The Way of the Knife (44 page)

I am deeply indebted to the many people in several different countries who gave up countless hours of their time to let me interview them. They trusted me to tell their stories, and this is their book as much as it is mine.

Mark Mazzetti

Washington, D.C.

December 2012

NOTES

PROLOGUE: THE WAR BEYOND

“Is he understanding everything?”:
Raymond Davis interrogation by Lahore police comes from cell-phone video taken during the questioning. The video can be seen at www.
youtube.com/watch?v=o10sPS6QPXk
.

An assortment of bizarre paraphernalia:
Mark Mazzetti et al., “American Held in Pakistan Worked With CIA,”
The New York Times
(February 21, 2011).

“our diplomat in Pakistan”:
Press conference by President Barack Obama, February 15, 2011.

Moscow Rules:
Author interview with two American officials.

trouble for the alliance:
The officer’s thoughts about the OSS quoted in Douglas Waller,
Wild Bill Donovan:
The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage
(New York: Free Press, 2011): 188–189.

twisted and burning:
Details of Sir Richard Dearlove’s trip to CIA headquarters come from Ross Newland, a former top CIA official who was standing next to Dearlove during the Predator strike.

CHAPTER 1: PERMISSION TO KILL

“You are there to kill terrorists”:
Secret cable from American ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin, to State Department, September 14, 2001. The cable was declassified and later released by the National Security Archive.

license to kill:
The CIA presentation in the White House Situation Room was described by one participant in the meeting and a second former American official with direct knowledge of what transpired during the meeting.

“Usama Bin Lane”:
Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.,
Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved Lives
(New York: Threshold Editions, 2012): 75.

to kill off as many al Qaeda operatives as possible:
George J. Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007): 165.

“have flies walking across their eyeballs”:
Cofer Black interview,
60 Minutes,
May 13, 2012.

“the flies-on-the-eyeballs guy”:
Bob Woodward,
Bush at War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002): 52.

who should be captured:
This idea is explored in greater depth in Philip Zelikow, “Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War,”
Houston Law Review
(April 16, 2012).

“we don’t do policy from [Langley] . . .”:
“Intelligence Policy,” National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 7 (2004).

take a job at the State Department:
Black and Pavitt were barely speaking to each other. By early 2002, according to several former CIA officials, Black’s popularity at the White House led the CTC chief to ignore his bosses at Langley and frequently say, “I work for the president.” After Black’s time at the State Department, he took a senior management job at Blackwater USA.

“out on Business”:
Rodriguez Jr., 20.

He was removed from the job:
David Wise, “A Not So Secret Mission,”
Los Angeles Times
(August 26, 2007).

prisoners presumably would be there:
David Johnston, and Mark Mazzetti, “A Window into CIA’s Embrace of Secret Jails,”
The New York Times
(August 12, 2009).

They dug up a handful of bodies:
Details of the Zhawar Kili exploitation operation come from Navy SEAL history of mission, July 2002. The history is titled “The Zhawar Kili Cave Complex: Task Force K-Bar and the Exploitation of AQ008, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.”

two teams stormed the compounds simultaneously:
Specifics of the Hazar Qadam operation come from U.S. Special Operations Command’s internal history of the raid, as well as interviews with members of the special-operations task force based in Kandahar.

an entirely new organization:
Donald H. Rumsfeld memorandum to George Tenet, “JIFT-CT.” September 26, 2001.

“If the war does not”:
Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Memorandum for the President,” September 30, 2001.

with gun barrels pointed forward:
Details of Mullah Khairkhwa’s pursuit and capture come from a U.S. Special Operations Command classified history, as well as interviews with members of the special-operations task force based in Kandahar.

one of the island prison’s first inmates:
Memorandum for Commander, United States Southern Command, March 6, 2008, “Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantánamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP(S).” Available at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/579-khirullah-said-wali-khairkhwa.

