The Sword And The Olive (40 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
In Israel, most Cabinet ministers had never been privy to classified defense information. Now confronted with the prestige of a defense minister and military machine who supposedly had just saved the country from oblivion by winning one of the most smashing victories in history, even fewer were inclined to argue. On a lower level the same was true, owing to the greatly increased portion of national resources that now went the IDF’s way. In 1966, the last year of “normalcy,” that portion had stood at 12.4 percent of GNP;
6
by 1971 (the year after the 1969-1970 War of Attrition and thus one of relative peace) the figure had doubled to 24.7 percent. In terms of foreign currency spent on arms the increase was even greater, from $200 million to $670 million.
7
The country’s heretofore modest arms manufacturing capabilities were also expanding into a true military-industrial complex (see Chapter 16). Much more than had been the case under Ben Gurion and Eshkol before 1967, Israel became like a sailing boat with an oversized keel—difficult to steer in any direction not first approved by, and serving the interests of, the defense establishment.
6
by 1971 (the year after the 1969-1970 War of Attrition and thus one of relative peace) the figure had doubled to 24.7 percent. In terms of foreign currency spent on arms the increase was even greater, from $200 million to $670 million.
7
The country’s heretofore modest arms manufacturing capabilities were also expanding into a true military-industrial complex (see Chapter 16). Much more than had been the case under Ben Gurion and Eshkol before 1967, Israel became like a sailing boat with an oversized keel—difficult to steer in any direction not first approved by, and serving the interests of, the defense establishment.
Against this double background of growing resources and an increasingly powerful voice in national affairs, it is no wonder that the mean, lean fighting machine of pre-1967 days became transformed. One of the first decisions was to increase the period of conscript service to three years for men and two and a half for women, thereby considerably augmenting the number of personnel available for setting up new units and for undertaking “current” security operations along the borders and in the Occupied Territories. By 1973 the twenty-one brigades the IDF had possessed in 1967 increased to twenty-six to thirty (with several of the former mechanized infantry ones converted to armor).
8
Moreover, the task forces of old were now consolidated into permanent divisions complete with their own headquarters, staffs, divisional troops, and the like. To solve the resulting organizational problems another rank, that of
tat-aluf
(brigadier), was inserted between that of
aluf mishne
(colonel) and
aluf
(brigadier general). The outcome was that the COS, as the highest-ranking officer, went up from major general to lieutenant general; his immediate subordinates, the brigadier generals, became major generals.
8
Moreover, the task forces of old were now consolidated into permanent divisions complete with their own headquarters, staffs, divisional troops, and the like. To solve the resulting organizational problems another rank, that of
tat-aluf
(brigadier), was inserted between that of
aluf mishne
(colonel) and
aluf
(brigadier general). The outcome was that the COS, as the highest-ranking officer, went up from major general to lieutenant general; his immediate subordinates, the brigadier generals, became major generals.
Even more important than numerical expansion was the improvement in materiel that took place. Whether because of financial difficulties or because various states refused to sell it arms, the IDF prior to 1967 had been a relatively poor army, to the point that in 1964 more men were available than arms and the decision was made to cut back the length of conscript service from thirty to twenty-six months
9
(after a year, with new arms coming from West Germany, the IDF reversed itself). Almost all arms had been provided by France and Britain, with only a trickle of U.S. arms coming in the form of Hawk antiaircraft missiles and M-48 Patton tanks. Immediately after the Six Day War, however, French Pres. Charles de Gaulle blocked the delivery of fifty Mirage V fighter-bombers already paid for; in January 1969 the prohibition was transformed into a total embargo (though individual French officials and firms sometimes defied their government and continued supplying Israel as best they could for as long as they could). With its entire order of battle consisting of French-built machines, the IAF felt a particularly heavy blow. For a time it was desperate for new aircraft and spare parts.
9
(after a year, with new arms coming from West Germany, the IDF reversed itself). Almost all arms had been provided by France and Britain, with only a trickle of U.S. arms coming in the form of Hawk antiaircraft missiles and M-48 Patton tanks. Immediately after the Six Day War, however, French Pres. Charles de Gaulle blocked the delivery of fifty Mirage V fighter-bombers already paid for; in January 1969 the prohibition was transformed into a total embargo (though individual French officials and firms sometimes defied their government and continued supplying Israel as best they could for as long as they could). With its entire order of battle consisting of French-built machines, the IAF felt a particularly heavy blow. For a time it was desperate for new aircraft and spare parts.
In the event, the French embargo resulted not in the gradual suffocation of the IDF but, on the contrary, in its transformation into a modern army well armed from the much larger U.S. arsenals. Among the first weapons to arrive were the A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, which had been promised before the war.
