The Sword And The Olive (16 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Whereas news of the Mount Scopus attack merely reinforced Jewish determination—after all, Jews had nowhere to go—the effect of the Dir Yassin attack among the Palestinians was just the reverse. Previously only a trickle of well-to-do Arabs had been leaving the country for neighboring ones, many hoping to return when hostilities ended; now the news of the atrocity triggered a mass flight. These events seem to have taken the Jewish leadership by surprise. Although there had long been some vague talk about the possibility of changing the “demographic balance,” up to this point there had been scarcely any offensive plans—holding out and retaliating was all that Hagana had prepared for—and consequently no detailed schemes for dealing with any noncombatant Arab population that might come under Jewish rule. Needless to say, once the mass flight got under way it was almost always welcomed. Often, as in Lyddia and Ramla later in the war, it was assisted by any means, including the most brutal. Over the next six months or so the result was the uprooting of perhaps 600,000-760,000 people from their homes. This was 75-85 percent of the non-Jewish population in the area that later became part of Israel.
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Not to be outdone, Hagana for its part followed up on “Operation Nachshon” by reinforcing its hold over the road to Jerusalem and the city itself by clearing Arab villages in the area. The task was entrusted to a newly established PALMACH brigade, Harel; its commander was the newly promoted Yitschak Rabin. Like the rest, Rabin had gained considerable experience in small-unit and underground operations; with Dayan he helped spearhead the British invasion of Syria in 1941. Like the rest, too, he had never gone through anything more advanced than a platoon commander’s course conducted under somewhat irregular conditions. To the last night of his life he would recall “the good-looking boys” with whom he had fought in this area, and so many of whom had died.
During April 19-22 Rabin’s men passed four major convoys into Jerusalem, though the last one was attacked and badly mauled. These reinforcements were used in “Operation Yevusi” (after the biblical, pre-Israelite inhabitants of the area) in order to extend the Jewish-controlled part of Jerusalem north and south. Fighting, conducted almost exclusively with small arms and at very close quarters, was heavy; in the south the dominating monastery of Saint Simon, held by a company that counted among its ranks
two
future chiefs of staff (David Elazar and Refael Eytan), came within a hair of being overrun.
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The follow-up on “Operation Yevusi” was “Operation Kilshon (Pitchfork),” which opened during the first half of May and extended the Jewish hold on the western part of the city.
two
future chiefs of staff (David Elazar and Refael Eytan), came within a hair of being overrun.
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The follow-up on “Operation Yevusi” was “Operation Kilshon (Pitchfork),” which opened during the first half of May and extended the Jewish hold on the western part of the city.
Even so, not all objectives were achieved. In particular, the overlooking hill of Nebi Samuel and the Arab neighborhood that links Jerusalem with Hebrew University on top of Mount Scopus could not be secured, the former because the attack on it failed and the latter because the British, in one of their last acts, made Hagana return it to the Arabs (in whose hands it remained until 1967). More serious, Hagana did not succeed in breaking the siege of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. Surrounded by walls that proved impregnable to available weapons, fewer than 2,000 Jews were fighting for their lives against an Arab population ten times as large. The latter were assisted by a battalion of the Arab Legion, some 600 strong with artillery, which, contrary to the understanding achieved in the previous year, had joined the fighting.
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Although ultimately successful in securing West Jerusalem, more or less, Hagana was unable to hold on to Gush Etsion, which fell to the Arab Legion on May 12 after several attempts to reinforce it failed.
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The next month would witness continued fighting in the city proper and in the corridor leading to it. The latter could be extended to a maximum width of perhaps twenty miles, but in the former no further progress was made by either side. Although casualties were heavy, geographically speaking the scale of the fighting may be gauged from the fact that one “major” Transjordanian armored advance was halted a few hundred yards from its starting point at Nablus Gate. The surrender to the Legion of the Jewish Quarter (May 28) marked the hardening of the battlelines. After that there would be no more great changes until the conclusion of the armistice agreements later in the year, the Legion being content to hold their positions.
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The next month would witness continued fighting in the city proper and in the corridor leading to it. The latter could be extended to a maximum width of perhaps twenty miles, but in the former no further progress was made by either side. Although casualties were heavy, geographically speaking the scale of the fighting may be gauged from the fact that one “major” Transjordanian armored advance was halted a few hundred yards from its starting point at Nablus Gate. The surrender to the Legion of the Jewish Quarter (May 28) marked the hardening of the battlelines. After that there would be no more great changes until the conclusion of the armistice agreements later in the year, the Legion being content to hold their positions.
