The Wizards of Langley (60 page)

48
. Ibid.

49
. Ibid., pp. 303–304.

50
. Ibid., pp. 304–305; McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 25.

51
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 305; McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 27.

52
. Bacalis interview.

53
. Paul F. Crickmore,
Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed
(London: Osprey, 1993), pp. 26–28; Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 305; McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 27; NPIC,
Black Shield Mission X-001, 31 May 1967,
June 1967, 2000 CIA Release.

54
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 306; McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” pp. 27–28; NPIC,
Black Shield Mission BX-6705, 20 June
1967,
June 1967, 2000 CIA Release; NPIC,
Black Shield Mission BX-6706, 30 June 1967,
July 1967, 2000 CIA Release.

55
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 307; Crickmore,
Lockheed SR-71,
pp. 30–31.

56
. NPIC,
Black Shield Mission BX-6723, 17 September 1967,
November 1967, p. 1, 2000 CIA Release; NPIC,
Black Shield Mission BX-6725, 4 October 1967,
December 1967, pp. 1–2, 2000 CIA Release; NPIC,
Black Shield Mission BX-6732, 28 October 1967,
December 1967, p. 1, 2000 CIA Release.

57
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, pp. 310–311.

58
. 9th SRW,
History of the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, 1 October–31 December 1967
, n.d., pp. 43–44; Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 310.

59
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, pp. 310–311.

60
. Ibid., p. 311.

61
. Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: OXCART and SR-71 Operations, December 29, 1967.

62
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 307; McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 28.

63
. Crickmore,
Lockheed SR-71
, pp. 32–33.

64
. Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, pp. 307, 309; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, DIA, Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Requirement for a Second BLACK SHIELD Mission over North Korea, January 29, 1968, LBJ Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, “NRO,” Box 9.

65
. McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 32.

66
. Ibid.

67
. Ibid., pp. 32–33; Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance
, p. 313.

68
. L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support, “Announcement of Assignment to Key Position, Office of the Deputy Director for Science and Technology,” HN 20-115, September 13, 1963; “ORD Milestones,” n.d.; Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, General Notice No. 12, May 5, 1964; L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support, “Announcement of Assignment to Key Position, Office of the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Office of Research and Development,” HN 20-197, March 19, 1965. All NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 66, Folder 5.

69
. John Marks,
The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control
(New York: Norton, 1991), p. 227.

70
. Michael Warner, CIA History Staff, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: The Central Intelligence Agency and Human Radiation Experiments: An Analysis of the Findings, February 14, 1995, pp. 7–8; Memorandum for: Director of Research and Development, Subject: Transfer of Funds to EARL for Follow-Up Study of Medical Volunteers, February 17, 1971. CIA, congressional, and DOD investigators subsequently could not determine whether such tests ever took place.

71
. Interview with Victor Marchetti, October 12, 1999.

72
. Ibid.; John Ranelagh,
The Agency
, p. 208.

73
. Ranelagh,
The Agency
, p. 208.

74
. Memorandum for: [Deleted], [Deleted] Views on Trained Cats [Deleted] for [Deleted] Use, n.d.

75
. Interview with a former CIA official.

76
. Ibid.

77
. Ibid.

78
. Ibid.

79
. Ibid.; Marchetti interview.

80
. Interview with a former CIA official.

81
. Kirsten Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy: Intelligence as Political Football,” Kennedy School of Government, C16-89-884.0, Case Program, 1989, p. 1; William Beecher, “Soviet Missile Deployment Puzzles Top U.S. Analysts,”
New York Times
, April 14, 1969, pp. 1, 39.

82
. Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 2; John Prados,
The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence
Analysis and Russian Military Strength
(New York: Dial Press, 1982), p. 210; John Newhouse,
War
and Peace in the Nuclear Age
(New York: Knopf, 1989), p. 215.

83
. Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 2; Prados,
The Soviet Estimate
, pp. 209–210.

84
. Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 3; Anne Hessing Cahn,
Killing Détente: The Right Attacks
the CIA
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), p. 93; Prados,
The Soviet
Estimate
, p. 208.

85
. Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-68,
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces
, in Donald P. Steury (ed.),
Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1953
(Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1996), pp. 239–251 at pp. 249–250.

86
. Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 5.

87
. Prados,
The Soviet Estimate
, p. 208.

88
. Extracts from David S. Brandwein’s Personal Notebook, provided to author.

89
. Ibid.

90
. Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” pp. 5–6.

91
. Ibid., p. 7.

92
. Ibid., pp. 7, 11.

93
. Ibid., p. 13; Cahn,
Killing Détente
, pp. 93–96.

94
. Extract from Brandwein diary, June 6, 1969.

95
. Peter Grose, “U.S. Intelligence Doubts First-Strike Goal,”
New York Times
, June 19, 1969, pp. 1, 10.

