The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (150 page)
Authors: Adam Roberts,Vaughan Lowe,Jennifer Welsh,Dominik Zaum
83
Saadia Touval, ‘Why the UN Fails’,
Foreign Affairs
73, no. 5 (1994), 53.
84
Ibid.
85
Quoted in Thierry Tardy, ‘UN Peace Operations in Light of the Events of 11 September 2001’, in Thierry Tardy (ed.),
Peace Operations after 11 September 2001
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), 20.
86
‘Briefing to the Security Council by Lakhdar Brahimi’, 13 Nov. 2001, available at
www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/brahimi-sc-nriefing.htm
(accessed 21 Nov. 2006). There were in the end, it should perhaps be added, also other reasons that weighed against a UN force to Afghanistan.
87
The tensions between France and the US over Iraq, for example, have done nothing to prevent them from cooperating amicably in the establishment of new peace operations in Eastern Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Haiti.
88
New missions since 2003 include the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti, MINUSTAH (SC Res. 1542 of 30 Apr. 2004), the UN Mission to Liberia, UNMIL (SC Res. 1506 of 19 Sep. 2004), the UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI (SC Res. 1528 of 27 Feb. 2004); the UN Operation in Burundi, ONUB (SC Res. 1545 of 21 May 2004); and the UN Mission in Sudan, UNMIS(SC Res. 1590 of 24 Mar. 2005). For the expansion of MONUC, see SC Res. 1493 of 28 July 2003; and for the expansion of UNIFIL, see SC Res. 1701 of 11 Aug. 2006.
89
On the ‘underlying political character’ of peacekeeping and it implications, see Alan James, ‘The Dual Nature of UN Peacekeeping’, in D. Bourantonis and M. Evriviades (eds.),
A United Nations for the 21st Century
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 171–86.
90
The continuing importance of normative influence is evident in the declaratory commitment of member states at the World Summit of September 2005 to the notion of a ‘responsibility to protect’.
91
In the press conference announcing the record level of deployment reached by the UN, the head of peacekeeping also noted that ‘we can’t have peacekeeping in the midst of a shooting war’. See above, n. 3.
92
Nicholas, ‘UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe’, 335.
93
Sanderson, ‘The Lesson Learnt from UNTAC’, 186.
1
SC Res. 661 of 6 Aug. 1990.
2
See SC Res. 221 of 9 Apr. 1966; and SC Res. 418 of 4 Nov. 1977 respectively.
3
While some observers viewed the more active use of Security Council sanctions as a fulfilment of the peacekeeping function envisioned by the founding members of the UN, scepticism regarding the legal basis of comprehensive UN sanctions and controversies regarding the reach of
Chapter VII
authorization have been a concern to a number of analysts. See Paul Conlon,
United Nations Sanctions Management: A Case Study of the Iraq Sanctions Committee, 1990–1994
(Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2000); and Vera Gowlland-Debbas, (ed.),
United Nations Sanctions and International Law
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001).
4
Peter Wallensteen and Carina Staibano (eds.),
International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System
(New York: Frank Cass, 2005).
5
Our past research confirms this mix of coercion and the promise of its release as a bargaining tool that increases the likelihood of sanctions success. See David Cortright and George A. Lopez,
The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Security Council Sanctions in the 1990s
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). See especially ch. 2, ‘How to Think About the Success and Impact of Sanctions’, 13–35.
6
See David Cortright and George A. Lopez, ‘Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations’, in Cortright and Lopez (eds.),
Economic Sanctions: Peacemaking or Panacea in a Post-Cold War World
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 3–16.
7
For an overview of these targeted sanctions see David Cortright and George A. Lopez (eds.),
Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Wallensteen and Staibano (eds.),
International Sanctions.
8
The most articulate analyst of humanitarian impact is Joy Gordon, ‘A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions’,
Ethics and International Affairs
, 13 (1999), 123–42; and ‘Cool War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass Destruction’,
Harper’s Magazine
, Nov. 2002, 43–52. For a comparative analysis of the humanitarian impact of sanctions on Iraq, see Thomas G. Weiss et al. (eds.),
Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
9
See George A. Lopez and David Cortright, ‘Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked’,
Foreign Affairs
, 83, no. 4 (July/Aug. 2004), 1–14.
10
Barton Gellman, ‘Iraq’s Arsenal Was Only on Paper; Since Gulf War, Nonconventional Weapons Never Got Past the Planning Stage’,
Washington Post
, 7 Jan. 2004, A01.
11
George H. W. Bush, ‘The President’s News Conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany’ (Transcript, Washington, DC, 20 May 1991), available at
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19601
12
As quoted in Barbara Crossette, ‘For Iraq: A Dog House with Many Rooms’,
New York Times
, 23 Nov. 1997, 4.
13
SC Res. 687 of 3 Apr. 1991.
14
Rolf Ekéus, ‘Speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Millennium: Prospects and Initiatives’, Washington, DC, 13 Feb. 1996.
15
Rolf Ekéus, ‘Shifting Priorities: UNMOVIC And the Future of Inspections in Iraq: An Interview with Ambassador Rolf Ekéus’,
Arms Control Today
30, no. 2 (Mar. 2000), 6.
16
The estimate comes from Meghan O’Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 139.
17
UN export figures are available from the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, ‘Oil Exports (By Phase)’, updated 21 Mar. 2003, available at
www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/basicfigures.html
18
See Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme,
The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme
, 7 Sep. 2005, vol. 1, 95; Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme,
Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime
, 27 Oct. 2005, 1, available at
www.iic-offp.org/
19
US State Department estimates provided by Meghan O’Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions
, 139.