Not so in the rest of the country, where there was usually less dependence on individual roads, much greater room for maneuver, and, in most places, no well-organized and well-commanded Arab Legion to limit what Hagana and its PALMACH spearhead could do. Calling in reservists, PALMACH was expanded to eight battalions, although not all of them were as well trained and cohesive as the original force. During the second week of April some of these forces underwent their baptism of fire by taking on Kauji’s forces in the Valley of Esdraelon. Having been repulsed at Tirat Tsvi and Gesher, Kauji crossed the Jordan farther south and, finding himself unopposed, moved into his old stomping ground of Nablus, Tul Karem, and Jenin. From there he moved west toward Mishmar Ha-emek, a strategically positioned
kibbuts
in the Valley of Esdraelon. Next he may have planned to continue to Haifa in a pincer movement on both sides of Mount Carmel (at any rate that is what strategy would dictate).
kibbuts
in the Valley of Esdraelon. Next he may have planned to continue to Haifa in a pincer movement on both sides of Mount Carmel (at any rate that is what strategy would dictate).
Sadeh commanded the opposition, an assortment of PALMACH companies and local Hagana forces totaling between two and three battalions. He used the kind of flexible tactics that would become PALMACH’s specialty: In the face of Kauji’s superiority in artillery his men abandoned positions by day but reoccupied them by night, thus holding their own at comparatively low cost. A battle of attrition developed that lasted for a few days—strangely enough under the eyes of the British, who at first tried to mediate but later threw in the towel. It ended when Sadeh ambushed a major advance by Kauji’s forces (April 11-12), outflanked him from the south, and, by threatening to cut him off from his base near Jenin, forced him to retreat northeast toward Nazaret. At the time these events took place neither the Syrians nor the Lebanese regular forces had as yet entered the war. With the British withdrawal continuing apace, practically the only obstacle standing between the Jews and full control over the northern part of the country was the local Palestinians.
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Even more so than in the area around Jerusalem, Palestinians who were on their own were in no position to withstand the onslaught of the much stronger Hagana forces. The first town to come under attack was Tiberias, which fell on April 17-18, its 2,000 Arab inhabitants (facing perhaps three times as many Jews) being evacuated by the British. Next was Haifa, where the two sides had been sniping and car-bombing each other for months; on April 21 it became clear that the British were going to evacuate their positions early, opening the door to a Hagana offensive. Five CHISH companies made their way down the mountain from the Jewish neighborhoods into the Arab ones below, causing all but 3,000 of the Arab inhabitants to flee.
Next, one PALMACH and one CHISH battalion were concentrated in the upper part of the Jordan Valley (north of the Sea of Galilee); fighting all the way, they made their way west into the mountains toward Safed. Here the local militias were assisted by a part of the Arab Salvation Army, which had infiltrated from Lebanon. Its commander, Adib Shishakli, was a Syrian regular army officer who later rose to become his country’s dictator. Like those of Kauji farther to the south, his troops wore uniforms (they even carried gas masks)
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and were provided with vehicles and artillery.
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and were provided with vehicles and artillery.
The fighting for Safed lasted about a week; in terms of casualties suffered by both sides it was one of the most bitter chapters in the war. Concentrating all available forces for a single blow—even at the risk of denuding the Jewish settlements in the area
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—Yigal Allon used his PALMACH battalion to outflank the town from the north, thus interposing his forces between Shishakli and the Lebanese border. With Hagana’s homemade mortars in support, he stormed the city on the night of May 10-11, an operation that culminated in hand-to-hand fighting in the vaults of the ancient citadel. Almost simultaneously, other forces advanced north from the area east of the Gilboa Mountains to Bet Shean, which they took. The last northern city to fall was Acre; on May 17-18 it came under attack by a force that drove north some eight miles from Haifa. Here, however, the Arab population was not forced to flee, and once the first few chaotic days were over it was able to continue life in comparative security.
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—Yigal Allon used his PALMACH battalion to outflank the town from the north, thus interposing his forces between Shishakli and the Lebanese border. With Hagana’s homemade mortars in support, he stormed the city on the night of May 10-11, an operation that culminated in hand-to-hand fighting in the vaults of the ancient citadel. Almost simultaneously, other forces advanced north from the area east of the Gilboa Mountains to Bet Shean, which they took. The last northern city to fall was Acre; on May 17-18 it came under attack by a force that drove north some eight miles from Haifa. Here, however, the Arab population was not forced to flee, and once the first few chaotic days were over it was able to continue life in comparative security.
