The World Was Going Our Way (91 page)
Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
The Middle East: Introduction
1
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 393.
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 393.
2
. Hollander,
Anti-Americanism
, p. 364.
. Hollander,
Anti-Americanism
, p. 364.
3
. Rubinstein,
Moscow’s Third World Strategy
, p. 237.
. Rubinstein,
Moscow’s Third World Strategy
, p. 237.
4
. On KGB SIGINT operations, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 21.
. On KGB SIGINT operations, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 21.
5
. Ibid., p. 337.
. Ibid., p. 337.
6
. Mitrokhin had no access to the files of either the Eighth Chief Directorate (Communications and Cryptography) or the Sixteenth Directorate (SIGINT). The FCD files to which he had access, however, included some documents from both directorates.
. Mitrokhin had no access to the files of either the Eighth Chief Directorate (Communications and Cryptography) or the Sixteenth Directorate (SIGINT). The FCD files to which he had access, however, included some documents from both directorates.
7
. Dzhirkvelov,
Secret Servant
, pp. 211-14.
. Dzhirkvelov,
Secret Servant
, pp. 211-14.
8
. See below, pp. 202-3.
. See below, pp. 202-3.
9
. See below, p. 155.
. See below, p. 155.
10
. It is impossible, however, to exclude the possibility that there may have been some major KGB penetration in Saddam Hussein’s Baghdad which was not recorded in the files seen by Mitrokhin.
. It is impossible, however, to exclude the possibility that there may have been some major KGB penetration in Saddam Hussein’s Baghdad which was not recorded in the files seen by Mitrokhin.
11
. Nasser’s tribute was proudly quoted in the official history of Soviet foreign policy; Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 289.
. Nasser’s tribute was proudly quoted in the official history of Soviet foreign policy; Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 289.
12
. See below, p. 153.
. See below, p. 153.
13
. See below, p. 151.
. See below, p. 151.
14
. Taubman,
Khrushchev
, p. 610.
. Taubman,
Khrushchev
, p. 610.
15
. See below, pp. 175, 178, 201-2, 208-10.
. See below, pp. 175, 178, 201-2, 208-10.
16
. See below, pp. 232-3.
. See below, pp. 232-3.
17
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 506.
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 506.
18
. See below, pp. 236, 243.
. See below, pp. 236, 243.
19
. See above, pp. 48, 53.
. See above, pp. 48, 53.
20
. See below, pp. 253-4, 256.
. See below, pp. 253-4, 256.
21
. Fear that the Official IRA might not preserve the secrecy of its KGB connection led to a delay of almost three years in responding to its 1969 request for a secret arms delivery; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 384 - 5.
. Fear that the Official IRA might not preserve the secrecy of its KGB connection led to a delay of almost three years in responding to its 1969 request for a secret arms delivery; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 384 - 5.
22
. Ibid., pp. 3 87- 9.The KGB reluctantly became involved in the assassination of the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London in 1978 only because it felt it could not refuse an urgent plea for assistance from the Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov.
. Ibid., pp. 3 87- 9.The KGB reluctantly became involved in the assassination of the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London in 1978 only because it felt it could not refuse an urgent plea for assistance from the Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov.
23
. It is impossible, however, to exclude the possibility of a continuing connection with the PFLP which was not recorded in files seen by Mitrokhin.
. It is impossible, however, to exclude the possibility of a continuing connection with the PFLP which was not recorded in files seen by Mitrokhin.
24
. See below, pp. 253-6.
. See below, pp. 253-6.
25
. Clarridge,
A Spy for All Seasons
, pp. 335-6.
. Clarridge,
A Spy for All Seasons
, pp. 335-6.
26
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p . 392. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin do not reveal how far - if at all - Andropov sought to influence the use made of Palestinian terrorists by his Soviet-bloc allies.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p . 392. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin do not reveal how far - if at all - Andropov sought to influence the use made of Palestinian terrorists by his Soviet-bloc allies.
27
. Follain,
Jackal
, ch. 15.
. Follain,
Jackal
, ch. 15.
28
. Najib, ‘Abu Nidal Murder Trail Leads Directly to Iraqi Regime’.
. Najib, ‘Abu Nidal Murder Trail Leads Directly to Iraqi Regime’.
29
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, pp. 501, 505.
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, pp. 501, 505.
30
. See below, p. 259.
. See below, p. 259.
The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in Egypt
1
. Nasser,
The Philosophy of the Revolution
, p. 41.
. Nasser,
The Philosophy of the Revolution
, p. 41.
2
. Talbott (ed.),
Khrushchev Speaks
, p. 432.
. Talbott (ed.),
Khrushchev Speaks
, p. 432.
3
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 156.
Razvedka
, published in 1998, is an extended version of an earlier edition of Kirpichenko’s memoirs,
Iz arkhiva razvedchika
, published five years earlier.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 156.
