The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (153 page)
Authors: Adam Roberts,Vaughan Lowe,Jennifer Welsh,Dominik Zaum
70
Rosalyn Higgins,
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 259.
71
Roberts, ‘The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention’, 39–40.
72
John Norton Moore, ‘The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order’, in Cyril Black and Richard Falk (eds.),
The Future of the International Legal Order
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 140.
1
Article 25 of the UN Charter states that ‘[t]he members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.’
2
UN doc. A/59/2005 of 21 Mar. 2005, paras. 74–5.
3
UN Charter, Art. 24(1).
4
UN doc. S/1999/100 of 30 Jan. 1999.
5
SC Res. 1270 of 22 Oct. 1999.
6
SC Res. 1299 of 19 May 2000, Arts. 2 & 3.
7
SC Res. 1279 of 30 Nov. 1999.
8
SC Res. 1264 of 15 Sep. 1999.
9
SC Res. 1320, 15 Sep. 2000.
10
SC Res. 1500 of 14 Aug. 2003.
11
As of 31 August 2006, the top ten troop contributors to UN missions were Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Fact Sheet, Sep. 2006, available at
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf
.
12
Kofi Annan,
In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All – Report of the Secretary-General
, UN doc. A/59/2005 of 2 Mar. 2005.
1
For anticipation that the Soviet Union would veto any effort by the Security Council to recommend military action to defend South Korea, see the statement by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson of 13 January 1950 in US Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee,
Reviews of the World Situation: 1949–1950
, 81st Congress, 2nd session, Historical Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 191.
2
SC Res. 82 of 25 June 1950.
3
SC Res. 83 of 27 June 1950.
4
SC Res. 84 of 7 July 1950.
5
SC Res. 85 of 31 July 1950.
6
For 1951 see
Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 229–30.
7
GA Res. 377 (V) of 3 Nov. 1950. For a frank discussion of US motives here, see Dean G. Acheson,
Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 448–51. See also Dominik Zaum’s discussion of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in
Chapter 6
.
8
Glenn D. Paige,
The Korean Decision
(New York: Free Press, 1968), 106, 203.
9
UN Charter, Art. 20.
10
UN Charter,
Chapter VII
.
11
For the State Department’s explanation of the decision to go to the Security Council, see US State Department,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950
, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 295–7. Henceforth volumes in this series will be referred to as
FRUS.
12
For an argument that the United States was essentially correct in its basic perceptions, see William Stueck,
Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 61–83.
13
Harry S. Truman,
Memoirs
, vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 333–44.
14
William Stueck,
The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947–1950
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 185–95.
15
UN doc. S/1500 of 25 June 1950. The most detailed description of the meeting, which includes the original US draft, is in Paige,
Korean Decision
, 116–21.
16
See UN docs. S/1503 of 26 June 1950, S/1504 of 26 June 1950, S/1505 of 26 June 1950, and S/1507 of 26 June 1950, the last being the most decisive.
17
On the Security Council meeting of 27 June, see Paige,
Korean Decision
, 202–6. On Truman’s decision for the use of US forces in support of the ROK, see
FRUS, 1950
, vol. 7, 178–83.
18
Evan Luard,
A History of the United Nations
, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1982), 98–103; Trygve Lie,
In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations
(New York: Macmillan, 1954), 95–9.
19
Lie,
In the Cause of Peace
, 333–4.
20
For documentation on discussions in New York and between Washington and its allies, see
FRUS, 1950
, vol. 7, 291–329, and War in Korea File, vol. 2, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.
21
Ibid., 490–2. Concern about the Secretary-General and the Secretariat among some Security Council members was mentioned by US Ambassador Warren Austin in his telegram to the State Department of 24 July, quoted ibid., 491n1. He did not identify the source of concern.
22
Ibid., 491–2.
23
Ibid., 495.
24
UN doc. S/1653 of 31 July 1950.
25
Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950
, 236.
26
FRUS, 1950
, vol. 7, 555–6.
27
New York Times
, 15 Aug. 1950, 1; 16 Aug. 1950, 1, 5; 19 Aug. 1950, 3; 20 Aug. 1950, 1, 20; 21 Aug. 1950, 1, 5; 22 Aug. 1950, 1; 24 Aug. 1950, 5. On the Canadian role, see United Kingdom High Commissioner, Canada, to Commonwealth Relations Office, 5 Aug. 1950, FO 371/84083, Public Records Office, Kew, UK. On the Australian reaction, see Australian Delegation to the United Nations to the Department of External Affairs, 18 Aug. 1950, A1838, 852/20/4/2/11, Australian Archives (Mitchell Branch), ACT, Australia.
28
FRUS, 1950
, vol. 7, 556.
29
Department of State Bulletin
, 23 (28 Aug. 1950), 330–1.
30
New York Times
, 18 Aug. 1950, 1;
Department of State Bulletin
, 23 (11 Sep. 1950): 375 and 407. On discussion in Washington about a military campaign in North Korea, see William Stueck,
The Korean War: An International History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 61–3.
31
UN doc. S/PV.530 of 30 Nov. 1950.
32
On the beginning of the broad challenge to US leadership, see Stueck,
Korean War
, 130–1.
33
GA Res. 384 (V) of 14 Dec. 1950.
34
Stueck,
Korean War
, 130–42.
