The World Was Going Our Way (89 page)
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Authors: Christopher Andrew
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84
. Interview with senior CIA officer who has requested anonymity; cited in Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’.
. Interview with senior CIA officer who has requested anonymity; cited in Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’.
85
. See above, p. 22.
. See above, p. 22.
86
. k-22, 372.
. k-22, 372.
87
. k-22, 367.
. k-22, 367.
88
. k-22, 363.
. k-22, 363.
89
. The Politburo resolved: ‘1. Adopt the proposal of the KGB, as stated in Memorandum No. 3075-A/L, dated 7 December 1971. 2. Approve the plan in the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution to allocate the KGB the necessary funds for carrying out special measures (attached).’ Council of Ministers Resolution No. 2691-RS, dated 20 December 1971, decreed: ‘Via the State Bank of the USSR, allocate to the USSR Council of Ministers Committee on State Security [KGB] $130,000 to carry out special measures, charged to expenses designated by the USSR State Bank’s foreign currency plan.’ k-22, 367.
. The Politburo resolved: ‘1. Adopt the proposal of the KGB, as stated in Memorandum No. 3075-A/L, dated 7 December 1971. 2. Approve the plan in the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution to allocate the KGB the necessary funds for carrying out special measures (attached).’ Council of Ministers Resolution No. 2691-RS, dated 20 December 1971, decreed: ‘Via the State Bank of the USSR, allocate to the USSR Council of Ministers Committee on State Security [KGB] $130,000 to carry out special measures, charged to expenses designated by the USSR State Bank’s foreign currency plan.’ k-22, 367.
90
. k-22, 344.
. k-22, 344.
91
. k-22, 245.
. k-22, 245.
92
. k-22, 370. On Basov, see Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 391-2.
. k-22, 370. On Basov, see Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 391-2.
93
. k-22, 373.
. k-22, 373.
94
. k-22, 341. According to Mitrokhin’s notes, while in the sanatorium, the Kuznetsovs were ‘involved in an operation [probably an influence operation] ’ against the Allendes.
. k-22, 341. According to Mitrokhin’s notes, while in the sanatorium, the Kuznetsovs were ‘involved in an operation [probably an influence operation] ’ against the Allendes.
95
. k-22, 377.
. k-22, 377.
96
. k-22, 92. Andropov’s memorandum was a response to a report of 5 January 1972 by Sergei Kondrashev, Deputy Head of the FCD, on the work of the Second (Latin American) Department. Mitrokhin did not note Kondrashev’s report.
. k-22, 92. Andropov’s memorandum was a response to a report of 5 January 1972 by Sergei Kondrashev, Deputy Head of the FCD, on the work of the Second (Latin American) Department. Mitrokhin did not note Kondrashev’s report.
97
. k-22, 92.
. k-22, 92.
98
. Mitrokhin notes that contact with Torres was ‘formalized in the USSR [presumably during a visit by Torres] in November-December 1975’, but gives no further details. KGB contact with Torres was maintained by B. P. Kolomyakov, V. Y. Ryabov and V. I. Denisyuk; k-2, 94.
. Mitrokhin notes that contact with Torres was ‘formalized in the USSR [presumably during a visit by Torres] in November-December 1975’, but gives no further details. KGB contact with Torres was maintained by B. P. Kolomyakov, V. Y. Ryabov and V. I. Denisyuk; k-2, 94.
99
. k-22, 92.
. k-22, 92.
100
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, p. 132; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 345-6. On evidence of CIA funding for the Truckers’ Strike, see Haslam,
The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile
, p. 171.
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, p. 132; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 345-6. On evidence of CIA funding for the Truckers’ Strike, see Haslam,
The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile
, p. 171.
101
. k-22, 375.
. k-22, 375.
102
. k-22, 365.
. k-22, 365.
103
. k-22, 377.
. k-22, 377.
104
. k-22, 77.
. k-22, 77.
105
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 192, 236.
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 192, 236.
106
. Ibid., ch. 6.
. Ibid., ch. 6.
107
. Memorandum No. 687-A, 27 March 1973; k-22, 348. As well as being leader of the Venezuelan Movimento Electoral del Pueblo, Beltrán Prieto was a distinguished educationalist and prolific author, publishing more than seventy books on topics ranging from politics to poetry.