Razvedka
, published in 1998, is an extended version of an earlier edition of Kirpichenko’s memoirs,
Iz arkhiva razvedchika
, published five years earlier.
4
. Ibid., pp. 34, 40-41. Mitrokhin noted almost no KGB files on agent penetration of Egypt during the Nasser era. Most of his material deals with the post-Nasser period.
. Ibid., pp. 34, 40-41. Mitrokhin noted almost no KGB files on agent penetration of Egypt during the Nasser era. Most of his material deals with the post-Nasser period.
5
. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, p. 60. The Presidium agreed to extensive further arms supplies in November 1955. Khrushchev acknowledged that supplying arms was risky but told the Politburo that it was worth the risk. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 61, 63, 903 n. 9.
. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, p. 60. The Presidium agreed to extensive further arms supplies in November 1955. Khrushchev acknowledged that supplying arms was risky but told the Politburo that it was worth the risk. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 61, 63, 903 n. 9.
6
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 41-3. Shepilov’s term as Foreign Minister lasted only from June 1956 to May 1957. He was sacked on suspicion of having supported an attempted coup against Khrushchev.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 41-3. Shepilov’s term as Foreign Minister lasted only from June 1956 to May 1957. He was sacked on suspicion of having supported an attempted coup against Khrushchev.
7
. Barron,
KGB
, pp. 69-73; Sakharov,
High Treason
, p. 193; Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 88. Sharaf’s official position was that of Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. His life in the shadows meant that he was virtually unknown to the Egyptian public; Beattie,
Egypt during the Sadat Years
, pp. 40-41. On Nasser’s ‘keen interest’ in intelligence, see el-Din,
Memories of a Revolution
, p. 240.
. Barron,
KGB
, pp. 69-73; Sakharov,
High Treason
, p. 193; Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 88. Sharaf’s official position was that of Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. His life in the shadows meant that he was virtually unknown to the Egyptian public; Beattie,
Egypt during the Sadat Years
, pp. 40-41. On Nasser’s ‘keen interest’ in intelligence, see el-Din,
Memories of a Revolution
, p. 240.
8
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 318. Following the usual practice of memoirs by KGB officers (other than defectors), Kirpichenko’s memoirs do not identify any of the agents whom he ran.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 318. Following the usual practice of memoirs by KGB officers (other than defectors), Kirpichenko’s memoirs do not identify any of the agents whom he ran.
9
. Ibid., p. 121.
. Ibid., p. 121.
10
. Sharaf added a long quotation from ‘the great leader Lenin’. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, pp. 226-7.
. Sharaf added a long quotation from ‘the great leader Lenin’. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, pp. 226-7.
11
. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 152-203, 954-6.
. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 152-203, 954-6.
12
. The assassination plot seems never to have progressed beyond the planning stage. Aldrich,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 479-85; Wright,
Spycatcher
, pp. 84-5.
. The assassination plot seems never to have progressed beyond the planning stage. Aldrich,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 479-85; Wright,
Spycatcher
, pp. 84-5.
13
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 108-9.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 108-9.
14
. Ibid., pp. 70-73.
. Ibid., pp. 70-73.
15
. On the evolution of Nasser’s relations with the Soviet Union, see Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, and Dawisha,
Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt
, chs. 2, 3.
. On the evolution of Nasser’s relations with the Soviet Union, see Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, and Dawisha,
Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt
, chs. 2, 3.
16
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 73-6, 104.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 73-6, 104.
17
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 363.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 363.
18
. Shelepin to Khrushchev, 29 July 1961; Zubok, ‘Spy vs. Spy’, p. 33 n. 42.
. Shelepin to Khrushchev, 29 July 1961; Zubok, ‘Spy vs. Spy’, p. 33 n. 42.
19
. Khrushchev informed the Presidium on 26 May 1964, after his return from a visit to the UAR: ‘Egyptian leaders are conducting a quite progressive policy. They have nationalized enterprises [and] banks. They’ve taken the land away from the feudal lords, but they don’t know what to do with the land.’ Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 822-3.
. Khrushchev informed the Presidium on 26 May 1964, after his return from a visit to the UAR: ‘Egyptian leaders are conducting a quite progressive policy. They have nationalized enterprises [and] banks. They’ve taken the land away from the feudal lords, but they don’t know what to do with the land.’ Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 822-3.
20
. H. A. R. [‘Kim’] Philby, ‘Nasser’s Pride and Glory’, the
Observer
, 22 July 1962. Though Philby did not formally admit in his memoirs working as a KGB agent in Beirut, he gave the broadest of hints: ‘If it would have been odd of SIS not to take advantage of my presence in the Middle East, it would have been odder still if the Soviet Intelligence service had ignored me.’ Philby,
My Silent War
, p. 178.