10
Then, after considerable bargaining, the much more powerful F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers arrived during the winter of 1969- 1970. By October 1973 the IAF had some 150 of the former and 100 of the latter; the total number of first-line combat aircraft had been doubled to somewhat over 400. Even these figures underestimate the magnitude of the change, however, since Skyhawks and Phantoms could carry four to six times more ordnance than older French aircraft and deliver it much more accurately. Aided by South Africa, whose air force also used the Mirage III, the IAF was able to keep some of its own Mirages flying. In addition it started building its own version of the Mirage V on the basis of stolen blueprints, although the operational number in October 1973 is not clear.
10
Then, after considerable bargaining, the much more powerful F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers arrived during the winter of 1969- 1970. By October 1973 the IAF had some 150 of the former and 100 of the latter; the total number of first-line combat aircraft had been doubled to somewhat over 400. Even these figures underestimate the magnitude of the change, however, since Skyhawks and Phantoms could carry four to six times more ordnance than older French aircraft and deliver it much more accurately. Aided by South Africa, whose air force also used the Mirage III, the IAF was able to keep some of its own Mirages flying. In addition it started building its own version of the Mirage V on the basis of stolen blueprints, although the operational number in October 1973 is not clear.
On the ground the problems created by the French embargo were less serious, yet the transformation that took place was no less far-reaching. In 1966 a couple of the new British Chieftain tanks were brought over for tests. Although Tal, commander of the armored corps, liked them, they were deemed too expensive, and in the end it was decided to develop a native tank.
11
In the interim TSAHAL pressed some 200 captured T-54 and T-55 tanks into service; with twenty tons less armor than the Centurion, these tanks were not a satisfactory solution. It also purchased M-60 tanks from the United States, bringing the total order of battle to little short of 2,000. Though the old Shermans retained their dangerously flammable gasoline engines, the rest came with diesel engines or, in the case of the Centurions and M-48s, were converted to diesel. They also carried or were converted to carry the redoubtable 105mm gun.
11
In the interim TSAHAL pressed some 200 captured T-54 and T-55 tanks into service; with twenty tons less armor than the Centurion, these tanks were not a satisfactory solution. It also purchased M-60 tanks from the United States, bringing the total order of battle to little short of 2,000. Though the old Shermans retained their dangerously flammable gasoline engines, the rest came with diesel engines or, in the case of the Centurions and M-48s, were converted to diesel. They also carried or were converted to carry the redoubtable 105mm gun.
While the air force and armored corps were being allocated more than 80 percent of all available resources,
12
the equipment of the ground forces was less satisfactory. U.S.-built M-109 and M-107 self-propelled cannons (155mm and 175mm respectively) were purchased and took their place alongside the self-manufactured 105mm guns atop Sherman chassis, known as “Priests”; the IDF also had available locally manufactured 160mm mortars. Yet quantitatively, artillery, although no longer towed and thus capable of keeping up with the tanks, was still suffering from neglect (when war came in 1973 the ratio of tanks to self-propelled guns was approximately 5:1
13
instead of 2-3:1 as it ought to have been if each armored division had been provided with its full artillery complement). The situation of the mechanized infantry was even worse, only about one-seventh being converted from the antiquated M-3 half-tracks to the more modern M-113 APCs. Even in the field of small arms progress was limited. The USSR saw to it that every Egyptian and Syrian infantryman was equipped with the excellent Kalashnikov assault rifle, but its Israeli-made equal, the Galil, began to be issued to some units only in the last months before October 1973. Most still carried their old FN automatic rifles and Uzi submachine guns. Incredible as it sounds, some even had model 98 Mauser rifles, the “98” referring to 1898, the first year they were produced.
12
the equipment of the ground forces was less satisfactory. U.S.-built M-109 and M-107 self-propelled cannons (155mm and 175mm respectively) were purchased and took their place alongside the self-manufactured 105mm guns atop Sherman chassis, known as “Priests”; the IDF also had available locally manufactured 160mm mortars. Yet quantitatively, artillery, although no longer towed and thus capable of keeping up with the tanks, was still suffering from neglect (when war came in 1973 the ratio of tanks to self-propelled guns was approximately 5:1
13
instead of 2-3:1 as it ought to have been if each armored division had been provided with its full artillery complement). The situation of the mechanized infantry was even worse, only about one-seventh being converted from the antiquated M-3 half-tracks to the more modern M-113 APCs. Even in the field of small arms progress was limited. The USSR saw to it that every Egyptian and Syrian infantryman was equipped with the excellent Kalashnikov assault rifle, but its Israeli-made equal, the Galil, began to be issued to some units only in the last months before October 1973. Most still carried their old FN automatic rifles and Uzi submachine guns. Incredible as it sounds, some even had model 98 Mauser rifles, the “98” referring to 1898, the first year they were produced.