20
US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999–2000
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 2002), 77, 129. In an earlier version of the same document, released by the Clinton administration, the amount given for the identical dataset is much higher. In it, Iraq’s military expenditures for 1989 equal US $25.5 billion, a difference of US $10.
4
billion from the 2002 version. See US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Apr. 2000), 87.
21
George A. Lopez and David Cortright, ‘Trouble in the Gulf: Pain and Promise’,
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
54, no. 3 (May/June 1998), 39–43.
22
Human Rights Watch developed early proposals along these lines. See Hanny Megally, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, ‘Letter to United Nations Security Council’, 4 Jan. 2000, available at
www.hrw.org/press/2000/01/iraq-ltr.htm
23
An oil embargo on Yugoslavia was not specified in the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions, but was implicit in the general ban on exports and imports.
24
The five stand-alone arms embargoes were Somalia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia (1998), Ethiopia–Eritrea, and Liberia. In 2001 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1343 imposing diamond and travel sanctions on Liberia and reauthorizing the arms embargo originally established in 1992.
25
For a detailed assessment of these cases, see David Cortright and George A. Lopez,
Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action
(Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
26
Richard Garfield,
Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 to 1998: Assessing the Impact of Economic Sanctions
, Occasional Paper Series 16:OP:3, Mar.1999, available at
www.fourth-freedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=7
27
Mohamed M. Ali and Iqbal H. Shah, ‘Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq’,
The Lancet
, 355 (May 2000), 1837–57.
28
UN doc. S/1995/300 of 13 Apr. 1995.
29
Claudia von Brunmühl and Manfred Kulessa,
The Impact of UN Sanctions on Humanitarian Assistance Activities
, Report commissioned by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (Berlin, Dec. 1995).
30
Larry Minear et al.,
Toward More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing the Capacity of the United Nations System
, Occasional Paper 31 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1998). This report is the published version of a study of the same title produced for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
31
Manuel Bessler, Richard Garfield, and Gerard McHugh,
Sanctions Assessment Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of Sanctions
(New York: United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2004).
32
SC Res. 1373 of 28 Sep. 2001.
33
The exceptions were the sanctions imposed on Sudan in 1996, and against designated individuals in Syria in 2005.
34
For more detailed analysis of arms embargoes, see Andy Knight,
The United Nations and Arms Embargoes Verification
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998).
35
See for example SC Res. 1333 of 19 Dec. 2000, in which the Security Council decided that states should not sell, supply, or transfer arms and related materiel, but should also prevent their nationals from giving advice and assistance to the Taliban regime.
36
SC Res. 1565 of 10 Oct. 2004, and SC Res. 1572 of 15 Nov. 2004.
37
As noted above (n.23), the oil embargo on Yugoslavia was implicit in the general ban on exports and imports.
38
David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber, ‘The Viability of Commodity Sanctions: The Case of Diamonds’, in David Cortright and George A. Lopez,
Sanctions and the Search for Security
, 181–200.
39
UN doc. S/1996/776 of 24 Sep. 1996, paras. 33 and 34.
40
UN doc. S/1996/946 of 15 Nov. 1996, para. 14.
41
UN doc. S/1996/776 of 24 Sep. 1996, paras. 48 and 49.
42
US Department of State, ‘UN Sanctions against Belgrade: Lessons Learned for Future Regimes’, Paper presented by the Inter-agency Task Force on Serbian Sanctions, Washington, DC, June 1996, 11.
43
UN doc. S/1996/776 of 24 Sep. 1996, para. 78.
44
United States, Department of State,
UN Sanctions against Belgrade
, 11.
45
UN doc. S/1996/776 of 24 Sep. 1996, para. 78.
46
This account draws from David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Jaleh Dashti-Gibson and Richard W. Conroy, ‘Taming Terrorism: Sanctions Against Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan’, in Cortright and Lopez,
The Sanctions Decade
, 107–21.
47
SC Res. 883 of 11 Nov. 1993.
48
SC Res. 1192 of 27 Aug. 1998; UN doc. S/PRST/10 of 8 Apr. 1999.
49
UN doc. SG/SM/6944 of 4 Apr. 1999, 3–4.
50
US Department of State,
Patterns of Global Terrorism—1996
, Publication 10535 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996).
51
SC Res. 1267 of 15 Oct. 1999, para. 2.
52
SC Res. 1333 of 19 Dec. 2000.
53
SC Res. 1390 of 28 Jan. 2002.
54
SC Res. 1373 of 28 Sep. 2001.
55
UN doc. S/2004/1039 of 31 Dec. 2004, para. 24.
56
Ibid., para. 5; UN doc. S/2006/22 of 17 Jan. 2006, para. 9.
57
Ibid.
58
UN doc. S/2004/1039 of 31 Dec. 2004, para. 18.
59
Ibid., para. 28.
60
Ibid., para. 29.
61
UN doc. S/2004/1039 of 31 Dec. 2004, para. 31.
62
SC Res. 1013 of 7 Sep. 1995.
63
SC Res. 1237 of 7 May 1999.
64
UN doc. S/2000/203 of 10 Mar. 2000; UN doc. S/2000/1026 of 25 Oct. 2000; UN doc. S/2000/1225 of 21 Dec. 2000; UN doc. S/2001/363 of 11 Apr. 2001; UN doc. S/2001/966 of 12 Oct. 2001; UN doc. S/2002/486 of 26 Apr. 2002; and UN doc. S/2002/1119 of 16 Oct. 2002.
65
SC Res. 1363 of 30 July 2001.