CHAPTER 2: A MARRIAGE AMONG SPIES

“Pakistan has always seen”:
Mahmud Ahmed to Richard Armitage, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with Pakistan Intel Chief Mahmud: You’re Either with Us or You’re Not,” State Department cable, September 12, 2001. This document and several others cited in this chapter were declassified and released on September 11, 2011, by the National Security Archive.

“to save the planet”:
Donald Rumsfeld to George W. Bush, “Memorandum for the President: My Visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Uzbekistan, and Turkey,” (October 6, 2001).

“Usama bin Ladin”:
U.S. embassy in Islamabad cable to U.S. Secretary of State, “Usama bin Ladin: Pakistan seems to be leaning against being helpful,” State Department cable, December 18, 1998.

“I cannot understand why you Americans”:
John R. Schmidt,
The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011): 109.

“is the future of Afghanistan”:
Author interview with Shaukat Qadir.

the embassy car waiting for him:
Author interview with Porter Goss.

“deep introspection” in Islamabad:
Secret State Department cable detailing meeting between Richard Armitage and Mahmud Ahmed, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with Pakistan Intel Chief Mahmud,” September 12, 2001.

all the intelligence it had about al Qaeda:
U.S. Secretary of State cable to U.S. embassy in Islamabad, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with General Mahmud: Actions and Support Expected of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism,” September 13, 2001.

the northern province of Sindh:
Pervez Musharraf,
In the Line of Fire
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006): 206.

a crushed, impoverished outcast:
Ibid., 202.

“if and when the government”:
Pervez Musharraf, Translated text of speech, September 19, 2001.

“Afghanistan will revert to warlordism”:
U.S. embassy in Islamabad cable to U.S. Secretary of State, “Mahmud Plans 2nd Mission to Afghanistan,” State Department cable, September 24, 2001.

“You want to please the Americans”:
John F. Burns, “Adding Demands, Afghan Leaders Show Little Willingness to Give Up Bin Laden,”
The New York Times
(September 19, 2001).

after years of mistrust:
George J. Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007): 140–141.

Grenier was dead wrong:
Henry A. Crumpton,
The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service
(New York: Penguin Press, 2012): 194.

“Every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed”:
U.S. Secretary of State cable to U.S. embassy in Islamabad, “Message to Taliban,” State Department cable, October 5, 2001.

turned our stalled relationship around:
Colin L. Powell to President George W. Bush, “Memorandum to the President: Your Meeting with Pakistan President Musharraf,” November 5, 2001.

stay in Afghanistan for years:
Author interview with General Ehsan ul Haq.

Pakistan’s embassies in Washington:
A description of the ISI cables comes from a former senior Pakistani official who had read the ISI analysis.

“a very short-term affair”:
Author interview with Asad Durrani.

on level ground with the Americans:
Account of the conversation comes from author interview with Ehsan ul Haq.

nothing productive came from the meeting:
Ibid.

“range after range”:
Churchill’s dispatches were later compiled in his first book, Winston Churchill,
The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1989).

“an inconvenient fact”:
Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Amid U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,”
The New York Times
(June 30, 2008).

The hunt for bin Laden:
Christina Lamb, “Bin Laden Hunt in Pakistan Is ‘Pointless’,”
London Sunday Times
(January 23, 2005).

the suspicions had dissolved:
Author interview with Asad Munir.

dripping wet in his swimsuit:
Ibid.

informing on al Qaeda for Britain’s MI6:
The information al-Jaza’iri had been a British agent came from the dossier of information compiled about his background by interrogations at Guantánamo Bay. The dossier was part of a number of documents made public by the group WikiLeaks, and is available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/guantanamo-files/PK9AG-001452DP.

CHAPTER 3: CLOAK-AND-DAGGER MEN

assassination attempts:
“National Security Act of 1947,” United States Congress, July 26, 1947. NSA 1947 was codified in 50 U.S.C, Chapter 15, Subchapter I § 403-4a. President Truman’s views on the CIA are described in Tim Weiner,
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
(Maine: Anchor, 2008): 3.

the largest and most complex:
Richard H. Schultz Jr.,
The Secret War Against Hanoi
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999): 337.