The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (157 page)
Authors: Adam Roberts,Vaughan Lowe,Jennifer Welsh,Dominik Zaum
62
See Eldon, ‘East Timor’, 551–66; Ian Martin, ‘A Field Perspective’, in Malone (ed.),
Security Council
, 567–74; Ian Martin,
Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention
(Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2001); Geoffrey Robinson, ‘With UNAMET in East Timor – An Historian’s Personal View’, in Tanter et al. (eds.),
Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers
, 55–72; Damien Kingsbury (ed.),
Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence
(Clayton., Victoria: Monash Asian Institute, 2000); DFAT,
East Timor in Transition
, 90–154; and, for a detailed journalistic account, Greenlees and Garran,
Deliverance
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003), 157–294.
63
Greenstock, Interview, 27 Oct. 2005.
64
Message broadcast to the people of East Timor on the eve of the 30 Aug. 1999 Popular Consultation by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, quoted in DFAT,
East Timor in Transition
, 120–1. A rather similar address had been made by the SRSG, Ian Martin, on 29 Aug. 1999, see ibid., 118.
65
On UNAMET’s staffing and budget, see DFAT,
East Timor in Transition
, 94.
66
Kieran Prendergast had twice suggested an SC Mission on 24 and 26 August, and the Portuguese permanent representative, Ambassador António Monteiro, had made a subsequent request on 1 September, see Eldon, ‘East Timor’, 555–6; Martin, ‘Field Perspective’, 569; and Greenstock, Interview, 27 Oct. 2005, who stressed the key role of the Council President, Peter van Walsum (the Netherlands), and the Dutch delegation in lobbying other Council members to approve the SC Mission on 5 Sep. Van Walsum’s deputy, Alfons Havers, was one of the Mission’s five official members.
67
The Council by its Res. 1262 of 27 Aug. 1999 had agreed to double the number of Civpol to 480 (‘to continue to advise the Indonesian police, and to prepare for the recruitment and training of the new East Timorese police force’) and increase the MLOs six-fold to 300, but it would have taken at least a month to get them on the ground in East Timor.
68
Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
, UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 Aug. 2000, para. 9.
69
Martin, ‘Field Perspective’, 569.
70
See Ward and Carey, ‘East Timor Issue’, 68 n. 8.
71
Martin, ‘Field Perspective’, 569. The formal handover from InterFET to UNTAETonly took place in mid-Feb. 2000, four and a half months after the 30 Aug. ballot.
72
Ibid., 570; and Eldon, ‘East Timor’, 554.
73
Interview with Greenstock. See DFAT,
East Timor in Transition
, 132.
74
Greenstock, Interview, 27 Oct. 2005, who reported that Andjaba and himself had cornered Wiranto in a corridor of the burnt out Mahkota Hotel (now Hotel Timor) in Díli after a press conference and had told him that ‘the current situation is intolerable and unsustainable. Peace must be restored and the UN must be allowed in to monitor that peace.’ See also Eldon, ‘East Timor’, 558; Greenlees and Garran,
Deliverance
, 253; and David Usborne, ‘A Chilling Audience with Dr Strange-love’,
Independent
, 11 Sep. 1999.
75
On this see Greenlees and Garran,
Deliverance
, 243–4. It is likely that Admiral Blair warned Wiranto that US-Indonesian military ties would be in jeopardy if the TNI did not get a handle on the situation in East Timor.
76
See ibid., 244–5; and DFAT,
East Timor in Transition
, 134–7. President Clinton reinforced these messages in a phone call to Habibie from the APEC Summit in Auckland (9–12 Sep.).
77
Greenstock, Interview, 27 Oct. 2005.
78
Ibid. According to Greenstock, ‘the Defence Minister [Wiranto] was genuinely shocked and annoyed that he had not been properly informed about what was happening on the ground to forbid international journalists to accompany the Council Mission to Díli. Once [they] had been brought in, it was impossible to put the lid back on.’ On the importance of the media, see further Eldon, ‘East Timor’, 557.