With its forces thus undergoing rebuilding and expansion, the IDF also transferred a growing part of its deployment to the Occupied Territories. On the Golan Heights, in the West Bank, and in Gaza and the Sinai some of the former Arab armies’ bases were taken intact; this included the enormous former Egyptian base at Bir Gafgafa, airfield and all. Elsewhere new headquarters, training bases, depots, and of course fortifications were built at great cost. Military intelligence also moved into the Territories, setting up its characteristic electronic listening posts; as a result, from the Sinai through the Jordan Valley all the way to the Golan many of the tallest hills were soon festooned with mysterious antennae, their exact function being clear only to the initiated. Other buildings housed the military government that had been instituted to look after—according to the Israelis—or hold down—according to their enemies—the populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Like the rest they had to be linked by means of roads, electric and telephone wires, water pipes, and so on, representing a huge investment that necessarily subtracted from monies for combat arms.
These were the years when IDF prestige was at its zenith. In this situation it had no trouble attracting and retaining high-quality manpower for the professional army. As one survey showed, two out of three officer candidates thought that “being a combat officer will make me rise in the estimation of the past generation”; a similar percentage thought that “being a good soldier is a proof that one is worth something.”
14
Youngsters who for one reason or another were disqualified for service felt deeply hurt, sometimes mounting wild escapades to prove their worth to themselves and peers. Conversely the handful
15
who refused to accept the common view of the IDF as the glory of creation and did not want to serve were regarded as psychiatric cases. Every time a commander returned from a raid the media automatically characterized him as
yeffe toar
(handsome); meanwhile announcements coming out of the IDF’s public relations office were believed as if holy writ. Despite these facts the growth in the army’s size, the increase in the number and variety of its missions, and the fourfold extension of the territory over which it was deployed probably led to decreased cohesion—a fact that became obvious during the October War, when there suddenly appeared large numbers of psychiatric casualties.
16
No longer could everybody know everybody else, a fact the General Staff recognized when, on top of the old system of Tsiyun Le-shevach (literally honorary mention, referring to Mentioning in Dispatches) it decided to institute a regular system of decorations as in other armies.
14
Youngsters who for one reason or another were disqualified for service felt deeply hurt, sometimes mounting wild escapades to prove their worth to themselves and peers. Conversely the handful
15
who refused to accept the common view of the IDF as the glory of creation and did not want to serve were regarded as psychiatric cases. Every time a commander returned from a raid the media automatically characterized him as
yeffe toar
(handsome); meanwhile announcements coming out of the IDF’s public relations office were believed as if holy writ. Despite these facts the growth in the army’s size, the increase in the number and variety of its missions, and the fourfold extension of the territory over which it was deployed probably led to decreased cohesion—a fact that became obvious during the October War, when there suddenly appeared large numbers of psychiatric casualties.
16
No longer could everybody know everybody else, a fact the General Staff recognized when, on top of the old system of Tsiyun Le-shevach (literally honorary mention, referring to Mentioning in Dispatches) it decided to institute a regular system of decorations as in other armies.
In January 1968 Rabin’s term ended. His replacement was Maj. Gen. Chayim Bar Lev (later a lieutenant general), an officer whose calm and deliberate professionalism (he spoke v-e-r-y s-l-o-w-l-y) helped him win the job against his main competitor, “wild” Ezer Weizman.
17
Reflecting the war’s supposed lessons, he was the first COS since Laskov to have served as commander of the armored corps, but unlike Laskov (the perfect all-arounder) he was an armored specialist. He was a comparatively gentle character, and the future would show he did not really have whatever it takes to succeed in the rough-and-tumble of Israeli politics. He was an effective commander, however, and when brought back into service as a reservist in 1973 he proved able to create order out of chaos while keeping even the most difficult subordinates in check. During his four-year term the transformation of the IDF—from an army with an almost exclusively offensive orientation to one that, initially at least, expected to defend and hold out—was completed.
17
Reflecting the war’s supposed lessons, he was the first COS since Laskov to have served as commander of the armored corps, but unlike Laskov (the perfect all-arounder) he was an armored specialist. He was a comparatively gentle character, and the future would show he did not really have whatever it takes to succeed in the rough-and-tumble of Israeli politics. He was an effective commander, however, and when brought back into service as a reservist in 1973 he proved able to create order out of chaos while keeping even the most difficult subordinates in check. During his four-year term the transformation of the IDF—from an army with an almost exclusively offensive orientation to one that, initially at least, expected to defend and hold out—was completed.
