The World Was Going Our Way (88 page)
Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
‘Progressive’ Regimes and ‘Socialism with Red Wine’
1
. Minute by Andropov, 5 Jan. 1972; k-22, 92.
. Minute by Andropov, 5 Jan. 1972; k-22, 92.
2
. k-22, 64.
. k-22, 64.
3
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
4
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 26.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 26.
5
. Ibid., ch. 4.
. Ibid., ch. 4.
6
. The analysis of the role of the IPC and other US-owned businesses in Peru in Clayton,
Peru and the United States
, ch. 7, provides a convincing case study of the inadequacy of dependency theory.
. The analysis of the role of the IPC and other US-owned businesses in Peru in Clayton,
Peru and the United States
, ch. 7, provides a convincing case study of the inadequacy of dependency theory.
7
. Compensation, however, was agreed five years later.
. Compensation, however, was agreed five years later.
8
. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, pp. 243-61. On the Velasco regime’s reform programme, see McClintock and Lowenthal (eds.),
The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered
.
. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, pp. 243-61. On the Velasco regime’s reform programme, see McClintock and Lowenthal (eds.),
The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered
.
9
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’; Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 108-11.
. Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’; Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 108-11.
10
. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, pp. 243-61; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, ch. 4.
. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, pp. 243-61; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, ch. 4.
11
. t-7, 192. Operations officers in the Lima residency increased in number from two on its foundation in 1969 to twenty in 1976; k-22, 184.
. t-7, 192. Operations officers in the Lima residency increased in number from two on its foundation in 1969 to twenty in 1976; k-22, 184.
12
. k-22, 233.
. k-22, 233.
13
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 92.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 92.
14
. k-22, 226.
. k-22, 226.
15
. k-22, 31.
. k-22, 31.
16
. k-22, 42. By 1972 the residency had five Line PR agents and nine confidential contacts. Three years later Line PR was running ten agents. k-22, 21, 99, 184.
. k-22, 42. By 1972 the residency had five Line PR agents and nine confidential contacts. Three years later Line PR was running ten agents. k-22, 21, 99, 184.
17
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 328-9.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 328-9.
18
. k-22, 184, 192, 233. The CPSU Central Committee resolution was No. P 7/77-OP, dated 14 June 1971.
. k-22, 184, 192, 233. The CPSU Central Committee resolution was No. P 7/77-OP, dated 14 June 1971.
19
. k-22, 188.
. k-22, 188.
20
. k-22, 74.
. k-22, 74.
21
. k-22, 233.
. k-22, 233.
22
. k-22, 99.
. k-22, 99.
23
. k-22, 184, 202. A KGB memorandum (No. 979-A) setting out details of co-operation with Peruvian military intelligence was approved by the CPSU Central Committee on 22 April 1975; k-22, 184. Gallegos has been described as ‘the “model” Peruvian army progressive of the Velasco era’. From 1974 to 1976 he was Minister of Agriculture, charged with overseeing the programme of agrarian reform. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, p. 249.
. k-22, 184, 202. A KGB memorandum (No. 979-A) setting out details of co-operation with Peruvian military intelligence was approved by the CPSU Central Committee on 22 April 1975; k-22, 184. Gallegos has been described as ‘the “model” Peruvian army progressive of the Velasco era’. From 1974 to 1976 he was Minister of Agriculture, charged with overseeing the programme of agrarian reform. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, p. 249.
24
. k-22, 225.
. k-22, 225.
25
. k-22, 99.
. k-22, 99.
26
. k-22, 184.
. k-22, 184.
27
. k-22, 233.
. k-22, 233.
28
. k-22, 188.
. k-22, 188.
29
. k-22, 99.
. k-22, 99.
30
. k-22, 187, 188.
. k-22, 187, 188.
31
. k-22, 233.
. k-22, 233.
32
. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, pp. 258-9; Rudolph,
Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis
, p. 58.
. Masterson,
Militarism and Politics in Latin America
, pp. 258-9; Rudolph,
Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis
, p. 58.
33
. k-22, 99.
. k-22, 99.
34
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 88n., 90, 329.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 88n., 90, 329.
35
. Klarén,
Peru
, pp. 359-65.
. Klarén,
Peru
, pp. 359-65.
36
. t-7, 192. Maoism in Peru, however, was far from dead. During the 1980s Sendero Luminoso established itself as the world’s most aggressive Maoist guerrilla force, responsible for approximately 25,000 deaths.
. t-7, 192. Maoism in Peru, however, was far from dead. During the 1980s Sendero Luminoso established itself as the world’s most aggressive Maoist guerrilla force, responsible for approximately 25,000 deaths.
37
. Mitchell,
The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia
, ch. 6; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, ch. 12.
. Mitchell,
The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia
, ch. 6; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, ch. 12.
38
. k-22, 287-8.
. k-22, 287-8.
39
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 272-3.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 272-3.
