Their Finest Hour (83 page)

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

18.X.40.

What arrangements have we got for blind landings for aircraft? How many aircraft are so fitted? It ought to be possible to guide them down quite safely, as commercial craft were done before the war in spite of fog. Let me have full particulars. The accidents last night are very serious.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

19.X.40.

I was very much pleased last week when you told me you proposed to give an armoured division to Major-General Hobart.
¹⁴
I think very highly of this officer, and I am not at all impressed by the prejudices against him in certain quarters. Such prejudices attach frequently to persons of strong personality and original view. In this case General Hobart’s original views have been only too tragically borne out. The neglect by the General Staff even to devise proper patterns of tanks before the war has robbed us of all the fruits of this invention. These fruits have been reaped by the enemy, with terrible consequences. We should, therefore, remember that this was an officer who had the root of the matter in him and also vision.

In my Minute last week to you I said I hoped you would propose to me the appointment that day, i.e., Tuesday, but at the latest this week. Will you very kindly make sure that the appointment is made at the earliest moment.

Since making this Minute I have carefully read your note to me and the summary of the case for and against General Hobart. We are now at war, fighting for our lives, and we cannot afford to confine Army appointments to persons who have excited no hostile comment in their career. The catalogue of General Hobart’s qualities and defects might almost exactly have been attributed to most of the great commanders of British history. Marlborough was very much the conventional soldier, carrying with him the good will of the Service. Cromwell, Wolfe, Clive, Gordon, and, in a different sphere, Lawrence, all had very close resemblance to the characteristics set down as defects. They had other qualities as well, and so I am led to believe has General Hobart. This is a time to try men of force and vision and not to be exclusively confined to those who are judged thoroughly safe by conventional standards.

I hope, therefore, you will not recoil from your proposal to me of a week ago, for I think your instinct in this matter was sound and true.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

19.X.40.

Are there no younger men available for this strenuous administrative appointment? [Director-General Home Guard.] The bringing back of retired officers for posts like these causes much criticism, both in and out of Service circles. Why not try to find a man still in the forties, and give him temporary rank?

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

19.X.40.

In view of the forecasts of small-arms ammunition, and the very great improvement in our position which will be effected from the factories coming into bearing in October, and the expanding output expected before March 31, 1941, and having regard to the fact that unless there is an invasion no operations are possible except in the Middle East, and then only on a comparatively moderate scale, I am of opinion that a very much larger issue may be made now to the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces for practice. I understand he has only two million rounds a week for this purpose, and that training is grievously hampered in consequence. Although it seems a risk to deplete our small War Office reserve, I think it should be considered whether, from November 1 onward, the amount issued for practice should not be doubled – i.e., four million a week. I shall be glad if you will consult the Chiefs of Staff immediately.
¹⁵

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

20.X.40.

1. When was the last meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief, Naval, Air. and Military? Was it not found very useful? Who attended it?

I should be willing to preside over such a meeting in the course of the next week or so.

2. Let me have a plan for the imparting of more information about our war policy to these very high officers.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

20.X.40.

I am deeply concerned with the non-expansion, and indeed contraction, of our bomber force which must be expected between now and April or May next, according to present policy. Surely an effort should be made to increase our bomb-dropping capacity during this period. In moon light periods the present arrangements for bombing are the best possible, and the only difficulty is our small numbers compared to the many attractive military targets. On no account should the limited bomber force be diverted from accurate bombing of military objectives reaching far into Germany. But is it not possible to organise a second line bomber force, which, especially in the dark of the moon, would discharge bombs from a considerable and safe height upon the nearest large built-up areas of Germany, which contain military targets in abundance. The Ruhr, of course, is obviously indicated. The object would be to find easy targets, short runs, and safe conditions.

How is such a second line or auxiliary bomber force to
be
improvised during the winter months? Could not crews from the training schools do occasional runs? Are none of the Lysander and reconnaissance pilots capable of doing some of this simpler bombing, observing that the Army is not likely to be in action unless invasion occurs? I ask that a whole-hearted effort shall be made to cart a large number of bombs into Germany by a second line organisation such as I have suggested, and under conditions in which admittedly no special accuracy would be obtained. Pray let me have the best suggestions possible, and we can then see whether they are practical or not.

How is it that so few of our bombers are fitted with blind landing appliances? M.A.P. tells me that a number of Lorenz equipments are available. The grievous losses which occurred one day last week ought not to be repeated. Not only do the bombers need the blind landing facilities (which have been used in commercial aviation for years), but also if fighter aircraft are to operate by night, as they must increasingly, such aircraft must also be furnished with the means of making safe landings. Pray let me have your observations.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

20.X.40.

In connection with the plans now being developed for night fighting, not only by individual Aircraft Interception fitted machines, but by eight-inch fighter squadrons, it is worth considering whether in any area where our fighters are operating and the guns have to remain out of action, these guns should not fire blank charges. This would
(a
) confuse the enemy by the flashing on the ground, and tend to make him less aware of the impending fighter attacks – it would thus have a strictly military reason;
(b)
it would make a noise to drown the approach of our attacking fighters, and also to avoid discouraging silence for the population. It would not be legitimate to fire blank merely for the second purpose, but if there is a military reason the objection disappears.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

20.X.40.