. Memorandum No. 687-A, 27 March 1973; k-22, 348. As well as being leader of the Venezuelan Movimento Electoral del Pueblo, Beltrán Prieto was a distinguished educationalist and prolific author, publishing more than seventy books on topics ranging from politics to poetry.
108
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’; Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 125-6.
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’; Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 125-6.
109
. k-22, 110.
. k-22, 110.
110
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
111
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 171-5; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 347-8. Pinochet became army commander on 23 August.
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 171-5; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 347-8. Pinochet became army commander on 23 August.
112
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 346-7.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 346-7.
113
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 172-4, 204.
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 172-4, 204.
114
. k-22, 108.
. k-22, 108.
115
. The other members of the junta were General Gustavo Leigh of the air force, Admiral José Toribio Merino of the navy and General César Mendoza of the Carabineros; Constable and Valenzuela,
A Nation of Enemies
, p. 53.
. The other members of the junta were General Gustavo Leigh of the air force, Admiral José Toribio Merino of the navy and General César Mendoza of the Carabineros; Constable and Valenzuela,
A Nation of Enemies
, p. 53.
116
. k-22, 110.
. k-22, 110.
117
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 171-5; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, chs. 10-11.
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 171-5; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, chs. 10-11.
118
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 353-7.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 353-7.
119
. k-22, 82.
. k-22, 82.
120
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
121
. k-22, 82.
. k-22, 82.
122
. Amnesty International,
The Case of General Pinochet
.
. Amnesty International,
The Case of General Pinochet
.
123
. The full text of the 2004 Chilean government report is accessible at
http://www.comisiontortura.cl/
.
. The full text of the 2004 Chilean government report is accessible at
http://www.comisiontortura.cl/
.
124
. vol. 5, sec. 12; k-8, 533.
. vol. 5, sec. 12; k-8, 533.
125
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 361. In 1976 the
New York Times
published only three articles referring to human rights abuses in Cuba.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 361. In 1976 the
New York Times
published only three articles referring to human rights abuses in Cuba.
126
. The text in the Appendix is an English translation of the Russian version copied by Mitrokhin. He did not note the Spanish text of the forgery.
. The text in the Appendix is an English translation of the Russian version copied by Mitrokhin. He did not note the Spanish text of the forgery.
Intelligence Priorities after Allende
1
. k-22, 116.
. k-22, 116.
2
. Ibid. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether or not this is a quotation from the Politburo minutes.
. Ibid. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether or not this is a quotation from the Politburo minutes.
3
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
4
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 515.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 515.
5
. k-19, 389.
. k-19, 389.
6
. k-22, 106. Mitrokhin’s notes include no reference to participation by Méndez Cominches in any conference of Soviet bloc intelligence chiefs before 1973. Since these notes are not comprehensive, however, the possibility that he took part in an earlier conference cannot be excluded.
. k-22, 106. Mitrokhin’s notes include no reference to participation by Méndez Cominches in any conference of Soviet bloc intelligence chiefs before 1973. Since these notes are not comprehensive, however, the possibility that he took part in an earlier conference cannot be excluded.
7
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 514.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 514.
8
. k-22, 106. A list of DGI residencies in 1977 noted by Mitrokhin mentions New York, Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Guyana, Panama, Jamaica, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Japan and thirteen African cities not individually listed by Mitrokhin; k-22, 161. This list, however, appears to be slightly incomplete. A note by Mitrokhin on a 1976 file mentions a DGI residency in Ecuador; k-22, 6.
. k-22, 106. A list of DGI residencies in 1977 noted by Mitrokhin mentions New York, Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Guyana, Panama, Jamaica, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Japan and thirteen African cities not individually listed by Mitrokhin; k-22, 161. This list, however, appears to be slightly incomplete. A note by Mitrokhin on a 1976 file mentions a DGI residency in Ecuador; k-22, 6.
9
. k-20, 345.
. k-20, 345.
10
. k-22, 6, 161.
. k-22, 6, 161.
11
. k-22, 8, 149.
. k-22, 8, 149.
12
. k-20, 62.
. k-20, 62.
13
. k-20, 345.
. k-20, 345.
14
. For details of KGB SIGINT operations during the Cold War, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch.21; details of running costs for the major radio intercept stations in KGB residencies are given on p. 670.
. For details of KGB SIGINT operations during the Cold War, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch.21; details of running costs for the major radio intercept stations in KGB residencies are given on p. 670.
