The World Was Going Our Way (94 page)
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Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
1
. Halliday, ‘Soviet Relations with South Yemen’.
. Halliday, ‘Soviet Relations with South Yemen’.
2
. Vassiliev,
Russian Policy in the Middle East
, pp. 192-3.
. Vassiliev,
Russian Policy in the Middle East
, pp. 192-3.
3
. Golan,
Soviet Policies in the Middle East
, p. 233.
. Golan,
Soviet Policies in the Middle East
, p. 233.
4
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 142-3.
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 142-3.
5
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 193.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 193.
6
. k-12, 373; k-18, 138. Mitrokhin’s notes imply, but do not explicitly state, that Muhammad Said Abdalla (codenamed KERIL), the PDRY Minister of State Security, was also present at the meeting with Andropov on 12 May 1972. Mitrokhin had no access to Sixteenth Directorate files and thus provides no information on the KGB’s ability to decrypt PDRY communications.
. k-12, 373; k-18, 138. Mitrokhin’s notes imply, but do not explicitly state, that Muhammad Said Abdalla (codenamed KERIL), the PDRY Minister of State Security, was also present at the meeting with Andropov on 12 May 1972. Mitrokhin had no access to Sixteenth Directorate files and thus provides no information on the KGB’s ability to decrypt PDRY communications.
7
. k-12, 373; k-18, 138. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the full cost of KGB assistance to the PDRY intelligence agency, but provide some examples: an original allocation of 200,000 convertible rubles in 1972 for the training of PDRY intelligence officers and cipher personnel; ‘financial assistance’ of 200,000 rubles to PDRY intelligence, approved by the Politburo in February 1975; the supply in May 1975 of ‘operational equipment’ valued at over 100,000 rubles; and a payment in June 1975 of $100,000 to the PDRY Minister of State Security. It is unclear whether the equipment and money handed over in May and June 1975 were part of, or additional to, the ‘assistance’ approved by the Politburo in February.
. k-12, 373; k-18, 138. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the full cost of KGB assistance to the PDRY intelligence agency, but provide some examples: an original allocation of 200,000 convertible rubles in 1972 for the training of PDRY intelligence officers and cipher personnel; ‘financial assistance’ of 200,000 rubles to PDRY intelligence, approved by the Politburo in February 1975; the supply in May 1975 of ‘operational equipment’ valued at over 100,000 rubles; and a payment in June 1975 of $100,000 to the PDRY Minister of State Security. It is unclear whether the equipment and money handed over in May and June 1975 were part of, or additional to, the ‘assistance’ approved by the Politburo in February.
8
. Not to be confused with Yasir Arafat, who had the same codename, AREF; see below, p. 250.
. Not to be confused with Yasir Arafat, who had the same codename, AREF; see below, p. 250.
9
. k-12, 374. The total cost of AREF’s treatment at the sanatorium amounted to 2,842 rubles.
. k-12, 374. The total cost of AREF’s treatment at the sanatorium amounted to 2,842 rubles.
10
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 193.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 193.
11
. After the end of Turkish rule in 1918, North Yemen was ruled by an autocratic Imamate from the Zeidi branch of Shia Islam. In 1962 the Imamate was overthrown in a nationalist coup which set up the Yemen Arab Republic. Civil war, however, continued for the remainder of the decade.
. After the end of Turkish rule in 1918, North Yemen was ruled by an autocratic Imamate from the Zeidi branch of Shia Islam. In 1962 the Imamate was overthrown in a nationalist coup which set up the Yemen Arab Republic. Civil war, however, continued for the remainder of the decade.
12
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, pp. 90-97.
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, pp. 90-97.
13
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, pp. 316-17.
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, pp. 316-17.
14
. Mitrokhin noted no file on the assassination of al-Hamdi, save for a file on the KGB active measures which it prompted. Al-Hamdi was killed on the eve of a visit to Aden aimed at forging closer links with the PDRY. A variety of theories have been put forward to account for his assassination; Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, p. 179.
