The Sword And The Olive (36 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
On June 3 the head of Mossad, Brigadier General (ret.) Amit, returned home from talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. He brought the clear impression that the United States would not mind if “Nasser’s bones were broken” and certainly would do nothing to prevent it. That evening the final decision to go to war was made.
17
Two days later, at 0750 hours, the air-raid sirens sounded in towns and settlements all over Israel. Those who switched on their radios could hear the announcer say that the IAF had gone to war in order to intercept Egyptian aircraft approaching Israel—a flat lie, no such approach having taken place. Five minutes previously, at 0845 hours Egyptian time, the first IAF flights had reached their targets. Excellent intelligence enabled the Israelis to pinpoint the entire order of battle of Egypt’s air force, down to the names of individual pilots. More significant, the locations of individual squadrons and their types of aircraft were also known,
18
thus enabling the IAF to select and strike the most dangerous Egyptian forces first.
17
Two days later, at 0750 hours, the air-raid sirens sounded in towns and settlements all over Israel. Those who switched on their radios could hear the announcer say that the IAF had gone to war in order to intercept Egyptian aircraft approaching Israel—a flat lie, no such approach having taken place. Five minutes previously, at 0845 hours Egyptian time, the first IAF flights had reached their targets. Excellent intelligence enabled the Israelis to pinpoint the entire order of battle of Egypt’s air force, down to the names of individual pilots. More significant, the locations of individual squadrons and their types of aircraft were also known,
18
thus enabling the IAF to select and strike the most dangerous Egyptian forces first.
Of the IAF’s 200 combat aircraft only twelve stayed behind to defend the homeland, either on airborne patrol or sitting at the edge of runways. Some of the attacking planes were loaded with few bombs and lots of fuel—many were operating at extreme range—and flew in low over the Mediterranean, maintaining radio silence and presumably using electronic countermeasures (ECM) to avoid the dozens of Egyptian, Soviet, and U.S. radars that might have detected them.
19
Other aircraft were sent against bases located in the Sinai itself and thus made straight for their targets. The first wave hit nine bases, knocking out many modern MIG-21 fighters and launching ground-penetrating Durendals into the runways to render them unserviceable. Some of the bombs exploded immediately, creating craters, whereas delayed fuses were set on others to obstruct attempts to clear and repair the runways. Then, for two hours and fifty minutes, one wave after another followed up until no fewer than nineteen Egyptian airfields had been attacked and 286 machines of various types turned into smoldering wrecks.
20
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Other aircraft were sent against bases located in the Sinai itself and thus made straight for their targets. The first wave hit nine bases, knocking out many modern MIG-21 fighters and launching ground-penetrating Durendals into the runways to render them unserviceable. Some of the bombs exploded immediately, creating craters, whereas delayed fuses were set on others to obstruct attempts to clear and repair the runways. Then, for two hours and fifty minutes, one wave after another followed up until no fewer than nineteen Egyptian airfields had been attacked and 286 machines of various types turned into smoldering wrecks.
20
The offensive had been carefully timed to hit its targets after the Egyptian predawn patrols landed but before senior commanders reached their desks. The enemy was taken totally by surprise, what with the majority of senior officers not yet at their desks and most planes sitting neatly on the runways, waiting to be strafed. Designed to shoot planes that flew at high altitudes, the Egyptians’ Soviet-made SAM-2 surface-to-air missiles proved little threat, as did the fire of antiaircraft guns, which tended to be uncoordinated and overall lighter than anticipated. A couple of the Israeli aircraft in the first wave were shot down by Egyptian MIGs, which managed to take off but were themselves promptly downed. It was a nearly letter-perfect operation, carried out with zest and determination. By 1100 hours Israeli time Ezer Weizman could be heard bellowing on the telephone that the war had been won
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—which indeed was the case.
21
—which indeed was the case.