15
. Ball, ‘Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)’, pp. 27-9; Rosenau, ‘A Deafening Silence’, pp. 723-5.
. Ball, ‘Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)’, pp. 27-9; Rosenau, ‘A Deafening Silence’, pp. 723-5.
16
. vol. 6, ch. 7, part 4.
. vol. 6, ch. 7, part 4.
17
. k-22, 146, 106.
. k-22, 146, 106.
18
. k-19, 528.
. k-19, 528.
19
. k-19, 526.
. k-19, 526.
20
. k-19, 529.
. k-19, 529.
21
. k-19, 530.
. k-19, 530.
22
. k-19, 532.
. k-19, 532.
23
. k-18, 527.
. k-18, 527.
24
.
Izvestia
, 9 Feb. 1974.
.
Izvestia
, 9 Feb. 1974.
25
. t-7, 182.
. t-7, 182.
26
. k-19, 267.
. k-19, 267.
27
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4.
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4.
28
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 556-7. Though the CIA provided covert funding for UNITA against the MPLA, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War Washington had no stomach for a serious challenge to the Cuban military presence in Africa.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 556-7. Though the CIA provided covert funding for UNITA against the MPLA, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War Washington had no stomach for a serious challenge to the Cuban military presence in Africa.
29
. Balfour,
Castro
, pp. 129-30.
. Balfour,
Castro
, pp. 129-30.
30
. Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976’, pp. 26-8.
. Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976’, pp. 26-8.
31
. k-19, 389.
. k-19, 389.
32
. k-19, 390.
. k-19, 390.
33
. k-22, 150. The DGI carried out a similar operation, at the request of the KGB, against the Venezuelan embassy in Havana.
. k-22, 150. The DGI carried out a similar operation, at the request of the KGB, against the Venezuelan embassy in Havana.
34
. k-19, 386.
. k-19, 386.
35
. k-19, 388.
. k-19, 388.
36
. See below, ch. 6.
. See below, ch. 6.
37
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 559-60.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 559-60.
38
. Quirk,
Fidel Castro
, pp. 776-9.
. Quirk,
Fidel Castro
, pp. 776-9.
39
. ‘Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78’, pp. 93-4.
. ‘Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78’, pp. 93-4.
40
. k-19, 391.
. k-19, 391.
41
. k-22, 37.
. k-22, 37.
42
. k-22, 89. Posing as the representative of Sovfilmeksport and using the alias Sergei Sergeyevich Konstantinov, Tolstikov had been deputy resident in Argentina from 1955 to 1960 and resident in Mexico from 1962 to 1966; k-22, 376.
. k-22, 89. Posing as the representative of Sovfilmeksport and using the alias Sergei Sergeyevich Konstantinov, Tolstikov had been deputy resident in Argentina from 1955 to 1960 and resident in Mexico from 1962 to 1966; k-22, 376.
43
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, p. 155.
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, p. 155.
44
. k-22, 89.
. k-22, 89.
45
. k-14, 710, 711. On Gelbard and the financing of the Argentinian Communist Party see Gilbert,
El Oro de Moscu
, ch. 12.
. k-14, 710, 711. On Gelbard and the financing of the Argentinian Communist Party see Gilbert,
El Oro de Moscu
, ch. 12.
46
. k-22, 78.
. k-22, 78.
47
. Milenky,
Argentina’s Foreign Policies
, pp. 154-5.
. Milenky,
Argentina’s Foreign Policies
, pp. 154-5.
48
. k-22, 115.
. k-22, 115.
49
. Milenky,
Argentina’s Foreign Policies
, pp. 155-7; Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 154-6.
. Milenky,
Argentina’s Foreign Policies
, pp. 155-7; Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 154-6.
50
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 149, 156-8.
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 149, 156-8.
51
. k-22, 115.
. k-22, 115.
52
. In 1974-75 the Lima residency tried to stem the right-wing shift by collecting ‘compromising material’ on General Javier Tantaleán Vanini, whom it identified as an important right-wing influence on Velasco; k-22, 186, 189. Tantaleán’s movement, La Misión, allied with Morales Bermúdez in the 1975 coup; McClintock, ‘Velasco, Officers and Citizens’, p. 281.