96
. Extract from Brandwein diary.

97
. Cahn,
Killing Détente
, p. 97; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Final Report, Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 78; extract from Brandwein diary. Helms, however, dropped a paragraph from the memo that reemphasized the view that the Soviet Union was not seeking a first-strike capability. An assistant to Laird objected to the paragraph, noting that it was a direct contradiction of Laird’s position and he was about to make a speech claiming that an ABM system was essential. Helms complied by dropping the paragraph from the main text, only to have it restored as a footnote by the director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. (Russell Jack Smith,
The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency
[New York: Berkley, 1992], p. 243; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Final Report, Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence
, p. 78.)

98
. Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” p. 13.

99
. Ibid., p. 14.

100
. “Statement by the Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” June 23, 1969, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 182, Folder 8.

101
. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Intelligence and the ABM
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 3, 13; Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” pp. 16–17.

102
. Extract from Brandwein diary.

103
. Lundberg, “The SS-9 Controversy,” pp. 17–18.

104
. Ibid. p. 18; Cahn,
Killing Détente
, p. 98.

105
. Nicholas R. Garafalo, “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars,”
Studies in Intelligence
13, 1 (Spring 1969): 53–61 at 55.

106
. Ibid., p. 56.

107
. Ibid.; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse,
Nuclear Weapons
Databook, Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 362.

108
. Desmond Ball,
Pine Gap: Australia and the U.S. Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite
Program
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 57.

109
. Interview with Roy Burks, North Potomac, Maryland, May 10, 1999; interview with John McMahon, Los Altos, California, November 17, 1998.

110
. Ball,
Pine Gap
, pp. 57–58, 61.

111
. John Noble Wilford, “A Secret Payload Is Orbited by U.S.,”
New York Times
, August 7, 1968, p. 7; Air Force Eastern Test Range,
Eastern Test Range Index of Missile Launchings, July 1968–June
1969
(Patrick AFB, Fla.: AFETR, 1969), p. 3; Christopher Anson Pike, “CANYON, RHYOLITE, and AQUACADE,”
Spaceflight
37, 11 (November 1995): 381–383.

112
. Pike, “CANYON, RHYOLITE, and AQUACADE”; interview with a former CIA official; Ball,
Pine Gap
, p. 18; Philip J. Klass, “U.S. Monitoring Capability Impaired,”
Aviation Week and
Space Technology
, May 14, 1979, p. 18.

113
. Ball,
Pine Gap
, p. 16.

114
. Interview with a former CIA official.

115
. Ibid.

116
. Interview with Henry Plaster, Vienna, Virginia, September 30, 1999.

117
. Interview with a former CIA official.

118
. Ibid. A third camera was carried on five HEXAGON missions. The film of this twelve-inch mapping camera was fed into the final film capsule and returned at the end of the mission. A secondary experimental system was used on some early missions to transmit pictures by radio signals—essentially the same system that had failed when it operated on SAMOS. The results were no better this time, and the system was eventually jettisoned.

119
. Ibid.; “Space Reconnaissance Dwindles,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology
, October 6, 1980, pp. 18–20.

120
. Interview with a former CIA official.

121
. Curtis Peebles, “The Guardians,”
Spaceflight
, November 1978, pp. 381ff.

122
. William Burrows,
Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security
(New York: Random House, 1986), p. 239.

123
. Warren F. Carey and Myles Maxfield, “Intelligence Implications of Disease,”
Studies in Intelligence
16, 1 (Spring 1972): 71–78 at 71.

124
. Ibid., pp. 71–72.

125
. Ibid., pp. 74, 76.

126
. Ibid., p. 76.

127
. Ibid., pp. 76–77.

128
. Ibid., p. 77.

129
. Ibid.

1
. “Introduction: Producing National Intelligence Estimates,” in Donald P. Steury (ed.),
Intentions
and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), p. xvi.

2
. Telephone conversation with Sayre Stevens, November 11, 1998; undated, untitled, CIA summary of functions of selected offices, circa 1975.

3
.
The Reminiscences of Arthur C. Lundahl
, Columbia University, Oral History Research Office, 1982, p. 302.

4
. Ibid.. p. 303.

5
. Ibid., p. 305.

6
. Telephone interview with Dino Brugioni, May 21, 1996.

7
. Ibid.

8
. Interview with R. M. Huffstutler, Falls Church, Virginia, March 23, 1999; Brugioni interview; telephone interview with Edward Proctor, March 16, 1999. According to R. M. “Rae” Huffstutler, there was some opposition to the transfer of NPIC. Dino Brugioni recalled that this opposition included Edward Proctor, the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Proctor recalled that he recommended the transfer.

9
. John Ranelagh,
The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, from Wild Bill Donovan to
William Casey
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 545–546, 732; William Colby and Peter Forbath,
Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 332.