. Mitrokhin noted no file on the assassination of al-Hamdi, save for a file on the KGB active measures which it prompted. Al-Hamdi was killed on the eve of a visit to Aden aimed at forging closer links with the PDRY. A variety of theories have been put forward to account for his assassination; Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, p. 179.
15
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 317.
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 317.
16
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, pp. 77, 181; Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, pp. 98-9; Golan,
Soviet Policies in the Middle East
, p. 233. The files noted by Mitrokhin contain no information on either assassination.
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, pp. 77, 181; Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, pp. 98-9; Golan,
Soviet Policies in the Middle East
, p. 233. The files noted by Mitrokhin contain no information on either assassination.
17
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, pp. 77-8.
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, pp. 77-8.
18
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, p. 99.
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, p. 99.
19
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, p. 183.
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, p. 183.
20
. Vassiliev,
Russian Policy in the Middle East
, p. 194.
. Vassiliev,
Russian Policy in the Middle East
, p. 194.
21
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, pp. 185-6.
. Page,
The Soviet Union and the Yemenis
, pp. 185-6.
22
. vol. 6, ch. 10.
. vol. 6, ch. 10.
23
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, p. 113.
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, p. 113.
24
. Halliday,
Revolution and Foreign Policy
, pp. 195-6, 200. Kirpichenko believed that ‘the South Yemeni were . . . beginning to tire of constant confrontation with their neighbours, and Ali Nasir Muhammad was feeling out paths of normalization of relations with the rest of the Arab world’. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 194.
. Halliday,
Revolution and Foreign Policy
, pp. 195-6, 200. Kirpichenko believed that ‘the South Yemeni were . . . beginning to tire of constant confrontation with their neighbours, and Ali Nasir Muhammad was feeling out paths of normalization of relations with the rest of the Arab world’. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, p. 194.
25
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 317.
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 317.
26
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, pp. 119-27.
. Almadaghi,
Yemen and the United States
, pp. 119-27.
27
. Halliday,
Revolution and Foreign Policy
, pp. 41-4.
. Halliday,
Revolution and Foreign Policy
, pp. 41-4.
28
. Volkogonov,
The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire
, pp. 519-20.
. Volkogonov,
The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire
, pp. 519-20.
29
. Halliday,
Revolution and Foreign Policy
, p. 45.
. Halliday,
Revolution and Foreign Policy
, p. 45.
Israel and Zionism
1
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 1, p. 324.
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 1, p. 324.
2
. Dzhirkvelov,
Secret Servant
, pp. 246-8; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 418-19. Vertiporokh’s alias ‘Rozhkov’ is given in vol. 2, Iran, app. 2, item 71.
. Dzhirkvelov,
Secret Servant
, pp. 246-8; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 418-19. Vertiporokh’s alias ‘Rozhkov’ is given in vol. 2, Iran, app. 2, item 71.
3
. In 1983, Klingberg was secretly arrested, tried and convicted as a Soviet spy. A news blackout was imposed on his arrest and trial and he was kept in jail under an assumed identity. Not until 1993 was the blackout lifted. Cohen, ‘Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons’; Tsur Batsheva, ‘Court Orders Klingberg Freed’,
Jerusalem Post
, 4 Sept. 1998. Mitrokhin did not note Klingberg’s file.
. In 1983, Klingberg was secretly arrested, tried and convicted as a Soviet spy. A news blackout was imposed on his arrest and trial and he was kept in jail under an assumed identity. Not until 1993 was the blackout lifted. Cohen, ‘Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons’; Tsur Batsheva, ‘Court Orders Klingberg Freed’,
Jerusalem Post
, 4 Sept. 1998. Mitrokhin did not note Klingberg’s file.
4
. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence supplied by KHAIMOV; k-14, 534.
. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence supplied by KHAIMOV; k-14, 534.