. H. A. R. [‘Kim’] Philby, ‘Nasser’s Pride and Glory’, the
Observer
, 22 July 1962. Though Philby did not formally admit in his memoirs working as a KGB agent in Beirut, he gave the broadest of hints: ‘If it would have been odd of SIS not to take advantage of my presence in the Middle East, it would have been odder still if the Soviet Intelligence service had ignored me.’ Philby,
My Silent War
, p. 178.
21
. Dawisha,
Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt
, chs. 2, 3.
. Dawisha,
Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt
, chs. 2, 3.
22
. vol. 6, ch. 9.
. vol. 6, ch. 9.
23
. Andropov also insisted that the KGB ‘must know not only what is happening in the country of the enemy, but it must take offensive actions and force the enemy into combat under unfavourable conditions, thus paralysing the enemy’s activities’; vol. 6, ch. 9, n. 6.
. Andropov also insisted that the KGB ‘must know not only what is happening in the country of the enemy, but it must take offensive actions and force the enemy into combat under unfavourable conditions, thus paralysing the enemy’s activities’; vol. 6, ch. 9, n. 6.
24
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 13, 550- 51, 562-63. Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, pp. 17-19, 44, 89. Primakov was appointed Director of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies in 1977and of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in 1985.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 13, 550- 51, 562-63. Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, pp. 17-19, 44, 89. Primakov was appointed Director of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies in 1977and of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in 1985.
25
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 501.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 501.
26
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 101-4, 282-3. Though refuting claims that Primakov was a KGB agent, Kirpichenko acknowledges that he maintained ‘close working contact’ with him during his Middle Eastern travels, including a ‘constant exchange’ of political information. The FCD provided Primakov with what Kirpichenko calls ‘the necessary assistance’.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 101-4, 282-3. Though refuting claims that Primakov was a KGB agent, Kirpichenko acknowledges that he maintained ‘close working contact’ with him during his Middle Eastern travels, including a ‘constant exchange’ of political information. The FCD provided Primakov with what Kirpichenko calls ‘the necessary assistance’.
27
. The transcript of the meetings between Nasser and Podgorny after the Six-Day War is published in Farid,
Nasser: The Final Years
, ch. 1; quotation from p. 5.
. The transcript of the meetings between Nasser and Podgorny after the Six-Day War is published in Farid,
Nasser: The Final Years
, ch. 1; quotation from p. 5.
28
. Aburish,
Nasser
; Beattie,
Egypt during the Nasser Years
; Pryce-Jones, ‘Under His Spell’.
. Aburish,
Nasser
; Beattie,
Egypt during the Nasser Years
; Pryce-Jones, ‘Under His Spell’.
29
. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, pp. 282-3.
. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, pp. 282-3.
30
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 231.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 231.
31
. Gromyko,
Memories
, p. 270.
. Gromyko,
Memories
, p. 270.
32
. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, p. 216.
. Heikal,
Sphinx and Commissar
, p. 216.
33
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 206.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 206.
34
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 120-22.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 120-22.
35
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, pp. 223-4.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, pp. 223-4.
36
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, p. 145. Leonov had access to the file on the ‘crocodiles” plot as deputy head of Service 1.
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, p. 145. Leonov had access to the file on the ‘crocodiles” plot as deputy head of Service 1.
37
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 113.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 113.
38
. Beattie,
Egypt during the Sadat Years
, p. 56.
. Beattie,
Egypt during the Sadat Years
, p. 56.
39
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 635 n. 63.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 635 n. 63.
40
. By 1967 the KGB was decrypting 152 cipher systems employed by 72 states; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p . 337. Though no statistics are available, the number had doubtless increased further.
. By 1967 the KGB was decrypting 152 cipher systems employed by 72 states; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p . 337. Though no statistics are available, the number had doubtless increased further.
41
. Beattie,
Egypt during the Sadat Years
, pp. 60-61. For another example of tapes of bugged conversations being passed to the Soviet embassy, see ibid., p. 124.
. Beattie,
Egypt during the Sadat Years
, pp. 60-61. For another example of tapes of bugged conversations being passed to the Soviet embassy, see ibid., p. 124.
42
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 114-17.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 114-17.
43
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, pp. 206, 223-4.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, pp. 206, 223-4.
44
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, p. 145; Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, p. 145; Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
45
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 122-3.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 122-3.
46
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 225.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 225.
47
. Report on the activities of the Cairo residency in 1972-76 by FCD Directorate R (Operational Planning and Analysis); k-18, 485.
. Report on the activities of the Cairo residency in 1972-76 by FCD Directorate R (Operational Planning and Analysis); k-18, 485.
48
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 503.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 503.
49
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 284.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 284.