Simultaneously on the ground, the principal thrust was made in the north by Brigadier General Tal’s
ugda
with three brigades and Fouga ground-support light aircraft. But the Egyptian understanding of the terrain proved better than that of the Israelis, two of whose brigades floundered in the sands when they tried to outflank Rafah on the left. As they tried to advance through the dunes, Eytan’s paratroopers, riding half-tracks, lost their way as well as contact with their own attached tanks. Next they came under an Egyptian counterattack, supported by heavy JS III tanks, and suffered losses; by late afternoon they could be found slowly grinding toward Rafah from the south. From there they drove back into the Gaza Strip, thus crossing the communications of the rest of their own
ugda
at the cost of considerable confusion;
22
in the Strip itself they linked up with “Force Reshef” (one of Gavish’s reserve brigades), which had been standing by but was now unleashed.
ugda
with three brigades and Fouga ground-support light aircraft. But the Egyptian understanding of the terrain proved better than that of the Israelis, two of whose brigades floundered in the sands when they tried to outflank Rafah on the left. As they tried to advance through the dunes, Eytan’s paratroopers, riding half-tracks, lost their way as well as contact with their own attached tanks. Next they came under an Egyptian counterattack, supported by heavy JS III tanks, and suffered losses; by late afternoon they could be found slowly grinding toward Rafah from the south. From there they drove back into the Gaza Strip, thus crossing the communications of the rest of their own
ugda
at the cost of considerable confusion;
22
in the Strip itself they linked up with “Force Reshef” (one of Gavish’s reserve brigades), which had been standing by but was now unleashed.
Though Eytan’s advance had been disorderly and uncoordinated, he finally reached his objective. Not so “M” Armored Brigade, with its reservists riding out-of-date Sherman and AMX-13 tanks. Throughout the day it attempted to pass the impassable stretch of dunes assigned to it; by evening it had yet to fire a shot. This meant that Tal’s real thrust had to be delivered by a single brigade, 7th Armored, a crack formation consisting of conscripts riding Centurions. Coming from the west, first they captured Khan Yunis. Next, and overrunning the Palestinians on the way, they drove south to Rafah, where their accurate fire, delivered at long range, proved more than a match for the Egyptian antitank guns and thus vindicated Tal’s theories (the more so because they were being supported by Fougas from the air). Having barely avoided firing at Eytan’s paratroopers (who were reaching for the same objective from the south), they next headed for the Jirardi Defile. The leading tank battalion got through easily enough but found the road blocked behind it; approaching in its turn, the second one also got through but took heavy losses on the way. Still the Egyptians resisted, blocking the defile for the second time until 7th Brigade’s mechanized infantry arrived and mopped up.
As fought—conducted would be too complimentary, since only one out of Tal’s three brigades responded to his orders while carrying out its mission—the battle for the northeastern Sinai was misunderstood by the Israelis. It should have taught them that tank advances against unbroken infantry were risky business. Instead they took them as the supreme proof of the virtues of tanks driving forward in
egrofei shiryon
. “Tankomania” (in the words of Ariel Sharon) was carried to the point where the force was nicknamed
Ugdat Ha-plada
(Steel Division), and Tal became the only Israeli officer ever to have a serenade written in his honor: “On the fifth of June/The armored battalion broke through . . . just as you wanted, Tal.” The hero of the day was the commander of 7th Brigade, Col. Shmuel Gonen, known for the martinetlike antics he inflicted on his unfortunate troops. Now he found the road to promotion open to him until, as we shall see, he came up against the “Peter Principle” and was cut down to size.
egrofei shiryon
. “Tankomania” (in the words of Ariel Sharon) was carried to the point where the force was nicknamed
Ugdat Ha-plada
(Steel Division), and Tal became the only Israeli officer ever to have a serenade written in his honor: “On the fifth of June/The armored battalion broke through . . . just as you wanted, Tal.” The hero of the day was the commander of 7th Brigade, Col. Shmuel Gonen, known for the martinetlike antics he inflicted on his unfortunate troops. Now he found the road to promotion open to him until, as we shall see, he came up against the “Peter Principle” and was cut down to size.