5
. Though Mitrokhin recorded PERETS’s real name and date of birth in Sofia, he noted no details of his position in Israel or the intelligence he provided. k-14, 532. Apart from KHAIMOV and PERETS, the only Bulgarian agent in Israel identified by Mitrokhin is ALIALEKH, who joined the Israeli Communist Party and was employed as a manual worker in a dry-cleaning business. Despite his humble employment, ALIALEKH was considered of some significance; he was allowed to visit his relatives in Bulgaria and had meetings with Bulgarian intelligence during his visits; k-14, 533.
. Though Mitrokhin recorded PERETS’s real name and date of birth in Sofia, he noted no details of his position in Israel or the intelligence he provided. k-14, 532. Apart from KHAIMOV and PERETS, the only Bulgarian agent in Israel identified by Mitrokhin is ALIALEKH, who joined the Israeli Communist Party and was employed as a manual worker in a dry-cleaning business. Despite his humble employment, ALIALEKH was considered of some significance; he was allowed to visit his relatives in Bulgaria and had meetings with Bulgarian intelligence during his visits; k-14, 533.
6
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 2, p. 643. During his meetings with Rabinovich, Vertiporokh operated under diplomatic cover as first secretary at the Tel Aviv legation, using his alias Rozhkov; Rabinovich, who reported the meetings to the Foreign Ministry, was unaware that he was dealing with the Soviet resident. The editors of the mostly admirably edited
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations
also fail to realize Rozhkov’s real identity.
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 2, p. 643. During his meetings with Rabinovich, Vertiporokh operated under diplomatic cover as first secretary at the Tel Aviv legation, using his alias Rozhkov; Rabinovich, who reported the meetings to the Foreign Ministry, was unaware that he was dealing with the Soviet resident. The editors of the mostly admirably edited
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations
also fail to realize Rozhkov’s real identity.
7
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 2, pp. 868-70. Following a bomb attack on the Tel Aviv legation in February 1953, Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations were broken off; they were reinstated in July.
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 2, pp. 868-70. Following a bomb attack on the Tel Aviv legation in February 1953, Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations were broken off; they were reinstated in July.
8
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 150-51.
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 150-51.
9
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 2, pp. 579n., 589, 610, 698, 821, 913. In 1953 Sneh and the left-wing faction which he headed were expelled from Mapam; late in 1954 they joined the Israeli Communist Party.
.
Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953
, vol. 2, pp. 579n., 589, 610, 698, 821, 913. In 1953 Sneh and the left-wing faction which he headed were expelled from Mapam; late in 1954 they joined the Israeli Communist Party.
10
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 33- 5.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 33- 5.
11
. BOKER’s successive controllers were Ya. P. Medyanik, V. A. Avdeyenko and I. P. Dedyulya; k-14, 537.
. BOKER’s successive controllers were Ya. P. Medyanik, V. A. Avdeyenko and I. P. Dedyulya; k-14, 537.
12
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 157-8.
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 157-8.
13
. Avni,
False Flag
, chs. 4-10 and ‘Postscript’ by his interrogator, Yehuda Prag. Avni refutes, among other colourful myths published about his career, the claim that Lenin had stayed with his parents in Switzerland during the First World War.
. Avni,
False Flag
, chs. 4-10 and ‘Postscript’ by his interrogator, Yehuda Prag. Avni refutes, among other colourful myths published about his career, the claim that Lenin had stayed with his parents in Switzerland during the First World War.
14
. Avni,
False Flag
, chs. 10-11.
. Avni,
False Flag
, chs. 10-11.
15
. Mitrokhin’s brief notes on Avni refer to him only by the codename CHEKH. Since CHEKH is identified as the Israeli commercial attaché in Belgrade, there is no doubt about his identity. There is, however, a possible ambiguity about the date of Avni’s transfer to KGB control. Mitrokhin noted, ‘He [CHEKH] was recruited by the KGB’, then added a date whose last digit is indistinct but appears to be 1954 (k-4, 89). It is possible but not probable that 1954 refers only to the date at which Avni became commercial attaché in Belgrade, and that his transfer to the KGB occurred earlier. Even when publishing his memoirs in 1999, Avni continued to believe mistakenly that his career in Soviet intelligence had been exclusively with the GRU.