. In 1974-75 the Lima residency tried to stem the right-wing shift by collecting ‘compromising material’ on General Javier Tantaleán Vanini, whom it identified as an important right-wing influence on Velasco; k-22, 186, 189. Tantaleán’s movement, La Misión, allied with Morales Bermúdez in the 1975 coup; McClintock, ‘Velasco, Officers and Citizens’, p. 281.
53
. k-22, 200.
. k-22, 200.
54
. k-22, 185.
. k-22, 185.
55
. k-22, 184.
. k-22, 184.
56
. k-22, 8.
. k-22, 8.
57
. k-22, 9. On the origins of the Departamento de América, see above, p. 56.
. k-22, 9. On the origins of the Departamento de América, see above, p. 56.
58
. k-8, 525; k-14, 383; k-22, 48, 101, 118.
. k-8, 525; k-14, 383; k-22, 48, 101, 118.
59
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 181-2; Smith, ‘Mexico since 1946’, p. 367. Though these episodes do not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes, it would have been wholly out of character if the KGB had failed to claim credit for them.
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 181-2; Smith, ‘Mexico since 1946’, p. 367. Though these episodes do not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes, it would have been wholly out of character if the KGB had failed to claim credit for them.
60
. k-22, 101; k-8, 522. Mitrokhin’s notes also mention the use for active measures of a Mexican publication identified only by its codename VESTNIK (‘Herald’).
. k-22, 101; k-8, 522. Mitrokhin’s notes also mention the use for active measures of a Mexican publication identified only by its codename VESTNIK (‘Herald’).
61
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 191-2.
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 191-2.
62
. vol. 6, ch. 14; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 230 - 1.
. vol. 6, ch. 14; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 230 - 1.
63
. vol. 6, app. 1, pp. 610a, b.
. vol. 6, app. 1, pp. 610a, b.
64
. Agee,
Inside the Company
, pp. 522-3, 628.
. Agee,
Inside the Company
, pp. 522-3, 628.
65
. vol. 6, app. 1, pp. 610a, b. Echeverría’s successor, José López Portillo, was faced with an immediate economic crisis to which he responded by announcing an economic policy based on austerity and monetarism. In January 1977 he signed a three-year agreement with the IMF which was heavily criticized by the left. Abroad, however, he expressed public sympathy with a number of revolutionary causes. The files noted by Mitrokhin claim that the Mexico City residency ‘used its contacts and its agents to conduct conversations of influence’ with López (k-8, 525), but imply less easy access than under Echeverría. The residency was criticized, for example, for providing inadequate intelligence on Mexican-US relations in 1978-79 and on President Carter’s visit to Mexico in 1979 (k-22, 176).
. vol. 6, app. 1, pp. 610a, b. Echeverría’s successor, José López Portillo, was faced with an immediate economic crisis to which he responded by announcing an economic policy based on austerity and monetarism. In January 1977 he signed a three-year agreement with the IMF which was heavily criticized by the left. Abroad, however, he expressed public sympathy with a number of revolutionary causes. The files noted by Mitrokhin claim that the Mexico City residency ‘used its contacts and its agents to conduct conversations of influence’ with López (k-8, 525), but imply less easy access than under Echeverría. The residency was criticized, for example, for providing inadequate intelligence on Mexican-US relations in 1978-79 and on President Carter’s visit to Mexico in 1979 (k-22, 176).
66
. k-22, 116.
. k-22, 116.
67
. k-22, 128. Since Mitrokhin had no access to the KGB Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate, he was unable to note the contents of any decrypts.
. k-22, 128. Since Mitrokhin had no access to the KGB Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate, he was unable to note the contents of any decrypts.
68
. IZOT is the highest-ranking Brazilian agent identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin. He provided recruitment leads on three fellow diplomats, including the ambassador of a NATO country in Prague. IZOT had himself been talent-spotted for the KGB by another Brazilian ambassador, an agent codenamed ALEKS; k-22, 235-7.
. IZOT is the highest-ranking Brazilian agent identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin. He provided recruitment leads on three fellow diplomats, including the ambassador of a NATO country in Prague. IZOT had himself been talent-spotted for the KGB by another Brazilian ambassador, an agent codenamed ALEKS; k-22, 235-7.
69
. k-22, 235-7; k-8, 551.
. k-22, 235-7; k-8, 551.
70
. Skidmore, ‘Brazil’s Slow Road to Democratization’, pp. 9-19.
. Skidmore, ‘Brazil’s Slow Road to Democratization’, pp. 9-19.