Farther south, Brig. Gen. Avraham Yoffe’s two-brigade
ugda
had an easier task of it. This time the Israelis’ confidence in their ability to get through terrain the Egyptians considered impassable proved well founded; although the struggle against the sand proved difficult, there was no opposition. By late afternoon the Centurions of the leading “I” Brigade had penetrated some thirty miles into Egyptian territory, thus interposing themselves between the two main Egyptian fortified areas to the north and south. They were refueled from the air—their own
dragim
(trains) got stuck in the dunes—took up positions along the road leading northeast from Jebel Livni, and waited. That same evening the leading elements of the Egyptian 4th Armored Division appeared in front of them as if on a peacetime march. Their objective was Al Arish, some twenty miles away, where they were supposed to counterattack Tal’s forces; suddenly the sky lit up as the Israelis fired flares. The 4th Egyptian fell easy prey to the Centurions, with their long-range guns firing from concealed positions. Early next morning, the survivors turned back.
ugda
had an easier task of it. This time the Israelis’ confidence in their ability to get through terrain the Egyptians considered impassable proved well founded; although the struggle against the sand proved difficult, there was no opposition. By late afternoon the Centurions of the leading “I” Brigade had penetrated some thirty miles into Egyptian territory, thus interposing themselves between the two main Egyptian fortified areas to the north and south. They were refueled from the air—their own
dragim
(trains) got stuck in the dunes—took up positions along the road leading northeast from Jebel Livni, and waited. That same evening the leading elements of the Egyptian 4th Armored Division appeared in front of them as if on a peacetime march. Their objective was Al Arish, some twenty miles away, where they were supposed to counterattack Tal’s forces; suddenly the sky lit up as the Israelis fired flares. The 4th Egyptian fell easy prey to the Centurions, with their long-range guns firing from concealed positions. Early next morning, the survivors turned back.
Still farther south, the IDF’s third
ugda
found itself facing the Abu Ageila-Kusseima fortified zone, which had stymied their predecessors eleven years earlier. The Egyptians had learned from their experience: Not only was 2nd Infantry Division, which held the position, reinforced to approximately 16,000 men; it was provided with a mobile counterattack force in the form of a tank regiment (sixty-six T-34 tanks with 85mm guns) and a battalion of tank destroyers (twenty-two Su-100s with 100mm guns). The Egyptian reserves were, however, stationed too far west, and their commander did not have authority to act on his own. In the end, this deficiency in command would bring about their defeat.
23
ugda
found itself facing the Abu Ageila-Kusseima fortified zone, which had stymied their predecessors eleven years earlier. The Egyptians had learned from their experience: Not only was 2nd Infantry Division, which held the position, reinforced to approximately 16,000 men; it was provided with a mobile counterattack force in the form of a tank regiment (sixty-six T-34 tanks with 85mm guns) and a battalion of tank destroyers (twenty-two Su-100s with 100mm guns). The Egyptian reserves were, however, stationed too far west, and their commander did not have authority to act on his own. In the end, this deficiency in command would bring about their defeat.
23
On the Israeli side, the commander in charge was Ariel Sharon. After 1956 he had been put on hold, first commanding a reserve infantry brigade and later serving as chief of staff, Northern Command. Once Rabin became chief of the General Staff, Sharon was brought back into the center of things as director of military training; in wartime he was to command an
ugda.
On the basis of detailed air photos he proceeded to draw up a meticulous plan for capturing the Abu Ageila-Kusseima area by way of a concentric attack.
24
One brigade was to capture Kusseima on the south, thus creating a diversion while also preventing any attempt by Force Shazly at Kuntilla to intervene. While the main assault was carried out by two armored brigades coming from the north, a force of paratroopers would land west of Abu Ageila, thus cutting off the position from its operational reserve.
ugda.