. Mitrokhin’s brief notes on Avni refer to him only by the codename CHEKH. Since CHEKH is identified as the Israeli commercial attaché in Belgrade, there is no doubt about his identity. There is, however, a possible ambiguity about the date of Avni’s transfer to KGB control. Mitrokhin noted, ‘He [CHEKH] was recruited by the KGB’, then added a date whose last digit is indistinct but appears to be 1954 (k-4, 89). It is possible but not probable that 1954 refers only to the date at which Avni became commercial attaché in Belgrade, and that his transfer to the KGB occurred earlier. Even when publishing his memoirs in 1999, Avni continued to believe mistakenly that his career in Soviet intelligence had been exclusively with the GRU.
16
. As a condition of publishing his memoirs, Avni was not allowed by the Israeli authorities to give details of any Mossad operation - or, apparently, of any of the intelligence about Mossad which he passed on to the GRU and KGB. However, an introduction by Nigel West to the English-language edition (doubtless approved by Avni) gives a few examples of Mossad operations in which he took part; Avni,
False Flag
, pp. xii-xiv.
. As a condition of publishing his memoirs, Avni was not allowed by the Israeli authorities to give details of any Mossad operation - or, apparently, of any of the intelligence about Mossad which he passed on to the GRU and KGB. However, an introduction by Nigel West to the English-language edition (doubtless approved by Avni) gives a few examples of Mossad operations in which he took part; Avni,
False Flag
, pp. xii-xiv.
17
. k-4, 90.
. k-4, 90.
18
. Avni,
False Flag
, preface and chs. 12-19.
. Avni,
False Flag
, preface and chs. 12-19.
19
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 158-64; ‘Yisrael Beer’s Career’,
Jerusalem Post
, 16 April 1961. Though published after Beer’s arrest, the
Jerusalem Post
simply repeated his fraudulent account of his career before reaching Palestine in 1938.
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 158-64; ‘Yisrael Beer’s Career’,
Jerusalem Post
, 16 April 1961. Though published after Beer’s arrest, the
Jerusalem Post
simply repeated his fraudulent account of his career before reaching Palestine in 1938.
20
. British Military Attaché, Tel Aviv, to Director of Military Intelligence, 14 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew (I am grateful for this reference to Ronen Bergman).
. British Military Attaché, Tel Aviv, to Director of Military Intelligence, 14 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew (I am grateful for this reference to Ronen Bergman).
21
. Tel Aviv Embassy to Foreign Office, 17 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew.
. Tel Aviv Embassy to Foreign Office, 17 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew.
22
. ‘Yisrael Beer’s Career’,
Jerusalem Post
, 16 April 1961.
. ‘Yisrael Beer’s Career’,
Jerusalem Post
, 16 April 1961.
23
. British Military Attaché, Tel Aviv, to Director of Military Intelligence, 14 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew. Peres was, of course, unaware of Beer’s KGB connection.
. British Military Attaché, Tel Aviv, to Director of Military Intelligence, 14 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew. Peres was, of course, unaware of Beer’s KGB connection.
24
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 162-5; Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 14.
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, pp. 162-5; Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 14.
25
. Tel Aviv Embassy to Foreign Office, 17 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew.
. Tel Aviv Embassy to Foreign Office, 17 April 1961; FO371/15746, The National Archives, Kew.
26
. Among the new KGB agents were DITA, a female journalist in Tel Aviv, and GRANT, a Mapam politician, recruited in, respectively, 1966 and 1967; k-14, 538-9.
. Among the new KGB agents were DITA, a female journalist in Tel Aviv, and GRANT, a Mapam politician, recruited in, respectively, 1966 and 1967; k-14, 538-9.
27
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, p. 214.
. Black and Morris,
Israel’s Secret Wars
, p. 214.
28
. vol. 6, ch. 7, part 1, p. 288.