40
. k-22, 290.
. k-22, 290.
41
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
42
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 258, 262-3, 330-31; Mitchell,
The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia
, pp. 114-18.
. Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, pp. 258, 262-3, 330-31; Mitchell,
The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia
, pp. 114-18.
43
. k-22, 46.
. k-22, 46.
44
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 162 - 3, 357 - 8.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 162 - 3, 357 - 8.
45
. Bird,
Costa Rica
, p. 133.
. Bird,
Costa Rica
, p. 133.
46
. k-22, 46. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of whether or how the loan was repaid.
. k-22, 46. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of whether or how the loan was repaid.
47
. t-7, 126.
. t-7, 126.
48
. Figueres’s file describes the confidant as his ‘trusted representative’; t-7, 126.
. Figueres’s file describes the confidant as his ‘trusted representative’; t-7, 126.
49
. t-7, 126.
. t-7, 126.
50
. k-22, 79.
. k-22, 79.
51
. t-7, 126.
. t-7, 126.
52
. k-22, 79.
. k-22, 79.
53
. Record of conversation on 15 August 1976 between Piñeiro and Vladimir Konstantinovich Tolstikov, then head of the FCD’s Second Department; k-22, 9-11, 39.
. Record of conversation on 15 August 1976 between Piñeiro and Vladimir Konstantinovich Tolstikov, then head of the FCD’s Second Department; k-22, 9-11, 39.
54
. k-22, 46.
. k-22, 46.
55
. k-12, 160.
. k-12, 160.
56
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, p. 128.
. Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987
, p. 128.
57
. k-22, 368. Though Mitrokhin’s notes do not specify Kuznetsov’s cover on this occasion, on other missions he operated as a Novosti correspondent; k-22, 343.
. k-22, 368. Though Mitrokhin’s notes do not specify Kuznetsov’s cover on this occasion, on other missions he operated as a Novosti correspondent; k-22, 343.
58
. k-22, 368.
. k-22, 368.
59
. k-22, 110.
. k-22, 110.
60
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, p. 4.
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, p. 4.
61
. Haslam,
The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile
, pp. 2-3.
. Haslam,
The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile
, pp. 2-3.
62
. k-12, 160.
. k-12, 160.
63
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 48-53; Quirk,
Fidel Castro
, p. 685.
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 48-53; Quirk,
Fidel Castro
, p. 685.
64
. k-22, 368.
. k-22, 368.
65
. Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’, ch. 4.
. Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’, ch. 4.
66
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 370-72; Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 4-5.
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 370-72; Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 4-5.
67
. k-12, 160.
. k-12, 160.
68
. Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’. Mitrokhin’s notes detail some of the complexities in transmitting the secret subsidies. In 1965, for example, at least $100,000 of the subsidy was transmitted via the KGB residency in Montevideo; t-7, 90.
. Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’. Mitrokhin’s notes detail some of the complexities in transmitting the secret subsidies. In 1965, for example, at least $100,000 of the subsidy was transmitted via the KGB residency in Montevideo; t-7, 90.
69
. Politburo decision No. P-170/31 of 27 July 1970; k-12, 160. Mitrokhin’s notes resolve a conundrum posed by the records of payments to foreign Communist parties in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee. According to one document, in 1970 the Chilean Communist Party received the fourth highest of the secret subsidies given to fraternal parties. The list of 1970 allocations, however, puts the Chilean Party in sixth place (Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’). The discrepancy is explained by the additional payment to the Chilean Communist Party authorized by the Politburo on 27 July 1970.
. Politburo decision No. P-170/31 of 27 July 1970; k-12, 160. Mitrokhin’s notes resolve a conundrum posed by the records of payments to foreign Communist parties in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee. According to one document, in 1970 the Chilean Communist Party received the fourth highest of the secret subsidies given to fraternal parties. The list of 1970 allocations, however, puts the Chilean Party in sixth place (Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’). The discrepancy is explained by the additional payment to the Chilean Communist Party authorized by the Politburo on 27 July 1970.
70
. The Chilean Communist Party leader, Luis Corvalán, records in his memoirs that Allende had asked the Party to request $100,000 from Moscow for him to use in his presidential election campaign. Corvalán adds, ‘The reply, which was negative, seemed to us so terrible and unpresentable to our candidate [Allende] that we decided to use our own reserves to provide him with US$100,000 . . . in the name of the Soviet Communists.’ Corvalán was clearly unaware that Allende also received $50,000 from Moscow via the KGB. Corvalán,
De lo vivido y lo peleado
, p. 108; Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’.
. The Chilean Communist Party leader, Luis Corvalán, records in his memoirs that Allende had asked the Party to request $100,000 from Moscow for him to use in his presidential election campaign. Corvalán adds, ‘The reply, which was negative, seemed to us so terrible and unpresentable to our candidate [Allende] that we decided to use our own reserves to provide him with US$100,000 . . . in the name of the Soviet Communists.’ Corvalán was clearly unaware that Allende also received $50,000 from Moscow via the KGB. Corvalán,
De lo vivido y lo peleado
, p. 108; Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’.