On the basis of detailed air photos he proceeded to draw up a meticulous plan for capturing the Abu Ageila-Kusseima area by way of a concentric attack.
24
One brigade was to capture Kusseima on the south, thus creating a diversion while also preventing any attempt by Force Shazly at Kuntilla to intervene. While the main assault was carried out by two armored brigades coming from the north, a force of paratroopers would land west of Abu Ageila, thus cutting off the position from its operational reserve.
Driving west against comparatively light opposition, by late afternoon both of Sharon’s landborne prongs reached their jumping-off positions north and south of Abu Ageila. A message from Southern Command arrived and suggested that the attack be postponed until the next morning to enable the IAF to take part; Sharon, however, decided to go ahead. At 2200 hours artillery from two brigades opened up on the Egyptians from the north. Next, Col. Danny Matt’s paratroopers used the confusion to enter the Egyptian artillery positions from the west. In the north, Sharon’s two remaining brigades—one armored, one infantry—brought in mineclearing equipment. Carrying colored identification lights and forming narrow wedges, they advanced closely behind their own artillery barrage and straight into the main defenses. As Sharon noted at one point, “It was all working like a Swiss watch.” Though Matt’s paratroopers took heavy casualties, by 1100 hours or so on the morning of June 6 the battle was over.
Perhaps the decisive factor in the Egyptian defeat had been the inactivity of their local reserves, which, since they did not come under attack, stood idly throughout the night until surrounded in the morning.
25
The same inactivity now overtook Sharon’s own forces, either because of exhaustion or because they received no orders from headquarters. Dayan’s daughter Yael was attached to Sharon’s headquarters as a journalist; she reported
26
that they laid themselves down in the desert. They thus enabled Force Shazly to slip away and its commander to make a name for himself as the only Egyptian officer who escaped defeat; rising up the ladder of promotion, in 1973 he was chief of staff and in charge of crossing the canal.
25
The same inactivity now overtook Sharon’s own forces, either because of exhaustion or because they received no orders from headquarters. Dayan’s daughter Yael was attached to Sharon’s headquarters as a journalist; she reported
26
that they laid themselves down in the desert. They thus enabled Force Shazly to slip away and its commander to make a name for himself as the only Egyptian officer who escaped defeat; rising up the ladder of promotion, in 1973 he was chief of staff and in charge of crossing the canal.
Even at the height of the battle for Abu Ageila, however, Yoffe had already asked and received permission to send his second armored brigade across the road cleared by Sharon north of the perimeter westward into the central Sinai. On the morning of June 6 there were thus four armored brigades ready to carry out the second phase of the campaign: two under Yoffe, two under Tal (who also made Eytan’s paratroopers reverse direction and join the attack). Coming from the north, Gonen drove south toward Jebel Livni, where on the morning of June 6 he linked up with Yoffe’s “I” Brigade, thus building a pocket and trapping inside all the Egyptian forces (two divisions) defending the northeastern Sinai. With 2nd Egyptian Division at Abu Ageila broken, 4th Armored bloodied, and Force Shazly isolated far to the south, the lone main force remaining was the Egyptian 3rd Division.
When news of the fall of Abu Ageila arrived the minister of defense, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, panicked. Without so much as consulting the chief of staff, he ordered all remaining formations to retreat, with the result that command and control collapsed and the Egyptians ceased to represent a cohesive force. At about the same time as this order was being given (1630) Gavish met with his division commanders. Quickly surveying the latest developments, the Israelis decided not to pursue but to drive straight
through
the retreating Egyptians to reach the passes ahead of them.
27
Only Yoffe’s forces succeeded in this task. Driving all night (and engaged retreating Egyptian tanks at point-blank range along the road) the Centurions of “I” Brigade reached the Giddi on the morning of June 8. They took up positions and opened fire on the approaching columns of 3rd Infantry Division, wreaking vast destruction.
through
the retreating Egyptians to reach the passes ahead of them.
