The Way of the Knife (45 page)

The war ended before any kidnappings:
Douglas Waller,
Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage
(New York: Free Press, 2011): 316.

the principal focus of its hearings:
L. Britt Snider,
The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress 1946–2004
(CreateSpace, 2008): 275.

“once the capability”:
United States Senate, “Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,” April 26, 1976.

“avert a nuclear holocaust or save a civilization”:
Ibid.

London School of Economics:
Author interview with Ross Newland.

in an attempt to kill Castro:
T. Rees Shapiro, “Nestor D. Sanchez, 83; CIA Official Led Latin American Division,”
Washington Post
(January 26, 2011).

each shadowy front of the Cold War:
Duane R. Clarridge with Digby Diehl,
A Spy for All Seasons
(New York: Scribner, 1997): 23–39.

Dewey Marone and Dax Preston LeBaron:
Ibid., 26.

infuriated State Department diplomats:
CNN interview with Duane Clarridge and kept by the National Security Archive, 1999.

“shallow and devious”:
Richard N. Gardner,
Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 291.

a covert war in Central America:
Clarridge with Diehl, 197.

than the CIA had to spend:
Ibid., 234.

CIA covert-action programs:
Richard A. Best Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,”
Congressional Research Service
(December 27, 2011). The restrictions that came to be known as the “Casey Accords” were signed in 1986. But the horse was already out of the barn, as the accords came several months after President Reagan signed a secret finding authorizing the secret transfer of missiles to Iran.

authority to “neutralize”:
Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,”
Journal of National Security Law and Policy
(2012). This is an excellent study on the laws buttressing the work of the CIA and the Pentagon and how the work of soldiers and spies has increasingly blurred in the years since the September 11 attacks.

“Do you know what”:
Joseph Persico,
Casey: From the OSS to the CIA
(New York: Penguin, 1995): 429.

the training of Lebanese hit men:
Timothy Naftali,
Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism
(New York: Basic Books, 2005): 152.

“fighting terrorism with terrorism.”:
Ibid., 150.

the new threat:
Vincent Cannistraro, an operations officers, said that “Casey came to the CIA believing that the evil Soviet Union was behind all terrorism in the world.” By this logic, Cannistraro said during an interview, Moscow could dial up and ratchet back terrorist attacks whenever it chose to.

destroyed any hope that terrorism:
Naftali, 180. Naftali quotes future Counterterrorism Center deputy Fred Turco describing Casey’s views about the terrorism violence.

an expansive new war:
Casey had been getting pressure from the White House to “do something” about terrorism, and told Clarridge to come up with a new covert strategy for the CIA. And as usual, Clarridge wanted as much running room as he could get. He pushed for new legal authorities that would allow him to build two teams that could hunt terrorists globally and kill them if doing so might prevent an imminent attack. One of the teams would be made up of foreigners who could move easily in the bazaars and crowded streets of Middle Eastern cities, and the second would be made up of Americans. Members of the teams were chosen based on proficiency in foreign languages, facility with weapons, and other specialized skills. One was a mercenary who had fought in the African civil wars. Another was a former Navy SEAL. See Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: Penguin Press, 2005): 139–140; see also Clarridge with Diehl,
A Spy for All Seasons
(New York: Scribner, 1997): 325 and 327.

to penetrate the Abu Nidal organization and Hezbollah:
Naftali, 183.

“The wheels had fallen off for Reagan”:
Ibid., 199–200.

cut by 22 percent:
Author interview with senior American intelligence official.

trying to get a meeting with the president:
R. James Woolsey public remarks at George Mason University, September 13, 2012.

“ordered, planned, or participated”:
Intelligence Oversight Board, “Report on the Guatemala Review,” June 28, 1996.

“Going back to the history”:
Author interview with Dennis Blair.

“What’s the president”:
Ibid.

CHAPTER 4: RUMSFELD’S SPIES

“We seem to have created”:
Frank C. Carlucci, “Memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Richard Stillwell,” Washington, D.C., May 26, 1982, declassified in 2001 via Freedom of Information Act Request by the National Security Archive. Jeffrey T. Richelson and Barbara Elias of the National Security Archive compiled other declassified documents used in this chapter. Also invaluable to this chapter, Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,”
Journal of National Security Law and Policy
(2012).

“Given the nature of our world”:
Donald H. Rumsfeld, “SECRET Memo to Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard Meyers,” October 17, 2001.

without harming the captives:
Author interview with Robert Andrews. Also, Rowan Scarborough,
Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander
(District of Columbia: Regnery, 2004): 8–10.

“We had to clear”:
Author interview with Thomas O’Connell.

since the days of the OSS:
Richard H. Shultz Jr.,
The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999
):
ix.

how the military would fight:
Author interview with Robert Andrews.

“little birds in a nest”:
Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Known and Unknown: A Memoir
(New York: Sentinel, 2011): 392.

relying on American newspaper reports:
Mark Bowden,
Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam
(New York: Grove Press, 2006): 122. The CIA’s one success before the operation was a lucky break, when a CIA officer on a plane out of Tehran happened to be sitting next to a Pakistani cook who had recently been working inside the American-embassy compound. The cook gave the Americans the crucial piece of information that all of the hostages were being held in the same location, inside the chancery building.

“reliable human observers”:
Lt. Gen. Philip C. Gast, “Memorandum for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,” Washington, D.C., December 10, 1980.

“I’ll be damned”:
Steven Emerson,
Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era
(New York: Putnam, 1988): 39.

soldiers shouldn’t also be spies:
The most significant of these operations was a secret Navy unit called Task Force 157. Using a fleet of electronic eavesdropping ships disguised as luxury yachts, Task Force 157 spies positioned themselves at the opening of the Panama Canal, inside the Strait of Gibraltar, and other maritime “choke points” to keep track of Soviet ships. The Pentagon never discussed the group’s work in public, and when in 1973 the deputy chief of naval operations testified before Congress, he made only one oblique reference to how the “Navy’s human intelligence collection program is expanding operations in sensitive areas.” When he was the CIA’s station chief in Istanbul, Dewey Clarridge worked with Task Force 157 spies who were monitoring shipping traffic on the Bosporus. For the best treatment of Task Force 157, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Truth Conquers All Chains: The U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1981–1989,”
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
12, no. 2 (1999).

“Also I heard”:
Ibid., 171.

to whomever might be watching from the sky:
Ibid., 172.

the mission into Laos:
Emerson, 78.

whether local sources:
Ibid., 79.

front companies used:
Seymour H. Hersh, “Who’s In Charge Here?”
The New York Times
(November 22, 1987).

a Rolls-Royce, a hot-air balloon:
Emerson, 81.

“We should have learned”:
Frank C. Carlucci, “Memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Richard Stillwell.”

“Our intelligence about Grenada”:
Quoted in Tim Weiner,
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
(New York: Doubleday, 2007): 454.

“Mr. Casey, what you say”:
Duane R. Clarridge with Digby Diehl,
A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA
(New York: Scribner, 2002): 229.

“If I had known”:
Author interview with Robert Andrews.

to send its officers anywhere in the world:
Although any government agency technically can carry out a covert action, these activities have generally been accepted to be the preserve of the CIA because the spy agency was seen as more capable of carrying out missions officially denied by the U.S. government.

“ongoing” or “anticipated” hostilities:
Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,”
Foreign Affairs
(March/April 2004).

“We had the ability to finish”:
Bradley Graham,
By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld
(New York: Public Affairs, 2009): 584.

“If we’re at war”:
Author interview with Thomas O’Connell.