready as soon, or earlier. The
Tirpitz
is three months behind the
Bismarck,
according to every statement I have received, and it is hoped by that time we shall have the
Prince of Wales
and
Queen Elizabeth.
If such statements are made to the Cabinet, I should be forced to challenge them.

2. The whole argument is meant to lead up to the idea that we must submit to the wishes of Vichy because they have the power to drive us out of Gibraltar by bombing. I fully share the desire of the Naval Staff not to be molested in Gibraltar, but I do not think that the enforcement of the blockade will lead the French to do this, still less to declare war upon us. I do not believe the Vichy Government has the power to wage war against us, as the whole French nation is coming more and more onto our side. I have dealt with this in a Minute on general policy which is being circulated, and of which I enclose you the relevant extract.

3. The redeeming point in this paper is the suggestion that we should tell the Vichy Government that if they bomb Gibraltar we shall retaliate not against, say, Casablanca, but Vichy, to which I would add, or any other place occupied by the Vichy Government. This is the proper note to strike, and it is also important to bear in mind that while humbleness to Vichy will not necessarily prevent them being ordered to make war upon us by their German masters, a firm attitude will not necessarily deter them from coming over to our side.

These questions are not urgent because of the failure to intercept
Primaguet.
¹³