. vol. 6, ch. 7, part 1, p. 288.
29
. Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 15.
. Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 15.
30
. k-8, 583.
. k-8, 583.
31
. Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 15.
. Bergman, ‘Spooked’, p. 15.
32
. Mitrokhin noted the figures for the budget of the Jerusalem residency only for the period 1975 to 1980 (k-13, 243-4, 250-51). The figures (in thousands of convertible rubles) were as follows: 13.0 (1975); 14.1 (1976); 16.0 (1977); 16.4 (1978); 20.3 (1979); 25.4 (1980).
. Mitrokhin noted the figures for the budget of the Jerusalem residency only for the period 1975 to 1980 (k-13, 243-4, 250-51). The figures (in thousands of convertible rubles) were as follows: 13.0 (1975); 14.1 (1976); 16.0 (1977); 16.4 (1978); 20.3 (1979); 25.4 (1980).
33
. Among those with whom the KGB lost contact after the Six-Day War were the agents DITA and GRANT and the confidential contact BOY, a Mapam (Israeli Labour Party) journalist; k-14, 538-9, 541.
. Among those with whom the KGB lost contact after the Six-Day War were the agents DITA and GRANT and the confidential contact BOY, a Mapam (Israeli Labour Party) journalist; k-14, 538-9, 541.
34
. Wolf,
Man without a Face
, p. 257.
. Wolf,
Man without a Face
, p. 257.
35
. Sachar,
A History of Israel
, pp. 735-7.
. Sachar,
A History of Israel
, pp. 735-7.
36
. Memorandum by Andropov and Gromyko, dated 10 June 1968 and approved by Central Committee on same date; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 65-6.
. Memorandum by Andropov and Gromyko, dated 10 June 1968 and approved by Central Committee on same date; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 65-6.
37
. Statistics of Jewish emigration cited in this chapter are taken from Ro’i (ed.),
Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union
, p. 359.
. Statistics of Jewish emigration cited in this chapter are taken from Ro’i (ed.),
Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union
, p. 359.
38
. Ro’i, ‘Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration’, pp. 51-6; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, p. 359.
. Ro’i, ‘Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration’, pp. 51-6; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, p. 359.
39
. Andropov to Central Committee, enclosing report by F. D. Bobkov, head of the KGB Fifth Directorate (Dissidents and Ideological Subversion), 17 May 1971; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, p. 6.
. Andropov to Central Committee, enclosing report by F. D. Bobkov, head of the KGB Fifth Directorate (Dissidents and Ideological Subversion), 17 May 1971; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, p. 6.
40
. Excerpt from Politburo minutes, 20 March 1973; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 170-76.
. Excerpt from Politburo minutes, 20 March 1973; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 170-76.
41
. See above, p. 160.
. See above, p. 160.
42
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 193-4. Kalugin is probably referring to agents infiltrated into Israel after the breach of diplomatic relations. Klingberg, who had emigrated to Palestine in 1947, continued to provide significant intelligence until his arrest in 1983.
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 193-4. Kalugin is probably referring to agents infiltrated into Israel after the breach of diplomatic relations. Klingberg, who had emigrated to Palestine in 1947, continued to provide significant intelligence until his arrest in 1983.
43
. Wolf,
Man without a Face
, p. 257.
. Wolf,
Man without a Face
, p. 257.
44
. t-7, 290.
. t-7, 290.
45
. vol. 7, app. 2, 40; k-19, 407; k-16, 76-7; k-18, 135; t-7, 5.
. vol. 7, app. 2, 40; k-19, 407; k-16, 76-7; k-18, 135; t-7, 5.
46
. k-19, 407; k-16, 75. The spelling of Linov’s alias is unclear; Mitrokhin’s notes refer to both ‘Motl’ and ‘Mottl’.
. k-19, 407; k-16, 75. The spelling of Linov’s alias is unclear; Mitrokhin’s notes refer to both ‘Motl’ and ‘Mottl’.
47
. k-14, 39; k-12, 448.