79
Ibid. The UK Mission provided its own press officer (David Lloyd) for the Jakarta/Díli Mission.
80
Greenstock, Interview, 27 Oct. 2005.
81
See Whitfield, ‘Groups of Friends’, 319. On the gang rapes of Chinese women in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities, see ‘Glodok Revisited: Sexual abuse used to terrorise minorities’,
Tapol Bulletin
, 147 (July 1998), 8–10; and ‘The Findings of the TGPF’,
Tapol Bulletin
, 149/50 (Dec. 1998), 18–19. At least 150,000 Indonesian Chinese and Western expatriates are thought to have led Indonesia at this time.
82
Such conflicts only emerged following the mandating of the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) on 25 Oct. 1999, see Martin, ‘Field Perspective’, 570–71; Astri Suhrke, ‘Peace-Keepers as Nation-Builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’,
International Peacekeeping
8.4 (2001), 1–20; and Conflict, Security, and Development Group, International Policy Institute, King’s College London,
A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change
(London: King’s College, 2003), 215–91.
83
Eldon, ‘East Timor’, 555.
84
Both the Secretary-General and the SC mission in their separate reports recommended that the Council should ‘institute action for the investigation of apparent abuses of international humanitarian law on the ground in East and West Timor since 4 September’, see UN doc. S/1999/976 of 14 Sep.1999, section VI, para. 27, recommendation vii; and UN doc. A/54/654 of 13 Dec. 1999, 8 para. 42.
85
For a good discussion of these pressures on East Timor, see Joseph Nevins,
A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 160–78.
86
President Xanana Gusmão’s Statement to the Security Council, 23 Jan. 2006, UNdoc.S/PV.5351, 5.
87
Between 25 May and 3 June 2006, 1,200 Australian, 90 New Zealand, and 500 Malaysian troops were deployed in Dili along with a 120-strong contingent of the Portuguese Republican Guard (Garda Nacional Republica/GNR). On 25 Aug. 2006, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT), to consolidate stability and support elections in 2007. See SC Res. 1704 of 25 Aug. 2006.
88
UN doc. S/2001/436, paras. 2–7.
89
Fretilin won 55 out of the 86 seats. Although just short of the two-thirds majority needed to make constitutional changes and override the presidential veto, it gave it de facto control of the legislative process. This process, however, remained almost completely subordinate to the executive: during the entire five-year period since the August 2001 elections, the assembly has only initiated one bill (on national holidays) and only one – non-Fretilin – cabinet member, Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs & Cooperation, Dr José Ramos-Horta, has come before the bar of the House to explain a piece of legislation. Fretilin also refused to contest new elections after the one-year term of the Constituante had been completed, 1 Aug. 2002, and has been considering adopting the current Portuguese form of proportional representation for the Aug. 2007 elections which would almost certainly give it the two-thirds majority it craves.
1
UN doc. S/PV.2252 of 23 Oct. 1980, 8.
2
UN doc. S/14190 of 23 Sep. 1980.
3
Javier Peréiz de Cuéillar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
(New York: St Martins Press, 1997) 132–3; UN doc. S/PV.2247 of 26 Sep. 1980, 1–2.
4
UN doc. S/PV.2247 of 26 Sep. 1980, 2–3.
5
SC Res. 479 of 28 Sep. 1980; Brian Urquhart,
A Life in Peace and War
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 325.
6
UN doc, S/PV.2248 of 28 Sep. 1980, 10.
7
Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp,
Iran and Iraq at War
(London: IB Tauris, 1988), 53–7.
8
UN doc. S/PV.2250 of 15 Oct. 1980, 1–6.
9
SC Res. 457 of 4 Dec. 1979; SC Res. 461 of 31 Dec. 1979.
10
Chubin and Tripp,
Iran and Iraq at War
, 191–2, 203–8, 220–1.