71
. k-22, 41.
. k-22, 41.
72
. Mitrokhin notes simply, ‘A report signed by Andropov, under reference No. 2591-A of 23 September 1970, informed the CPSU Central Committee of the part played by the KGB in the electoral campaign and of the outcome. ’ The fact that Andropov chose to report on the role of the KGB in the election, however, undoubtedly means that he did so in positive terms; k-12, 160.
. Mitrokhin notes simply, ‘A report signed by Andropov, under reference No. 2591-A of 23 September 1970, informed the CPSU Central Committee of the part played by the KGB in the electoral campaign and of the outcome. ’ The fact that Andropov chose to report on the role of the KGB in the election, however, undoubtedly means that he did so in positive terms; k-12, 160.
73
. k-12, 160. Allende’s KGB file, DOR No. 90526, fills three volumes for the period up to his election.
. k-12, 160. Allende’s KGB file, DOR No. 90526, fills three volumes for the period up to his election.
74
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 270-71; Gustafson, ‘CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970’.
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 270-71; Gustafson, ‘CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970’.
75
. k-22, 368.
. k-22, 368.
76
. The US economic offensive against the Allende government was conducted not in Chile itself but through attempts to influence international lending markets and the Paris club of major creditor nations. Falcoff,
Modern Chile 1970-1989
, pp. 217-30; Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’. On Allende’s economic mismanagement, see Haslam,
The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile
, ch. 5.
. The US economic offensive against the Allende government was conducted not in Chile itself but through attempts to influence international lending markets and the Paris club of major creditor nations. Falcoff,
Modern Chile 1970-1989
, pp. 217-30; Gustafson, ‘CIA Covert Action and the Chilean Coup’. On Allende’s economic mismanagement, see Haslam,
The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile
, ch. 5.
77
. k-22, 344. In reality, Davis opposed a request by the Santiago CIA station for more funds for covert action in February 1973, and tendered his resignation over CIA covert action in Angola in 1975. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 308, 387-8. Kuznetsov also gave Allende the names of seventeen other real or alleged CIA officers in Chile.
. k-22, 344. In reality, Davis opposed a request by the Santiago CIA station for more funds for covert action in February 1973, and tendered his resignation over CIA covert action in Angola in 1975. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, pp. 308, 387-8. Kuznetsov also gave Allende the names of seventeen other real or alleged CIA officers in Chile.
78
. k-22, 341.
. k-22, 341.
79
. k-22, 362, 366, 371. In two of these notes from KGB files, Miria Contreras Bell is incorrectly referred to as ‘Miria de Ropert’, no doubt as a result of her previous marriage to the Socialist Party militant, Enrique Ropert Gallet, some details of whose career were published in the Santiago journal
El Periodista
, vol. 2, no. 44, 14 September 2003. The third reference gives her name as ‘Maria [
sic
] Contreras Ropert’. There was some confusion in KGB files when recording Spanish names as a result of the Spanish and Latin American system of giving the Christian forename, then the patronym, followed by the mother’s surname, but omitting the last in shorter versions.
. k-22, 362, 366, 371. In two of these notes from KGB files, Miria Contreras Bell is incorrectly referred to as ‘Miria de Ropert’, no doubt as a result of her previous marriage to the Socialist Party militant, Enrique Ropert Gallet, some details of whose career were published in the Santiago journal
El Periodista
, vol. 2, no. 44, 14 September 2003. The third reference gives her name as ‘Maria [
sic
] Contreras Ropert’. There was some confusion in KGB files when recording Spanish names as a result of the Spanish and Latin American system of giving the Christian forename, then the patronym, followed by the mother’s surname, but omitting the last in shorter versions.
80
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, p. 50.
. Davis,
The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende
, p. 50.
81
. k-22, 366.
. k-22, 366.
82
. See below, p. 77.
. See below, p. 77.
83
. Beatriz (commonly known as ‘Taty’) followed her Cuban husband, Luis Fernández Oña, to Havana after the 1973 coup, and committed suicide four years later, apparently suffering from depression. Pérez, ‘Salvador Allende, Apuntes sobre su Dispositivo de Seguridad’; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 352; Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959- 1987
, p. 142; Quirk,
Fidel Castro
, p. 664.
. Beatriz (commonly known as ‘Taty’) followed her Cuban husband, Luis Fernández Oña, to Havana after the 1973 coup, and committed suicide four years later, apparently suffering from depression. Pérez, ‘Salvador Allende, Apuntes sobre su Dispositivo de Seguridad’; Horne,
Small Earthquake in Chile
, p. 352; Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959- 1987
, p. 142; Quirk,
Fidel Castro
, p. 664.
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