27
Only Yoffe’s forces succeeded in this task. Driving all night (and engaged retreating Egyptian tanks at point-blank range along the road) the Centurions of “I” Brigade reached the Giddi on the morning of June 8. They took up positions and opened fire on the approaching columns of 3rd Infantry Division, wreaking vast destruction.
Meanwhile to the north along the coastal road, Tal’s “M” Brigade—the one that had not fired a shot on June 5—pursued from Al Arish, reaching the Suez Canal on June 7. At Bir Gafgafa on the same day, the campaign’s only major
shin be-shin
battle was fought between Gonen’s 7th Armored Brigade and elements of the Egyptian 4th Armored Division with its T-54 and T-55 tanks.
28
Like the Allies at Falaise in 1944 (albeit on a much smaller scale), the Israelis went for an encirclement and tried to outflank the enemy from the south. Also like the Allies at Falaise in 1944, they were only partly successful, since the jaws snapped shut too late; at least part of 4th Armored Division managed to escape. Finally, and even though he was now being attacked from two directions (in addition to Sharon coming from the north, he was being pursued by Gavish’s remaining reserve brigade, which drove at him from Kuntilla), Shazly, as already related, gave them both the slip. Only
after
he had passed through Giddi Pass did some of “I” Brigade’s Centurions arrive on their last drop of fuel, holding it for eighteen hours before Sharon could reach them, bagging little but stragglers.
shin be-shin
battle was fought between Gonen’s 7th Armored Brigade and elements of the Egyptian 4th Armored Division with its T-54 and T-55 tanks.
28
Like the Allies at Falaise in 1944 (albeit on a much smaller scale), the Israelis went for an encirclement and tried to outflank the enemy from the south. Also like the Allies at Falaise in 1944, they were only partly successful, since the jaws snapped shut too late; at least part of 4th Armored Division managed to escape. Finally, and even though he was now being attacked from two directions (in addition to Sharon coming from the north, he was being pursued by Gavish’s remaining reserve brigade, which drove at him from Kuntilla), Shazly, as already related, gave them both the slip. Only
after
he had passed through Giddi Pass did some of “I” Brigade’s Centurions arrive on their last drop of fuel, holding it for eighteen hours before Sharon could reach them, bagging little but stragglers.
It remained to secure Sharm al-Sheikh. Committing his last available reserve, Gavish carried out the operation on June 7 by means of a paratrooper drop—but when the men landed they found the navy waiting for them. On June 8 the Israelis mopped up, sending forces north to south along the Suez Canal and from there on farther south along the peninsula’s western coast. By that time, however, attention had long shifted to the central front. Despite the fact that King Hussein had put his forces under the command of an Egyptian general, Israel did not expect him to enter the war. The king’s reasoning is hard to figure. If it were true, as was later claimed, that he was “almost certain” to be attacked by Israel following its eventual victory over both Egypt and Syria,
29
he should have hit out as hard as he could on the first day with his armored brigades. But he made only two symbolic thrusts at Jerusalem’s Mount Scopus and the Mount of Evil Council (both of them totally unimportant objectives), fired a few long-range 155mm artillery shells in the general direction of Tel Aviv, and mounted a few air attacks against Israeli airfields. Perhaps Hussein felt that he had no choice but to do something, all the while hoping to avoid serious retaliation.
29
he should have hit out as hard as he could on the first day with his armored brigades. But he made only two symbolic thrusts at Jerusalem’s Mount Scopus and the Mount of Evil Council (both of them totally unimportant objectives), fired a few long-range 155mm artillery shells in the general direction of Tel Aviv, and mounted a few air attacks against Israeli airfields. Perhaps Hussein felt that he had no choice but to do something, all the while hoping to avoid serious retaliation.
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