The Wizards of Langley (57 page)

86
. Ibid., p. 24.

87
. David S. Brandwein, “Telemetry Analysis,”
Studies in Intelligence
8, 4 (Fall 1964): 21–29 at 23–24.

88
. Ibid., p. 24.

89
. Ibid., pp. 26–27; Klaimon, “Reentry Vehicle Analysis,” p. 28.

90
. Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-64,
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
, October 8, 1964, p. 41.

91
. Central Intelligence Agency,
Cost Reduction Program FY 1966-FY 1967
, September 1, 1965, p. 9, NARA, RG 263, HRP 89-2, Box 7, File HS/HC 713.

92
. Olav Riste,
The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970
(London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 149, 158; Rolf Tamnes,
The United States and the Cold War in the High North
(Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), pp. 211–212.

93
. McMahon interview.

94
. Hedrick Smith, “U.S. Aides Say Loss of Post in Iran Impairs Missile-Monitoring Ability,”
New
York Times
, March 2, 1979, pp. A1, A8; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997.

95
. Interview with William H. Nance, Bethesda, Maryland, May 4, 1999.

96
. Smith, “U.S. Aides Say Loss of Post in Iran Impairs Missile-Monitoring Ability.”

97
. Interview with Robert Phillips, Rosslyn, Virginia, June 4, 1999; Nance interview.

98
. Nance interview; U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Fiscal Year 1980 International
Security Assistance Authorization
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 366; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997; Phillips interview.

99
. Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-67,
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
, October 26, 1967, p. 10; Berman and Baker,
Soviet Strategic Forces
, p. 104; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-64,
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
, October 8, 1964, p. 13.

100
. “Soviets Step Up Testing of First-Line ICBM Systems,”
EUCOM Intelligence Report
, April 13, 1966; “Soviets Maintaining High Launch Rate for Major ICBM’s; SS-11 Crew Training May Be Under Way,”
EUCOM Intelligence Report
, August 18, 1966; “Series of SS-11 ICBM Tests to Pacific Impact Area Concluded,”
EUCOM Intelligence Report
, September 7, 1966.

101
. Frank Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,”
Studies in Intelligence
11, 2 (Spring 1967): 59–65 at 64.

102
. Ibid., p. 60.

103
. N. C. Gerson, “SIGINT in Space,”
Studies in Intelligence
28, 2 (Summer 1984): 41–48 at 47; Directorate of Collection, Office, ACS/Intelligence, U.S. Air Force,
History: Directorate of Collection,
Office, ACS/Intelligence 1 July 31–December 1962
, n.d., p. 3; Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,” pp. 60–61.

104
. Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,” pp. 63–64; Donald C. Brown, “On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost,”
Studies in Intelligence
13, 2 (Spring 1969): 11–19 at 13.

105
. Brown, “On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost,” pp. 13–14, 19.

106
. Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,” pp. 61, 64.

107
. Ibid., pp. 64–65.

108
. William H. Nance, “Quality ELINT,”
Studies in Intelligence
12, 2 (Spring 1968): 7–19 at 7–8; Gene Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960–1975,”
Studies in Intelligence
42, 1 (Spring 1998): 51–59 at 54–55. The specific technical characteristics that fall in the power and coverage categories are maximum beam power, total radiated power, antenna gain, and variation in gain (side and back lobe distribution) (Nance, “Quality ELINT,” pp. 7–19 at 10.)

109
. Nance, “Quality ELINT,” p. 15.

110
. Ibid., pp. 16–17.

111
. Nicholas R. Garofalo, “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars,”
Studies in Intelligence
13, 2 (Spring 1969): 53–61 at 55.

112
. Ibid.; “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” August 25, 1965, in Nina D. Howland (ed.),
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII: Iran
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 166–167.

113
. “The Indian Connection,”
India Today
, December 31, 1983, p. 10; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998. “The Indian Connection” and other sources have reported this device to be aimed at monitoring Chinese nuclear tests. Wheelon and McMahon recalled that the Himalaya project was to monitor telemetry.

114
. Interview with a former CIA official; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

115
. Interview with a former CIA official; Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos,
Skunk Works: A Personal
Memoir of My Years at Lockheed
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), p. 182.

116
. Interview with Richard Bissell, Farmington, Connecticut, March 16, 1984.

117
. Chris Pocock,
Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane
(Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), p. 98.

118
. Ibid.

119
. Ibid., p. 100; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence
Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974
(Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), p. 282.

120
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 282; Pocock,
Dragon Lady
, p. 100.

121
. Pocock,
Dragon Lady
, p. 100.

122
. Ibid., pp. 100–101; R. E. Lawrence and Harry W. Woo, “Infrared Imagery in Overhead Reconnaissance,”
Studies in Intelligence
11, 3 (Summer 1967): 17–40 at 23.