Thus, during a period of approximately five weeks, units belonging to several different Hagana brigades—the largest formation actually employed in any single operation seems to have been the battalion—cleared almost the entire northern part of the country, including the Valley of Esdraelon, Haifa, and upper Galilee (both east and west). Meanwhile around Tel Aviv other forces were planning to occupy Jaffa, the largest single Arab town in the country. During preparations they were forestalled by ETSEL units; the latter had hijacked a British train
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and helped themselves to mortars and ammunition. On April 25 they opened their attack and were joined by Hagana two days later. Known as “Operation Chamets (Leavened Bread),” it ended with the clearing of the entire area around Tel Aviv of Arab inhabitants. In the aftermath the largest British army camp in the country, built for 30,000 men and located at Sarafand, some ten miles east of Tel Aviv, was also taken under the noses of Arab Legionaries who had been sent to occupy it.
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and helped themselves to mortars and ammunition. On April 25 they opened their attack and were joined by Hagana two days later. Known as “Operation Chamets (Leavened Bread),” it ended with the clearing of the entire area around Tel Aviv of Arab inhabitants. In the aftermath the largest British army camp in the country, built for 30,000 men and located at Sarafand, some ten miles east of Tel Aviv, was also taken under the noses of Arab Legionaries who had been sent to occupy it.
By the middle of May, Jewish forces had occupied about one-third of the total area allocated to the Israeli state under the UN partition plan. Militarily the Palestinians had nearly ceased to exist. Following events at Dir Yassin and elsewhere, hundreds of thousands were already on their way to exile, whereas the rest could do little more than pray for assistance from outside. On May 13 even the road to the Negev was temporarily opened, though the forces that carried out the operation were promptly recalled to fight at Latrun, on the way to Jerusalem, thus opening the way to the Egyptian army, which was soon to advance from Gaza. Yet Hagana’s victories should not be allowed to hide the desperate nature of the struggle, as it made evident the loss of Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter and Gush Etsion, the near disaster at Mishmar Ha-emek, the tough fighting around Safed, and of course the large number of casualties. The casualties were in fact an indication of the troops’ determination to conquer or die. Nor was it by any means the end of the story. Instead, just when they had more or less overcome the Palestinians and their allies from the Arab Salvation Army, Israel faced the much more formidable challenge of invasion by armies of neighboring countries.
Repelling Invasion: half-track column, Golani Brigade, October 1948.
CHAPTER 6
REPELLING INVASION
T
HE INTERNAL AND external political events that led to the declaration of the Jewish state do not concern us here. Suffice it to say, although the British withdrawal had not yet been completed, the creation of the new state was formally announced by Ben Gurion in Tel Aviv on May 15, 1948. This announcement was followed promptly by a declaration of war on the part of the neighboring Arab countries of Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt. The Arab Legion was already taking part in the fighting in the area around Jerusalem. The rest now sent their armies into action.
HE INTERNAL AND external political events that led to the declaration of the Jewish state do not concern us here. Suffice it to say, although the British withdrawal had not yet been completed, the creation of the new state was formally announced by Ben Gurion in Tel Aviv on May 15, 1948. This announcement was followed promptly by a declaration of war on the part of the neighboring Arab countries of Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt. The Arab Legion was already taking part in the fighting in the area around Jerusalem. The rest now sent their armies into action.
The possibility, indeed probability, of having to fight not only the local Palestinian population but also the regular forces of the above-mentioned countries had preoccupied the leadership of the
Yishuv
for some years past.
1
According to information recorded in Ben Gurion’s diary, in mid-1947 the Arab states could muster a total of 160,000 men as well as four hundred tanks and armored cars.
2
However, by no means did all of these forces take part in the invasion of Palestine. Some Arab regimes, notably in Syria and Jordan, could not bring their full weight to bear owing to internal security concerns, a problem that, then and later, affected Israel only to a marginal extent. The geographical positions of Egypt and Iraq meant that they would have to operate their armies at the ends of long and, as it turned out, vulnerable lines of communication.
Yishuv
for some years past.
1
According to information recorded in Ben Gurion’s diary, in mid-1947 the Arab states could muster a total of 160,000 men as well as four hundred tanks and armored cars.
2
However, by no means did all of these forces take part in the invasion of Palestine. Some Arab regimes, notably in Syria and Jordan, could not bring their full weight to bear owing to internal security concerns, a problem that, then and later, affected Israel only to a marginal extent. The geographical positions of Egypt and Iraq meant that they would have to operate their armies at the ends of long and, as it turned out, vulnerable lines of communication.
In the event the invading forces were limited to approximately 30,000 men. The strongest single contingent was the Jordanian one, already described. Next came the Egyptians with 5,500 men, then the Iraqis with 4,500 who, as they deployed in the Nablus area, were joined by perhaps 3,000 local irregulars. The total was thus around eight rather understrength brigades, some of them definitely of second- and even third-rate quality. To these must be added approximately 2,000 Lebanese (one brigade) and 6,000 Syrians (three brigades).
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