The Way of the Knife (48 page)

critical proxies for its defense against India:
Author interviews with five current and former American intelligence officials and one Pakistani official.

phone calls between Pakistani spies and Haqqani:
In 2008, shortly after the National Security Agency intercepted communications that linked ISI operatives to a bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul carried out by the Haqqani Network, Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, pledged that the ISI would be “handled.” He assured American officials that, unlike his predecessor, he had no policy of using the ISI to cultivate ties to terror groups. “We don’t hunt with the house and run with the hare, which is what Musharraf was doing,” he said.

“strategic asset”:
David E. Sanger,
The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power
(New York: Crown, 2009): 248.

allow American troops to withdraw:
Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Amidst U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,”
The New York Times
(June 30, 2008).

American financial support to Pakistan would continue:
Ibid.

incursions from the tribal areas into Afghanistan:
Ibid.

a CIA drone killed Khalid Habib:
Pir Zubair Shah, “US Strike Is Said to Kill Qaeda Figure in Pakistan,”
The New York Times
(October 17, 2008).

CHAPTER 10: GAMES WITHOUT FRONTIERS

“A Mighty Wurlitzer”:
Frank Wisner, quoted in Richard H. Schulz,
The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999): 129. Original citation of the “Wurlitzer” quote is in John Ranelagh,
The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA
(New York: Touchstone, 1986): 218.

convinced he had just received approval:
Much of the material for this chapter is based on interviews with more than a dozen former executives at U-Turn Media/IMV, hundreds of pages of corporate documents, and discussions with current and former military and intelligence officials. Most of the U-Turn/IMV employees would not agree to have their names used because of nondisclosure agreements with the now-defunct company. Michael Furlong was also interviewed about his information-operations projects for the Pentagon.

fishermen were even asked:
Author interview with Robert Andrews. The Sacred Sword of the Patriots League is discussed further in Richard Schultz,
The Secret War Against Hanoi,
139–148.

“we all cursed it”:
Author interview with Robert Andrews.

ways to communicate:
Early efforts were halting, and in 2004 a report by the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board—a panel that advises the Secretary of Defense—concluded that there was a “crisis” in America’s efforts to communicate its messages overseas. The war on terrorism, the report concluded, couldn’t be just about dropping bombs on mud huts, jailing terror suspects, and killing people with Hellfire missiles launched by remote control. There needed to be a softer side of the war, an effort to “counter violent extremism” in the parts of the world where the United States was deeply unpopular. Congress gave the Pentagon money to try to solve the problem.

U-Turn was hired to help:
U-Turn Media (PowerPoint presentation to SOCOM).

“almost every waking minute”:
U-Turn Media (Proposal to SOCOM, May 8, 2006).

a contract worth just $250,000:
SOCOM contract H92222-06-6-0026.

named after a Lebanese commando unit:
JD Media (Presentation to SOCOM, May 29, 2007).

get them distributed in the Middle East:
Michael D. Furlong, e-mail message to SOCOM officials, June 22, 2007.

the Pentagon’s more basic requirement:
Joseph Heimann and Daniel Silverberg, “An Ever Expanding War: Legal Aspects of Online Strategic Communication,”
Parameters
(summer 2009).

how easy it might be for Russian intelligence:
Information about the cables from the CIA station in Prague comes from two American intelligence officials.

CHAPTER 11: THE OLD MAN’S RETURN

the funding for the information program:
Details about McKiernan’s desire for the AfPax contract comes from five current and former military officers in Afghanistan at the time, as well as three private contractors. The timeline for the events chronicled in this chapter comes in large part from a Pentagon investigation into a private spying operation run by Michael Furlong. The investigation’s final report, “Inquiry into Possible Questionable Intelligence Activities by DoD Personnel and Contractors” by M. H. Decker, was completed and given to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on June 25, 2010. The report, hereafter referred to as the “Decker Report,” remains classified but a copy was obtained by the author.

more American troops had died:
Mark Mazzetti, “Coalition Deaths in Afghanistan Hit a Record High,”
The New York Times
(July 2, 2008).

the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center:
Decker Report, A-2.