I am concerned by the very low state of equipment of the Polish troops, whose military qualities have been proved so high. I hope to inspect them on Wednesday this week.

Pray let me have during Monday the best proposals possible for equipping them. I am most anxious they should not become disheartened.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary, War Office.

20.X.40.

It is impossible to take away steel helmets from “the Home Guard in Government offices.” Four were killed outside Downing Street on Thursday night. Whitehall is as heavily bombed as any part of the country. It will be difficult to take helmets away from anyone to whom they have been issued. I am astonished to see that the Army is aiming at three million helmets. I was not aware that we had three million men. Let me have a full return of all steel helmets in possession of the Regular Army, showing the different branches, i.e., whether field army or training or holding battalions, etc., or in store….

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S., Sir James Grigg.

21.X.40.

This very lengthy report by General Irwin
¹⁶
on how he was carried out to Freetown and back emphasises all the difficulties of the operation in which he was concerned. He foresaw all the difficulties beforehand, and the many shortcomings in the preparations. He certainly felt throughout that he was plunged into the midst of a grave and hazardous undertaking on political rather than military grounds. All this makes it the more surprising that he should have wished to persist in this operation, with all its defects and dangers, of which he was so acutely conscious, after these had been so formidably aggravated by the arrival through a naval failure of the French cruisers and reinforcements in Dakar, and in the teeth of the considered opinion of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff that conditions had now so changed as to make the original plan impossible. However, any error towards the enemy and any evidence of a sincere desire to engage must always be generously judged. This officer was commanding a division very ably before he was selected for the expedition, and I see no reason why he should not resume these duties now that he has returned. He would make a mistake, however, if he assumed either
(a)
that no enterprise should be launched in war for which lengthy preparation had not been made, observing that even in this connection twenty-five Frenchmen took Duala, and with it the Cameroons, or
(b)
that ships can in no circumstance engage forts with success. This might well be true in the fog conditions which so unexpectedly and unnaturally descended upon Dakar; but it would not necessarily be true of the case where the ships’ guns could engage the forts at ranges to which the forts could not reply, or where the gunners in the forts were frightened, inefficient, or friendly to the attacking force.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies. [ Lord Lloyd ].

21.X.40.

I am afraid I have been some time in studying your notes on the African continent, and its strategic and political dangers in the present war. I should deprecate setting up a special committee. We are overrun by them, like the Australians were by the rabbits. I see no reason to assume that we shall be at war with Vichy France or Spain, or that the South African position will develop dangerously. I should have thought that you would be able, with your own military experience and political knowledge, to gather such officials of the Colonial Office as you may need around you, and prepare yourself any reports you may think it right to present to the Defence Committee or the War Cabinet. If, however, you feel the need of being associated with a committee, I suggest that the Middle East Ministerial Committee take on the agenda you have outlined as an addition to their present sphere.

P.S. – I am trying to move one of the West African brigades back from Kenya to the West Coast.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Minister of Information and Sir Alexander Cadogan.

24.X.40.

Sir Walter Citrine leaves this country shortly for the United States on a mission from the Trade Union Congress to American labour. He is a man of exceptional qualities and consequence, and is a Privy Councillor. He should certainly have a diplomatic status conferred upon him which will facilitate his movements. The T.U.C. are paying all his expenses in connection with the purely Labour side of the business, but I think that any expenses he may incur in work useful in the national interest should be defrayed by the Ministry of Information. Perhaps the Minister would look into this and see what can be done. In any case, Sir Walter should be treated with the greatest consideration, as I am sure we can count on his entire loyalty and discretion.

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

1.XI.40.

How is it that when we have five hundred and twenty crews available for bombing operations, and only five hundred and seven aircraft similarly available, we do not draw on the aircraft storage units, where a large number are awaiting use?

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

1.XI.40.

Let me have, on not more than two sheets of paper, an analysis of the German aviators taken prisoner of war since July 1, showing numbers, ages, amount of training, etc., distinguishing between bomber and fighter prisoners. Any other information about them would be welcome.

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.

6.XI.40.

Although 1 feel sceptical about the pocket battleship going to Lorient, the Air Force should be thinking of attacking him there at the earliest moment and should be warned
now.
If he goes to Lorient, he runs a chance of being caught by you on the way in, bombed while he is there, and caught again on the way out. There is only one way in and out of Lorient. Very different is his position at Kiel, where he can come out via the Heligoland Bight or through the Skagerrak or sneak up the Norwegian Corridor to Trondhjem. f would much rather see him go to Lorient than break south or stay out on the Atlantic route or go back one side or the other of Iceland.

If he continues preying on the trade, you ought to be able to bring him to action.

On further reflection I agree it is better our two heavy ships should stay in the north.

These notes are only for your consideration.