. k-14, 39; k-12, 448.
48
. vol. 6, app. 1, p. 590.
. vol. 6, app. 1, p. 590.
49
. k-12, 339, 449.
. k-12, 339, 449.
50
. t-3, 46; k-12, 10.
. t-3, 46; k-12, 10.
51
. k-14, 116; k-16, 74.
. k-14, 116; k-16, 74.
52
. KIM left for the United States, where he remained in contact with the KGB through correspondence containing secret writing and microdots sent to accommodation addresses. In December 1979 he failed to turn up for a meeting in Vienna with G. P. Kapustyan, deputy head of FCD Department 18 (Israel and the Middle East), and may subsequently have broken contact with the KGB; vol. 6, app. 1, p. 590.
. KIM left for the United States, where he remained in contact with the KGB through correspondence containing secret writing and microdots sent to accommodation addresses. In December 1979 he failed to turn up for a meeting in Vienna with G. P. Kapustyan, deputy head of FCD Department 18 (Israel and the Middle East), and may subsequently have broken contact with the KGB; vol. 6, app. 1, p. 590.
53
. k-12, 448.
. k-12, 448.
54
. k-12, 44.
. k-12, 44.
55
. k-14, 116.
. k-14, 116.
56
. k-16, 75.
. k-16, 75.
57
. k-11, 56; the dates at which YASAI’s deployment to Israel was first decided and then cancelled are unclear.
. k-11, 56; the dates at which YASAI’s deployment to Israel was first decided and then cancelled are unclear.
58
. k-16, 536; k-24, 76;
Time
, 16 Sept. 1974.
. k-16, 536; k-24, 76;
Time
, 16 Sept. 1974.
59
. k-9, 237.
. k-9, 237.
60
. Memorandum by Andropov, 5 June 1975; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 214-15.
. Memorandum by Andropov, 5 June 1975; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 214-15.
61
. Andropov, ‘Personal for Comrade Chernenko’, No. 547-A, 11 March 1975. We are grateful to Vladimir Bukovsky for supplying us with a photocopy of this top-secret communication from his personal collection of KGB documents found in the Kremlin archives.
. Andropov, ‘Personal for Comrade Chernenko’, No. 547-A, 11 March 1975. We are grateful to Vladimir Bukovsky for supplying us with a photocopy of this top-secret communication from his personal collection of KGB documents found in the Kremlin archives.
62
. Memorandum by Andropov, 5 June 1975; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 214-15.
. Memorandum by Andropov, 5 June 1975; Morozov (ed.),
Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration
, pp. 214-15.
63
. Shevchenko,
Breaking with Moscow
, p. 375. Shevchenko defected in 1978.
. Shevchenko,
Breaking with Moscow
, p. 375. Shevchenko defected in 1978.
64
. A useful chronology of the Jewish Defense League’s activities is to be found on the website of the Anti-Defamation League:
www.adl.org/extremism/jdf
.
. A useful chronology of the Jewish Defense League’s activities is to be found on the website of the Anti-Defamation League:
www.adl.org/extremism/jdf
.
65
. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
66
. Ibid.; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 23 8.
. Ibid.; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 23 8.
67
. k-25, 148.
. k-25, 148.
68
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
69
. vol. 9, ch. 3, paras. 5, 6; t-7, 219; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 469.
. vol. 9, ch. 3, paras. 5, 6; t-7, 219; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 469.
70
. Jakobovits,
‘If Only My People . . .’
, ch. 5.
. Jakobovits,
‘If Only My People . . .’
, ch. 5.
71
. The codenames of the agents were VOSTOKOV, LVOV, SHIROKIKH, LEVIN, SERGEI, GNOM, ILYIN, MARK, ELEKTRON, PROFESSOR and PETROV; k-25, 153.
. The codenames of the agents were VOSTOKOV, LVOV, SHIROKIKH, LEVIN, SERGEI, GNOM, ILYIN, MARK, ELEKTRON, PROFESSOR and PETROV; k-25, 153.
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