“I had to come up with a euphemism”:
Author interview with Michael Furlong.

a program the agency thought:
Decker Report, A-3.

Jan Obrman’s International Media Ventures:
Ibid.

classified military-intelligence databases:
Decker Report, A-7.

Both fluent in Dari, Pashtu, and Arabic:
Michael Furlong e-mail.

“Let’s be honest guys”:
Michael Furlong e-mail.

“Get used to it, world”:
The War on Democracy
, directed by Christopher Martin and John Pilger, 2007.

“prying S.O.B.”:
Douglas Waller,
Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage
(New York: Free Press, 2011): 353.

operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan:
Some of the agents in Clarridge’s network still work undercover in Pakistan and Afghanistan, occasionally for the U.S. government, and the author has agreed not to reveal the identities or professions of the agents.

“God willing, we will do it”:
Intercepted conversation contained in Afghanistan military situation reports released by WikiLeaks.

“moved an operative in” inside Pakistan:
Michael Furlong e-mail.

he would “need top cover”:
Ibid.

“huge potential for mistakes”:
Decker Report, A-5.

they entered the reports:
Decker Report, A-6.

Taliban fighters in the poppy-growing regions:
Ibid., A-9.

The assassin was his longtime bodyguard:
“Afghan President’s Brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai Killed,”
BBC News
(July 12, 2011).

missions that the CIA couldn’t accomplish:
U.S. Central Command, “Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order,” September 30, 2009. The order remains classified, but a copy was obtained by the author.

extremist networks and individual leaders of terror groups:
Ibid.

perhaps the most influential general:
Decker Report, A-6.

lying to his superiors:
Three former military officers and two contractors with direct knowledge of the contents of the memorandum described the memo’s contents.

“And I made it happen”:
Author interview with Michael Furlong.

“prepare approximately 200 local personnel”:
Decker Report, A-9.

CHAPTER 12: THE SCALPEL’S EDGE

“We’ll continue saying”:
Cable from U.S. embassy in Sana’a to State Department, “General Petraeus Meeting with President Saleh on Security Assistance, AQAP Strikes,” January 4, 2010.

posted informants inside mosques:
Michael Slackman, “Would-Be Killer Linked to al Qaeda, Saudis Say,”
The New York Times
(August 28, 2009).

“We have a problem”:
Cable from U.S. embassy in Riyadh to State Department, “Special Advisor Holbrooke’s Meeting With Saudi Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef,” May 17, 2009.

leaving a smoking crater:
“Profile: Al Qaeda ‘Bomb Maker’ Ibrahim al-Asiri,”
BBC
(May 9, 2012).

a Saudi spy network in Yemen:
“Al Qaeda Claims Attempted Assassination of Saudi Prince Nayef,”
NEFA Foundation
(August 28, 2009).

“We will reach you soon”:
Ibid.

Brennan withdrew his name:
Brennan denounced the CIA prison program after he joined the Obama campaign. However, several CIA officers who served with Brennan in 2002 do not recall him voicing his objections to the program at the time he was serving.

Obama was just as committed:
Cable from U.S. embassy in Riyadh to State Department, “Special Advisor Holbrooke’s Meeting with Saudi Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef,” May 17, 2009.

the drone killings in Pakistan:
Interview with two Obama administration officials who attended the meetings at the CIA.

“Once the interrogation was gone”:
Author interview with John Rizzo.

the United States could use a “scalpel”:
Speech by John Brennan on May 26, 2010, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“none of the baggage”:
Bob Woodward,
Obama’s Wars
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010): 377.

a military commander for a secret war:
Panetta’s reaction to learning about the CIA drone strikes comes from two senior American government officials.

releasing the memos:
Panetta’s discussions with senior CIA officials about the release of the interrogation memos comes from interviews with two American officials involved in the discussions.

winning Emanuel over to his side:
The White House discussions, and Emanuel’s decision to side with Panetta, come from two participants in the discussions. The debates over the release of the memos are covered extensively in Daniel Klaidman,
Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012).