123
. Pocock,
Dragon Lady
, p. 111.

124
. Ibid., pp. 102–103, 111; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

125
. Ledford interview. An undated, but clearly pre-1963, “Inspector General’s Survey of Air Activities: Summary of Recommendations” (NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 45, Folder 5), contained the recommendation that the CIA explore “with the U.S. Navy the feasibility and arrangements necessary for staging of missions from aircraft carriers whenever the target lies beyond the range of U.S.-based U-2s.”

126
. Ledford interview; Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead
Reconnaissance
, pp. 247–248.

127
. Pocock,
Dragon Lady
, pp. 107–109; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse,
Nuclear Weapons
Databook, Volume V
, p. 407; interview with a former CIA official.

128
. Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

129
. David Reade,
The Age of Orion: Lockheed P-3, an Illustrated History
(Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1998), p. 104; interview with Robert Singel, Great Falls, Virginia, February 25, 1999.

130
. Singel interview; Reade,
The Age of Orion
, p. 105; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999.

131
. Reade,
The Age of Orion
, p. 105.

132
. Ibid., p. 106.

133
. McMahon interview; Wayne Mutza,
Lockheed P2V Neptune: An Illustrated History
(Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996), p. 115; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, January 28, 2000.

134
. Singel interview; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999.

135
. Reade,
The Age of Orion
, p. 106. By November 1965, the CIA was involved in another program to modify P-2V7 aircraft for intelligence purposes. That month, representatives from ORD and OSA visited E-Systems at Greenville, Texas, to explore the possibility of using the planes as multi-sensor platforms. A memo noted that the CIA would likely be able to use such an aircraft for reconnaissance of undefended areas where conventional photography was limited because of dense foliage. A March 1966 memo noted that ORD had been directed to run the program and that “the continuation of any OSA program to achieve a low-altitude multi-sensor capability depends directly on the success or failure of this [effort].”The reference to dense foliage and the fact that the NRO was not providing funds for the program suggest that its primary focus was reconnaissance of Southeast Asian territory in support of CIA covert operations. (“Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Visit to [deleted], Project [deleted], November 22, 1965; Memorandum for: see Distribution, Subject: [deleted] Meetings, March 23, 1966, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release RG 263, Box 45, Folder 5 [both memos]).

136
. Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998; Wheelon interview, March 21, 2000.

137
. Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

138
. Thomas P. McIninch, “The OXCART Story,”
Studies in Intelligence
15 (Winter 1971): 1–34 at 17.

139
. Ibid.

140
. Ibid., p. 19.

141
. Ibid., p. 20; Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, pp. 300–301.

142
. McIninch,
The OXCART Story
, p. 20.

143
. Ibid., p. 21.

144
. Ibid.

145
. Ibid., p. 23.

146
. Ibid.; Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, pp. 301–302.

147
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 302.

148
. Ibid., p. 307.

149
. Ibid.

150
. Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

151
. Interview with a former CIA official.

1
. Interview with a former CIA official.

2
. Interview with Albert Wheelon, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1997.

3
. Interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998; Robert Perry,
A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program,
1960–1965
(Washington, D.C.: NRO, 1969), pp. 123–124n. in NRO CAL Records, 2/A/0066.

4
. Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting with Dr. Brockway McMillan, July 23, 1963.

5
. Perry,
A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5
, p. 120.

6
. Office of Public Affairs, Secretary of the Air Force, “General Lew Allen Jr.,” September 1981; interview with Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Pasadena, California, June 10, 1999.

7
. General Lew Allen Jr. interview.

8
. Roswell Gilpatric, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Mr. McCone’s Concerns Regarding NRO, August 22, 1963.

9
.
Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume One, Chapters I-II
(Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1973), pp. 105–106.

10
. Letter, Albert D. Wheelon, June 17, 1999.

11
. Jonathan McDowell, “Launch Listings,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.),
Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), pp. 235–246 at p. 238.

12
. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Subject: Policy Guidance on Management Control over Reconnaissance Programs, October 22, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0043.

13
. Brockway McMillan, Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Management of the CORONA Project, October 28, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0044.

14
. Wheelon letter.

15
. John A. McCone, Memorandum for: General Carter, Dr. Wheelon, September 20, 1963.

16
. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Management of CORONA Project, December 10, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0062; Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum for Director, NRO Program A, Director, NRO Program B, Subject: Responsibility for Operating Management of the CORONA Project, December 10, 1963, NRO CAL Archives, 1/A/0045.

17
. Perry,
A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5
, p. 134.

18
. John A. McCone, Director, to Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, December 13, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/A/0047.

19
. Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director (Science and Technology), Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Recommendation re Fubini’s proposal, February 3, 1964, NRO CAL Records, 1/C/0067.

20
. Brockway McMillan, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, to John McCone, February 4, 1964.