71
. Alves,
State and Opposition in Military Brazil
, pp. 48-9, 142, 170-71, 173.
. Alves,
State and Opposition in Military Brazil
, pp. 48-9, 142, 170-71, 173.
72
. In May 1980 Prestes was succeeded as leader of the Brazilian Communist Party by Giocondo Dias. In December Dias sent his thanks to Moscow, via the Brasilia residency, for allowing him, like his predecessor, to nominate Party members for free visits to Soviet sanatoria and holiday homes; k-26, 399.
. In May 1980 Prestes was succeeded as leader of the Brazilian Communist Party by Giocondo Dias. In December Dias sent his thanks to Moscow, via the Brasilia residency, for allowing him, like his predecessor, to nominate Party members for free visits to Soviet sanatoria and holiday homes; k-26, 399.
73
. Golbery do Couto e Silva,
Conjuntura politica nacional
, section ‘Geopolítica do Brasil’, p. 52; Alves,
State and Opposition in Military Brazil
, pp. 24-5.
. Golbery do Couto e Silva,
Conjuntura politica nacional
, section ‘Geopolítica do Brasil’, p. 52; Alves,
State and Opposition in Military Brazil
, pp. 24-5.
74
. k-22, 1, 3.
. k-22, 1, 3.
75
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
76
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 174-8.
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, pp. 174-8.
77
. Skidmore, ‘Brazil’s Slow Road to Democratization’, pp. 25-7; Alves,
State and Opposition in Military Brazil
, p. 222.
. Skidmore, ‘Brazil’s Slow Road to Democratization’, pp. 25-7; Alves,
State and Opposition in Military Brazil
, p. 222.
78
. Dix,
The Politics of Colombia
, p. 198.
. Dix,
The Politics of Colombia
, p. 198.
79
. k-22, 91. The Centre was doubtless privately embarrassed by the fact that, like President Echeverría of Mexico, López had previously been the target of a KGB active measure; Agee’s
Inside the Company
(pp. 190-91) had claimed that López’s party, the MRL, had been financed by the CIA’s Bogotá station.
. k-22, 91. The Centre was doubtless privately embarrassed by the fact that, like President Echeverría of Mexico, López had previously been the target of a KGB active measure; Agee’s
Inside the Company
(pp. 190-91) had claimed that López’s party, the MRL, had been financed by the CIA’s Bogotá station.
80
. k-22, 91. On Tolstikov’s meetings with Perón see above, pp. 98-9.
. k-22, 91. On Tolstikov’s meetings with Perón see above, pp. 98-9.
81
. k-22, 91, vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
. k-22, 91, vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
82
. k-22, 376.
. k-22, 376.
83
. k-22, 181.
. k-22, 181.
84
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. In 1978 López was succeeded as President by Julio César Turbay Ayala, who followed a very different foreign policy and actively blocked Cuba’s attempts to secure a Security Council seat.
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. In 1978 López was succeeded as President by Julio César Turbay Ayala, who followed a very different foreign policy and actively blocked Cuba’s attempts to secure a Security Council seat.
85
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
86
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
87
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
88
. Torrijos admitted in a meeting with Graham Greene in 1979 that he had been visited by a KGB officer who was ‘very cultivated’ and spoke ‘excellent Spanish’; Greene,
Getting to Know the General
, p. 179. Leonov has acknowledged that the reference is to him; Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
. Torrijos admitted in a meeting with Graham Greene in 1979 that he had been visited by a KGB officer who was ‘very cultivated’ and spoke ‘excellent Spanish’; Greene,
Getting to Know the General
, p. 179. Leonov has acknowledged that the reference is to him; Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
89
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
90
. vol. 6, misc. footnote material, p. 20.
. vol. 6, misc. footnote material, p. 20.
91
. The two main US accounts of the negotiation of the treaties and subsequent struggle to secure ratification are: Vance,
Hard Choices
, ch. 8; Carter,
Keeping Faith
, pp. 152-87.
. The two main US accounts of the negotiation of the treaties and subsequent struggle to secure ratification are: Vance,
Hard Choices
, ch. 8; Carter,
Keeping Faith
, pp. 152-87.
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Wesley by Bailey Bradford
The Rogue Crew by Brian Jacques
Can't Get Enough by Tenille Brown
Inheritor by C. J. Cherryh
1 Bless Her Dead Little Heart by Miranda James