35
GA Res. 498(V) of 1 Feb. 1951.
36
GA Res. 500 (V) of 18 May 1951.
37
Stueck,
Korean War
, 148–94.
38
William Stueck,
Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 5.
39
Stueck,
Korean War
, 238–43.
40
GA Res. 610 (VII) of 3 Dec. 1952.
41
Stueck,
Korean War
, 286–306.
42
Ibid., 313–30.
43
On various aspects of the Chinese seat in the Security Council, see Robert Accinelli,
Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950–1955
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 44–5, 79; Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Britain the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China’,
The Historical Journal
26, no. 1 (1983), 154–8; William Stueck, ‘The Limits of Influence: British Policy and American Expansion of the War in Korea’,
Pacific Historical Review
55, no. 1 (Feb. 1986), 67–70.
44
On the Uniting for Peace resolution, see Richard P. Stebbins et al,
The United States in World Affairs, 1950
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), 369–72. For the 1951 report of the Collective Measures Committee, see UN doc. A/1891.
1
Richard Crossman quoting Bevan in
Jewish Observer and Middle East Review
, 27 Nov. 1964, cutting in FO 371/178598. Quotations from FO, CO, and other British documents refer to records at the Public Record Office, now the National Archives. The fiftieth anniversary of the Suez crisis in 1956 produced several books that are useful for the subject of Suez and the United Nations: Martin Woollacott,
After Suez: Adrift in the American Century
(London: IB Tauris, 2006); Barry Turner,
Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2006); Brian Cull, David Nicolle, and Shlomo Aloni,
Wings Over Suez: The Only Authoritative Account of Air Operations During the Sinai and Suez Wars of 1956
(London: Grub Street Publishing, 2006); Laura James,
Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Peter J. Beck,
Using History, Making British Policy: The Treasury and the Foreign Office, 1950–76
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); see also especially his article ‘The Lessons of Abadan and Suez for British Foreign Policymakers in the 1960s’,
Historical Journal
49, no. 2 (2006). For recent decades, see David M. Malone,
The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980–2005
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). For further references see the expanded yet significantly different version of this chapter in W.R. Louis,
Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).
2
SC Res. 95 of 1 Sep. 1951. The failure of the UN Security Council to follow up on this resolution, and its more general failure to get a grip on the deteriorating situation between Israel and its Arab neighbours, contributed to a sceptical and even dismissive view of the UN on the part of the Israeli government. See for example the discussion of the UN’s role in Moshe Dayan,
Diary of the Sinai Campaign
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), 10–19.
3
See for example SC Res. 106 of 29 Mar. 1955, condemning the Israeli attack against the Egyptian forces in Gaza; SC Res. 107 of 30 Mar. 1955 on the demarcation line between Egypt and Israel; and SC Res. 108 of 8 Sep. 1955, urging both Israel and Egypt to continue the ceasefire accepted by both of them and to cooperate with the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
4
Quoted in Lewis Johnman, ‘Playing the Role of a Cassandra: Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Senior Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office’,
Contemporary British History
, 13 (Summer 1999), 56. See also especially Peter Hennessy,
Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties
(London: Penguin, 2006), 426–30.
5
Fitzmaurice to Sir George Coldsteam, Top Secret, 6 Sep. 1956, LCO 2/5760 [LCO = Lord Chancellor’s Office]. Fitzmaurice also had emphatic views about the function of the Security Council: ‘It is very difficult to get it into the heads of people in this country that the Security Council is not an institution for settling disputes, or even for doing justice between nations, but an institution for preventing or stopping wars.’ Minute by Fitzmaurice, 24 Aug. 1956, FO 800/748.
6
For Hammarskjöld see especially Brian Urquhart,
Hammarskjold
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972); see also Mark W. Zacher,
Dag Hammarskjold’s United Nations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
7
For this theme see Conor Cruise O’Brien,
The United Nations: Sacred Drama
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968).
8
Memorandum by J. D. Murray, 30 July 1956, FO 371/119118.
9
Minute by Eden, 8 Aug. 1956 on Foreign Office to Washington, 7 Aug. 1956, PREM 11/1099.
10
Ralph Negrine, ‘The Press and the Suez Crisis’,
Historical Journal
25, no. 4 (1982), 978.
11
See Peter Lyon, ‘The Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis’, in W. R. Louis and Roger Owen,
Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
12
Macmillan to Eden, Top Secret, 26 Sep. 1956, PREM 11/1102.
13
Harold Macmillan,
Riding the Storm, 1956–1959
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 135–6.
14
Eden stated in the House of Commons that if the Egyptians defaulted on international obligations ‘we should take them to the Security Council’.
Parliamentary Debates
, Commons, 13 Sep. 1956, col. 305. Britain and France submitted letters to the United Nations on 23 Sep.
15
GA Res. 377 (V) of 3 Nov. 1950. This was adopted on the initiative of the Western powers in order to make it possible to continue the UN mandate for the use of force in Korea. This was done after the Soviet Union had returned to the Security Council and was thus once again in a position to veto resolutions.
16
SC Res. 119 of 31 Oct. 1956. As a ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution is considered to be a procedural resolution, the veto does not apply.
17
GA Res. 997 (ES-1) of 2 Nov. 1956.
18
Herman Finer,
Dulles over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 160.