50
. Sakharov,
High Treason
; Barron,
KGB
, ch. 2.
. Sakharov,
High Treason
; Barron,
KGB
, ch. 2.
51
. k-26, 87. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate whether the money was passed on via the KGB residency; this, however, was common practice.
. k-26, 87. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate whether the money was passed on via the KGB residency; this, however, was common practice.
52
. Ismael and El-Sa‘id,
The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988
, p. 129.
. Ismael and El-Sa‘id,
The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988
, p. 129.
53
. k-26, 87, 89.
. k-26, 87, 89.
54
. The first payment recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes was of $15,000 handed by the KGB resident in Baghdad to the leader of the Iraqi Communist Party on 27 May 1974 for onward transmission to SOYUZNIK; k-26, 77.
. The first payment recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes was of $15,000 handed by the KGB resident in Baghdad to the leader of the Iraqi Communist Party on 27 May 1974 for onward transmission to SOYUZNIK; k-26, 77.
55
. Bregman and el-Tahri,
The Fifty Years War
, p. 112.
. Bregman and el-Tahri,
The Fifty Years War
, p. 112.
56
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 230.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 230.
57
. Ayubi,
Nasser and Sadat
, pp. 76-7, 192-3.
. Ayubi,
Nasser and Sadat
, pp. 76-7, 192-3.
58
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 503.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 503.
59
. Report on the activities of the Cairo residency in 1972-76 by FCD Directorate R (Operational Planning and Analysis); k-18, 485. The residency, however, was allowed to continue to recruit and run non-Egyptian agents in Egypt. These included ZAMIL and NAUM, attachés at, respectively, the Syrian and South Yemen embassies, and IND, an intelligence officer at the Indian embassy; k-18, 48.
. Report on the activities of the Cairo residency in 1972-76 by FCD Directorate R (Operational Planning and Analysis); k-18, 485. The residency, however, was allowed to continue to recruit and run non-Egyptian agents in Egypt. These included ZAMIL and NAUM, attachés at, respectively, the Syrian and South Yemen embassies, and IND, an intelligence officer at the Indian embassy; k-18, 48.
60
. k-18, 482.
. k-18, 482.
61
. Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, p. 276.
. Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, p. 276.
62
. k-18, 482.
. k-18, 482.
63
. Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, p. 276.
. Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, p. 276.
64
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 390-92.
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 390-92.
65
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, p. 41. Mitrokhin’s notes contain only fragmentary information on KGB penetration of the Egyptian armed forces and intelligence services. KGB sources in 1973 included FEDOR (k-14, 530), an army colonel, and the intelligence officer ELDAR (k-27, 150). No information is available on GRU penetration of Egyptian armed forces. As usual, Kirpichenko’s memoirs contain no reference to the use of agents but briefly refer to the role of ‘radio intercepts’; Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 126.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, p. 41. Mitrokhin’s notes contain only fragmentary information on KGB penetration of the Egyptian armed forces and intelligence services. KGB sources in 1973 included FEDOR (k-14, 530), an army colonel, and the intelligence officer ELDAR (k-27, 150). No information is available on GRU penetration of Egyptian armed forces. As usual, Kirpichenko’s memoirs contain no reference to the use of agents but briefly refer to the role of ‘radio intercepts’; Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 126.
66
. t-7, 315; vol. 6, ch. 9.
. t-7, 315; vol. 6, ch. 9.
67
. k-18, 374.
. k-18, 374.
68
. vol. 6, ch. 9. Marwan’s career as adviser to Sadat continues intermittently to excite media attention. In 2003 he denied claims by an Egyptian newspaper that he had been a Mossad agent and by an Israeli historian that he had, on the contrary, fed disinformation to Mossad. Yossi Melman, ‘Double Trouble’,
Ha’aretz
, 20 Jan. 2003.
. vol. 6, ch. 9. Marwan’s career as adviser to Sadat continues intermittently to excite media attention. In 2003 he denied claims by an Egyptian newspaper that he had been a Mossad agent and by an Israeli historian that he had, on the contrary, fed disinformation to Mossad. Yossi Melman, ‘Double Trouble’,
Ha’aretz
, 20 Jan. 2003.
69
. Kazakov was doubtless selected for the mission because of his expertise on the CIA; k-14, 565.
. Kazakov was doubtless selected for the mission because of his expertise on the CIA; k-14, 565.
70
. k-14, 565; t-7, 220; vol. 6, ch. 8.
. k-14, 565; t-7, 220; vol. 6, ch. 8.
71
. k-24, 448.
. k-24, 448.
72
. k-18, 486.
. k-18, 486.
73
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 13. Sadat wrongly claimed that he was twelve, rather than fourteen, when Hitler took power.
. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 13. Sadat wrongly claimed that he was twelve, rather than fourteen, when Hitler took power.
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