Their Finest Hour (89 page)

* * * * *

Prime Minister to C.A.S. and Air Ministry.

29.XII.40.

It seems odd that only one machine should have been despatched from Takoradi during the week ending December 27, when no fewer than forty-four are piled up there waiting. Is there a breakdown in the handling work at Takoradi? Could we have a special report on conditions there? Quite soon they will have the second instalment from the
Furious
upon them.

{Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air, C.A.S., and Minister of Aircraft Production. (Secret.)

30.XII.40

1. I am deeply concerned at the stagnant condition of our bomber force. The fighters are going ahead well, but the bomber force, particularly crews, is not making the progress hoped for. I consider the rapid expansion of the bomber force one of the greatest military objectives now before us. We are of course drawing upon the bomber force for the coastal command and for the Middle East. If the bottle-neck is, as I am told, crews, we must either have the pilots and personnel we are sending out to the Middle East returned to us after they have delivered their machines, or, what would be less injurious to formed squadrons, have other pilots and personnel sent back from the Middle East in their place. The policy is to remount the Middle East, and this must be achieved before reinforcements of a permanent character can be indulged in. Even before the recent reinforcements there were one thousand pilots in the Middle East. Air Marshal Longmore must be told to send back an equal number of good men of the various classes, and not add to his already grossly distended personnel.

2. In order to increase the number of crews available, the training must be speeded up and a certain measure of dilution accepted.

3. The figures placed before me each day are deplorable. Moreover, I have been told on high authority that a substantial increase in numbers available for operations against Germany must not be expected for many months. I cannot agree to this without far greater assurance than I have now that everything in human wit and power has been done to avert such a complete failure in our air expansion programme.

4. So far as aircraft are concerned, the question arises, from constant study of the returns, whether sufficient emphasis is put upon bomber production. The fighters are streaking ahead, and it is a great comfort that we have so good a position in them. We must however increase our bomb deliveries on Germany, and it appears some of the types and patterns most adapted to this are not coming forward as we had hoped.

I am well aware of the damage done by enemy action, but I ask whether it cannot be remedied, and what further steps are possible.

5. I wish to receive a programme of expansion week by week, and also a plan set forth showing what measures can be taken to improve the position, which at present is most distressing and black.

The first table contains the figures which were given to the President in my letter of December 8, 1940.
¹

The second table gives the final assessment in the light of post-war knowledge.

TABLE I

W
EEKLY
L
OSSES
AT
S
EA

T
ABLE
I — W
EEKLY
L
OSSES
AT
S
EA
(Continued)

TABLE II

M
ONTHLY
T
OTALS
OF
S
HIPPING
L
OSSES
B
RITISH
, A
LLIED
,
AND
N
EUTRAL

May, 1940 to December, 1940

1. A
IRCRAFT
P
RODUCTION
IN
1940

2 O
PERATIONAL
S
TRENGTHS
D
URING THE
B
ATTLE OF
B
RITAIN

SUMMARISED ORDER OF BATTLE
(
BOMBER COMMAND
)
AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT IN AIRCRAFT STORAGE UNITS

B
OMBER
C
OMMAND

AIR SUPPLY UNITS

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED TO CURRENT OPERATIONAL STANDARDS, READY FOR DISPATCH

3. O
PERATIONAL
S
TRENGTHS OF
F
IGHTER
C
OMMAND
W
EEK
BY
W
EEK

4. C
OMPARISON OF
B
RITISH
AND
G
ERMAN
F
IGHTER
S
TRENGTH
D
URING
THE
B
ATTLE OF
B
RITAIN

The preceding table gives the overall strength of Fighter Command, including Blenheims and Defiants. But these cannot be reckoned, for the purposes of comparisons, as part of the day fighting force which consisted of Hurricanes and Spitfires.

After taking representative dates in the period July 10–October 31, the approximate daily average of Squadrons
available for operations,
of these two latter types combined, is:

On the German side figures of serviceability are not at present available; comparison can therefore be made only in terms of Initial Equipment. The German IE was:

The comparable Initial Equipment figures for British Hurricanes and Spitfires averaged over the 12 weeks, was 827.