There was, in fact, a lot to defend. Up and down the new lines the cease-fire proved tenuous, and one incident followed another. Opposite Lebanon, a troublesome frontier for the first time in many years, the PLO fired mortar rounds and Katyusha rockets into Galilee. On the Golan Heights infiltrators planted mines and blew up installations. More trouble was caused by the Syrian army, which from time to time engaged the IDF in artillery and tank battles (although on the whole its size remained strictly limited). In the Jordan Valley the PLO, rapidly building a state within a state in the refugee camps, also fired rockets and repeatedly tried to infiltrate parties into the West Bank. Their objectives were to sow mines, attack patrols and settlements, and reach into the interior to stir the indigenous population to resistance. Finally, on the Suez Canal the Egyptian army sent raiding parties across and engaged in occasional artillery duels. On the northern and southern fronts the incidents sometimes escalated, causing one or both sides to call in their air forces, usually with sad results for the Arabs as the IAF shot down their planes. Israel also used its navy in its operations against Lebanon and Egypt.
A blow-by-blow account of these hundreds of incidents would be tedious. Tactically many of them displayed a brilliance that was sans pareil; given the feeling of
en brera
and the IDF’s exalted status in the eyes of the Israeli public, it was not yet constrained by the need to minimize casualties (as it later would be). Perhaps the single most spectacular operation was the December 1969 raid against Beirut International Airport, following several terrorist attacks on El Al aircraft.
18
Excellent intelligence provided information on the type and location of each aircraft, making possible meticulous planning and training. Helicopters carrying commandos knifed in undetected, landing at four different spots. They blocked the road leading to the airport with caltrops. In a perfectly coordinated action the commandos blew up thirteen aircraft belonging to various airlines. The operation took exactly twenty-nine minutes, not a single casualty being caused or suffered.
en brera
and the IDF’s exalted status in the eyes of the Israeli public, it was not yet constrained by the need to minimize casualties (as it later would be). Perhaps the single most spectacular operation was the December 1969 raid against Beirut International Airport, following several terrorist attacks on El Al aircraft.
18
Excellent intelligence provided information on the type and location of each aircraft, making possible meticulous planning and training. Helicopters carrying commandos knifed in undetected, landing at four different spots. They blocked the road leading to the airport with caltrops. In a perfectly coordinated action the commandos blew up thirteen aircraft belonging to various airlines. The operation took exactly twenty-nine minutes, not a single casualty being caused or suffered.
Less successful was the earlier operation mounted against the PLO in Jordan (March 1969). Once again the motivating factor was terrorism, this time a mine planted north of Elat; riding a bus, two Israelis were killed and twenty-seven wounded.
19
In response the IDF organized two raids, one south of the Dead Sea at Tsaffi and one north of the sea, across the Jordan at Karameh. Whereas the former went without a hitch, the latter, directed against a PLO base, ran into stiff opposition. Morning fog delayed the planned heliborne landing, enabling Yasser Arafat and many of his guerrillas to escape.
20
Then the two Israeli brigades (one armored, one mechanized) came under accurate fire from the Jordanian army. At the end of the day they withdrew, having lost some thirty killed and almost one hundred wounded
21
as well as four tanks (one of which remains on display at the military museum in Amman). Though Jordanian and PLO losses were considerably larger, the operation achieved nothing and was not repeated.
19
In response the IDF organized two raids, one south of the Dead Sea at Tsaffi and one north of the sea, across the Jordan at Karameh. Whereas the former went without a hitch, the latter, directed against a PLO base, ran into stiff opposition. Morning fog delayed the planned heliborne landing, enabling Yasser Arafat and many of his guerrillas to escape.
20
Then the two Israeli brigades (one armored, one mechanized) came under accurate fire from the Jordanian army. At the end of the day they withdrew, having lost some thirty killed and almost one hundred wounded
21
as well as four tanks (one of which remains on display at the military museum in Amman). Though Jordanian and PLO losses were considerably larger, the operation achieved nothing and was not repeated.
Even so, the IDF’s attempts to seal off the Jordan Valley against infiltrators gradually bore fruit. First under Eytan, then under Col. Moshe Levy (the subsequent chief of staff), elite infantry units patrolled, mounted ambushes, and used helicopters to detect parties that had crossed the river into Israeli-held territory; once they were detected it was a question of tracking, cornering, and destroying the infiltrators. During the early days these troops were reckless. Geared up and seeking to justify their reputation for heroism, they assaulted enemies head-on and suffered unnecessary casualties as a result. Later, after a brigade commander had been killed and Levy himself severely wounded, they learned to be more deliberate, carefully sealing off an area before bringing up—if the terrain permitted—tanks. The tanks finished off the guerrillas within their hiding places at point-blank range.
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