11
Dilip Hiro,
The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict
(London: Grafton Books, 1989), 71–2.
12
Saddam Hussein to the Iraqi National Assembly 4 Nov. 1980,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Middle East
6 Nov. 1980 [A/5–10].
13
Cameron R. Hume,
The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq – How Peacemaking Changed
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 41–5.
14
SC Res. 514 of 12 July 1982.
15
SC Res. 522 of 4 Oct. 1982; Chubin and Tripp,
Iran and Iraq at War
, 57–61.
16
Edgar O’Ballance,
The Gulf War
(London: Brassey’s Publishers, 1988), 149–50.
17
Report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons
, UN doc. S/16433 of 26 Mar. 1984.
18
De Cuéllar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
, 141–2; UN doc. S/16454 of 30 Mar. 1984.
19
International Herald Tribune
, 6 Mar. 1984;
Time
, 19 Mar. 1984; O’Ballance,
The Gulf War
, 150.
20
SC Res. 582 of 24 Feb. 1986.
21
Report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons
, UN doc. S/17911; and UN doc, S/17911 Add.1 of 21 Mar. 1986; UN doc. S/17932 of 21 Mar. 1986.
22
Human Rights Watch,
Iraq’s Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 254, 262–5.
23
SC Res. 598 of 20 July 1987.
24
SC Res. 612 of 9 May 1988.
25
Hiro,
The Longest War
, 203–10.
26
Report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons
, UN doc. S/20060 of 20 July 1988; and UN doc. S/20134 of 19 Aug. 1988.
27
SC Res. 540 of 31 Oct. 1983.
28
De Cuéllar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
, 137; O’Ballance,
The Gulf War
, 118.
29
De Cuéllar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
, 142–3; Anthony C. Arend, ‘The Role of the United Nations in the Iran–Iraq War’, in Christopher C. Joyner (ed.),
The Persian Gulf War – Lessons for Strategy, Law and Diplomacy
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 196; Hiro,
The Longest War
, 134–6.
30
Report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons
, UN doc. S/19823 of 25 Apr. 1988.
31
Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton,
Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran–Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 45–69; SC Res. 540 of 31 Oct. 1983.
32
SC Res. 552 of 1 June 1984.
33
De Cuéllar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
, 142; Navias and Hooton,
Tanker Wars
, 77–85.
34
Navias and Hooton,
Tanker Wars
, 128–47.
35
De Cuéllar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
, 158–9; P. Tavernier, ‘The UN Secretary-General: Attitudes and latitudes’, in Farhang Rajaee (ed.),
The Iran–Iraq War – The Politics of Aggression
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 177.
36
Thomas L. McNaugher, ‘U.S. Policy and the Gulf War’, in Joyner (ed.),
The Persian Gulf War
, 116–17.
37
SC Res. 616 of 20 July 1988.
38
De Cuéllar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
, 150; SC Res. 588 of 8 Oct. 1986.
39
De Cuéllar,
Pilgrimage for Peace
, 151–2.
40
Marrack Goulding, ‘The UN Secretary-General’, in David Malone (ed.),
The UN Security Council-From the Cold War to the 21st Century
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 273.
41
See David M. Malone,
The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1988–2005
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 22–53.
42
Hume,
The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq
, 117–21; Hiro,
The Longest War
, 199; SC Res. 598 of 20 July 1987; Arend, ‘Role of the UN’, 193–5.
43
Shahram Chubin, ‘Iran and the War: From stalemate to ceasefire’, in Efraim Karsh (ed.),
The Iran–Iraq War: Impact and Implications
(London: Macmillan, 1989), 21–4; Arend, ‘Role of the UN’, 193–5, 197–201; Hiro,
The Longest War
, 241–9.
1
See further David M. Malone,
The Struggle over Iraq: International Politics in the Security Council 1980–2005
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
2
Dilip Hiro,
Neighbours Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars
(London: Routledge, 2001), 29.
